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1. Introduction 
Trust is ubiquitous. As we move through our social world, numerous encounters with other 
people present an opportunity for us to realize and achieve the things we want in life. The 
success of some of these encounters depends only on our own effort, and whether or not we 
can attain our goals is our sole responsibility. But in many other cases, we must rely on others, 
and on their good-faith attempts to do what we ask. We need to let go and give in to the risks 
that come with interaction, because we simply cannot control the outcome. Others may not do 
what we would prefer them to, and, in thus acting, they may hinder the realization of our aims, 
or even harm us. At times, we are conscious of these risks. Things can go wrong, yet we feel 
assured and secure. We nevertheless decide to take the plunge into the unknown. In some cas-
es others disappoint us, and only then do we realize that we left ourselves vulnerable to the 
actions and decisions of others. This insight might come to us as a shock or surprise, and this 
shock brings home to our consciousness that we put ourselves into a position of vulnerability. 
Yet it never occurred to us to think of the risks involved in our interactions when we let go in 
the first place. 
Both type of outcome demonstrates what common sense tells us about trust—it is sometimes 
very difficult, and sometimes very easy for us to trust others, and in any case it is risky. A 
natural question to ask is the following: how is trust warranted in the first place? There has 
been a recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical studies exploring the role of trust in social 
processes. Fueled by remarkable findings on its economic impact, the increase in research ac-
tivity has sparked numerous attempts to advance our theoretical understanding of the concept 
of trust and its underlying mechanisms (even motivating the launch of the Journal of Trust 
Research as the first discipline-specific journal in 2011). Contributions originate from more 
traditional research fields, ranging from psychology and social psychology to sociology, polit-
ical science, economics, law, anthropology, biology, computer science, and neuroscience. Be-
ing an interdisciplinary endeavor par excellence, the accumulated contributions and literature 
are vast. The following section serves as a short introduction of the topic to the reader. It will 
highlight some major insights and point to the open questions in trust research.  
1.1. Achievements and Enduring Questions in Trust Research 
To structure the impressive amount of knowledge at hand, it is useful to classify trust research 
into three categories which constitute the predominant levels of analysis: (1) microanalyses, 
studying the interactive generation, maintenance, and disruption of trust at the individual lev-
el, (2) mesoanalyses, investigating the effects of trust in social environments at an aggregated 
level; for example in dyadic partnerships, in teams, in social networks, and in organizations, 
and (3) macroanalyses, exploring the impact of trust on the functioning of social systems and 
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society at large. The rise of trust as a “hot topic” in research reflects accumulating evidence of 
the substantial benefits that emerge on the micro, meso, and macro levels when trust is in 
place.  
With respect to macrolevel social systems, such as political or economic systems, trust is re-
garded as an indispensable ingredient in their smooth functioning, and in the successful circu-
lation of the underlying symbolic media of exchange (Misztal 1996). Trust in the reliability, 
effectiveness, and legitimacy of money, law, and other cultural symbols warrants their con-
stant reproduction in everyday interactions, and their aggregation into stable social structures. 
In essence, these modern social institutions would disappear if trust were absent (Lewis & 
Weigert 1985a, b). Concerning its influence on the political system and on democratic institu-
tions, researchers have repeatedly pointed to the significance of trust as a resource that inte-
grates and protects the underlying institutions. For example, Putnam (1993) argues that trust 
was a critical factor in the historic development of democratic regimes, with long-lasting ef-
fects reaching as far as present-day civic engagement.
1
 Likewise, Sztompka (1996) suggests 
that a lack of trust was a main barrier to the successful transformation of postcommunist soci-
eties into democratic market societies, maintaining that a vital “culture of trust” is a precondi-
tion for the functioning of democratic institutions. Higher levels of trust have been associated 
with more efficient judicial systems, higher-quality government bureaucracies, lower corrup-
tion, and greater financial development (La Porta et al. 1997, Guiso et al. 2004). The presence 
or absence of trust in society can have a macroeconomic impact. Empirically, several influen-
tial studies have shown that country-level trust, along with GDP and GDP growth, are posi-
tively correlated (Knack & Keefer 1997, Zak & Knack 2001). What is more, country-specific 
trust predicts bilateral trade volumes and crossnational investment decisions (Guiso et al. 
2004, 2009). It is no wonder that trust is regarded as an efficient mechanism governing trans-
actions (Arrow 1974, Bromiley & Cummings 1995), a sort of “ever-ready lubricant that per-
mits voluntary participation in production and exchange” (Dasgupta 1988: 49). 
In short, trust and other forms of social capital are regarded just as important as physical capi-
tal in facilitating the creation of large-scale business organizations necessary for economic 
growth and the functioning of markets (Fukuyama 1995). The above studies also suggest that 
trust is a vital factor for the emergence and reproduction of democratic institutional arrange-
ments, and has a critical impact on a society’s political environment, its stability, economic 
growth, and macroeconomic outcomes. 
                                                 
1 This hypothesis has been empirically scrutinized by Guiso et al. (2008), who show that historical differences between north 
and south Italy in the build-up of trust and social capital have translated into sizeable present-day differences in voter 
turnout, number of non-profit organizations, and per capita income. 
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Focusing on the mesolevel, organizational researchers have documented a substantial body of 
evidence revealing the stimulating effects of trust on team building and team performance, 
worker productivity and organizational commitment (e.g. Jones & George 1998, Dirks & Fer-
rin 2001, Kramer & Cook 2004). In addition, trust is related to diminished costs of interorgan-
izational negotiation and transaction, resulting in increased revenue and turnover (Williamson 
1993, Uzzi 1997, Zaheer & McEvily 1998). Regarding dyadic relationships, such as close 
partnerships (Rempel et al. 1985), consumer-seller relationships (Ganesan 1994, Bauer et al. 
2006), and patient-physician relationships (Anderson & Dedrick 1990, Thom & Campbell 
1997), trust promotes the build-up of long-term emotional attachment, the attribution of be-
nevolent motivations and intentions, and a reduction in uncertainty, thus securing the stability 
of the relationship in question (Williams 2001). Being “essential for stable relationships” 
(Blau 1964: 64), trust is a valuable resource for individuals because, once in place, it facili-
tates the attainment of desired outcomes and adds to the stock of available social capital (Burt 
2003). The social networks and the relations—that is, the embeddedness of actors in their so-
cial environments—constitute both a main opportunity and source of trust production (Grano-
vetter 1985, Buskens 1998).  
Considering trust on the microlevel, present or absent “within” the individual, it can be shown 
that individuals who report high levels of trust also report significantly higher levels of life 
satisfaction and happiness (DeNeve & Cooper 1998, Helliwell & Putnam 2004). It is no won-
der that trust is generally regarded as a state worth striving for (Rempel et al. 1985, Baier 
1986). It is a major factor in reducing the complexity of a contingent social life and stabilizing 
expectations in interactions (Luhmann 1979, 1988), and is sometimes said to be necessary 
even as a ground for the most routine behavior (Garfinkel 1963: 217). It enables individual 
cooperation, and thus promotes the further inclusion of actors into their social environment, 
leading to a relative advantage in comparison to low-trust types (Hardin 1993).  
The question of its individual generation, maintenance, and disruption has been a prime topic 
of research in psychology and social psychology for over 40 years. While early research fo-
cused on the individual determinants of trust in the development of stable personality traits, 
and the cognitions that trust-related attributes yielded (Rotter 1967, Erikson 1989), recent re-
search has increasingly focused on the cognitive processes involved, and on how they influ-
ence trust decisions. For instance, automatic processes may play a crucial role in the genera-
tion of trust, because salient situational features can trigger the use of trust-related heuristics 
and schemata (Hill & O’Hara 2006, Schul et al. 2008). Likewise, current mood influences 
judgments of trustworthiness (Forgas & East 2008), and humans often experience automatic 
emotional responses when recognizing faces and judging others’ trustworthiness (Winston et 
al. 2002, Eckel & Wilson 2003, Singer et al. 2004, Todorov et al. 2009). In one very recent 
development, neuroscience studies have helped researchers to understand the neural processes 
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involved in the generation of trust, showing that trusting behavior is triggered by the activa-
tion of specific areas in the brain (Adolphs 2002, Krueger et al. 2007), and can be substantial-
ly modulated by neuropeptides such as the hormone oxytocin (Kosfeld et al. 2005, Zak 2005, 
Baumgartner et al. 2008). Generally, researchers continue to add detail to the picture of the 
mechanisms that generate trust on the individual level, utilizing recent advancements in social 
psychology and neuroscience to improve theoretical models of trust. 
At the same time, the development of experimental tools for performing microlevel measure-
ments of trust (e.g. the “trust game,” Camerer & Weigelt 1988, Dasgupta 1988, Kreps 1990, 
and the “investment game,” Berg et al. 1995) has enabled researchers to scrutinize the impact 
of different social institutions on the generation of trust. For instance, communication, which 
has long been recognized as a booster of cooperation (Isaac & Walker 1988, Sally 1995), 
clearly helps to promote trust (Bicchieri 2002, Charness & Dufwenberg 2006). There is con-
sistent evidence that formal institutions, such as contracts and agreements, tend to “crowd 
out” intrinsically motivated trusting behavior (Malhotra & Murnighan 2002, Bohnet & Bay-
telman 2007, Ben-Ner & Putterman 2009), especially if they are related to punishment oppor-
tunities, or otherwise costly. Although first and third party punishment opportunities are effec-
tive in the generation of efficient outcomes (Fehr & Gächter 2000a), they prevent the build-up 
of mutual trust, and cooperation fails to extend to later stages of the game if these institutions 
cease to exist. On the other hand, a “favorable” social history and a corresponding positive 
reputation clearly foster the build-up of trust (Bohnet & Huck 2004, Bohnet et al. 2005). 
Likewise, the creation of a shared group identity (Eckel & Grossman 2005, Brewer 2008) and 
a decrease in social distance (Buchan et al. 2006) result in increased levels of mutual trust. 
Despite the progress that experimental research presents with respect to the influence of insti-
tutional arrangements on trust, these results also demonstrate the fragility of trust, proving that 
even minor changes in social and institutional environments may have dramatic changes on 
the levels of trust generated. Accordingly, a main conclusion that can be drawn from the ex-
perimental evidence is that context is critical to understanding trust (Hardin 2003, Ostrom 
2003). 
However, the accumulation of empirical evidence about individual decisions in social dilem-
mas such as the trust game has not been accompanied by equivalent progress in the develop-
ment of integrative theoretical frameworks, theories, and models that would combine 
knowledge across disciplines (Bigley & Pearce 1998, Ostrom 2003). Despite the fact that trust 
research is flourishing, and many inspiring results have been uncovered, it has become almost 
a truism that a universally accepted scholarly definition of trust does not exist, just as no gen-
eral paradigm of trust research has emerged (Lewis & Weigert 1985b, Mayer et al. 1995, 
Rousseau et al. 1998, Kramer 1999, Hardin 2002).  
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The universality and the complexity inherent in the concept can certainly be regarded as the 
main problem of the research (Kassebaum 2004). Since even in everyday language its mean-
ing is multifaceted and diverse, the subsequent academic definition of and operationalization 
of trust is severely hampered. The concept of trust is used in a variety of distinct ways, which 
sometimes appear to be incompatible. For instance, definitions differ by the level of analysis, 
and vary with the causal role that trust is assumed to play (cause, effect, or interaction). They 
change with the specific context that is being analyzed, and collide when trust is viewed as 
static or dynamic, or conceived of as either a unidimensional or multidimensional phenome-
non. In addition, trust may be confused with other concepts, antecedents, and outcomes, such 
as risk, other-regarding preferences, and cooperation (Mayer et al. 1995, McKnight & Cher-
vany 2000, 2001).  
The conceptual diversity of the literature on trust is mirrored in the many attempts that have 
been made to organize the vast interdisciplinary research (Lewicki & Bunker 1995b, a, Bigley 
& Pearce 1998, Rousseau et al. 1998, Kramer 1999). For example, Sitkin and Roth (1993) 
collect work on trust into four basic categories: (1) trust as an individual attribute, (2) trust as 
a behavior, (3) trust as a situational feature, and (4) trust as an institutional arrangement. 
Bigley and Pierce (1998) advocate a “problem-centered” approach, distinguishing between 
research accounts that focus on (1) interactions among unfamiliar actors, (2) interactions 
among familiar actors in ongoing relationships, and (3) the organization of economic transac-
tions in general. While these approaches cut across disciplinary borders, trust research is often 
regarded as segregated into several traditions, which although identical on the level of observ-
able behavior, make differential assumptions concerning the underlying mechanisms and 
causal elements of trust (Lewis & Weigert 1985b). Kramer (1999) contrasts the “behavioral” 
tradition, which principally regards trust as rational choice, to the “psychological” tradition, 
which attempts to understand the more complex intrapersonal states associated with trust, in-
cluding a merging of expectations, affect, and dispositions. Lewicki and Bunker (1995a) dif-
ferentiate a purely “psychological” tradition, which focuses on individual personality differ-
ences, from the “institutional” approach taken by economists and sociologists, and from the 
“social-psychological” approach, which focuses on the interpersonal transactions between in-
dividuals that generate or disrupt trust.  
Conceptual dissent can even arise within the different paradigms of trust research. For in-
stance, psychological accounts of trust usually focus on either affective or cognitive processes 
(Kassebaum 2004: 8). In economics, those accounts of trust that support a strong self-interest 
hypothesis (Gambetta 1988a, Coleman 1990) have been challenged by models of social pref-
erences and a “wide” rational choice approach (see Fehr & Schmidt 2006). The result is a 
multitude of possible solutions for the rational explanation of trust-related phenomena. It is 
not surprising that a number of typologies which postulate different varieties and “types” of 
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trust have emerged; often limited to specific domains and research paradigms. For example, 
specific versus generalized trust (Rotter 1971, 1980), cognition-based versus affect-based trust 
(McAllister 1995), calculus, knowledge, and identification based trust (Lewicki & Bunker 
1995b), and dispositional, history, category, role, and rule based trust (Kramer 1999), to name 
a few. In sum, “social science research on trust has produced a good deal of conceptual confu-
sion regarding the meaning of trust and its place in social life” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 975), 
while the development of integrative theoretical frameworks has remained elusive. Historical-
ly, trust definitions have become “homonymous,” preventing theoretical formulations and 
empirical results from becoming comparable and accumulating (McKnight & Chervany 
1996). 
In an attempt to reconcile this conceptual diversity, Kramer (1999: 574) argues that the pres-
ence of diverging notions of trust does not necessarily reflect insurmountable differences be-
tween incompatible models (i.e. that trust is either calculative or affective or role-based, etc.). 
Instead, a suitable theoretical framework must admit the influence of social and situational 
factors on the impact of instrumental and noninstrumental factors, and also articulate how the-
se factors exert their influence on the decision-making process. From this perspective, future 
conceptualizations of trust need to integrate microlevel psychological phenomena with me-
solevel group dynamics and macrolevel institutional arrangements. The interplay of individu-
al, situational, and structural parameters and the impact of context in the development of trust 
have become a prime concern for research. Contributions that explicitly relate the generation 
of trust to internal dispositions and mental states, as well as to external cues and the socially 
structured and socially constructed environment (e.g. McKnight et al. 1998, Kramer 2006, 
Nooteboom 2007, Schul et al. 2008) have shifted the scholarly focus from the question “What 
is trust?” to the more preferable question of “Which trust, and when?”  
1.2. Aim and Structure of this Work 
This question is the starting point for the present study. While trust research appears to be 
fragmented and theoretically unintegrated, I want to show that this state of affairs has its roots 
in the neglect of several fundamental ingredients to trust which have not been sufficiently in-
corporated into the current theoretical frameworks. In emphasizing and approaching these 
fundamentals, the goal of the book is to equip trust research with a broad and general perspec-
tive on the phenomenon in which the conflicting perspectives and diverging types that have 
been previously developed can be smoothly integrated and reductively explained under a 
common umbrella. In short, I argue that current trust research has not sufficiently taken care 
of individual level adaptive rationality; it has furthermore failed to explicate the role of inter-
pretation and the subjective definition of the situation in shaping a flexible adjustment of in-
formation processing states to the current needs of the social situation. I propose that an inte-
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gration of existing trust research can be achieved along the dimension of adaptive rationality. 
However, this necessitates going beyond the descriptive work of creating “yet another” typol-
ogy and merely sorting what has been already known. The final destination is causal explana-
tion. 
This ambition springs from the scientific approach I advocate here, which has been commonly 
indicated by the label of “methodological individualism” (Popper 1945, Elster 1982) and “an-
alytical sociology” (Hedström & Swedberg 1996, 1998). In the framework of this approach, 
sociological explanations of collective phenomena are qualified by their focus on the, often 
unintended, consequences of individual actions which are restricted by structural, normative 
and cultural constraints and opportunities that are imposed by the social system in which the 
collective phenomenon emerges (Coleman 1990, Esser 1993b, 1999b). The explanative 
scheme, that is, the logic and structure of an analytical sociological explanation, requires that 
three steps be made explicit in order to understand and reductively explain a collective phe-
nomenon: (1) a macro-to-micro transition, defining how the environment into which actors are 
embedded influences and restricts individual action, (2) a micro theory of action, specifying 
the principles by which individual actions and decisions are reached, and (3) a micro-to-macro 
transition, defining how a set of individual actions combine to produce a collective outcome. 
The combination of these three steps provides the core of any analytical nomological explana-
tion of a collective phenomenon (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948). The present work sets out to 
show how the collective phenomenon of a dyadic trust relation can be analytically explained. 
It focuses on the phenomenon of interpersonal trust. 
To this end, chapter 2 introduces the reader to the concept of trust, as defined in current trust 
research. The methodological device and guiding scheme to structure the review is a distinc-
tion between the objective structure and subjective experience of trust. This differentiation on 
the level of conceptual, empirical and theoretical description needs to be constantly observed 
when thinking about trust, because—as will become apparent by the end of chapter 2—an in-
sufficient distinction between the two levels often leads to fuzzy definitions which miss preci-
sion and definitional power. Put sharply, I argue that the conversion from structure to experi-
ence (the transition from macro to micro) presents a missing link in trust research. Authors 
focus and combine different aspects of objective structure and subjective experience when 
defining the concept. The crucial ingredients towards linking objective structure and subjec-
tive experience—interpretation and the subjective definition of the situation—are often taken 
for granted, or dealt with only implicitly. By focusing research on the process of interpreta-
tion, this work seeks to contribute to the advancement of a situated cognition perspective of 
trust. The second chapter can be understood as an invitation to think about the necessary mac-
ro-micro link in our explanations of trust, and as an appeal for a focus on the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in doing so on the level of the individual actor.  
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Chapter 3 continues with presenting current perspectives about the origins and explanations of 
trust. I review the different approaches to explaining trust in the psychological, sociological 
and economic disciplines. In doing so, the focus is not on emphasizing conflicts, differences 
and incompatibility. The basic principle in developing a broad interdisciplinary perspective is 
to look for the commonality, mutuality and similarity in existing research; to carve out the un-
derlying theoretical and conceptual grounds on which a unifying theoretical framework for 
trust research can emerge. The chapter ends with a discussion and presentation of the main 
theoretical concern of the present work: the complex relation between trust and rationality. 
Simply put, I argue that the neglect of the dimension of rationality in the trust concept is a 
main barrier to the theoretical integration of existing research. While the economic paradigm 
assumes the capability of actors to engage in a rational, instrumental maximization of utility, 
sociological and psychological approaches often emphasize that trust can be nonrational and 
blind. Actors apply the relevant knowledge or follow cultural and normative patterns automat-
ically, based on taken-for-granted expectations and structural assurance. Some portray trust as 
being based on simple heuristic processes, substituting the ideal of rational choice with a “log-
ic of appropriateness,” in which the adaptive use of rules, roles, and routines helps to establish 
a shortcut to trust. The discussion of the relation between trust and rationality suggests that we 
have to turn to other theoretical paradigms which incorporate the individual actor’s degree of 
rationality as a fundamental ingredient. Consequentially, we will have to think about the me-
chanics of adaptive rationality, link it to interpretation and choice, and simultaneously main-
tain a clear and formally tractable model. 
This task is picked up in chapter 4, which is wholly devoted to analyzing the different “routes 
to trust” that can be imagined when adopting the adaptive rationality perspective. It pinpoints 
how trustors can reach the behavioral outcome of a trusting act on different cognitive routes, 
linking them to different information processing states of the cognitive system. The dual-
processing paradigm of social cognition will be an important resource in developing and ad-
vancing this perspective of trust. Ultimately, adopting this perspective of trust and adaptive 
rationality helps to resolve the enduring tensions between rational and automatic, cognitive 
and affective, conditional and unconditional types of trust. At the same time, it will become 
apparent that, in order to understand and explain adaptive rationality, we have to think about 
our micro theory of action, which defines and dictates how we can establish both the macro-
micro and the micro-micro transition in our logic of explanation. With respect to the dual-
processing paradigm, a number of factors limit its utility as an explanative vehicle in a deduc-
tive nomological explanation of trust. Most importantly, it does neither provide a causal link 
between interpretation and choice, nor spell out a formally precise model which can be used 
to guide the theoretical and empirical analysis of the trust phenomenon. This is a hindrance if 
the context-sensitive adjustment of rationality is assumed to be a crucial factor in determining 
the types of trust and the resulting subjective experiences.  
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I continue by introducing the “Model of Frame Selection” (MFS), a general sociological theo-
ry of action that incorporates both the aspects of a social definition of the situation and the 
idea of human adaptive rationality at the same time (see Esser 1990, 1991, 2001, Kroneberg 
2006a, Esser 2009, 2010, Kroneberg 2011a). The MFS explicates how adaptive rationality can 
be formally grasped and linked to a causal explanation of action. In using the MFS to explain 
both conditional and unconditional types of trust, I develop a broad perspective and an inte-
grative approach to the phenomenon. As stated before, adaptive rationality must be regarded 
as a key dimension of the trust concept. Moreover, the degree of rationality involved in inter-
pretation and choice can dynamically change, it is not fixed. Thus, automatic or rational pro-
cesses can prevail during the definition of the situation and the choice of action. The broad 
perspective of trust helps to integrate contradictive accounts of trust. It suggests that trust re-
searchers have historically focused on different aspects of cognitive activity (interpretation or 
choice), assuming different processing modes (rational or automatic) when theorizing about a 
particular solution of a trust problem. The chapter closes with the development of a theoretical 
model that describes the mode-selection thresholds governing the adjustment of rationality 
during interpretation and choice in a trust problem. 
While chapter 4 is exclusively related to developing and advancing an individual-level micro 
theory of action which can be used as a nomological core for an analytical explanation of 
trust, chapter 5 directs the reader´s attention towards the micro-macro transition which com-
pletes the last step in the logic of explanation. I scrutinize the emergence of a dyadic trust re-
lation from an interactive and dynamic perspective in which the interpretations of the parties 
temporary converge into a shared social definition of the situation. This natural leads to adopt-
ing a perspective of reflexive structuration that draws heavily from a symbolic-interactionist 
interpretation of the trust phenomenon. I argue that trust is a dynamic and mutual achievement 
of the actors involved; it depends on active relational communication, identity signaling and 
impression management. These individual accomplishments serve as a basis for interpretation 
and choice because they provide the situational cues that govern information processing and 
trigger the activation of trust-related knowledge. Chapter 5 delineates how the trust relation, 
as a social system, is actively constituted by the actors involved. Far from being a passive 
achievement, interpretation and the subjective definition of the situation are normally reached 
in symbolic interaction with others, and rely on a dynamic process of communication. This 
also implies that the context of the trust relation cannot be static, but is highly dynamic, and 
endogenously shaped by the actors involved. In analyzing this last step of aggregation, the 
fifth chapter completes the logic of explanation of the trust phenomenon. 
Overall, the theoretical part of the thesis aims at demonstrating and substantiating that a broad 
and integrative perspective of trust can be developed under the headnote of adaptive rationali-
ty. The modeling of the underlying general processes joins individual and social, situational 
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and structural factors. It allows for a causal reductive explanation of trust and an integration of 
the existing, but conflicting, perspectives within trust research. The explication of two missing 
links is necessary to establish such a framework: (1) a focus and explication of individual 
adaptive rationality and (2) a clarification of the role of interpretation and the definition of the 
situation in the trust development process. In combination, I argue, these ingredients allow for 
a solid explanation of different types of trust and critically advance our understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
In chapter 6, the perspective of trust and adaptive rationality will be put to an empirical test. 
This test is has a twofold aim: for one, it is designed to gauge the adequacy of an adaptive ra-
tionality perspective in trust research from a general standpoint. The framing perspective of 
trust, as it will be developed in this work, is novel in that it merges psychological ideas of 
flexible information processing, “situated cognition,” and a contingent use of different trusting 
strategies in trust problems with sociological ideas of a cultural definition of the situation and 
adaptive rationality. But in going beyond previous research, it specifies the causal mecha-
nisms behind these concepts as well.  The reported experiment joins them in the spotlight of 
empirical scrutiny. The general course of action is to operationalize and manipulate those var-
iables which define and influence adaptive rationality. In turn, this provides a causal test of 
the hypotheses addressing the explanation of conditional and unconditional trust. The experi-
ment uses the setting of an “investment game” (Berg et al. 1995). It extends this set-up with 
manipulations of (1) the presented context and (2) the monetary incentives, that is, “what is at 
stake” for the trustor. Both factors are predicted to influence the amount of rationality in-
volved in the choice of a trusting act. Moreover, the model predicts that the internalization of 
trust-related knowledge shapes how these experimental factors influence trust. Overall, it 
points to the interactive nature of the determinants of adaptive rationality. These interactive 
effects and their predicted signs are one of the main concerns of the present empirical study. 
While the hypotheses are certainly more prone to falsification, they also portray the high em-
pirical content of the presented theory, and go beyond the statement of simple main effects. 
1.3. Summary of Empirical Results 
The development of the empirical test requires deriving hypotheses which predict the sign of 
the expected statistical effects (see chapter 6.3 for details). The MFS carries a very important 
general message: a number of determinants, such as cognitive motivation, chronic and tempo-
rary accessibility, or the presence of relevant situational cues, influence the degree of rational-
ity involved in interpretation and choice. However, their effect can only be analyzed jointly, 
and, depending on the concrete value of another determinant, one factor may or may not be-
come important in a particular trust problem. As will be demonstrated, the model of trust and 
adaptive rationality, in conjunction with a set of experiment-specific auxiliary hypotheses, can 
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be used to derive a closed set of admissible interaction patterns that are predicted to emerge 
in a statistical model when analyzing the experimental data. These patterns are a specific fea-
ture and consequence of the adaptive rationality perspective. Their prediction attests to the 
high informational value and empirical content of the theoretical model, and they carry a 
number of important propositions about the trust development process. 
Principally, the model suggests that trustors need not always be rational and rely on a con-
trolled processing of information when defining a trust problem and making a choice. Instead, 
if favorable conditions prevail, interpretation and choice may unfold rather automatically, 
guided by a “logic of appropriateness,” in which a number of shortcuts to trust can be used. 
Trust then may be based on feelings, on heuristic shortcuts, or on an unconditional execution 
of social norms, roles, routines, and all sorts of trust-related scripts. The MFS suggests that 
automatic action selection is most likely if actors have strongly internalized a corresponding 
script, and if the social situation points to its appropriateness and applicability, that is, if 
knowledge and situation “match” with each other. In this circumstance, actors may follow a 
script and maintain an unreflected routine even if the potential costs of an error and a wrong 
decision are very high.  
One of the most noteworthy empirical results is the finding of such an interaction between in-
centives, the internalization of trust-related knowledge, and the context in solving a trust prob-
lem. I argue that previous studies of monetary incentive and stake size effects have not con-
trolled for the factor of chronic frame and script accessibility, which is an important mediator 
of cognitive motivation in the model of adaptive rationality. In line with the predictions gen-
erated here, I can show that the degree of rationality involved in trust highly depends on the 
internalization of trust-related scripts (i.e. the norm of reciprocity). The degree of norm inter-
nalization counterbalances the negative effects of monetary incentives on trust, which, if left 
unchecked, would push trustors towards a rational and controlled consideration of the trust 
problem. In other words, trustors who have strongly internalized a trust-related script may be 
“less rational” and chose unconditional trusting strategies more often than those who have no 
access to a corresponding script. Similarly, I find that the context influences trust and the de-
gree of rationality involved: if cues suggest the validity of trust-related frames and scripts, 
then trustors readily use this information during the choice of a trusting act. In short, a coop-
erative context can be sufficient in suppressing incentive effects as well. This also means that 
incentives and context do interact on a basic level, a finding that is important insofar as previ-
ous experimental studies have usually assumed their independence. 
In addition, the analysis of recorded decision times reveals an overall coherent picture. That 
is, the predicted interaction patterns which I derive from the model match over the domain of 
two different dependent variables. This result is most noteworthy in itself; it lends strong sup-
port to the adequacy of the adaptive rationality perspective on trust, and the MFS in general. 
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For example, a high degree of norm internalization leads to a decrease in decision times. This 
indicates a shift to more automatic processing of information, and the prevalence of uncondi-
tional trusting strategies, for those trustors who have internalized trust-related norms. Moreo-
ver, if much is at stake and the situation involves potentially high costs of error, this increases 
decision times, indicating a shift to more conditional trusting strategies. But importantly, the 
second effect is mediated by chronic script accessibility, and it disappears with high norm in-
ternalization. Moreover, decision times decrease in a cooperative context, indicating a shift 
towards unconditional trusting strategies. I find that this effect depends on, and is mediated 
by, the accessibility of trust-related knowledge. At the same time, I show that decision times 
in the context of the trust problem are also strongly dependent on context free processing 
preferences, as measured and controlled for in the form of “faith in intuition” and “need for 
cognition” (Epstein et al. 1996). This is a remarkable finding for trust research, as it helps to 
clarify the looming tension between intuitive and rational approaches to trust, which are an 
ever-present facet of theorizing. The current data support a perspective in which individual 
differences in processing preferences shape the mode-selection threshold over and above the 
influence of situational and social factors and determine the resulting trusting strategies and 
the resulting type of trust. 
Taking things together, the empirical test shows that two different behavioral indicators of 
conditional and unconditional trusting strategies (that is, observed levels of trust and corre-
sponding decision times) can be explained with the help of one general theoretical model. The 
discovery of matching patterns and their similarity over the domain of two different dependent 
variables strongly prompts to the adequacy and validity of the adaptive rationality perspective 
of trust. The chapter ends with a discussion of the study´s limitations, potential caveats and 
unresolved questions.  
Chapter 7 presents a synthesis of the proposed theoretical and empirical framework that was 
developed in this thesis. It delineates the broad perspective on trust, summarizing the main 
conclusions and propositions, the benefits and pending problems in adopting this integrative 
perspective, and it re-connects the current work to the broader research agendas of social sci-
ence. I consider the perspective of trust and adaptive rationality to be a most useful guide for 
our study of the trust phenomenon because it directs our attention towards the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in suspension and the “leap of faith,” but it tackles them in a reductive logic 
by pointing to the underlying general cognitive processes. It also reminds us that a successful 
explanation must go beyond the creation of typologies and descriptive work, and instead mas-
ter the difficult requirement of causal modeling, to which the present work seeks to provide a 
starting ground. The thesis ends with a discussion of open questions and avenues for future 
trust research.  
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2. The Concept of Trust 
 “ ... trust is a term with many meanings” (Williamson 1993: 453). 
To begin a scientific conceptualization of trust, we can ask, “What does the term to trust real-
ly mean?” In answering this question, we reveal the term’s diverse and equivocal use in ver-
nacular language. We may “trust” other people with respect to their future actions, or “trust” 
organizations with respect to the promised quality of their products. We “trust” a doctor when 
we see her to cure us, as well as with respect to her abilities and intentions to heal us. When 
driving in traffic, we “trust” others to abide by the rules, just as we do. Some people “trust” 
the government, while others only “trust” in god or in themselves. Obviously, in each exam-
ple, the term “to trust” refers to a different situation and to a different object, and connotes a 
different meaning. In fact, it is impossible to uncover a consistent and universal notion of trust 
based on the everyday usage of the term (McKnight & Chervany 1996). Some researchers ar-
gue that the analysis of ordinary language is a futile tool in trust research, not only because it 
cannot promote one meaning of “trust” above all other candidates, but also because the use of 
the term—and even its very existence—varies greatly between different languages (Hardin 
2002: 58). On the other hand, if scientific definitions are too distant from their everyday coun-
terparts, they run the danger of missing important dimensions of the concept under scrutiny, 
and such definitions should therefore be informed by common-sense understanding (Kelley 
1992). This is especially true for the concept of trust, which has a breadth of meaning in eve-
ryday life.  
Unsurprisingly, trust researchers commonly relate scientific conceptualizations of trust to their 
everyday counterparts, for example by comparing dictionary and scientific definitions (Barber 
1983, McKnight & Chervany 1996), by explicitly assessing lay theories of trust and individu-
al-qualitative experiences (Henslin 1968, Gabarro 1978, Kramer 1996, Weber & Carter 2003), 
and by analyzing the meaning of the term in everyday language (Baier 1986, Lahno 2002). 
Most importantly, these studies suggest that trust must be conceived of as a multidimensional 
concept which (1) develops only under certain structural conditions and (2) merges different 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions into a unitary social experience (Lewis & 
Weigert 1985b, Rempel et al. 1985, McAllister 1995). We will therefore organize our intro-
ductory study of the concept along these two fundamental ingredients of trust: the objective 
structure and the subjective experience of trust. As it turns out, this course of action is most 
helpful in delineating the core problems and contradictions that mark the current state of trust 
research. 
To begin with, a reasonable level of consensus exists on the structural prerequisites which 
form the set of conditions necessary for trust to arise (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). We will re-
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fer to these as the objective structure of trust. Most importantly, the situation must involve a 
risk which stems from the trusting parties’ uncertainty about the preferences of the trusted 
party. Secondly, the situation must be marked by social interdependence, meaning that the 
interests of one party cannot be achieved without reliance on another party. As a corollary, the 
trusting party will have to transfer control over certain resources or events to the trusted party 
(Coleman 1990) and thereby become objectively vulnerable (Heimer 2001). Lastly, trust has 
to be future-oriented, in the sense that the outcome of trust cannot readily be observed, but 
will be determined at a more or less specified point of time in the future (Luhmann 1988).  
In contrast, the subjective experience of trust—that is, the internal mental state associated with 
trust—seems to be one prime reason for the “confusing potpourri” (Shapiro 1987: 625) of 
trust definitions in the literature. Although there appears to be a substantial consensus on de-
fining trust primarily as a mental state, there is much less agreement when it comes to the pre-
cise definition thereof. The propositions that have been offered by researchers are contradicto-
ry (Bigley & Pearce 1998). In a crossdisciplinary review of 60 articles on trust, McKnight and 
Chervany (1996) find that 50% of scientific definitions include cognitive elements, such as 
expectations, beliefs, and intentions, while 37% include affective elements, such as feelings of 
confidence and security. Almost all relate trust to some form of action. About 60% of all defi-
nitions locate trust on more than one dimension. What is more, some authors conceive of trust 
of as a state that is explicitly not perceived until it is broken, as something “non-cognitive” 
(Becker 1996), related to aspects of automatic decision making (Hill & O’Hara 2006, Schul et 
al. 2008) and preconscious processes which shape perception (Zucker 1986, Luhmann 2000, 
Lahno 2002). In a nutshell, while trust has clear structural antecedents, its subjective experi-
ence is a source of disagreement among trust researchers, because different experiential phe-
nomena come into focus. As a result, the acknowledged phenomenology of trust and its result-
ing definition differ remarkably between research traditions and disciplines. 
This poses a challenge to the development of a comprehensive theory. If the phenomeno-
logical foundation of trust is variable, then it is no surprise that its subsequent conceptuali-
zation and definition remain contradictory. Different authors focus on different phenomeno-
logical aspects of the same explanandum. As a consequence, trust definitions have historically 
become too narrow and “homonymous,” preventing theoretical formulations and empirical 
results from becoming comparable and accumulating (McKnight & Chervany 1996). Alt-
hough everyday language cannot provide a unitary precise definition, it does help trust re-
searchers to sharpen their conceptualizations, because it suggests how the phenomenology of 
trust should be conceived of. As it is, analysis of ordinary language indicates that the subjec-
tive experience of trust is in fact multifaceted (for example, consider the use of the term in 
idioms such as “I trusted you blindly!” versus “Trust, but verify!”). Ultimately, in moving to-
wards a broad theoretical framework, we will have to absorb this wide phenomenological 
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foundation of trust, and to explain when and why the subjective experience of trust differs so 
vastly between situations, as well as which factors (internal and external) promote, constrain, 
and shape the subjective experience of trust.  
The following chapter presents a comprehensive review of the core concepts of trust research. 
Moving from objective structure to subjective experience, the “ingredients” of trust are sys-
tematically explored, thereby also revealing the challenging diversity in the trust definitions 
present in the literature. Even though the amount of research reviewed may initially appear 
confusing and contradictory, this exercise is nonetheless most rewarding, as it enables the 
general lines of conflict, the stumbling blocks, and bones of contention in trust research to be 
carved out. The chapter includes a delineation of the conceptual boundaries between trust and 
related concepts, such as confidence, system trust, distrust, and the like. As it is, the concept 
of trust is often used only in conjunction with a host of related concepts. Some of these are 
antecedents to trust; others only seem to be related, and are frequently confused with trust. 
The discussion of the conceptual boundaries completes the introduction of the trust concept, 
and rounds up the terminology that will be used throughout the book. The chapter closes with 
a discussion of the relation between objective structure and subjective experience. It is argued 
that a prime reason for the diversity and contradictions among trust definitions is rooted in the 
fact that trust researchers rarely pay attention to the process of interpretation—the subjective 
definition of the situation—and how it relates to the objective structure of the trust problem. 
The central question that this chapter opens up is, “how does the objective structure of the 
trust problem translate into the subjective experience of trust?” 
2.1. Objective Structure 
2.1.1. Constituents of Interpersonal Trust Relations 
Trust is a phenomenon that we usually ascribe to other persons or to ourselves, but not to 
“things” or inanimate objects. Although we have not yet dealt with the question of the subjec-
tive experience of trust, it is clear that we can always find ex post reasons which have moti-
vated a trusting act, even if that trust was misplaced. In other words, individual and purposeful 
actors are the primary subjects of trust. This raises the question of whether collective actors 
can be a subject of trust as well. The “US government” might trust the “North Korean Re-
gime” with respect to nuclear policies, for example. We could even extend the concept to in-
clude collective “trust systems” (Coleman 1990) and the variations of collective action they 
enable. As Coleman notes, “the analysis of these phenomena requires going beyond the two- 
or three-actor systems, but it can be done through the use of these components as building 
blocks” (ibid. 188). The analysis of collective actors, collective trust systems and collective 
action is, however, beyond the scope of this book. The present work seeks to conceptualize 
and understand trust as an outcome of individual framing and decision-making processes. If 
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trust is conceived of as a mental phenomenon, then the individual microlevel represents its 
sole level of emergence. Hence, the concept will be limited to individual actors and their dy-
adic relations in the following. As a subject of trust, these actors will be called trustors. 
Trust generally denotes a special relation between two actors, but it can additionally refer to a 
relation between a trustor and other groups, organizations, or more abstract social institutions. 
Other actors, groups, organizations, institutions, and the like are examples of primary objects 
of trust. Many researchers have developed ideal-type trust classifications to refine these basic 
distinctions, for example by varying the degrees of social distance and generalization of the 
objects of trust (Bigley & Pearce 1998, Sztompka 1999). But given the broad experiential ba-
sis that trust can assume, any attempt to identify, classify, and validate various ideal-type ob-
jects of trust must remain incomplete and arbitrary (Möllering 2001). The case of interper-
sonal trust between two actors can nevertheless be regarded as a prototypical case. Dyadic 
trust relations form the micro social building blocks of larger systems of trust—this makes 
their comprehension a premise for understanding a wide range of social phenomena, including 
social integration at large. Focusing on these building blocks, the concept of trust will in the 
following be limited to a relation between two individual actors. Trust in groups and collec-
tive actors, in more abstract institutions (such as expert knowledge systems), and trust in the 
political or economic system as a whole will not be subject to detailed analysis. These types of 
trust will be delimited from the concept of interpersonal trust under the rubric of “system 
trust.” They are relevant insofar as they can become the basis for certain types of interpersonal 
trust that use system trust as a starting point (a topic which will be more fully explored in 
chapter 3.2). 
The special relation between two actors to which trust refers will be called a trust relation. Its 
emergence is the prime explanandum of this work. Trust relations are always a three-part rela-
tion in the form of “A trusts B with respect to X” (Hardin 2002: 9). In a trust relation, the se-
cond actor B—the object of trust—will be called the trustee. The item X is called the content 
of the trust relation. Trustor, trustee, and the content of the trust relation are the main constit-
uents of interpersonal trust relations. Note that, for the moment, we restrict the trust relation to 
a one-way relation. The notion of trust is often connected to the idea of a situation of mutual 
trust and iterated exchange. These are aspects of “social embeddedness” and of corresponding 
two-way trust relations in a social environment, which will be introduced later. Interpersonal 
trust, even when it is conceptualized as a psychological state of the trustor, is always relational 
and social in the sense that the trust relation necessarily extends to the dyad and “transcends” 
the boundaries of the individual (Lewis & Weigert 1985b).  
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2.1.2. The Basic Trust Problem 
The emergence of a trust relation is contingent upon certain structural prerequisites which 
confront the trustor with a particular decision-making problem, when he has to decide whether 
or not to trust. In the basic trust problem, a trustor faces two different sets of actions:  
(1) Actions from the first set make him vulnerable with respect to the actions of the trustee. 
The trustor transfers control over resources or events to the trustee, and the trustee’s future 
actions determine whether the trustor will experience a loss or a gain. While making his deci-
sion, the trustor cannot foretell with certainty how the trustee will decide, and he cannot rely 
on sanctions or any other form of external enforcement to induce the desired outcome.  
(2) In contrast, actions from the second set allow the trustor to eliminate potential damage, 
with certainty and from the beginning. In this case, the trustor does not put himself into a posi-
tion where the trustee can determine the loss or gain. By refraining from a transfer of re-
sources or control, the trustor is not taking a risk, and he prevents getting into a vulnerable 
position; he can maintain the status quo with certainty.  
If a trustor chooses actions from the first set, we say that “A trusts B,” and the observable ac-
tion will be called a trusting act. The choice of a trusting act constitutes the trust relation be-
tween the actors. If A chooses actions from the second set, then “A distrusts B,” and the ob-
servable action is distrust.  
It is now possible to spell out more precisely the content X of a trust relation: If “A trusts B 
with respect to X,” then all classes of actions which (1) do not harm A, and (2) serve to realize 
the prospective gain and utility increase for A, belong to the content of the trust relation X. If 
B chooses his actions accordingly, he is trustworthy, he fulfills A’s trust, or he honors A’s 
trust. Note that a trustworthy response often leaves some “latitude of judgment” to the trustee. 
That is, the content X may be very specific, and may demand a unique course of action, or it 
may be more general, defining the desired outcome state, but not the precise actions necessary 
to achieve it. Mutual gains can be achieved through trust and trustworthy response, but there 
are also incentives for the trustee to choose the untrustworthy option and to fail A’s trust 
(Messick & Kramer 2001: 91). Principally, a trustworthy response requires some form of ef-
fort (time, energy, or other resources) and thus has a cost to the trustee which he can save by 
simply not fulfilling the content of the trust relation. Deutsch (1958) emphasizes that trustwor-
thiness implies that the trustee will fulfill the content of the trust relation, even if violating 
trust is more immediately advantageous. The interests of the trustor are violated if the trustee 
disregards the content of the trust relation. In that case, “B fails A’s trust” and violates the 
trust relation. Coleman emphasizes that a breach of trust must put the trustor in a worse situa-
tion than if he had not trusted (Coleman 1990: 98f.). The following picture summarizes the 
basic trust problem (figure 1): 
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Figure 1: The basic trust problem 
 
In this case, the status quo payoffs are zero for both actors, the successful establishment of a 
trust relation yields payoffs (1|1), respectively. A failure of trust puts the trustor into a worse 
position as compared to status quo, while the trustee experiences some gain that puts him in a 
better position than a trustworthy response. To conclude, the trustor has to decide whether to 
trust the trustee with respect to X. The content of the trust relation comprises all actions which 
improve A’s utility with respect to the status quo and “realize” the content of the trust relation. 
These prospective gains present a basic motivation to engage in the trust relation. However, 
the transfer of control over resources or events involves the risk of incurring a loss if the trus-
tee disregards the content of the trust relation and fails A’s trust. These prospective losses pre-
sent a basic risk. While mutual gains can be achieved from trust and trustworthy response, 
there is also an incentive for the trustee to fail the trust. Taken together, these structural condi-
tions constitute the basic trust problem. 
2.1.3. Trust and Action 
As we have seen, if “A trusts B with respect to X,” then the trustor chooses an action which 
makes him vulnerable with respect to the actions of the trustee. On the level of overt behavior, 
we can observe the choice of a trusting act, manifested as a transfer of control over resources 
or events to the trustee. In other words, the behavioral content of trust is a risky course of ac-
tion through which trust is demonstrated (Lewis & Weigert 1985b). The choice of a trusting 
act can be interpreted as a “risky investment” (Luhmann 2000: 27), because the trustor must 
transfer control over certain resources or events to the trustee, and at the same time is incapa-
ble of determining the final outcome (the potential gain or loss) with certainty. So far, we 
have used the notion of a “choice” that the trustor “decides” on without further explication. 
But the issue is not trivial, and warrants closer inspection: how are trust and choice related? Is 
“trusting” equal to “making a choice”?  
In the “behavioral approach” to trust (Kramer 1999), researchers define trust solely in terms of 
cooperative choices in an interpersonal context (e.g. Deutsch 1958, 1960, Loomis 1959). Trust 
is defined as a behavioral outcome based on sufficiently positive expectations which allow the 
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trustor to choose a risky course of action (Gambetta 1988a, Coleman 1990). Essentially, trust 
is regarded as a rational choice among actions. For instance, Gambetta suggests that trusting 
someone means that “the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial to us ... is 
high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him” (1988a: 217, 
emphasis added). One advantage of this approach is that it opens up the toolbox of rational 
choice theory, which then can be applied to the study of trust decisions (Messick & Kramer 
2001: 91). Defining trust as choice behavior also warrants that it can be examined with the 
help of experimental devices (Fehr 2009: 238). 
Most authors maintain, however, that trust fundamentally differs from the choice of a trusting 
act. The trusting act merely displays the observable behavioral outcome of trust. In essence, 
“the fundamental difference between trust and trusting behaviors is between a ‘willingness’ to 
assume risk and actually ‘assuming’ that risk” (Mayer et al. 1995: 724). Pointing to the ques-
tion of choice, Hardin notes, “Trust is in the category of knowledge, acting on trust is in the 
category of action ... I do not, in an immediate instance, choose to trust, I do not take a risk. 
Only actions are chosen” (2001: 11ff.). In this line, authors often conceive of trust as a “men-
tal phenomenon” (Lahno 2002: 37) and a “psychological state” (Kramer 1999: 571). It is in-
trinsically tied to the subjective categories of knowledge and affect. When trusting someone, 
the trustor—in some way—accepts the vulnerability inherent in a trust problem. The choice of 
a trusting act merely displays an observable outcome.  
Do we “choose” to trust, then, or not? This far from trivial question will be subject to analysis 
throughout the book. As we will see, trust can be understood as a two-step process, which be-
gins with interpretation—that is, with the subjective definition of the situation—and leads to 
(and prepares for) a subsequent choice of action. The choice of the trusting act can approxi-
mate a rational decision-making process, but it need not. As such, “choosing to trust” can be 
an appropriate empirical description, but it can also be misleading if automatic processes pre-
vail. To keep the terminology simple, we will use the notion of choice (“if A chooses to trust 
B,” “if A trusts B,” “the choice of a trusting act” etc.) to denote the fact that a trustor has opt-
ed for a transfer of control and is in a vulnerable position—ignoring, for the moment, the way 
in which this outcome has been internally achieved by the trustor. 
A closely related question is whether trust and cooperation are the same (as suggested, for ex-
ample, by Gambetta’s definition, cited above). Although observable cooperative choices and 
trust are intimately related—cooperation can be a manifestation of trust—it is problematic and 
confusing to simply equate the two concepts (Good 1988, Mayer et al. 1995, Hardin 2001). 
Cooperation may occur for many reasons, even when there is no risk taken, no potential loss 
at stake, or no choice available. The most extreme case imaginable may be a situation in 
which cooperation is enforced by deterrence and the threat of punishment, against the will of 
the actors involved. While this, to an alien observer, might look like some form of coopera-
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tion, it is clearly not an outcome of trust. Therefore, whenever we observe cooperation, we 
must carefully ascertain whether or not we can ascribe trust to the actors involved in the inter-
action. Conceptually, these are not the same. As it is, cooperation must be conceived of as one 
indicator, among many others, of the latent construct of trust (McKnight & Chervany 1996: 
32). In fact, researchers have recently devised means of experimentally separating trust from 
cooperation, showing that an upward spiral of benign attributions and increased cooperation is 
involved in the mutual build-up of trust (Yamagishi et al. 2005, Ferrin et al. 2008). 
2.1.4. Social Uncertainty 
Assume a state of perfect information. If a trustor knew the trustee’s preferences, corres-
ponding motivations, and intentions with certainty, he could predict whether the trustee would 
honor or fail his trust. In this deterministic setting, there would be no “need” for trust, alt-
hough it would nonetheless be possible to observe trusting acts. Since the trustor can deter-
mine the outcome and knows all preferences and incentives, his actions can more adequately 
be described as reliance (Nooteboom 2002). Imagine, on the other hand, that no information 
at all was available; then the trustor could just as well roll a dice to make the decision in a 
trust problem. In this setting, there would be no “opportunity” for trust, although again we 
could observe trusting acts. In this case, it is more adequate to speak of hope (Lewis & Wei-
gert 1985b, Luhmann 2000: 28). Trust is limited to instances where specific knowledge struc-
tures play a crucial role in the solution of a trust problem (Endress 2001: 175). In short, the 
concept of trust addresses a state of knowledge that is neither perfect, nor completely ignorant 
(Simmel 1992: 392).  
In a trust problem, information is asymmetric and imperfect. While certain characteristics of 
the trustee (his preferences, motivation, and intentions) are hidden to the trustor, they are per-
fectly well-known to the trustee. At the same time, the trustor usually has at least some infor-
mation that he can use in a given trust problem—but this information is typically imperfect. In 
the case of imperfect information, the likelihood of an event (for example, “trustworthy re-
sponse to trust”) can be assessed as, at best, some probability. We will henceforth refer to the 
subjective assessment of the probability of an event as an expectation. Depending on the “pre-
cision” of his expectations, a trustor subjectively faces either a situation of risk or of ambigui-
ty. The terms expectation, risk, and ambiguity will be treated as subjective categories, and 
they describe the internal representations of the objective uncertainty involved in the trust 
problem (see chapter 2.2.2).
1
 
                                                 
1 Note that some authors (e.g. Knight 1965) have used the term “uncertainty” to refer to a subjective state of “ambiguity” 
(Camerer, Weber 1992: 326). The terminology adopted here follows Camerer & Weber (1992) and minimizes the risk of 
confusion: Uncertainty is objective, while risk and ambiguity are subjective, as discussed in chapter 2.2.2 below.  
21 
 
What is the source of uncertainty for the trustor? In a trust problem, uncertainty is based on 
the fact that the trustor cannot control the outcome of the trusting act once he has chosen to 
trust, and also on his imperfect information about the trustee. Since the outcome genuinely 
rests upon his interaction with the trustee, the trustor faces a fundamental social uncertainty 
(Kramer 2006: 68). Social uncertainty is endogenous to interactions. It results from the con-
tingent decisions of other actors, and becomes relevant whenever the utility of an actor is di-
rectly or indirectly influenced by the decisions of others. As we have seen, this is exactly the 
case in trust problems. Unlike exogenous, environmental uncertainty, an actor can to some 
degree influence endogenous, social uncertainty. For example, a trustor can mitigate social 
uncertainty by opting for the safe alternative of distrust. However, he can never avoid it when 
he chooses a trusting act. Social uncertainty is a constitutive element of the basic trust prob-
lem.  
All in all, trust problems are characterized by social uncertainty and asymmetric, imperfect 
information. The trustor has limited information about the trustee’s preferences, motivations, 
and intentions and, when confronted with the choice of a trusting act, cannot be sure of the 
future actions of the trustee. As noted by many researchers, the mix of social uncertainty and 
imperfect information, paired with the possibility of opportunistic action, is a core element of 
trust problems (Dasgupta 1988, Gambetta 1988a, Mayer et al. 1995, Luhmann 2000, Hardin 
2001, Heimer 2001, Kramer 2006). The fact that these elements are structural prerequisites 
and objective “facts” does not, however, give an answer to the question of how trustors sub-
jectively handle the uncertainties involved in a trust problem. This question is, as we will see, 
the crux of trust research, and it will be dealt with throughout the remainder of the book. Most 
trust researchers agree that trust is a special way of dealing with social uncertainty and imper-
fect information. In choosing to trust, the trustor—somehow—bypasses the social uncertainty 
inherent in the trust problem and takes a “leap beyond the expectations that reason and experi-
ence alone would warrant” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 970). We can conclude at this point that 
trust hints at the particular nature of the expectations involved, a particular way that they 
emerge and form, and a particular way of dealing with the uncertainty and the subjective risk 
or ambiguity involved in a trust problem. 
2.1.5. Vulnerability 
The concept of trust is almost routinely linked to the aspect of vulnerability (Hosmer 1995, 
Bigley & Pearce 1998). In fact, almost all research on the topic of trust rests on the idea that 
actors, in some way or other, become vulnerable to each other during their interaction. Many 
authors specify this vulnerability by referring to the objective structure of trust. From this per-
spective, vulnerability simply means that something must be “at stake” for the trustor. Trust 
always includes a transfer of control, and therefore results in the objective vulnerability of the 
trustor (Deutsch 1960, 1973). In the absence of vulnerability, the concept of trust is not neces-
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sary, as outcomes become irrelevant to the trustor (Mishra 1996). Vice versa, vulnerability 
increases with the proportion of total wealth that is at stake in an interaction (Heimer 2001). In 
short, vulnerability originates from the interaction in a basic trust problem, and it mirrors its 
incentive structure. 
In contrast, many authors emphasize the importance of the subjective perception of vulnera-
bility for trust, and use the term only with reference to the trustor’s subjective experience. In 
contrast to a structural prerequisite or mere consequence thereof, the term vulnerability then 
describes a qualitative element of individual subjective experience—an internal response to 
the incentive structure. In this perspective, the most commonly emphasized elements are fa-
vorable expectations and the willingness and intention to be vulnerable. For example, Rous-
seau et al. propose that “trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vul-
nerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (1998: 
395, emphasis added). That is to say, when facing a trust problem a trustor consciously per-
ceives vulnerability, but nevertheless chooses the risky course of action. This “behavioral-
intention subfactor” of trust (Lewicki et al. 2006), in addition to cognitive and affective ele-
ments, constitutes the heart of many trust definitions. 
A number of scholars argue explicitly against such a linkage of trust and vulnerability. They 
emphasize that vulnerability remains outside of the trustor’s awareness, even when it objec-
tively exists. Vulnerability becomes salient to the trustor only after the trustee has failed trust; 
the conscious perception of vulnerability is linked to a psychological state of distrust (Becker 
1996, Lahno 2001, 2002, Keren 2007, Schul et al. 2008). On the other hand, trust is linked to 
a state of inner security and certainty in which potential risks are not consciously experienced. 
This apparent discrepancy in trust definitions is one example of a problematic merging of ob-
jective-structural and subjective-experiential components in definitions of trust (see section 
2.4 below). Disregarding the question of its subjective experience for the moment, we first 
have to establish at this point that vulnerability is always manifest in the objective structure of 
a trust problem, and becomes tangible by the transfer of control. 
2.2. Subjective Experience 
2.2.1. The Phenomenology of Trust 
In a broad review of the trust literature, Kramer notes: “Most trust theorists agree that, what-
ever else its essential features, trust is fundamentally a psychological state” (1999: 571). It is 
now our task to understand how the phenomenological foundation of trust might be specified. 
As a psychological state, trust points to a special way of dealing with the social uncertainty 
and vulnerability inherent in trust problems. Although there seems to be a substantial consen-
sus on treating trust as a mental phenomenon, scholars are less in agreement on what precisely 
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characterizes this state of mind (Bigley & Pearce 1998). The aspect of its qualitative subjec-
tive experience is widely debated, and scholars hold somewhat diverse views.  
Many researchers emphasize that an intentional and conscious acceptance of vulnerability and 
the voluntary taking of risk are necessary, in order for us to be able to speak of trust (Deutsch 
1958, Luhmann 1988, Mayer et al. 1995, Rousseau et al. 1998). For example, cognitive con-
ceptualizations of trust focus on the expectations, beliefs, and intentions which a rational utili-
ty-maximizing actor uses to make a decision in a given trust problem. Trust from this perspec-
tive is a purely cognitive phenomenon, marked by a retrieval of existing knowledge, a result-
ing “cold” unemotional expectation, and a corresponding rational choice of action. In the 
worst case, the existing knowledge has to be updated, but essentially, trust remains in the cat-
egory of knowledge (Hardin 2001).  
Psychological studies often put a special emphasis on affective aspects of trust. For example, 
the emotional bonds between individuals can form a unique basis for trust, once developed 
(McAllister 1995), and both mood and emotions can color the subjective experience of trust, 
signaling the presence and quality of trust in a relationship (Jones & George 1998). Trust, it is 
argued, establishes commitment, generates a feeling of confidence and security, and induces 
attachment to the trustee (Burke & Stets 1999). Some researchers maintain that in a state of 
trust, we do not perceive social uncertainty and vulnerability at all. Instead, the subjective per-
ception of risk or ambiguity is effectively suppressed and replaced by a feeling of certainty 
and security that lasts until trust is failed (Garfinkel 1967: 38-52, Baier 1986, Becker 1996, 
Jones 1996, Schul et al. 2008). For example, Baier suggests that “most of us notice a given 
form of trust most easily after its sudden demise or severe injury” (1986: 234). In these con-
tributions, trust is not merely a matter of “cold” expectations, but refers to a “hot” affective 
state, or to preconscious processes which filter our perception (Holmes 1991, Lahno 2001).  
But the role of affect and emotions in creating trust is relatively unexplored in comparison to 
the large number of cognitive accounts that have been proposed. What is more, trust research-
ers seldom pay attention to the interaction of cognitive, affective, and behavioral elements, 
and how they jointly determine possible forms of trust that can emerge in the course of inter-
action (Bigley & Pearce 1998). Moreover, it is debated whether trust can be genuinely charac-
terized as a state (Lagerspetz 2001), or whether it is expressed “punctually” in different situa-
tions and decisions (Luhmann 2000: 34).  
Overall, trust is acknowledged to be a complex, multidimensional phenomenon which must be 
defined in terms of interrelated processes and orientations, involving cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral elements (Lewis & Weigert 1985a, b, Bigley & Pearce 1998, Kramer 1999). Note 
that the term cognitive is used in a narrow sense here, to include higher mental functions such 
as thinking, reasoning, judgment, and the like. On the other hand, the term affective here re-
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fers to experiences of feeling and to emotional sensation and arousal, charged with a positive 
or negative valence. The proposed dimensionality of the trust construct closely mirrors the 
classic trichotomy of attitude research, which proposes affective (“feeling”), cognitive 
(“knowing”), and behavioral (“acting”) dimensions of attitudes (Breckler 1984, Chaiken & 
Stangor 1987). Unsurprisingly, trust has, by some researchers, been defined as an attitude to-
wards the object of trust (e.g. Luhmann 1979: 27, Jones & George 1998, Lewicki et al. 2006). 
Presumably trust and its subjective experience have a “bandwidth” (Rousseau et al. 1998: 
398) and can take various forms in various relationships, or even within the same relationship. 
Conceptualizations range from a calculated weighing of perceived gains and losses, to an 
emotional response based on interpersonal attachment and identification. One reason for the 
widely divergent views on the subjective experience of trust is that its distinct cognitive, af-
fective, and behavioral manifestations need not necessarily be present at one point in time 
(Lewis & Weigert 1985a). The influence of each dimension varies with the specific trust rela-
tion. It is easy to imagine that the affective dimension of trust will be more pronounced in 
close relationships, while the cognitive dimension will be more influential in trust relations 
with secondary groups and strangers, or in market-based exchanges. Although these dimen-
sions are analytically distinct, the experience of trust always includes all of them: cognitive 
elements, such as knowledge structures and the corresponding expectations; affective ele-
ments, such as feelings, moods, and emotions; a behavioral intention to act on trust; and an 
implicit reference to the normatively and culturally structured social environment, which all 
merge into the unique experience of trust. Essentially, “trust in everyday life is a mix of feel-
ing and rational thinking” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 972).  
2.2.2. Expectations and Intentions 
One of the earliest and most commonly emphasized elements in academic definitions of trust 
is that of a favorable expectation about the outcome of a trusting act (Deutsch 1958, Rotter 
1967, Zand 1972, Barber 1983, Lewis & Weigert 1985b, Gambetta 1988a, Coleman 1990, 
Hardin 1993, Robinson 1996, Rousseau et al. 1998, Kramer 1999, Möllering 2001, Lewicki et 
al. 2006). In a trust problem, a trustor uses his available knowledge to form “a set of expecta-
tions, assumptions, or beliefs about the likelihood that another’s future actions will be benefi-
cial, favorable, or at least not detrimental to one’s own interests” (Robinson 1996: 576). We 
will summarize and label these “expectations, assumptions, or beliefs” as the expectation of 
trustworthiness of the trustor. According to Gambetta (1988a), this expectation is located on a 
probabilistic distribution with values between complete distrust (0) and complete trust (1), 
with a region of indifference (0.5) in the middle. The choice of a trusting act then requires that 
an expectation exceeds a subjective threshold value. As Gambetta points out, “optimal” 
threshold values will vary as a result of individual dispositions and change with situational 
circumstances. Once the expectation of trustworthiness exceeds the threshold and is high 
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enough to engage in the choice of the trusting act, we will say that it is a favorable expecta-
tion. 
Rotter (1967) defined interpersonal trust as a favorable expectation held by an individual that 
the word, promise, or oral or written statement of another individual or group can be relied 
upon. In addition, he proposed a distinction between specific and generalized expectations. 
While specific expectations are based on experiences in a situation with a unique individual, 
and rest on a concrete interaction history, generalized expectations are abstracted and synthe-
sized from a plurality of past experiences in similar situations. In a given situation, individuals 
use both specific and generalized expectations to assign intentions and motives to interaction 
partners. The influence of generalized expectations increases with the novelty and unfamiliari-
ty of the situation (Rotter 1971). Expectations provide a “lay theory” to the trustor of what he 
can expect in a given situation in response to his choice of a trusting act, and they represent 
the “good reasons” which constitute the evidence of trustworthiness. These are part of his so-
cially learned, though always imperfect, knowledge, and they allow a judgment to be made of 
the trustee’s trustworthiness.  
The idea that trust is based on an expectation points to the important fact that the trustor, in 
some way or the other, has to make an inference about the trustworthiness of the trustee. In 
doing so, he uses available information and queries the trust-related knowledge he has stored 
in his memory. The main questions that cognitive accounts of trust provoke naturally is, 
“What are the sources of trust-related knowledge?”; “On which indicators can the inference be 
based?” and “How is this trust-related knowledge actually used?” 
As it is, there are many sources of trust-related knowledge. Some may pertain directly to char-
acteristics of the trustee; others reflect indirect sources, such as generalized expectations or 
knowledge about institutions and the like. In general, one can distinguish “macro” sources, 
which apply generally and impersonally, from “micro” sources, which arise in specific ex-
change relations and are personalized (Nooteboom 2006). A related distinction between mac-
rosources and microsources has already been made by Deutsch (1973: 55), who differentiated 
between “universalistic,” “generalized,” and “particularistic” expectations of trustworthiness. 
In a similar fashion, Zucker (1986) identified three “modes” of trust production, and tied them 
to particular categories of trust-related knowledge: “process-based” trust is founded in repeat-
ed experience with a trustee or his reputation, “characteristics-based” trust relies on an as-
sessment of stable characteristics of the trustee, while “institution-based” trust refers to a set 
of shared expectations derived from formal social structures. Likewise, Sztompka (1999) de-
fines “axiological” trust as relating to an assessment of the trustee’s predisposition to follow 
normative rules, and “fiduciary” trust as relating to an assessment of the trustee’s inclination 
to meet moral obligations, whereas “instrumental” trust is based on assessments of the trus-
tee’s competence and past performance. All in all, trust researchers commonly refer to both 
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microsources and macrosources of knowledge when thinking about the informational basis of 
trust. 
Conceptualizing interpersonal trust in dyadic trust relations, a most frequent focus is on the 
characteristics of the trustee that promote a favorable expectation of trustworthiness (Butler & 
Cantrell 1984, Rempel et al. 1985, Baier 1986, Sitkin & Roth 1993, Hosmer 1995, Mishra 
1996, McKnight & Chervany 2000, for a review see Mayer et al. 1995). These characteristics 
refer to individual assessments of the trustee’s personality and thus, generally speaking, be-
long to the formation of specific expectations. Each characteristic contributes a unique per-
spective from which a trustor can consider the trustee and the trust relation. As such, trustee 
characteristics also help us to learn more about the quality of the subjective experience of 
trust. They are considered, among other factors, to be “antecedents of trust” (Mayer et al. 
1995: 727). From the many characteristics proposed in the literature, four major characteris-
tics can be extracted.
2
 In sum, the perceived (1) benevolence, (2) competence, (3) integrity, 
and (4) predictability of the trustee are assumed to notably shape perceived trustworthiness 
and the resulting level of interpersonal trust. Trustee characteristics can be thought of as sub-
categories of the higher-level construct “expectation of trustworthiness.” Adopting a slightly 
different terminology, McKnight et al. use the term “trusting beliefs” to refer to the “secure 
conviction that the other party has favorable attributes, such as benevolence, integrity, compe-
tence and predictability” (2006: 30). We will use the terms “belief” and “expectation” synon-
ymously in the following. 
(1) Benevolence indicates an assumption concerning the trustee’s motivation. The trustee is 
benevolent to the extent that he cares about the welfare of the trustor, and therefore respects 
the content of the trust relation. That is, a benevolent trustee will not choose the opportunistic 
act of failing trust, even if there are incentives to do so, and has the intention of acting in the 
interest of the trustor. In the context of dyadic trust relations, benevolence points to a personal 
orientation of the trustee towards the trustor; it is the perception of his goodwill, caring, and 
responsibility. Benevolence also points to the normative dimension of trust. It is itself a moral 
value (Hosmer 1995), and implies a responsibility or “fiduciary obligation” (Barber 1983) to 
care for the protection of the trustor. 
(2) Competence or ability refers to the capability and qualification of the trustee to fulfill the 
content of the trust relation. In order to honor trust, the trustee must possess certain skills to 
successfully complete actions which realize the content of the trust relation. This may require 
technical competencies, interpersonal competencies, the ability to make judgments, and so 
forth. The domain-specificness of skills and competencies carries forward to the trust concept 
                                                 
2 Following Mayer et al. (1995) and McKnight et al. (1998). 
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itself (Zand 1972). That is, one primary reason why A trusts B with respect to X, but not with 
respect to Y, is that expectations of competence and ability do not extend over all domains. 
(3) Integrity means that the trustee adheres to a set of principles which the trustor finds ac-
ceptable. The degree to which a trustee is judged to have integrity will be influenced, for ex-
ample, by the consistency of the trustee’s past actions; by his honesty, truthfulness, and open-
ness in communication, by the extent to which a trustor believes the trustee’s statements of 
future intentions, and by how congruent his actions are with his words (Hosmer 1995). Per-
ceived integrity is always “value-laden,” because the trustor evaluates the perceived trustee’s 
moral and behavioral principles within his own value system (McKnight & Chervany 2000). 
Again, this points to a normative dimension of the trust concept. Integrity is influenced by the 
degree of perceived value congruence between trustor and the trustee (Sitkin & Roth 1993). 
Integrity will be high if the trustor can identify a shared value or moral principle and assume 
that the trustee acts accordingly (Jones & George 1998). 
(4) Predictability. While integrity denotes a value-laden evaluation of the trustee’s personali-
ty, the aspect of predictability refers to a value-free perception of the trustee’s consistency in 
action. Predictability means that the actions of the trustee are consistent enough over time so 
that a trustor can forecast to a satisfying degree what the trustee will do. Although a perfect 
opportunist may not be judged to have high personal integrity, his actions are predictable. 
With high predictability, other characteristics of the trustee, such as his benevolence or com-
petence, do not vary over time. However, predictability alone is insufficient to make a trustor 
willing to take a risk and choose a trusting act: if a trustee, with a high degree of predictabil-
ity, will act opportunistically, then a trustor may still withhold trust, if he is convinced that the 
trustee will seek his own advantage by not being trustworthy. 
According to Mayer et al. (1995), these characteristics jointly explain a major portion of per-
ceived trustworthiness. In fact, evidence of their absence often provides a rational basis for 
withholding trust (Shapiro 1987, McAllister 1995). Mayer et al. (1995) have developed a 
widely received model of trust development in which these trustee characteristics, in combina-
tion with a trustor’s internally stable and generalized “disposition to trust,”3 wholly determine 
the level of trust an actor has. Importantly, they define trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform 
a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that 
other party” (ibid.: 712, emphasis added). Note that this definition focuses on trust as an inten-
tional consequence of expectation formation (“willingness to be vulnerable”), rather than on 
                                                 
3 Mayer et al. (1995) use the term disposition to trust to refer to generalized expectations of trustworthiness. These are under-
stood as referring to stable personality traits, which influence how much trust one has “prior to data on that particular party 
being available” (ibid. 715); see also chapter 3.1.3. 
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the act of trusting. Similarly, McKnight and Chervany define a trusting intention as “a secure, 
committed willingness to depend upon, or become vulnerable to, the other party” (2006: 30), 
and separate it analytically from the expectation of trustworthiness. Formally, they claim, ex-
pectations and intentions must be treated as distinct subcategories of the high-level construct 
of trust; expectations are regarded as the causal antecedents to trusting intentions (McKnight 
et al. 1998, also Ferrin et al. 2008). Note that these contributions emphasize the subjective ex-
perience of vulnerability, that is, a conscious acceptance of risk, and the intentionality inher-
ent in the choice of a trusting act. 
In the model presented by Mayer et al. (1995), the trusting intention is compared to the level 
of perceived risk in a given trust problem (notably, this resembles Gambetta’s definition of a 
subjective threshold value to which actual expectations are compared). If intentions are suffi-
ciently strong, the trustor engages in “behavioral risk taking” by choosing the trusting act (see 
figure 2): 
Figure 2: The model of trust development, adapted from Mayer et al. (1995: 715) 
 
Several points of about this model are worthy of comment. First, the judgment of trustworthi-
ness and the evaluation of risks are assumed to rely on available information. Thus the model 
presents a purely cognitive approach to trust, viewing it basically as the outcome of a rational 
inference process (Schoorman et al. 2007). Second, the model is wholly focused on unidirec-
tional interpersonal trust. That is, it captures neither trust in more abstract institutions and so-
cial systems or the potential influence of other macro sources, nor the development of mutual 
trust. Most importantly, there is no explicit reference to the social environment in which the 
trust relation is embedded, and no reference to other categories of trust-related knowledge that 
may motivate trustworthiness. The model is “dynamic” through feedback from the outcome 
(the response of the trustee) to the input factors of perceived trustworthiness, and therefore 
allows for repeated interaction. However, it is “static” in the sense that, in a given trust prob-
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lem, there is no reference to communication or interactive processes through which the parties 
involved “define” their perspectives to negotiate perceived trustworthiness (see Jones & 
George 1998, Bacharach & Gambetta 2001, Nooteboom 2002; this issue will be taken up in 
chapter 5). Fourth, even when contextual factors are assumed to change the levels of per-
ceived risk and trustworthiness, trust essentially remains a joint function of trustee characteris-
tics and generalized expectations. Although the proposed causal relation between trusting be-
liefs and trusting intention appears to be empirically justified (McKnight & Chervany 2006, 
Colquitt et al. 2007, Schoorman et al. 2007), the assumed cognitive basis of trust is clearly 
very narrow. 
Considerable attention has been paid by trust researchers to identify further sources of trust-
related knowledge which the trustor can access in a given trust problem (e.g. Granovetter 
1985, Zucker 1986, Shapiro 1987, Buskens 1998, Jones & George 1998, McKnight et al. 
1998, Ripperger 1998, Kramer 1999, Luhmann 2000, Möllering 2006a, Buskens & Raub 
2008). Many theoretical accounts demonstrate a much broader cognitive basis for trust and a 
plethora of “good reasons” on which the trustor can base his decision. Conversely, they pre-
sent a much broader motivational basis for a trustee to be trustworthy. In a nutshell, the most 
important micro and macrosources of trust-related knowledge derive from (1) specific expec-
tations, including knowledge of characteristics of the particular trustee and/or the structure of 
the particular, unique trust problem; (2) the dyadic embeddedness of the trust relation, that is, 
knowledge from repeated and reciprocal interaction; (3) the network embeddedness of trustor 
and trustee, that is, knowledge of the social mechanisms of reputation, learning, and control; 
(4) institutional embeddedness and the internalization of trust-related norms, social roles, cul-
tural practices, as well as knowledge concerning institutional safeguards such as legal con-
tracts, regulations, and guarantees; (5) generalized expectations, individual “dispositions to 
trust,” moral principles, values, stereotypes, and the like. These categories will be introduced 
and discussed in depth in chapter 3. For now, it is sufficient to note that a trustor can utilize a 
very broad base of informational resources that help to establish expectations in a trust prob-
lem (see figure 3): 
30 
 
Figure 3: Sources of trust-related knowledge 
 
In sum, cognitive accounts define trust as the willingness and intention to be vulnerable based 
on sufficiently favorable expectations of trustworthiness in the face of social uncertainty 
(Mayer et al. 1995, McKnight et al. 1998, Rousseau et al. 1998). The trustor’s stored 
knowledge provides the foundation and cognitive basis, from which a transition into expecta-
tions, intentions, and action can be made. The trustor uses his trust-related knowledge to form 
expectations, to develop intentions, and finally to decide whether the choice of a trusting act is 
justified or not. As Coleman argues, situations of trust can be viewed as a particular subset of 
those involving risk: “The elements confronting the potential trustor are nothing more or less 
than the considerations a rational actor applies in deciding whether to place a bet” (Coleman 
1990: 99). Note that this implies a perception of social and environmental uncertainty in terms 
of subjective risk. Although the trustor faces endogenous and exogenous uncertainty, he can 
synthesize the available information into a precise estimate of the risk involved in the choice 
of a trusting act. In doing so, the trustor relies on a broad base of informational resources, 
such as trustee characteristics, generalized expectations, and knowledge of the social envi-
ronment in which the trust relation is embedded, which enable him to take an appropriate 
course of action. 
2.2.3. About Risk 
At this point, it is necessary to take a closer look at the relation between expectations, uncer-
tainty, risk, and ambiguity (see Frisch & Baron 1988, Camerer & Weber 1992). According to 
scholarly definitions, both risk and ambiguity refer to the subjective perception of objective 
uncertainty. In a situation of risk, a decision-maker can predict the occurrence of events with a 
precise probability. The risk of a situation is represented by his expectations; it can be summa-
rized as lotteries over outcomes, which are the formal apparatus for modeling risk (Mas-Colell 
et al. 1995). Risk can be understood as the perceived probability of loss which originates from 
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the choice of an uncertain event. It includes opportunity costs in the form of foregone gains 
that result from disregarding other alternatives (Chiles & McMackin 1996). In a situation of 
risk, the utility of an actor itself becomes risky, and assumes the form of subjective expected 
utility (Savage 1954, Anscombe & Aumann 1963). Most importantly, risk describes the as-
sessment of a precise subjective probability, and therefore is also called “unambiguous proba-
bility” (Ellsberg 1961). For example, an event ei may or may not occur, but it does so with an 
exact subjective likelihood of p(ei). In short, in a situation of risk, the occurrence of an event 
is uncertain, but the expectation of its occurrence is unambiguous. 
In contrast, ambiguity characterizes a state of knowledge that is not sufficient to even make a 
“good guess.” With ambiguity, it is not possible to attach precise probabilities to events. In-
stead, the corresponding expectations are “ambiguous,” distributed along a second-order 
probability distribution (Marschak 1975, Einhorn & Hogarth 1986). When ambiguity increas-
es, the second-order probabilities become flatter, or more evenly distributed around the mean. 
In consequence, expectations become more ambiguous.
4
 In the worst case, the second-order 
probabilities become equally distributed. Then, the actor has no information at all about the 
probability of an event; he faces a state of complete ignorance. On the other hand, if there is 
absolutely no ambiguity, then expectations resemble point estimates from the second-order 
probability distribution, with a variance of zero and a second-order probability of one: the sit-
uation is reduced to a situation of risk. Put differently, risk refers to precise expectations of 
uncertain events, while ambiguity refers to the imprecision of expectations. The terms risk and 
ambiguity refer to the subjective perception of objective, endogenous, or exogenous uncer-
tainty (figure 4).  
Figure 4: Risk (a) and ambiguity (b) 
  
Returning to the problem of interpersonal trust, note that the preceding exposition offers a 
host of interpretations concerning the question: “How is trust related to uncertainty, risk, and 
                                                 
4 Keeping the terminology consistent, we will not say: “Expectations become more uncertain”! 
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ambiguity?” To begin with, in most cognitive accounts, trust is assumed to be based on per-
ceived risk and on the corresponding expectations in the given trust problem. Taking these 
authors by their words, this implies that there is no ambiguity present when a trustor decides 
to trust. In using his available knowledge, a trustor converts all uncertainty inherent in a trust 
problem into subjective risk. Most cognitive models of trust share the assumption that trust is 
a matter (or “a subset”) of risk, and thus, one of unambiguous expectations. We can add to 
this argument by allowing for the presence of ambiguity at the initial stage of the trust prob-
lem. Imagine a situation in which the trustor is in a state of complete ignorance, with corre-
spondingly flat second-order probabilities. Every piece of information that the trustor can use 
to interpret the situation will help him to establish more unambiguous expectations. By con-
sidering his broad base of knowledge, the second-order distributions become denser and dens-
er, until they finally converge to point estimates—expectations of trustworthiness are then 
stable and unambiguous: the subsequent choice of a trusting act is possible. In essence, trust is 
solely related to the categories of knowledge, expectation, and risk (Coleman 1990, Hardin 
2002).  
However, such an interpretation fails to inform us of the purported “cognitive leap beyond the 
expectations that reason and experience alone would warrant” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b). As 
we have conjectured at the outset, trust characterizes the particular nature of the expectations 
involved, a particular way of their emergence and formation, and a particular way of dealing 
with risks and ambiguity in a trust problem. In a purely cognitive approach, there is nothing 
“beyond” the knowledge that promotes trust. But according to Lewis and Weigert (1985b), “to 
trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will not occur” (ibid. 969). Möllering 
(2001) introduces the idea of suspension to capture this “as-if” notion of trust. He claims that 
suspension is a process that “brackets out” ambiguity by making the available knowledge 
momentarily certain. This facilitates the transition into favorable or unfavorable expectations. 
More pointedly: trust comes into play exactly when available knowledge is not sufficient to 
stabilize otherwise ambiguous expectations.
5
 Applying this argument figuratively, a trustor 
would use his knowledge and available information to reduce ambiguity towards stable expec-
tations, but at some point, further reductions would become no longer possible. Now, by sus-
pension, all remaining ambiguity is converted into manageable risk. Unfortunately, Möllering 
does not offer an explanation of the mechanisms behind suspension. But he makes the im-
portant point that interpretation—that is, the trustor’s subjective definition of the situation—is 
the constitutional ground on which expectations, as an output of interpretation, are built. In 
order to understand suspension, he concludes, it is necessary to better understand the process 
of interpretation.  
                                                 
5 Similarly, Lewis and Weigert conclude that “ ... knowledge alone cannot be a fully adequate basis for the expectations in-
forming social action. Trust begins where knowledge ends” (1985a: 462). 
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Furthermore, if suspension is part of the trust phenomenon, it can be brought to an interesting 
extreme. Imagine that, given a lack of further supportive information, suspension not only re-
duces ambiguity down into risk, but instead completely eliminates risk or ambiguity by re-
placing them with subjective certainty. In other words, the effect of suspension could also be 
an “extrapolation” of (un)ambiguous expectations into the extremes of subjective certainty. 
This entails the subjective experience of security and self-assurance if available information is 
extrapolated into the direction of a certain and favorable expectation of trustworthiness with 
an attached probability of one. And it entails a clear perception of distrust when the extrapo-
lated expectations become fixed at zero. Such a perspective coincides with theoretical ac-
counts that characterize trust as a state in which risks are not perceived. In a similar fashion, 
Luhmann asserts that trust replaces external uncertainty with internal certainty by means of 
“overdrawing” (2000: 30ff.) information. More pointedly: while risk implies the consideration 
of a set of uncertain alternatives, trust implies their elimination (Luhmann 1979: 25).
6
 As 
Luhmann claims, trustors cannot usually access their knowledge in the form of expectations in 
a particular trust problem, and risk need not be part of the trustor’s subjective experience at 
all, before the choice of a trusting act is made. From this perspective, a “cognitive leap” re-
sembles the suppression of perceived risks and the “extrapolation” of any form of subjective 
uncertainty into subjective certainty (see figure 5).   
Figure 5: Potential effects of suspension on cognitive expectations and trust 
 
All in all, cognitive accounts of trust focus on the choice of a trusting act, in which the trustor, 
quite similarly to one undertaking a bet, uses his expectations to rationally evaluate a lottery 
which grants him some expected (dis)utility. Trustors are aware of the risks, weighing the 
prospective gains and losses in order to choose the alternative with the highest expected utili-
                                                 
6 “ ... the benefit and rationale for action on the basis of trust are to be found ... in, and above all, a movement towards indif-
ference: by introducing trust, certain possibilities of development can be excluded from consideration. Certain dangers 
which cannot be removed but which should not disrupt action are neutralized” (Luhmann 1979: 25). 
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ty. As Coleman puts it, situations of trust are a “subset” of those involving risk (Coleman 
1990: 99f.). However, the process of expectation formation is controversial. Expectations may 
be formed by the retrieval of appropriate knowledge, but our discussion of the relation be-
tween risk and ambiguity—as well as the introduction of the idea of suspension—reveal that 
trust may also rely on a further element in which “our interpretations are accepted and our 
awareness of the unknown, unknowable and unresolved is suspended” (Möllering 2001: 414). 
This notion of suspension adds a noncognitive or “irrational” element to the cognitive concep-
tualization of trust, which allows trustors to go beyond their expectations. It can be interpreted 
either as suspension of ambiguity into unambiguous risk, or as an extrapolation of risk or am-
biguity into subjective certainty. Both interpretations illustrate the idea that trust enables a 
“cognitive leap” into stable expectations during the process of interpretation, so that the trus-
tor can make a decision just as if certain possible futures will not occur. 
2.2.4. Morals of Trust 
Many definitions of trust seem to be based, at least implicitly, upon the idea that a trustee has 
a moral obligation to behave in some “justified” manner. If a trustor willingly becomes vul-
nerable to the actions of the trustee, he does so with a favorable expectation that the trustee 
will respect the content of the trust relation and act accordingly. This does not only involve 
favorably assessing the ability and competence required for the fulfillment of the content of 
the trust relation: Scrutinizing trustee characteristics for their normative substance, we find 
that characteristics such as benevolence, goodwill, honesty, and integrity all invoke strong 
normative standards of how a trustee “ought” to behave. The reason for the strong normative 
notions in many trust definitions is simple: trust is problematic essentially because the trustor 
experiences social uncertainty with respect to the moral qualities of the trustee.
7
 Trustworthi-
ness necessitates a voluntarily adherence to the content of the trust relation, and it requires—at 
least— restraint from opportunistic action. As such, it cannot be dealt with without asking for 
the moral qualities of the trustee.  
The notion of an assumed “benevolent,” “fair,” and “justified” action on the part of the trustee 
is a recurring theme in the trust literature. In an attempt to gauge the scope and dimensionality 
of trustworthiness expectations, Barber (1983: 9f.) concludes that expectations of morally cor-
rect performance and the fulfillment of “fiduciary duties,” that is, direct moral responsibilities, 
are as important as expectations of technical competence, and adds them to the set of expecta-
tions that motivate the choice of a trusting act. Bromiley and Cummings (1996) define trust as 
an expectation that another individual or group will “(a) make a good faith effort to behave in 
                                                 
7 As Dasgputa puts it: “The problem of trust would of course not arise if we were all hopelessly moral, always doing what we 
said we would do in the circumstances in which we said we would do it. This is, the problem of trust would not arise if it 
was common knowledge that we were all trustworthy. A minimal non-congruence between individual and moral values is 
necessary for the problem of trust to be a problem” (1988: 53). 
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accordance with and keep commitments, (b) be honest in negotiations preceding those com-
mitments, and (c) not take excessive advantage of others even when the opportunity for op-
portunism is available” (ibid. 303). What is more, these “trusting expectations,” they argue, 
differ from purely “calculative expectations” because it is not assumed that the trustee’s fun-
damental motivation is the pursuit of self-interest (Bromiley & Harris 2006). Mishra (1996) 
expresses this idea by adding the dimension of concern to trustworthiness expectations. Con-
cern goes beyond believing that another party will not be opportunistic—it means that self-
interest is balanced by the trustee’s interest in the welfare of the trustor. Messick and Kramer 
(2001) define trust “as making the decision as if the other person or persons will abide by or-
dinary ethical rules that are involved in the situation” (ibid. 91). They argue that the two most 
important of these rules involve telling the truth and avoiding harming others, although other 
rules may become relevant in a particular situation as well. Taken together, the normative di-
mension of trust widely informs scholarly definitions; it is a constant undercurrent in most 
theoretical works.  
Hosmer (1995) defines trust as “the expectation by one person, group, or firm of ethically jus-
tifiable behavior—that is, morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles 
of analysis—on the part of the other person, group, or firm in a joint endeavor or economic 
exchange” (ibid. 399, emphasis added). This definition links trust directly to the subject of 
normative ethics and morality. According to Hosmer, trust is always accompanied by an as-
sumption of an acknowledged and voluntarily accepted moral duty to protect the interest of 
the trustor. That is, from the trustor’s perspective, the choice of a trusting act constitutes a 
“psychological contract” (Robinson 1996),8 that includes a moral obligation to respond trust-
worthily (Dasgupta 1988, Lahno 2002). This obligation is more than a promise to avoid harm. 
It amounts to an unspoken guarantee that the interests of the trustor will be included in the fi-
nal outcome. As Hosmer argues, however, no generally accepted rule exists as to how a trus-
tee can combine and balance the conflicting interests in a “fair,” “justified,” or “benevolent” 
manner. Since the objective structure of trust does not include direct external enforcement 
mechanisms per se, the trustor has to rely on the trustee’s adherence to moral principles 
(Hosmer 1995). Moral principles define what is considered a “fair,” “justified,” and morally 
correct response by the trustee.
9
 They can be understood as rules that underlie decision mak-
ing and restrict the pursuit of individual self-interest (Vanberg 1994: 42f.). Thus, the choice of 
a trusting act indicates that the trustor expects a morally correct response, and a morally cor-
                                                 
8 “A psychological contract emerges when one party believes that a promise of future return has been made [content of the 
trust relation], a contribution has been given [transfer of control] and thus, an obligation has been created to provide future 
benefits [trustworthy response]” (Robinson & Rousseau 1994: 346). 
9 Hosmer presents ten moral principles from the tradition of moral philosophy, such as universal rules (Kant), distributive 
justice (Rawls), utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill), and personal virtues (Plato, Aristotle).  
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rect response requires an action informed by a moral principle which restrains the pursuit of 
self-interest.  
Similarly, Jones and George (1998) propose that the psychological construct of trust is not 
only experienced through expectations, but through values, such as loyalty, helpfulness, fair-
ness, benevolence, reliability, honesty, responsibility, integrity, and competence. Values are 
general standards that are intrinsically desirable ends for actors. They are incorporated into a 
larger value system by prioritizing them in terms of relative importance as guiding principles 
(Rokeach 1968, 1973). Values are intricately related to moral principles: while values de-
scribe an ideal desirable end state, moral principles present the rules of how such an ideal end 
state is to be achieved. Consequently, most of the content of value systems is de facto rule-
based (e.g. “do not cheat,” “keep your promises,” “do not harm others”). Since they are so-
cially shared, rule-based value systems also constitute social norms regarding acceptable be-
havior (Messick & Kramer 2001). Furnishing criteria that an actor can use to evaluate events 
and actions, value systems guide behavior and the interpretation of experience. They allow a 
judgment of which behaviors and types of events, situations, or people are desirable or unde-
sirable. 
According to Jones and George (1998), this means that the perception and evaluation of trus-
tee characteristics and the formation of trustworthiness expectations is dependent upon the 
trustor’s value system. A trustor whose value system emphasizes fairness and helpfulness, for 
example, will strive to achieve fairness and helpfulness in trust relations with others, and will 
evaluate others primarily through these values. A favorable evaluation of the trustee depends 
on the degree of perceived value congruence between the trustor’s and the trustee’s value sys-
tems (ibid. 535f.). However, this does not mean that trust is possible only when trustor and 
trustee have completely similar values. More specifically, as long as there are no obvious 
signs for value incongruence, a trustor discards the belief that the trustee may have values that 
are different from his own. As Jones and George put it: “The actor ... simply suspends the be-
lief that the other is not trustworthy and behaves as if the other has similar values and can be 
trusted” (1998: 535, emphasis added).10 In short, the motive and intention that the trustor at-
tributes to the trustee when he in fact chooses to trust is acknowledged as morally justified 
and valuable (Lahno 2001). The choice of the trusting act expresses the recognition of a 
shared value, results in the suspension of any further doubts, and maintains and reinforces the 
shared value at the same time (Barber 1983, Jones & George 1998). On the other hand, an ac-
tual perception of value incongruence fosters unfavorable expectations of trustworthiness and 
can quickly lead to distrust (Sitkin & Roth 1993). 
                                                 
10 Although they introduce the idea of suspension to their conception of trust, Jones & George (1998) do not elaborate on this 
process any further. 
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The common characterizing feature of these normative accounts of trust is that the motivation 
for trustworthiness is assumed to be rooted in the trustee’s compliance to moral principles, 
values, or other social norms (Hardin 2003). That is, a trustor trusts because he thinks that the 
trustee has a moral commitment to be trustworthy, upholds values that are considered as justi-
fied, or follows a social norm such as the norm of reciprocity. Hardin correctly notes that such 
accounts are primarily concerned with normatively motivated trustworthiness. He admits that 
such motivations will be relevant in many trust problems, but remarks that they do not present 
the only “good reasons” for a trustor. Shapiro (1987) criticizes the normative perspective as 
proclaiming an “oversocialized” version of the regular trustor and trustee; a view that draws 
too heavily on the generalized morality of individuals. Hence, it is important to keep in mind 
that moral dispositions of the trustee are just one reason that may motivate trustworthiness, 
and one source for favorable expectations among many others.  
The normative undertone that sounds in many trust definitions suggests that trust is something 
more than a simple, “cold” expectation. Trust implies a promise of a future reciprocal transac-
tion in the form of a trustworthy response. This is because the trustor, by his choice of a trust-
ing act, signals that he recognizes the trustee’s character as worthy of his trust. The implicit 
demand of a morally correct response creates an obligation for the trustee to prove his trust-
worthiness, and to honor the risk that the trustor takes by relying on the trustee’s character. Of 
course, this necessitates that the moral values which create such obligation are in fact shared 
among the two parties. In short, trustworthiness often is not only “expected,” it is normatively 
“required” and regarded as something “good” in itself (Hardin 2001: 21). A trustor who 
chooses to trust sees himself as entitled to the right of a fair and justified treatment. A viola-
tion of trust disappoints this demand, which may be motivated by moral principles, ethical 
values, or social norms. 
Importantly, the normative dimension of trust also draws our attention to the social systems in 
which the trust relation is embedded, to the social norms prevailing within them, and to the 
values promoted by the larger superstructures of society. It points to a strong linkage of indi-
vidual, institutional, and cultural elements in the phenomenon of trust. That is, trust cannot be 
fully understood and studied exclusively on either a purely individual or a collective level, 
because it thoroughly permeates both (Lewis & Weigert 1985b). Generally speaking, where 
external enforcement mechanisms are not feasible, internal mechanisms to regulate behavior 
will have to be socially established; most importantly, through an internalization of social 
norms and moral values for the protection of trust and trustworthiness (Ripperger 1998).  
Both trustor and trustee enter the trust relation with an established value system and tacit un-
derstandings of the socially shared norms and cultural practices, such as interactional routines 
and role models or standards of economic and social exchange. This renders possible a form 
of “rule-based trust” (Kramer 1999), which is not based on a conscious calculation of conse-
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quences, but on shared understandings regarding the system of rules specifying appropriate 
behavior (or in the term of Jones and George (1998), based on “value congruence”), which 
triggers a suspension of doubt and distrust. Such rule-based trust emerges and is sustained by 
socialization into the structure of normative rules of a given social system. It can acquire a 
taken-for-granted quality if the members of a social system are highly socialized and experi-
ence continued and successful enactment of the rules. This view was endorsed, for example, 
by Zucker (1986: 54), who explicitly stated that trust was a set of expectations shared by eve-
ryone involved in an economic exchange. If trust is regularly experienced by individuals in a 
social system, it “exists as a social reality, [and] interpersonal trust comes naturally and is not 
reducible to individual psychology” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 976). As Lewis and Weigert 
argue, trust is essentially “social” and “normative,” rather than “individual” and “calculative.” 
In short, trust has to be understood from an institutional perspective as well.  
The institutional frameworks that surround a trust relation provide the rules, roles, and rou-
tines which can be a basis for trust because they represent shared expectations that give mean-
ing to action (see chapter 3.2 below). To indicate that trust is grounded in social institutions 
which provide relevant norms and moral values, and thus based socially shared expectations, 
we will henceforth use the term of rule-based, or institutional trust. According to Messick and 
Kramer, rule-based trust resembles a “shallow form of morality,” meaning that “the kind of 
deliberation and thought required to make a decision to trust or be trustworthy is not what 
psychologists call ‘deep’ and ‘systematic’ processing ... we decide very quickly whether to 
trust or to be trustworthy” (ibid.103). 
2.2.5. Feelings and Emotions 
Although most researchers agree that trust has a cognitive basis, many maintain that trust is a 
more complex psychological state, including an affective and emotional dimension as well. 
Due to the prevalence of cognitive-behavioral accounts, the affective dimension of trust was 
“historically overlooked” (Lewicki et al. 2006: 997), but researchers have been substantiating 
claims of its importance, both theoretically and empirically, ever since (Johnson-George & 
Swap 1982, Lewis & Weigert 1985b, Rempel et al. 1985, McAllister 1995, Jones & George 
1998, Williams 2001, Dunn & Schweitzer 2005, Schul et al. 2008, Lount 2010). Concerning 
the relation between the two dimensions, Bigley and Pearce note that “one of the most con-
tested issues ... relates to whether trust is exclusively the product of individuals’ calculative 
decision making processes or is emotion-based” (1998: 413). In a nutshell, many researchers 
insist that the cognitive basis of trust is necessary for the understanding of trust phenomena, 
but in itself not sufficient—one not only “thinks” trust, but also “feels” trust. 
To describe affective states, it is important to make a theoretical distinction between moods 
and emotions (Schwarz 1990, Clore 1992). The distinguishing feature between them is the in-
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tensity of the affective state and the particularity of the affective experience. Emotions are 
specific affective reactions to particular events. Most importantly, they have an identifiable 
cause and a clear content (e.g. disgust, anger, joy); they rise quickly, and have a relatively 
short duration. In contrast, moods can better be defined as low-intensity, diffuse, and enduring 
affective states which have no salient cause, and also possess less clearly defined content (e.g. 
being in a good or bad mood). Both mood and emotions indicate how one “feels” about things 
in daily activities, including interactions with other people. They inform individuals about the 
nature of the situation in which they are experienced, and they signal states of the world that 
need to be responded to (Frijda 1988, Damasio 1994).  
The influence of mood and emotions on interpersonal behavior has been a prime area of re-
search in social psychology. Researchers have accumulated a large body of evidence portray-
ing the influence of “hot” affective states on memory, judgment, decision making, and the 
choice of processing strategies across a wide range of content domains (see Schwarz 1990, 
1998, Forgas 2002, Schwarz & Clore 2007). Although early psychological research regarded 
affect mainly as a “biasing” factor to the cognitive process of rational decision making, it is 
now increasingly accepted as an inseparable aspect of human experience, and one with high 
informative value to individuals. According to the “feeling-as-information” paradigm 
(Schwarz & Clore 1983), affective states can serve as an additional source of information 
while making a judgment. Individuals simplify complex judgmental tasks by asking the ques-
tion “How do I feel about it?,” and use their feelings in a heuristic manner to solve problems. 
Affective states influence subsequent judgments directly when individuals let their judgments 
be informed by their feelings; they influence judgments indirectly when they change the pro-
cessing strategies of an individual, and thus influence “what comes to mind.” With regard to 
the subjective experience of trust, this suggests that affective states can have both direct and 
indirect impacts on judgments of trustworthiness and on the choice of a trusting act. In fact, 
the experience of moods and emotions is sometimes considered a primary aspect of the sub-
jective experience of trust (Jones & George 1998). Yet different authors hold different views 
on when and how mood and emotions are part of this subjective experience.  
To begin with, a trustor might decide on the choice of a trusting act by examining the emo-
tions he has towards a potential trustee in a given trust problem. The experience of positive 
(e.g. enthusiasm, excitement) or negative (e.g. nervousness, fear, anxiety) emotions can influ-
ence the judgment of trustworthiness and the decision to trust (Jones & George 1998, Dunn & 
Schweitzer 2005). Why would we expect such emotions to be present in the first place? Ac-
cording to “cognitive appraisal theory” (Smith & Ellsworth 1985, Lazarus 1991a, b), emotions 
result from a sequence of cognitive processes activated whenever the present situation is rec-
ognized as having an impact on personal well-being. The mere recognition that something is 
at stake, and that the outcome of a transaction is relevant to personal well-being, is sufficient 
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to generate emotions (Lazarus 1991a). As such, emotions should matter in a trust problem as 
well. A particularly pessimistic interpretation of this fact was delivered by Messick and Kra-
mer (2001), who argue that trust is “bothersome,” and may be accompanied by feelings of 
anxiety, deference, or fear—but generally by negative feelings. 
In contrast, Maier (2009: 35ff.) argues that trust is connected to a broad spectrum of different 
emotional reactions that arise in response to the interpretation of a given trust problem. More 
specifically, she argues that emotions result from cognitive appraisals in which the current 
situation is scrutinized for its meaning. This mirrors the idea of interpretation and a “subjec-
tive definition of the situation.” If a trustor becomes aware of the trust problem, the situation 
is framed either as an opportunity or a threat, and evaluated in terms of its impact on future 
personal well-being. Then, expectations of trustworthiness are generated, to which emotional 
responses automatically develop. Finally, these emotional reactions accumulate into a sum-
mary “feeling of rightness”—the anticipated trusting act either feels right, or it does not. The 
emotions that culminate into the feeling of rightness can be anger, disgust, fear, joy, happi-
ness, love, sadness, and surprise—that is, both negatively and positively valenced emotions. 
According to Maier, the arousal of each specific emotion is dependent on the context in which 
the trust problem is embedded. Each emotional reaction reflects a particular set of expecta-
tions, the trustor’s knowledge about the trustee, and the perceived status of the trust relation. 
Emotions may also be conflicting or ambivalent. In sum, a trustor “may be cognizant of cer-
tain calculated deliberations, intuitions, or expectations, compelling him to trust. Ultimately, 
he trusts—or not—because it feels right, no matter which factors inform that trust” (Maier 
2009: 48).
11
  
Emotions may be a result of how a trustor interprets a given trust problem. As such, they are 
conditional on a preceding interpretive activity (“cognitive appraisal”), in which the trustor 
uses his knowledge to define the situation and to form expectations. But emotional reactions 
may spontaneously emerge in a trust problem even without any prior interpretive effort, and 
may influence perception in form of a mood or an emotion that is not directly related to the 
immediate interpretation of the trust problem. In this way, affect may influence the process of 
interpretation and the formation of expectation itself. One source of immediate automatic 
emotional responses with a measurable impact on judgments of trustworthiness is the recogni-
tion of faces. The recognition of human faces is highly automatic and results in the activation 
of areas in the brain which are associated with the processing of affective stimuli (Whalen et 
al. 1998, Haxby et al. 2002, Phelps 2006). Empirical neuroscience studies show that the 
presentation of facial stimuli elicits automatic emotional responses with consequences for the 
                                                 
11 One can argue that emotional output (“feeling of rightness”) and cognitive output (“willingness to be vulnerable”) are dif-
ferent sides of the same coin. Although they are empirically hard to separate, we will treat them as analytically distinct. 
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subsequent evaluation of trustworthiness (Winston et al. 2002, Adolphs 2003). Empirically, 
Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) show that induced emotions, even when they are unrelated to a 
specific target, influence trust. They find that negative emotions such as anger, sadness, and 
guilt reduce judged trustworthiness and the intention to trust a trustee. Likewise, positive emo-
tions such as joy, gratitude, and pride increase judgments of trustworthiness and intentions to 
trust.  
This argument extends directly to the impact of mood on trust. One consistent finding in so-
cial psychological research is that global moods have a strong impact on processing strategies 
(Schwarz 1990, Mellers et al. 1998, Forgas 2002). Positive mood promotes a more global, 
“top-down” processing style in which individuals tend to rely on existing knowledge struc-
tures, while negative moods encourage a more systematic and detailed “bottom-up” pro-
cessing style, in which individuals rely more on external information (Bless & Fiedler 2006). 
In line with this, Forgas and East (2008) hypothesize and experimentally demonstrate that a 
negative mood increases skepticism and decreases the tendency to accept interpersonal com-
munication as truthful. At the same time, people in a negative mood became more accurate at 
detecting actual deception. Several trust researchers argue that a happy mood globally pro-
motes a more positive perception of others and thus increases trust (Jones & George 1998, 
Williams 2001). However, Lount (2010) argues and empirically corroborates the idea that a 
happy mood may also result in less trust. If cues of distrust are situationally available, they are 
more likely to be used by the happy, “top-down” individuals, resulting in decreased levels of 
trust. Both Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) and Lount (2010) show that the impact of affective 
states is neutralized when individuals are made aware of their affective state and its source. 
All in all, both mood and emotions can influence the choice of a trusting act by exerting a di-
rect or indirect influence on judgments and decision making in a trust problem. They are an 
ever-present element of the subjective perception of trust.  
What is more, if trust is not failed in repeated successful interactions, the trust relationship 
creates social situations that allow for intense emotional investments. The repeated behavioral 
expression of trust then reinforces and circulates positive affect (Rempel et al. 1985). Lewis 
and Weigert (1985b) claim that the development of strong affective bonds between actors can 
extend the cognitive basis of trust. That is, although grounded in cognition, trust can become 
predominantly a matter of positive affect towards the trustee. This aspect seems to describe 
most accurately what many authors describe as the “genuine” character of trust, which pre-
sumably develops only in the later stages of an interpersonal relation. It is conceived of as a 
state of positive affect, in which the trustor feels emotionally secure, confident that he will not 
be exploited, and does not even consider the possibility of opportunistic action on the part of 
the trustee (Baier 1986, Holmes 1991, McAllister 1995, Becker 1996, Jones 1996, Lahno 
2001, 2002). For example, Lahno argues that the particular affective state of trust works like a 
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perceptive filter, which “has an immediate impact on the beliefs and preferences of a trusting 
person” (2001: 183).  
One plausible explanation for the emergence and prevalence of affective states in mature trust 
relations is the development and activation of relational schemata (Baldwin 1992), which in-
dividuals use to frame their social relations.
12
 A relational schema is based on the idea that 
“people develop cognitive structures representing regularities in patterns of interpersonal re-
latedness” (ibid. 461). Such cognitive structures may be relation-specific or generalized. Im-
portantly, relational schemata also contain typical affective responses and schema-triggered 
affects (Fiske 1982, Fiske & Pavelchak 1986, Baldwin 1992, Chen et al. 2006). If, by repeated 
interaction, relational schemata develop which pertain to a particular trust relation and to a 
particular trustee, their activation can automatically trigger associated moods and emotions 
(Andersen & Chen 2002). That is to say, the subjective experience of affect in interpersonal 
trust can, in part, be rooted in the application of stored relational schemata that include affect, 
and which become activated when a trustor recognizes a trustee to which the relational sche-
ma can be applied while facing a trust problem (Huang & Murnighan 2010).
13
  
Lastly, researchers frequently point to the negative emotional reactions that emerge when trust 
is failed (Lewis & Weigert 1985b, Baier 1986, Robinson 1996, Jones & George 1998, Lahno 
2001). In an attempt to establish the emotional character of trust, Lahno (2001: 181f.) pro-
posed that trustors adopt a “participant attitude” and see themselves as personally involved 
and actively engaged in an interaction with the trustee. As a result of this, they become pre-
disposed to “reactive emotions,” that is, emotional reactions to the presumed intentions of the 
trustee. The trustor attributes an intention to the trustee that he himself acknowledges as justi-
fied and valuable (e.g. benevolence), and ascribes an implicit normative obligation to the trus-
tee to act appropriately. As we have seen, this aspect of the trustee’s “implied moral duty” is 
common to many trust definitions (Hosmer 1995). Importantly, it lends an emotional charge 
to the “cold” expectations of trustworthiness. When expectations of trustworthiness are disap-
pointed and the trustee fails trust, the trustor often experiences strong negative emotions, such 
as disappointment and anger. Robinson (1996) regards the failure of trust as a severe form of 
“psychological contract breach,” which elicits more intense repercussions than unfulfilled ex-
pectations, because general beliefs about respect for persons, codes of conduct, and assump-
tions of good faith and fair interaction—in short, moral values—are violated. This creates a 
                                                 
12 As Baldwin (1992: 461) points out, relational schemata have been described using other terms, such as interpersonal sche-
ma (Safran 1990a, b), working model (Bowlby 1969), relationship schema (Baldwin et al. 1990), relational model (Mitch-
ell 1988), and relational schema (Planalp 1987). We will here adopt the term “relational schema.” 
13 Specific relational schemata can even be applied to contexts and actors in which the particular significant other is not pre-
sent (Andersen & Chen 2002): “Interpersonal cues in a new person, such as the way he or she listens, hold one’s gaze, or 
draws one out, or even his or her smell, gestures, facial features, habits or attitudes, can all serve as applicability-based 
cues that contribute to the activation of a relevant significant-other representation, along with the associated relational 
self” (ibid. 623). This is called the principle of transference. 
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sense of wrongdoing, deception, and betrayal, with implications for the relationship in ques-
tion. Experimental studies reveal that even in simple, anonymous interactions, the violation of 
expectations results in negative emotional reactions and an impulse to punishment (Fehr & 
Gächter 2000a, b). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that reactive emotions are most likely a 
part of the subjective perception of (failed) trust as well. 
Unsurprisingly, a large number of authors have provided theoretical or empirical contributions 
suggesting a distinction between cognitive or affective forms of trust (e.g. Johnson-George & 
Swap 1982, Lewis & Weigert 1985a, b, Rempel et al. 1985, McAllister 1995, Jones & George 
1998). For example, Lewis and Weigert (1985b) propose a distinction between “cognitive 
trust” and “emotional trust.” While cognitive trust is primarily based on “cold” reasoning, and 
has a low level of affectivity, emotional trust is motivated primarily by positive affect for the 
trustee, and relies less on its cognitive foundation. Likewise, McAllister (1995: 25) proposes a 
distinction between one type of trust grounded in cognitive judgments of trustee characteris-
tics (benevolence, integrity, competence, predictability)—which he refers to as “cognition-
based trust”—and a second type, founded in affective bonds between individuals, referred to 
as “affect-based trust.” Jones and George (1998) differentiate between “conditional trust,” 
based on knowledge and positive expectations, and “unconditional trust,” which is based on 
shared interpretative schemes and positive affect. All three authors maintain that trust initially 
emerges from a cognitive foundation and shifts to a more affect-based form only with the con-
tinuation of a successful, ongoing trust relationship and the evolution of emotional ties be-
tween the interactants.  
Similarly, Rempel et al. (1985) distinguish between “predictability,” “dependability,” and 
“faith” as unique stages of trust development, where each stage requires an increasing invest-
ment in terms of time and emotional commitment. They suggest that the last stage (“faith”) is 
no longer rooted in past experience, but is noncognitive and purely emotional. Thus, faith “re-
flects an emotional security on the part of individuals, which enables them to go beyond the 
available evidence and feel, with assurance, that their partner will be responsive and caring 
despite the vicissitudes of an uncertain future” (Rempel et al. 1985: 97). Note that this is sur-
prisingly close to an affect-based reinterpretation of the idea of suspension. In the opposing 
perspectives of cognitive versus affective trust, an irrational element of suspension is found in 
the emotional content bred by “thick” trust. That is, once the affective bonds between individ-
uals become strong and affect-based trust develops, a trustor no longer attends to the cognitive 
basis of trust.  
In sum, affective states are an important aspect of the subjective experience of trust. They 
provide a trustor with signals concerning the nature and status of an initial or ongoing trust 
relation in a particular situation. Taking the “leap of faith,” a trustor chooses a trusting act be-
cause his “cold” expectations are sufficiently favorable and stable, and/or because a corre-
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sponding “hot” affective state makes the choice of a trusting act feel right. The automatic 
arousal of emotions and the presence of incidental moods can influence the judgment of 
trustworthiness, and emotional reactions or changes in the individual mood state can occur as 
a consequence of the cognitive appraisals which a trustor executes in a particular trust prob-
lem. Depending on the developmental stage of the trust relation, cognitive or affective ele-
ments may dominate the choice of a trusting act. But ultimately, trust relations provide the 
ground for a “mix of feeling and rational thinking” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 972), and both 
dimensions must be assumed to be of equal importance to our theoretical conceptualization of 
trust.  
Recent neuroscience studies suggest that the connection between cognition and affect is much 
closer than is portrayed in classical psychological and philosophical accounts, where the two 
are commonly treated as separate. In sharp contrast, cognition and affect seem to be insepara-
bly intertwined at all stages of human experience and development (Reis et al. 2000, Phelps 
2006). With respect to the phenomenon of trust, Hardin rightly concludes that “if we wish to 
separate non-cognitive from cognitive trusting behavior, we will most likely find them thor-
oughly run together in any kind of data we could imagine collecting” (2002: 69).  
According to Reis et al. (2000: 860f.), cognitive expectations provide an important “connect-
ing corridor” between cognition and emotion. Expectations allow the detection of discrepan-
cies between what can be expected, based upon past experience, and the current state of the 
environment. Many theories of emotion implicitly or explicitly assume that the detection of 
such a discrepancy is necessary for emotions to arise. The authors conclude that the fulfill-
ment or violation of expectations and the arousal of positive and negative emotions are tied 
together in every social relationship, and particularly so in trust relations. As pointed out be-
fore, one reason for the strong emotional charge of expectations of trustworthiness is that they 
include a normative element (that is, an obligation for benevolence, fairness, honesty, and in-
tegrity; a demand for compliance to socially shared norms of trust and trustworthiness). As a 
result, their violation does not simply result in a “cold” adjustment of expectations, but in a 
“hot” emotional reaction. Expectations of trustworthiness are often emotionally charged due 
to their implicit (or explicit) normative content, and the reference to moral values and social 
norms. This naturally relates trust back to the social systems surrounding a particular trust re-
lation, and to the cultural and institutional structures in which the trust problem is embedded.  
2.3. Conceptual Boundaries 
2.3.1. Familiarity and Confidence  
“Familiarity, confidence, and trust are different modes of asserting expectations—different 
types, as it were, of self-assurance” (Luhmann 1988: 99). This proposition of Luhmann, wide-
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ly accepted and regularly adopted into theoretical frameworks of trust, will serve as a starting 
point for a discussion of the conceptual boundaries of the concept of trust. As it is, the rela-
tionship between the three constructs is challenging. The concept of familiarity points to a 
central factor of human experience: it describes the certain acceptance of a socially construct-
ed reality as the unique reality, which is not questioned in terms of its consistence or validity. 
In consequence, familiarity implicitly precedes any action as an underlying assumption of tak-
en-for-grantedness in the “natural attitude” towards the life-world (Berger & Luckmann 1966, 
Schütz & Luckmann 1973). Familiarity means that situations which would otherwise be con-
sidered problematic can be automatically recognized as typical through the use of learned in-
terpretive schemes. This frees up cognitive resources to plan and engage in future-oriented 
actions. In this sense, familiarity must be regarded as a precondition to trust, and the condi-
tions of familiarity and its limits must be considered when thinking about trust (Luhmann 
1988). Luhmann asserts that familiarity is directed towards the past and things already known, 
while trust points toward the future and unknown things (namely the trustee’s intention and 
behavioral response). In essence, trust has to be achieved within in a familiar world, and trust 
and familiarity are “complementary ways of absorbing complexity, and are linked to one an-
other, in the same way as past and future are linked” (Luhmann 1979: 20) 
However, Luhmann’s analytic distinction is problematic. By definition, it precludes the possi-
bility of grounding trust in the recognition of the “typical” and in socially shared interpretive 
schemes, that is, in rule-based forms of trust, which rest upon familiarity with the cultural and 
normative content of the social systems and the institutions surrounding a trust relation. Luh-
mann argues that trust, in contrast to familiarity, “risks defining the future” (ibid.). Yet a 
recognition of the familiar implicitly does the same, because it presupposes an idealization of 
an ongoing, unproblematic present. Thus, familiarization is also future-oriented (Möllering 
2006a).
14
 On the other hand, trust also bears an orientation to the past, because it implicitly 
rests on the fact that trustworthiness has not been failed “so far,” and it extends this fact, as a 
taken-for-granted background assumption, to the present and the future (Endress 2001). The 
boundary between trust and familiarity is thus fuzzy and less clearly defined than suggested 
by the terminological framework of Luhmann. Möllering (2006a) argues that the process of 
familiarization, akin to suspension, must be regarded as a core element of trust, rather than as 
a “fringe consideration,” or an otherwise distinct concept. This is important, because trust can 
approximate familiarity when the situation is structured to such an extent that recognition of 
the typical is sufficient to induce trust. For example, Misztal (2001) discusses trust as an out-
come of situational normality, based on “familiarity, common faith, and values” (ibid. 322). In 
                                                 
14 Möllering (2006a) uses the term familiarization to describe an important aspect of interpretation. Familiarization describes 
recognition of the typical, and it includes the possibility that unfamiliar things, by recognition of their similarity to the typ-
ical, may be “brought in” to familiarity without interruption of the ongoing routine of pattern recognition. 
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a similar argument, McKnight et al. (1998) include beliefs of situational normality and struc-
tural assurance into their model of trust development, arguing that both antecedent factors 
have a direct impact on the trustor’s expectation of trustworthiness and his trusting inten-
tions.
15
  
Luhmann’s second analytic distinction between trust and confidence is equally problematic. It 
is a distinction made upon an assumption on the level of subjective experience: both trust and 
confidence refer to expectations of future contingencies that may disappoint. Yet the term 
confidence is applicable whenever an actor subjectively does not take into account the poten-
tial for damage and harm (Luhmann 1988). Luhmann refers to confidence as the “normal 
case.” Individuals do not expect their everyday routine to break down. They would, in fact, 
not be capable of acting, if such a state of permanent uncertainty prevailed. This links confi-
dence directly to familiarity and to the recognition of the typical. While familiarization de-
scribes the background process, confidence specifies its subjective experience. As such, con-
fidence can be understood as “a kind of blind trust” (Gambetta 1988a: 224), in which alterna-
tives are not taken into account and vulnerability is suppressed from actual perception. If such 
confident expectations are disappointed, the reasons for the failure must be found in external 
conditions. On the other hand, in the case of trust, an actor must be cognizant of the possibil-
ity of harm and vulnerability. If trust fails, the trustor will need to attribute the failure to his 
mistaken choice of action. Importantly, it is only when the trustor is aware of the potential of 
damage, of his vulnerability, and of the risks involved, that we can speak of trust (Luhmann 
1988: 98). But as we have seen, conceptualizations of trust widely diverge on the question of 
whether trust is a deliberate and intentional phenomenon, and a product of the conscious cal-
culation of risks. Luhmann’s distinction between confidence and trust, based on the criterion 
of subjective experience, categorically excludes the possibility of any form of blind trust. Yet 
such blindness is regarded as a characteristic feature of trust by other researchers. His distinc-
tion is problematic because trust problems can be solved in confidence as well. That is, in-
stances of “confident” trust (for example, when rule-based or affect-based) do not necessarily 
rely on a conscious and deliberate experience of risks and the consideration of potential harm 
and vulnerability. As Luhmann notes, a situation of confidence may turn into a situation of 
trust when the inherent risks become perceptible and the alternative of avoidance (that is, dis-
trust) is taken into account, or vice versa. The problem of how and when a situation of confi-
dence turns into a situation of trust is, as he notes, intricate, and it points to the centrality of 
the process of interpretation to our understanding of trust.  
                                                 
15 According to McKnight et al. (1998), situational normality beliefs indicate the appearance that things are normal and in 
proper order, which facilitates successful interaction. This refers to the concept of familiarity, and includes the actor’s ac-
quaintance with social roles. Structural assurance beliefs, on the other hand, involve the opinion that trustworthiness will 
be guaranteed because contextual conditions, such as promises, contract, and regulations are in place. The authors sub-
sume these two factors under the label “institution-based trust.” 
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Owing to the fact that trust and confidence are convertible, Luhmann observes that “the rela-
tion between confidence and trust becomes a highly complex research issue” (1988: 98), and 
admits that, “belonging to the same family of self-assurances, familiarity, confidence, and 
trust seem to depend on each other and are, at the same time, capable of replacing each other 
to a certain extent” (ibid. 101, emphasis added). In developing a broad theory of trust, we will 
have to pin down the relation between these concepts, and explain which factors, both internal 
and external, facilitate the transition between these different states of subjective experience. In 
short, what is needed is a theory of interpretation that is capable of causally explaining the 
emergence of either type of “self-assurance.” As will be argued in the course of this work, a 
major factor that determines the subjective experience of trust is the information processing 
state of the cognitive system. In this perspective confidence and trust, which face the same 
structural prerequisites, differ mainly with respect to the degree of rationality and elaboration 
involved in dealing with the trust problem. 
2.3.2. Self-Trust 
The concept of trust can also be applied in a self-referential way. More pointedly, self-trust 
denotes cases of trust where subject and object of trust are the same. This literally means to 
“trust in one’s own identity.” Govier (1993: 105f.) claims that self-trust is completely analo-
gous to interpersonal trust, in that it includes the same defining features: (1) positive expecta-
tions about one’s own motivations and competence, (2) a self-attribution of personal integrity, 
(3) a willingness to rely on oneself and also to accept risks from one’s own decisions, and (4) 
a disposition to see oneself in a positive light. But what would constitute a trust problem with 
respect to one’s own identity? In our terminology, a problem of self-trust would portray an 
aspect of uncertainty with respect to one’s own future preferences, motivations or compe-
tence; it thus recognizes the possibility of preference change or a deterioration of skills. Es-
sentially, it would amount to the question whether some investitive action can be justified by 
one’s own anticipated future preferences and motivation. But the concept of action always 
includes a motivation in the form of the desired ends, induced by the current preferences, and 
the purposively chosen means which cater to their fulfillment. If an action is chosen for the 
realization of some end, this implicitly rests on the assumption that the preferences which 
have motivated the action will remain stable, and that utility can be realized accordingly in the 
future. If preferences were completely transitory and random, an actor would be incapable of 
action. Uncertainty with regard to future preferences is most unlikely: we still know ourselves 
the best. A suitable way of making sense of “self-trust,” then, is to regard it as a type of “con-
fidence” in one’s own competence, skill or character qualities.  
48 
 
Thus, the term self-trust is closer to, and should be consistently replaced by, the concept of 
self-esteem and self-“confidence.”16 These refer to the balance of positive and negative con-
ceptions about oneself and the certainty of the clarity of such self-conceptions (Banaji & Pren-
tice 1994). Self-esteem and self-confidence are positively related to trust: high self-esteem 
increases the readiness to engage in trusting behavior because individuals with high self-
esteem tend to subjectively experience an augmented feeling of control over the environment, 
which is conducive to the acceptance of risks (Luhmann 1988: 82). The mechanism behind 
this effect is referred to as the “illusion of control” bias (McKnight et al. 1998, Goldberg et al. 
2005). McKnight et al. (1998) add illusion of control to a set of cognitive processes that inter-
act with other antecedent factors to elevate expectations of trustworthiness. It moderates the 
effect of general dispositions to trust (that is, it increases the “illusion” that generalized expec-
tancies apply to particular instances), of categorization processes such as stereotyping (that is, 
it builds confidence that applied categories are correct), and of structural assurance beliefs 
(that is, it reassures the conviction that structural safeguards are secure and effectively procure 
trustworthiness). In short, self-esteem is not a direct antecedent to trust, but rather an indirect 
antecedent which influences or “biases” the degree of certainty that a trustor can have with 
respect to his expectations. It is relevant to a conception of trust inasmuch as it indirectly in-
fluences how individuals deal with others during an interaction and how they approach the 
environment in general. 
2.3.3. System Trust 
System trust, in contrast to interpersonal trust, refers to abstract institutions or social systems 
as objects of trust. Luhmann (1979: 48f.) introduces the concept of system trust by analyzing 
the monetary system and its stability, which, as Luhmann argues, is maintained by the trust of 
the participating individuals in the functioning of the system as a whole. System trust is creat-
ed and sustained by the continual, ongoing, confirmatory experience of the system’s function-
ing. In contrast to interpersonal trust, system trust does not concern social uncertainty with 
respect to another individual’s action, but the global characteristics of an institution: its prima-
ry goals, its legitimacy, structure, and operation, and the effectiveness of the sanction mecha-
nisms which structure and control interaction in social settings (Endress 2002: 59). This no-
tion of trust in the system, especially at the macrolevel of society, has been a prominent topic 
of trust research (Fukuyama 1995, Putnam 1995, Sztompka 1999, Cook 2001). Trust in the 
reliability, effectiveness and legitimacy of money, law, and other cultural symbols warrant 
their smooth functioning and constant reproduction, and the absence of system trust facilitates 
                                                 
16 Confidence is not used in Luhmann’s sense here. Govier (1993) uses the terms self-confidence and self-trust interchangea-
bly. Her conceptual ambiguity is revealed most clearly when discussing the absence of self-trust, or distrust in oneself: she 
compares this to a “lack of confidence” (ibid. 108) and “extreme self-doubt” (ibid.). These conceptual slippages go to 
show that what she is really addressing is self-esteem, or self-confidence. In her work, the analytical difference between 
self-trust and self-esteem remains veiled. 
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the deterioration, decline, and ultimately the disruption of a social system (Lewis & Weigert 
1985b).  
It is important to distinguish the role that institutions can take as a basis of expectation for-
mation in a trust problem from their role as an object of trust. We have referred to the former 
case as rule-based, institutional trust, and we will denote the latter case as system trust. In this 
sense, institutional trust is a manifestation of system trust in a particular interaction. Luhmann 
argues that system trust ultimately depends on a form of generalized trust, or “trust in trust” 
(1979: 66f.). That is, system trust rests on the assumption that other actors in the social system 
do equally trust in it. According to Luhmann, system trust is impersonal, diffuse, rests on gen-
eralizations, and—in contrast to interpersonal trust—is marked by a low degree of emotional 
investment and affectivity.
17
 An actor who participates in a social system to which he main-
tains a high level of system trust assumes that the actions of other actors in the system are ef-
fectively regulated and structured by the institutionalized norms, rules, and procedures. Most 
importantly, system trust includes the expectation that norm violations are effectively sanc-
tioned. These background assumptions, shaped by system trust, lay the ground for institution-
al trust to emerge. Luhmann proposes that the basis of system trust is the appearance of nor-
mality (1979: 22, Lewis & Weigert 1985a: 463). This indicates that there is a link joining sys-
tem trust to the concepts of familiarity and confidence: system trust situationally manifests 
itself in the form of taken-for-granted background assumptions, that is, in familiarity with and 
confidence in the functioning of the system and its legitimate primary goals, rules, and sanc-
tioning potential. At the same time, system trust is the basis for institutional trust. If a trustor 
does not believe that a social institution is effectively regulating and sanctioning the behavior 
of others, then there is no sense in grounding expectations of trustworthiness in assumed 
norm-compliance. While institutional trust concerns the concrete interpretation of the institu-
tional rules with respect to the trustee’s action, system trust concerns assumptions concerning 
their general validity, applicability, and enforcement.  
At the same time, successful interpersonal trust relations that were structured by institutional 
trust, and in which trust was not failed, strengthen system trust. This exemplifies how dyadic 
trust relations can be regarded as “building blocks” of larger systems of trust (Coleman 1990: 
188). For example, Giddens (1990: 79f.) argues that trust in the medical system is developed 
to a large extent through experiences with doctors and medical professionals who represent 
and “embody” the institutions of medicine, and to whom a patient develops a concrete inter-
personal trust relation. In modern societies, a dense network of such institutional intermediar-
                                                 
17 The last proposition is problematic. As we have seen, trust between two actors may also be rather non-affective, calcula-
tive, or rest on generalized expectations. On the other hand, system trust clearly has an affective dimension (consider, for 
example, the intense emotional reactions that might arise in response to a violation of an oath of political office, or to cor-
ruption). 
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ies of trust controls the agency of trust between the microlevel and individual actions and the 
macrolevel of system trust (Zucker 1986, Shapiro 1987, Coleman 1990, Giddens 1990, Mish-
ra 1996). These intermediary institutions—for example courts, product testing agencies, and 
doctors’ surgeries—function as generators of both (rule-based) interpersonal trust and system 
trust, by providing generalized expectations for trust relations among a number of otherwise 
anonymous actors.  
With high system trust, institutions can serve as “carriers” of trust. Trust in the system is re-
garded as a public-good resource which facilitates the production of social capital (Ripperger 
1998: 164ff.). Since trust relations are embedded into a social environment, system trust is 
highly relevant for interpersonal trust: a low level of system trust makes interpersonal trust 
“more risky” (Lewis & Weigert 1985a: 463). Simply put, low system trust reduces the basis of 
any institutional-based form of trust. Trustors then cannot base trust on structural assurance 
and on the institutions which normally control and regulate trust and trustworthy action. On 
the other hand, high levels of system trust can have a positive effect: interpersonal trust be-
comes less risky because a trustworthy response based, for example, on institutional rules can 
be confidently expected. In sum, “trust occurs within a framework of interaction which is in-
fluenced by both personality and social system, and cannot be exclusively associated with ei-
ther” (Luhmann 1979: 6). As a basis for institutional trust, system trust is an important factor 
that shapes interactions and trust relations on the microlevel. 
2.3.4. Distrust 
The concept of distrust has received less scholarly attention than trust, but an ever-growing 
part of the trust literature focuses on its relation to trust and the problems of its theoretical 
conceptualization (Worchel 1979, Sitkin & Roth 1993, Bies & Tripp 1996, Lewicki et al. 
1998, McKnight & Chervany 2001, Lewicki et al. 2006, Schul et al. 2008, Keyton & Smith 
2009). Although the link between trust and distrust seems to be straightforward, a closer look 
reveals that their relation is intricate and warrants closer inspection. 
Luhmann (1979: 71ff.) regards trust and distrust as “functional alternatives” among which the 
trustor necessarily has to choose, and characterizes distrust as “positive expectation of injuri-
ous action” (ibid. 72). Barber (1983) defines distrust as “rationally based expectations that 
technically competent role performance and/or fiduciary obligation and responsibility will not 
be forthcoming” (ibid. 166): by adding the word “not” to his definition of trust, he creates a 
definition of distrust. Deutsch (1958) uses the term “suspicion” to denote a state in which a 
trustor “perceives that he is an object of malevolent behavior” (ibid. 267). Such a state has 
consequences for the trustor’s motivation to engage in trusting behavior. Distrust manifests 
itself in the choice of the safe alternative instead of the trusting act. The trustor does not trans-
fer control over events or resources to the trustee, and forfeits the potential gains that could be 
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achieved with trust and trustworthy response. He does not become vulnerable to the actions of 
the trustee, or confront social uncertainty with respect to the trustee’s choice. In short, distrust 
objectively minimizes vulnerability and social uncertainty, and it can be regarded as the “min-
imax” solution to a trust problem (Heimer 2001). It has been associated with increased moni-
toring and defense behavior (Schul et al. 2008), with refusal of cooperation, with reliance on 
contracts and formal agreements, and with neither party accepting the other’s influence or 
granting autonomy to the other (McKnight & Chervany 2001).  
From such a perspective, trust and distrust range on a single dimension and are mutually ex-
clusive (Worchel 1979); they reflect opposite levels of the same underlying construct 
(McKnight & Chervany 2001). This “bipolar” (Lewicki et al. 1998) perspective on trust and 
distrust emphasizes that, as trust decreases, distrust increases. Accounts in the cognitive be-
havioral tradition support such a conception, in which distrust is regarded as a low level of 
trust, resulting in the choice of the safe alternative. Recall that Gambetta (1988) locates expec-
tations of trustworthiness on a probabilistic distribution with values between complete distrust 
(0) and complete trust (1), with a region of indifference (0.5) in the middle. The choice of a 
trusting act requires that an expectation exceeds a subjective threshold value. If expectations 
do not exceed the threshold value, distrust and the choice of the safe alternative will prevail. 
In essence, distrust simply means that expectations of trustworthiness are unfavorable, hence 
the trustor’s trusting intention and willingness to become vulnerable are low, and do not sup-
port the behavioral taking of risks. In consequence, the antecedent conditions to distrust are 
opposite to those of trust. Distrust can be a result of perceived value incongruence (Sitkin & 
Roth 1993, Jones & George 1998), it can be triggered by unfavorable assessments of trustee 
characteristics (including competence, benevolence, integrity, and predictability), and it is fos-
tered by the absence of structural assurance and a lack of perceived situational normality 
(McKnight & Chervany 2001). 
With respect to the affective dimension, distrust is commonly related to negatively valenced 
emotions like doubt, wariness, caution, defensiveness, anger, fear, hate, and feelings of be-
trayal and vulnerability (Lewicki et al. 1998, Keyton & Smith 2009). Thinking in terms of 
“cognitive appraisals,” the arousal of these emotions mirrors the formation of negative and 
unfavorable expectations during the process of interpretation. The resulting emotions signal a 
potential threat to the trustor. Importantly, distrust is often regarded as a reflective phenome-
non, relying on systematic and elaborated processing strategies which allow the trustor to take 
rational decisions towards necessary protective measures (Luhmann 1979, Lewicki et al. 
1998, Endress 2002: 76). In this line, Schul et al. (2008) directly connect trust and distrust to 
information-processing strategies. In their conceptualization, trust and distrust span a continu-
um of mental states, which contain, as extreme end points, (1) the use of routine strategies and 
a feeling of security in the case of trust, and (2) the nonroutine use of elaborated processing 
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strategies, accompanied by a feeling of doubt, in the state of distrust. While trust is regarded 
as a “default” state, distrust prevails whenever the environment signals that something is not 
normal, that is, when situational normality is disturbed. Likewise, Luhmann argues that dis-
trust develops “through the sudden appearance of inconsistencies” (1979: 73), and triggers a 
“need” for more information (this suggests an interesting connection between distrust and dis-
ruptions of familiarity, see chapter 4). The resulting elaborate and protective strategies that the 
trustor uses “give distrust that emotionally tense and often frantic character which distin-
guishes it from trust” (ibid. 71). 
On the other hand, some researchers have drawn scholarly attention to the possibility that trust 
and distrust may be separate, but linked (Sitkin & Roth 1993, Lewicki et al. 1998, McKnight 
& Chervany 2001, Lewicki et al. 2006, Keyton & Smith 2009). In this perspective, trust and 
distrust are assumed to be independent constructs. The two-dimensional approach is grounded 
in two observations: Firstly, from a structural standpoint, relationships are “multifaceted and 
multiplex” (Lewicki et al. 1998: 442), offering a host of different contexts and situations in 
which two actors face trust problems. Thus, in the context of repeated interaction and social 
embeddedness, actors maintain different trust relations to each other simultaneously. Trust is 
content-specific: we may trust someone with respect to X, but not with respect to Y. Conse-
quentially, within the same relationship, both trust and distrust may “peacefully coexist” 
(Lewicki 2006: 192), since they present solutions to different specific trust problems. Second-
ly, proponents of a two-dimensional approach emphasize that psychological research exam-
ines the possibility that positively and negatively valenced emotions are not simple opposites. 
While emotions have traditionally been regarded as bipolar and mutually exclusive (Russell & 
Carroll 1999), this view has been challenged by the idea that positive and negative affect are 
independent, differing even on a neural basis (Cacioppo & Berntson 1994, Larsen et al. 2001).  
This suggests that trust and distrust—often portrayed as entailing opposed affective states—
may also be independent. Although trust and distrust represent “certain expectations” 
(Lewicki et al 1998: 444), the content of these expectations may be different: while trust ap-
preciates beneficial conduct from the trustee, distrust points toward the apprehension of harm 
and defection. That is, a low level of trust may not generally equate to a high level of distrust, 
and vice versa. Lewicki et al (1998), in favor of a multidimensional approach, argue that rela-
tionships are dynamic and that trust and distrust are sustained at specific levels akin to a “qua-
si stationary equilibrium.” During interaction, the “operational levels” of trust and distrust 
move on both dimensions, and change the nature of the “relationship orientation.”18 This sug-
                                                 
18 The ideal-type condition of “high trust/low distrust” is, for example, characterized by having “no reason to suspect the 
other,” high “value-congruence,” and “strong positive affect,” while distrust is characterized as “cautious” and “guarded” 
behavior, in which a trustor follows the principle of “trust but verify,” “fears” undesirable events, and attributes “sinister 
intentions” to the trustee (Lewicki et al. 1998: 446f.).  
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gests to the reader that trust and distrust may exist at the same point in time when the trustor 
faces a trust problem. But how can we understand this “simultaneity”? Is the conceptual inde-
pendence of the two constructs theoretically justifiable? 
Let us step back and examine the issue from a general perspective. The conceptual difficulty 
with the two-dimensional approach to trust and distrust arises, as is argued in the following, 
mainly because objective structural conditions and subjective experience are confused. With a 
clear distinction of the levels of analysis, the ostensible contradictions disappear, and it is easy 
to see that the multidimensional approach does neither have a solid and logical conceptual 
foundation, nor add to our understanding of the trust phenomenon. 
First, on the level of objective structure, a trustor must either choose a trusting act and become 
vulnerable, or choose the alternative of distrust and not become vulnerable, for a specific trust 
problem and a specific content X. Given that actors are socially embedded and interact repeat-
edly, consecutive trust problems may be solved differently. But many day-to-day trust prob-
lems resemble one-shot situations and do not allow for the “simultaneous” existence of trust 
and distrust. It is problematic to invoke the notion of “simultaneity” when really what is 
meant is that every trust problem may have a different solution. The domain-specificness of 
trust in ongoing relations was introduced earlier through the competence dimension of trustee 
characteristics, and it has already been included in our basic definition of a trust relation, in 
which “A trusts B with respect to X.” Different solutions to different trust problems in repeat-
ed interaction do not collide with a unidimensional view of trust and distrust. Of course, the 
experience of a failure of trust will change future expectations of trustworthiness, and there-
fore cater to the potential uncertainty a trustor may subjectively experience. But the domain-
specificness of trust does not logically imply its conceptual independence from distrust. 
Second, in a psychological sense, and on the level of subjective experience, the simultaneous 
existence of trust and distrust may be better described as the arousal of ambivalent affective 
states. Ambivalence denotes a state in which positive and negative affective reactions towards 
a target collide (Priester & Petty 1996).
19
 Recall that conflicting and ambivalent emotions may 
very well be a result of “cognitive appraisals” when a trust problem is subjectively defined. 
Deutsch has already noted that “when the fulfillment of trust is not certain, the individual will 
be exposed to conflicting tendencies to engage in and to avoid engaging in trusting behavior” 
(1958: 268). But as Maier (2009) has argued, trust ultimately either feels right, or it does not. 
In fact, ambivalent affective states are short-lived and transitory, and individuals, for the ma-
jority of their everyday lives, can effectively reduce affective ambivalence to a state with a 
clear valence (Larsen et al. 2001). This argument also reverberates in Möllering’s (2001) idea 
                                                 
19 For example, fear and excitement may occur in a new and unknown situation. 
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of suspension, which addresses those cases where the resolution of subjectively experienced 
ambivalence is conducive to the successful build-up of trust.  
All in all, while the unidimensional view seems to be appropriate on the descriptive level of 
objective structure and behavioral outcomes, a view that admits the possibility of ambivalent 
emotional states seems to be appropriate on the level of subjective perception. Ambivalent 
emotions can be a result of expectations which are not favorable, and reside in the “region of 
indifference” or below. However, the experience of ambivalent emotions does not logically 
imply the conceptual independence of trust and distrust. It merely indicates and signals to the 
trustee that expectations are close to unfavorable, nearing the threshold at which distrust will 
be exercised.  
Lastly, the two-dimensional position does add to the “potpourri” of trust definitions, as it im-
plies illogical types, such as high trust paired with high distrust (Schoorman et al. 2007). The 
definitions and constructs which have been developed to describe distrust are identical to 
those of trust, but merely formulated as opposites (McKnight & Chervany 2001).
20
 In short, 
there is no theoretical advantage gained and no explanative value added by treating them as 
“separate, but linked” constructs. Examining theoretical and empirical work, Schoorman et al. 
(2007) conclude that there is “no credible evidence that a concept of distrust which is concep-
tually different from trust is theoretically or empirically viable” (ibid. 350). Because a unidi-
mensional perspective is theoretically more sparse, more tractable, and merges more easily 
with psychological accounts of trust versus distrust and their relation to information-
processing strategies (e.g. Schul et al. 2008), we will maintain it in the following. The preced-
ing discussion nonetheless shows how important it is to have a clear distinction between ob-
jective structural conditions, potentially diverging subjective experiences, and the theoretical 
concepts developed to incorporate both of these into our understanding of the phenomenon of 
interpersonal trust. 
2.4. From Structure to Experience 
The preceding analysis of the objective structure of trust and its subjective experience has de-
lineated core elements of the trust phenomenon and served to introduce important theoretical 
concepts used in the trust literature. Taken together, publications from different research tradi-
tions and paradigms seem to converge on some fundamental points. Most importantly, there is 
broad consensus on the objective structure of trust and on the conditions which give rise to a 
                                                 
20 “Most trust theorists now agree that trust and distrust are separate constructs that are the opposites of each other” 
(McKnight & Chervany 2001: 42). The authors develop separate conceptual models for each construct, which are com-
pletely identical but contain opposite elements, such as “distrusting beliefs” of competence, benevolence, integrity, and 
predictability, “institution-based distrust,” “distrusting intentions,” and “distrust-related behavior.”  
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trust problem. A trust problem is marked by a particular incentive structure and asymmetric, 
imperfect information; the choice of a trusting act entails objective vulnerability and results in 
social uncertainty with respect to the trustee’s actions. This combination of opportunity and 
vulnerability is the sine qua non of a trust problem. 
The crux of trust research, however, is the question of how trustors subjectively handle the 
objective structure of trust; how they make sense of the structural conditions they face. Most 
trust researchers agree that trust is a special way of dealing with social uncertainty and imper-
fect information. Trust points to the particular nature of the expectations involved and a par-
ticular way that they emerge and form, and it additionally indicates affective processes that 
accompany and shape the subjective experience of trust. When choosing to trust, a trustor by-
passes social uncertainty and convinces himself that the choice of a trusting act is justified. 
But the propositions made by researchers to illustrate this idea are controversial. Formulated 
very generally, the question that provokes diverging views on trust is: how does the objective 
structure of trust translate into subjective experience? How do trustors deal with the social un-
certainty present in a trust problem? How is the choice of a trusting act “decided” on? In es-
sence, the concept of trust is blurry, because researchers are unclear about the role of interpre-
tation; they disagree on how trustors subjectively perceive and deal with the trust problem. 
The process of a subjective “definition of the situation,” although crucial to an understanding 
of the trust phenomenon, is often mentioned in passing only, or it is taken for granted and 
rarely dealt with explicitly. In short, the conversion from structure to experience, and the cog-
nitive mechanisms involved in doing so, present a “missing link” in trust theory.  
Consequently in the transition from structure to experience, the concept of trust often loses its 
clarity and precision. We have encountered this problem, for example, when dealing with the 
question of vulnerability. As an objective fact, vulnerability is undoubtedly present in all trust 
problems. But authors disagree on whether it is subjectively experienced by a trustor, or not. 
When trust is defined as “willingness to be vulnerable,” it involves a conscious perception of 
vulnerability, by definition. But this is contrary to theoretical accounts which instead relate 
trust to the suppression of vulnerability; to a sort of innate security and the absence of doubt. 
In going from structure to experience, the aspect of vulnerability can be retained or rejected, 
and the way we deal with it depends on our assumptions concerning the process of interpreta-
tion. Both notions seem equally plausible, and to exclude either possibility a priori would be 
unnecessary restrictive to a broad conceptualization of interpersonal trust. To answer the ques-
tion of how and when we can expect vulnerability to be part of subjective experience, it is es-
sential to be more precise about the “missing link” between structure and experience. 
We find the same problem when we address the relation between objective uncertainty and 
the subjective perception of risk or ambiguity. From a cognitive behavioral perspective, the 
perception of subjective risk is required, built upon the retrieval of imperfect information, and 
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expressed in unambiguous expectations. This notion is rather narrow in comparison to the oft-
purported “leap of faith,” which enables the trustor to cross “the gorge of the unknowable 
from the land of interpretation into the land of expectation” (Möllering 2001: 412). Although 
many authors agree, with Lewis and Weigert (1985b), that trust allows for a “cognitive leap” 
away from social uncertainty and into stable expectations, a precise formulation of this pro-
cess is rarely offered. It can be regarded as the stabilization of ambiguity into risk, or an ex-
trapolation of either form of subjective uncertainty into subjective certainty. Clearly, the expe-
rience of trust, and hence our conceptions of it, will differ between these possible readings of 
suspension. On top of that, if suspension is part of the trust phenomenon, it adds a further, 
nonrational element to a purely cognitive account of trust; it extends our understanding of the 
concept to something “beyond” the retrieval of knowledge. In going from structure to experi-
ence, objective uncertainty may be retained, reduced, or even suspended, and the answer de-
pends on our assumptions concerning the process of interpretation. Möllering (2001) conse-
quently, and rightly, argues that the interpretation and the subjective definition of the situation 
must be regarded as key processes to trust.  
A direct reference to the process of the definition of the situation, and a plea for its importance 
in our understanding of trust, was made by Jones and George (1998), who develop their ideas 
with recourse to the paradigm of symbolic interactionism (Mead 1967, Blumer 1969). In their 
contribution, the notion of “unconditional trust” expresses the idea that trust is built upon a 
joint social definition of the situation, based on shared interpretive schemes which contain 
values, attitudes, and affect, and which serve as structuring devices for actions in the trust 
problem, facilitating the suspension of perceived risks and doubt (Jones & George 1998: 
535f.). However, according to the authors, this requires that the actors involved have already 
developed a strong confidence in each other’s values and trustworthiness through repeated 
interaction, and that they hold favorable assessments of each other’s characteristics, which, 
taken together facilitate the experience of positive affect. “Conditional trust,” on the other 
hand, is purely based on knowledge and a favorable assessment of trustworthiness. It does not 
go along with an equal amount of suspension and affectivity—the actors only engage in what 
Jones and George term a “pretense of suspension.” The differentiation between these two 
types of trust closely resembles the many contributions in which “cognition-based” and “af-
fect-based” forms of trust are treated as separate ideal types. Again, the “missing link” of in-
terpretation seems to be of prime importance. In going from structure to experience, trustors 
can use different strategies to deal with a trust problem, resulting in conceptually different 
“types” of trust. Clearly, the emergence of these “types” rests on our assumptions concerning 
the process of interpretation. A broad theory of trust must predict whether, how, and when 
trustors will use different strategies to solve a trust problem, and it should demarcate the types 
of trust that will consequently appear.  
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Another instance that highlights the importance of the definition of the situation for the sub-
jective experience of trust is the question of affect. As we have seen, short-lived emotions 
arise during active interpretive processes (“cognitive appraisal”). The situation is scrutinized 
for its impact on well-being and framed for its valence, either as an opportunity or a threat. 
Expectations are generated, and, finally emotions surface as a response to these interpretive 
efforts. These affective reactions include a broad range of emotions, which mirror how favor-
able the expectations of trustworthiness are. But researchers have also related trust to relative-
ly stable and long-lived positive mood states which function as perceptive filters and directly 
impact expectation formation and preferences. In this perspective, a “trustful” affective state 
precedes the conscious formation of expectations, straightforwardly biasing them. What is 
more, affect-based forms of trust are sometimes seen to emerge exclusively of any deliberate 
efforts to analyze the situation. Trustors choose a trusting act based on positive feelings, with-
out further scrutinizing the trust problem, and without further thinking about the risks in-
volved. That is, in going from structure to experience, affect can be a by-product of a con-
trolled reasoning process, or it can be seen to operate preconsciously, activated for example 
by an automatic use and application of interpretive schemes or relational schemata. Affect 
may precede, replace, and bias cognitive expectations and, when used as information in its 
own right, can serve as a quick-step heuristic to interpersonal trust. Whether, how, and when 
affect is used heuristically to inform the choice of a trusting act, again depends on our under-
standing and conceptualization of the process of interpretation.  
Lastly, the normative dimension of trust highlights the importance of the social systems into 
which a trust relation is embedded. Cultural and normative systems deliver the moral values, 
cultural practices, and social norms that structure interaction in general, and interactions in a 
trust problem in particular. If norm-compliance is regarded as a viable factor in determining 
trustworthiness expectations, then interpretation is the implicit propellant behind the emer-
gence of rule-based forms of trust. As we have seen, rule-based forms of trust are often re-
garded as noncalculative forms of “shallow trust” (Messick & Kramer 2001), which do not 
require deep, systematic processing efforts. They rest on shared understandings regarding the 
system of rules specifying appropriate behavior, instead of being the result of a rational calcu-
lation of consequences. Implicitly, what is taken for granted here is that actors can easily iden-
tify situations in which “shallow trust” is feasible, and adjust their strategies accordingly. In 
other words, in going from structure to experience, trust may approximate a rational choice 
built upon the calculation of expected utility; it may also emerge based on the “shallow” use 
of rules and other heuristics, such as norm or relational schemata. Yet again, the “missing 
link” of interpretation and our assumptions concerning how people make sense of their envi-
ronment and use the available knowledge are decisive in describing whether, how, and when 
we can predict trust to be more calculative-, or rule-based (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Interpretation – the “missing link” in trust research 
 
Overall, when thinking about trust, the process of the subjective definition of the situation 
seems to be key in specifying the phenomenological foundation, the “mindset” of trust, and 
the associated subjective experiences. The decisive question that makes trust so difficult to 
grasp is that of how objective structural conditions translate into subjective experience. In or-
der to understand trust, we must sharpen our understanding of the “missing link” of interpreta-
tion. Controversial accounts of trust arise because different authors specify different aspects of 
our social reality as being relevant to the problem of interpersonal trust, and, in doing so, they 
implicitly make divergent assumptions concerning the underlying process of interpretation. 
This extant state of affairs gives the impetus for the present work, which seeks to open the 
“black box” of interpretation in order to advance our understanding of the trust phenomenon.  
The argument that will be developed in this remainder of the book can be summarized thus: to 
understand why there are such dramatic differences between our understanding of the objec-
tive structure of trust and its subjective experience, it is necessary to connect the process of 
interpretation to the concept of adaptive rationality. Recent social psychological and neuro-
logical research suggests that information can be processed at different degrees of elaboration 
and detail. In light of the discrepancies presented above, the assumption that actors are some-
times “more rational” and sometimes “less rational” seems to be a promising approach to 
remedying the current contradictions. If we think of actors as being capable of a flexible de-
gree of rationality, then we can understand, for example, why vulnerability and risk are per-
ceived at some times, and why actors suspend them at other times. Broadly speaking, adaptive 
rationality must be regarded as an important underlying dimension of the trust concept, de-
termining the different strategies which actors use to solve a trust problem. Interpretation is 
then the “motor” behind the adjustment of the degree of rationality involved. Although many 
authors implicitly refer to adaptive rationality when specifying different types of trust, it has 
not been systematically incorporated into current theoretical frameworks, nor given the central 
status it deserves. What is more, a precise formal model that allows for a tractable conceptual-
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ization of adaptive rationality as an endogenous factor of interpretation has not yet been put 
forward. The present work seeks to advance our understanding of trust by linking it directly to 
interpretation, adaptive rationality, and the choice of a trusting act as a behavioral outcome. 
Ultimately, it seeks to contribute to the development of a unifying framework in which clear 
theoretical predictions about the different forms, types, and nuances of trust can be made. 
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3. Origins and Explanations: An Interdisciplinary Approach 
“Experience molds the psychology of trust” (Hardin 1993: 508). 
Having defined the major components of the trust concept—its objective structure and subjec-
tive experience—we can now take a closer look at the theoretical approaches and major re-
search paradigms of trust research. The overarching idea in this discussion is to provide an 
interdisciplinary perspective and to outline the commonality, mutuality, and similarities that 
allow the existing theory to be integrated into a broader theoretical framework. In short, the 
psychological, sociological, and economic disciplines, by each emphasizing different aspects 
of the trust phenomenon, provide a unique perspective on trust that deserves proper and de-
tailed presentation. In developing an interdisciplinary perspective, the aim is not to discuss the 
pros and cons of each paradigm and to finally opt for one of them, or rule out another. Instead, 
we want to carve out the reasons behind their incompatibility and the lack of cross-
disciplinary fertilization. As we will see, the most essential factor which prevents the devel-
opment of a more comprehensive and integrative perspective is, across disciplines, an insuffi-
cient consideration of the aspect of adaptive rationality.  
The discipline of psychology explores the subjective experience of trust in the form of internal 
cognitions and affect along with the conditions of its emergence, maintenance, and disruption. 
This entails an analysis of the developmental aspects of trust, both in terms of “basic trust,” as 
an individual disposition and a personal trait, as well as the long-term development of mutual 
trust relations. Psychological learning theories provide an answer to an important prerequisite 
of trust: the presence or absence of trust-related knowledge, and its generalization into sche-
matic and typical knowledge structures, in the form of schemata and mental models. For that 
reason, learning theories are an indispensable ingredient in a broad theory of trust. Moreover, 
developmental models converge in their view that, at more mature stages of the trust relation, 
trust may become “blind,” and move away from its cognitive basis. This indicates a noncogni-
tive, irrational “leap of faith” in trust, which cannot be explained by sole reference to 
knowledge alone. Trust development is portrayed as occurring in qualitatively different stag-
es, in which the prevalent type of trust changes from calculus-based to affect-based forms. 
Essentially, the typologies created in psychological developmental models point to an increas-
ingly unconditional application of existing dyadic knowledge structures (i.e. relational sche-
mata), paired with the rise of schema-triggered affect and the trustors’ reliance on subjective 
emotional experiences as a “quick-step” to trust. 
Sociological approaches, on the other hand, have emphasized the relational character of trust 
and the social embeddedness of the trust problem in a larger cultural and institutional context. 
For one, this means that trust-related knowledge is adopted during socialization by a contin-
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ued internalization of the social stock of knowledge; it therefore is socially predefined. This 
opens up the avenue of regarding the prevalent “culture of trust” in a society, and the institu-
tions which shape the way that trustors deal with the trust problem, by referring to the cultural 
and normative context as a source of trust-related knowledge. Institutions that help to estab-
lish trust come in the form of, for example, social norms, social roles, or habitual routines. So-
ciologists have advocated the view that action need not be instrumental on all occasions, and 
that the norms and rules, social roles and routines used to solve trust problems may override 
rational considerations if the actors follow them guided by a “logic of appropriateness.” It is 
worth considering the functions that trust assumes in an individual sense and in a social sense. 
Individually, it can be understood as a mechanism for the reduction of social uncertainty; so-
cially, it is a mechanism for the production of social capital and social integration. The critical 
functions that trust assumes in social interactions warrant that it often becomes institutionally 
protected—for example, by the establishment of norms of reciprocity and other moral norms 
(keeping promises, telling the truth, etc.). Thus, the institutional and cultural conditions that 
shape the emergence of trust must be respected when we think about how trustors solve trust 
problems. At the same time, sociological approaches emphasize an unconditional element in 
trust that is grounded on a different “logic” than the rational consideration of utility. It roots 
trust in the internalized institutional and cultural rules which actors can routinely apply, based 
on taken-for-grantedness, situational normality, and structural assurance. 
Finally, the economic paradigm, which represents a current mainstream of trust research, 
demonstrates a vigorous attempt to formally specify and causally explain trust. In the rational 
choice approach, trust is essentially conceived of as a rational decision, made by trustors who 
engage in value-expectancy tradeoffs to discern the best alternative for proceeding, given the 
information, preferences, and constraints that they face. Modeling trust warrants that all pa-
rameters governing the choice of a trusting act must be formally captured and brought into a 
functional relation, so that the axiom of utility maximization can find its expression in a par-
simonious and tractable model that yields equilibrium predictions. Embeddedness arguments 
can be easily recast in terms of additional cost and incentive parameters, and “wide” concep-
tions of rational choice incorporate psychological factors and social preferences to model the 
various motivations and encapsulated interests that a rational trustor might take into account. 
However, despite its formal clarity and precision, a huge body of empirical and theoretical 
evidence suggests that the rational choice paradigm is limited in its applicability to trust re-
search. This lessens its attractiveness as a main explanatory vehicle. A critical factor is the 
question of rationality inherent in trust. While the rational choice paradigm is unambiguous in 
this regard, it clearly contrasts with the perspective of “blind” trust put forward by psycholog-
ical and sociological researchers.  
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The chapter closes with a discussion and presentation of the main theoretical concerns and 
motivations of the present work: the relation between trust and rationality, which has been de-
scribed inconsistently by different paradigms and research traditions. As will be argued, the 
neglect of the dimension of rationality in the trust concept is a main barrier to the theoretical 
integration of existing research. While the economic paradigm assumes the capability of ac-
tors to engage in considerations of a utility-maximization variety, sociological and psycholog-
ical approaches emphasize that trust can be nonrational, in that actors apply the relevant 
knowledge and follow cultural and normative patterns automatically, based on taken-for-
granted expectations and structural assurance. In a sense, these approaches portray the choice 
of a trusting act as being based on simple heuristic processes, substituting the ideal of rational 
choice with a “logic of appropriateness,” in which the adaptive use of rules, roles, and rou-
tines helps to establish a shortcut to trust. The discussion of the relation between trust and ra-
tionality suggests that we have to turn to other theoretical paradigms which incorporate an in-
dividual actor’s degree of rationality as a fundamental ingredient. Thus, we will have to an-
swer the question of its mechanics and its links to the processes of interpretation and choice, 
while simultaneously specifying a clear and formally precise model. 
3.1. Psychological Development 
3.1.1. Learning and Socialization  
A natural question to ask is whether trust can be “learned.” In a trust problem, the trustor’s 
expectation of trustworthiness depends on the information available to him; it depends on the 
way this stored knowledge is interpreted and used in conjunction with immediate situational 
impressions and affect. For example, knowledge of trustee characteristics depends on a con-
crete interaction history in which both actors have gotten to know each other and have had the 
opportunity to learn about each other’s qualities. On the other hand, generalized expectations 
are synthesized from a multitude of experiences in the past, and help to inform immediate im-
pressions of a potential trustee when specific knowledge is absent (often in the form of stereo-
types). Learned social rules, norms, roles, and the like can inform the choice of a trusting act 
when their validity is indicated. In fact, all trust-related knowledge must eventually be 
learned—in short, “experience molds the psychology of trust” (Hardin 1993: 508).  
In order to understand how knowledge evolves out of past experience, it is helpful to take a 
look at existing learning theories (see Anderson 1995). Broadly speaking, learning concerns 
the emergence of a connection, or association, between relevant features of a situation (stimu-
li) and the reactions of the organism (response). The two most important mechanisms for es-
tablishing such links are classical conditioning and instrumental learning. Classical condition-
ing concerns the association of stimuli and their internal evaluation in the form of experienced 
(dis)utility, which may be amplified by punishment and reward. Ultimately, this shapes the 
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preferences of an individual. Instrumental learning concerns the generation of causal hypothe-
ses and theories about the structure of the world and about the effect of actions upon it. By 
“reinforcement” learning (the emergence, reinforcement, or extinction of existing associa-
tions) and “trial and error” learning, humans gradually pick up the contingencies of the envi-
ronment, and use these to predict future contingencies and to plan actions. Ultimately, learned 
contingencies manifest in the form of expectations, which represent the mechanism through 
which past experiences and knowledge are connected to the future. With respect to expecta-
tions of trustworthiness, Hardin describes such an instrumental learning process as a “com-
monsense but likely unarticulated Bayesianism” (Hardin 1993: 508), in which past experienc-
es are used to “update” expectations whenever new information can be added to the existing 
stock of knowledge. 
In all learning, the processes of differentiation and generalization are important in determining 
the structure of knowledge and how it is organized. In essence, generalization and differentia-
tion allow for the classification and typification of knowledge, that is, the discrimination of 
different domains and the abstraction of the “typical” from specific experiences. The resulting 
mental structures allow for the recognition of things which are already known, and which 
serve as interpretive schemes for reality. Any result of such an abstracting categorization of 
past experience, that is, typical knowledge and its mental representation, is called a schema 
(Rumelhart 1980).
1
 Schemata facilitate the interpretation of events, objects, or situations and 
can emerge with respect to every aspect of subjective experience, concerning both our materi-
al reality and the world of thought. They vary in complexity, are often hierarchically orga-
nized, and can be conceived of as “organized representations of past behavior and experience 
that function as theories about reality to guide a person in construing new experience” (Bald-
win 1992: 468). Importantly, as a building block of cognition, they are fundamental to the 
subjective definition of the situation. As Rumelhart puts it, “the total set of schemata instanti-
ated at a particular moment in time constitutes our internal model of the situation we face at 
that moment in time” (1980: 37). Since the schema concept is very broad, researchers often 
devise more specific constructs according to their research program. For example, identity can 
be defined as a set of self-related schemata, including views about the self in relation to others 
(Greenwald & Pratkanis 1984). Likewise, a stereotype can be defined as a socially shared 
schema concerning the characteristic traits of a social category (Fiske 1993, Wheeler & Petty 
2001). Terms that will be used synonymously for schema in the following are mental model 
and interpretive scheme.    
                                                 
1 Rumelhart broadly defines a schema as “a data structure for representing generic concepts stored in memory. There are 
schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts: those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, 
actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is be-
lieved to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype of 
meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the meaning of that con-
cept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept” (1980: 34).  
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In an attempt to find the optimal mix between differentiation and generalization, individual 
knowledge becomes structured along the dimensions of familiarity, clarity, determinacy, and 
credibility (Schütz 1967, Schütz & Luckmann 1973). While the boundaries of the individual 
life-world (circumscribed by spatial, temporal, and social distance) are always incomplete and 
potentially problematic, knowledge can also acquire a taken-for-granted character in which it 
is left unquestioned. This concerns those sectors of life in which actors frequently act, have 
detailed knowledge of, and where experience presents itself “as not in need of further ana-
lysis” (Schütz 1967: 74). The available schematic knowledge is then sufficient to solve the 
problems encountered in daily life, and there exist neither internal nor external motivations to 
further “update” or refine it. Even if this knowledge does not perfectly apply to a given situa-
tion, individuals can often bring back unfamiliar events into the familiar world (“familiariza-
tion”) by recognizing their proximity to known schemata (Möllering 2006b).  
Familiarity with the structures of the life-world lays the ground for routine, which develops 
out of regularly and habitually performed actions, and is rooted in “habitual knowledge.” Ac-
cording to Schütz and Luckmann (1973), routine action is based on taken-for-grantedness, and 
it is directly related to the process of interpretation. A situation appears problematic and inter-
rupts routine to the extent that the available knowledge is not sufficient to define it, that is, 
when “coincidence between the actual theme and the potentially relevant elements of 
knowledge does not occur sufficiently for the mastery of the situation in question” (Schütz & 
Luckmann 1973: 236). Normally, however, knowledge serves as a routine schema for action: 
“With routine coincidence, ‘interpretation’ is automatic. No explicitly judging explication oc-
curs in which, on the one hand, the situation and, on the other hand, the relevant elements of 
knowledge come separately into the grasp of the consciousness to be compared to one anoth-
er” (ibid. 198). This suggests that the application of trust-related knowledge also can become 
a matter of routine in familiar settings when taken-for-grantedness is in place. 
In a broad perspective, learning, familiarization, and routinization are ever-present aspects of 
socialization, which describes the internalization of socially shared knowledge (“culture”) 
and, coincidentally, the development of individual identity (Berger & Luckmann 1966). Cul-
ture presents itself to the individual as part of an objective reality, as an “inescapable” fact of 
life. During socialization, the basic rules of society, its obligatory norms and moral values, as 
well as the schematic knowledge of the “typical” and the “problematic,” are internalized and 
learned from significant others (for example, parents). At the same time, the individual adopts 
and generalizes from experience a large set of socially shared interpretive schemes which can 
be used to attach meaning to typical situations (frames), typical actions (norms, rules), typical 
action sequences (scripts), and typical actions of typical actors (roles), along with a large 
amount of routine habitual knowledge (routines, or “knowledge of recipes”) and technical 
skills. For example, a role, according to Berger and Luckmann (1966), is a socially shared 
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type of actor in a context where action itself is typified. Similarly, an institution is defined as 
“a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors” (ibid. 54). All in all, this 
schematic cultural knowledge influences perception, interpretation, planning, and action (Di-
Maggio & Powell 1991, D´Andrade 1995). For example, frames, that is, the schematic 
knowledge of typical situations, help to focus the actors on the “primary goals” of an immedi-
ate situation (Lindenberg 1989, 1992). Most importantly, they provide the means for a recip-
rocal social definition of the situation. Through symbolic interaction, actors then negotiate 
and create a mutually shared meaning for the social situation (Mead 1967, Blumer 1969). This 
lays the ground for coordinated action and cooperation. Institutionalized cultural knowledge 
then becomes externalized, that is, “enacted” by schema application and the (potentially rou-
tine) execution of the actions prescribed by the relevant norms, roles, and scripts. Eventually, 
society’s institutions are reproduced by its members on the basis of their everyday routine in-
teractions. 
In the discussion of both the objective structure and subjective experience of trust, a recurring 
theme was the knowledge that trustors can attend to when forming expectations of trustwor-
thiness. The cognitive dimension of trust, and the trustor’s knowledge of the social world, 
point to processes of learning, socialization, familiarization, generalization, and to the devel-
opment of practically relevant interpretive schemes and their (routine) application. Many con-
tributions suggest that there is a developmental path to trust and trustworthiness by which a 
learned “capacity to trust” (Hardin 1993) is forged. The ability to trust is based on past experi-
ence, learning, and familiarity with the individual life-world, which render available the dif-
ferent categories of trust-related knowledge: specific information, such as trustee characteris-
tics, knowledge of dyadic and network embeddedness, and knowledge of the cultural-
normative frameworks surrounding the trust relation—such as rules, roles, norms, and values, 
as well as generalized expectations, stereotypes, and so forth. The aspect of routinization in 
familiar and unproblematic sectors of life suggests that trust, building on relevant schemata, 
may become a matter of routine, too. Likewise, the fact that the knowledge acquired during 
socialization is by and large “socially conditioned” (Schütz & Luckmann 1973: 243f.) recasts 
the idea of institution-based and rule-based forms of trust. All in all, socialization and learning 
are important background processes that determine the antecedent conditions of interpersonal 
trust. 
3.1.2. Basic Trust 
A minimum of trust is necessary to live and to find one’s bearing in life. However, this ability 
must be learned, and the essential qualifications for exhibiting trust have already been estab-
lished in infants (Luhmann 1979: 27f.). Dyadic trust relations are prototypical because trust is 
first tested within the family and in the relations of infants to their attachment figures and sig-
nificant others. In this sense, Erikson (1950, 1968, 1989) discusses the formation of basic 
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trust in infants and children. According to his psychoanalytic theory of personality develop-
ment, each individual builds up a “basic sense of faith in the self and the world” (Erikson 
1950: 80) within the first two years of life. The formation of this preconscious, diffuse sense 
of consistency and safety in the infant’s relationship with a care-giver is, as Erikson points 
out, the first and most important task at the start of a human biography.  
Basic trust develops with the child’s experience that the environment provides for security and 
for the general satisfaction of needs; it is strongly influenced by the availability and intensity 
of parental care and the reliability and predictability of responses to the child. In terms of sub-
jective experience, it is conceptualized as primarily emotional. It describes the innate under-
standing of being part of an ordered, meaningful social world and, a basic confidence in the 
future—ultimately, this lays the ground for the ability to see oneself connected to others 
through shared meaning, values, and norms (Lahno 2002: 325f.). As a part of the child’s de-
veloping inner organization and identity, basic trust readily influences interactions with the 
social world. It evolves into a core orientation that others can or cannot be trusted, affecting 
the overall “readiness to trust” in interpersonal relationships. Notably, the success or failure of 
the development of basic trust has far-reaching consequences for infants in terms of emotional 
organization, self-perception, behavior, and coping capabilities in problematic or stressful sit-
uations (Scheuerer-Englisch & Zimmerman 1997).  
In a similar fashion, Bowlby (1969) proposes that the earliest affective bonds formed by chil-
dren with their caregivers are of primary importance and have a long-lasting impact that con-
tinues throughout life. His contributions have inspired a theoretical paradigm known as at-
tachment theory (Bowlby 1969, 1973, Ainsworth et al. 1978, Bowlby 1980, Hazan & Shaver 
1987, Ainsworth & Eichberg 1991, Cassidy & Shaver 1999). Attachment theory studies and 
explains the formation of attachment and relationship patterns over the life course. It revolves 
around the question of why and how infants become emotionally attached to their primary 
caregivers, and how and whether these early patterns of attachment transfer into individual 
relationship behavior and the development of relationships throughout the life course. The 
term attachment denotes an affective bond between an individual and an attachment figure, 
usually the parents or other caregivers. These bonds are based on the child’s need for safety, 
security, and protection, and describe a “lasting psychological connectedness between human 
beings” (Bowlby 1969: 194). 
Ainsworth et al. (1978) showed that early caregiving experiences translate into interindividual 
differences in the way children organize their attachment behavior. On an empirical basis, 
they identified three major attachment styles: secure, anxious-avoidant, and resistant. These 
attachment styles describe how infants relate to their environment in terms of approach-
withdrawal behavior, how they cope with new and unexpected situations, and how they inter-
act with others (Fraley & Spieker 2003). Children with the secure attachment style show min-
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imal distress when left alone, use the attachment figure as a “secure base” to independently 
explore the environment, and respond with less fear and anxiety in novel situations. In con-
trast, children without the secure attachment style display more fearful, angry, and upset be-
haviors than do the securely attached children, are less independent, and more frequently use 
withdrawal strategies to cope with problematic situations.  
According to attachment theorists, the experience of regularity, attentiveness, responsiveness, 
tactfulness, and empathy in parental care leads to secure attachment—an innate sense of as-
surance and confidence which is similar to Erikson’s concept of basic trust. Infant attachment 
behavior is guided by an internal attachment system which follows the general goal of main-
taining “felt security” (Bretherton 1985). Beginning with the first months of life, the infant’s 
experiences with the caregiver are memorized, and lay the ground for the development of “in-
ternal working models” about social relationships and the environment.2 Internal working 
models are schemata of the self, of others, and of the environment, which help individuals to 
predict and interpret situations and behavior (Pietromonaco & Barrett 2000). Sticking to our 
terminology, we will use the term relational schema to denote such a cognitive structure (see 
Baldwin 1992, Chen et al. 2006). The feeling of security and faith in the reliability and re-
sponsiveness of parental care which characterizes basic trust is a by-product of one of the first 
relational schemata developed by infants (although it is not as differentiated and specific as 
the relational schemata developed in the later course of life). Basic trust and secure attachment 
mirror the relationship experience of the infant; they reflect an inner security which comes 
with the ongoing confirmation that “everything is normal” and is continuously “as expected.” 
Therefore, we can interpret basic trust as the first emotional experience of the familiarity and 
“taken-for-grantedness” of reality in the emergence of the natural attitude to the life-world.  
The findings of developmental psychology concerning the formation of basic trust in early 
childhood are important, because they point towards the origins and antecedent conditions of 
interpersonal trust. Bowlby hypothesized that attachment behavior characterizes human be-
ings “from the cradle to the grave” (1979: 129). He suggested that the relational schemata and 
attachment styles which are formed early in life generalize and extend to adulthood, and shape 
interpersonal attachment behavior with significant others and peers, and in close relationships. 
In fact, an increasing amount of empirical research indicates that the links between basic trust 
and early and adult attachment styles do exist, although the precise mechanisms which explain 
their stability and their changes over time are not fully understood (Fraley 2002, 2010).  
                                                 
2 “Each individual builds working models of the world and of himself in it, with the aid of which he perceives events, fore-
casts the future, and constructs his plans. In the working models of the world that anyone builds a key feature is his notion 
of who his attachment figures are, where they may be found, and how they may be expected to respond. Similarly, in the 
working model of the self that anyone builds a key feature is his notion of how acceptable or unacceptable he himself is in 
the eyes of his attachment figures” (Bowlby 1973: 203, emphasis added). As Baldwin (1992) points out, the working 
model concept is identical to the concept of a relational schema. 
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For example, Hazan and Shaver (1987) conceptualize romantic love in close relationships as 
an attachment process similar to infant attachment. In their study, they empirically identify the 
same patterns of attachment styles in adults which Ainsworth et al. (1978) had found in chil-
dren. Secure adult attachment styles tend to be associated with relationships that are character-
ized by higher levels of interdependence, trust, commitment, and satisfaction (Simpson 1990, 
Shaver & Hazan 1993). Importantly, adult attachment styles are tightly connected to differen-
tial relational schemata of the self and others; they involve different views of romantic love 
and love-worthiness, as well as different expectations about the availability and trustworthi-
ness of partners. While secure attachment types tend to seek closeness and intimacy, and are 
open to new relations with others, the anxious and avoidant types experience insecurity about 
other’s intentions, fear both intimacy and being unloved, and prefer distance and independ-
ence.  
Secure attachment styles are also positively related to measures of generalized interpersonal 
trust (Collins & Read 1990). Mikulincer (1998) finds that adult attachment styles are directly 
connected to the subjective experience of trust. Attachment style groups differ in the level of 
trust they feel towards partners, in the accessibility and affective quality of trust-related mem-
ories, in the appraisal of trust-related experiences, relationship goals, and in the strategies of 
coping with a breach of trust. In sum, attachment styles can be viewed as referring to “differ-
ences in the mental representations of the self in relation to others, to particular types of inter-
nal working models of relationships, models that direct not only feelings and behavior but also 
attention, memory and cognition” (Main et al. 1985: 67). This suggests that the development 
of early basic trust and the corresponding relational schemata may have long-lasting effects 
and accumulate into “a more stable trust orientation that may be activated and applied in close 
relationships” (Mikulincer 1998: 1221).  
3.1.3. Individual Dispositions and Traits 
The idea that the learning of trust-related knowledge can evolve into a stable disposition, or 
personality trait, has a long standing in trust research (Erikson 1968, Rotter 1980, Hardin 
1993, 2002). Theories of “dispositional trust” (Kramer 1999), focusing on interindividual dif-
ferences in trusting behavior, have been proposed regularly in the area of psychological trust 
research. Central to dispositional theories of trust is the assumption that certain factors within 
individuals predispose them to trust or distrust others.
3
 A prominent example of such an ac-
count is the work of Rotter (1967, 1971, 1980), who regards trust as a generalized expectation 
of the trustworthiness of others, and develops an attitudinal measure to measure its impact (the 
                                                 
3 Authors have synonymously used the terms trust propensity (Mayer et al. 1995), disposition to trust (McKnight et al. 1998), 
general trust (Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994), global trust (Couch & Jones 1997), and faith in humanity (Wrightsman 
1974, 1991) to generally denote “the extent to which one believes that non-specific others are trustworthy” (McKnight et 
al. 1998: 478). 
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“Interpersonal Trust Scale,” ITS). Arguing in the context of social learning theory, he posits 
that individuals develop a generalized expectation of other people’s trustworthiness, or gener-
alized trust, in response to their personal history of trust-related experiences over their life-
course. This is achieved by generalization, differentiation, and reinforcement learning. On top 
of that, individuals adopt relevant cultural schemata from significant others or from the mass 
media.
4
 Generalized trust can be regarded as the default expectation of the trustworthiness of 
unfamiliar others, which influences how much trust one has for a trustee in the lack of any 
other specific information. The influence of such a generalized expectation increases with the 
novelty, unfamiliarity, and atypicality of the situation; vice versa, specific expectations can 
replace generalized expectations and determine the choice of a trusting act, once trustor and 
trustee become acquainted with each other (Rotter 1980, Johnson-George & Swap 1982).
5
 
Hardin (1993, 2002) develops a similar argument, stating that individuals come to know about 
the general trustworthiness of others using naïve Bayesian learning. As a result, each individ-
ual develops an idiosyncratic “capacity to trust.” On the macro-level, different types of trus-
tors emerge. Recasting the arguments of attachment theory, Hardin maintains that experiences 
in the early years of life (e.g. neglect, abuse, trauma) highly influence the individual develop-
ment of the capacity to trust, which represents “general optimism about the trustworthiness of 
others” (1993: 508). Low-trust types are at a double disadvantage: they cannot capitalize from 
trust directly in terms of utility (that is, they risk neither gain nor loss), and they neglect the 
learning and updating opportunities to test whether their overly negative expectations of oth-
ers are justified. On the other hand, high-trust types will enter interactions more frequently, 
but may suffer severe losses if they are too optimistic. However, Bayesian updating suggests 
that these types can quickly readjust their expectations to an optimal level that aptly reflects 
the conditions of the social environment, whereas low-trust types suffer from an ever-
increasing relative disadvantage. 
In this line, a number of empirical studies report differences between high and low-trust indi-
viduals. Generally, high-trust types tend to be more sensitive to trust-related information and 
more accurate in judging the trustworthiness of others (Yamagishi et al. 1999). As suggested 
by Hardin, they also adjust more quickly to the threat of a breach of trust and signs of un-
trustworthiness (Yamagishi 2001). High and low-trust individuals differ with respect to the 
attribution of motives to a trustee and to the interpretation of responses (Holmes 1991, Jones 
                                                 
4 Thus, Rotter relates the development of a disposition to trust not only to learning from personal experience, but also to the 
acquisition of cultural schematic knowledge (i.e. stereotypes) from significant others and from mass media. Notably, the 
idea of an intergenerational transmission of trust-related attitudes has recently received empirical support (Dohmen et al. 
2006).  
5 For example, Johnson-George and Swap conclude that “disposition to trust” predicts the choice of a trusting act only in 
“highly ambiguous, novel, or unstructured situations, where one’s generalized expectancy is all one can rely on” (Johnson-
George and Swap 1982: 1307). 
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& George 1998, Rempel et al. 2001). High-trust individuals have been found to behave more 
trustworthily and honestly (Rotter 1971, 1980), perceive interpersonal relations as less prob-
lematic and distressful (Gurtman 1992), and are often regarded favorably by others (Rotter 
1980). Nevertheless, high levels of generalized trust do not equate to gullibility, that is, to a 
naïve and credulous belief which “overestimates the benignity of other people’s intentions 
beyond the level warranted by prudent assessment of available information” (Yamagishi & 
Yamagishi 1994: 135). On the contrary, high generalized trust can be regarded as a result of 
an individual’s cognitive investment into detecting signs of trustworthiness in environments 
with social uncertainty and risk—and as a consequence, the skills needed for discerning 
trustworthiness develop and become more refined. In short, high levels of generalized trust 
may be indicative of an improved social intelligence (Yamagishi 2001). 
The empirical evidence concerning the direct relation between generalized dispositions to 
trust and overt trusting behavior is, however, mixed. In an extensive meta-analytic study, 
Colquitt et al. (2007) show that dispositions to trust have an influence on trust-related out-
comes, such as risk taking, task performance, and organizational citizenship behavior, but the-
se relations are only moderate. At the same time, it has been found that single-item measures 
of generalized trust do not successfully predict trusting behavior in experiments (Glaeser et al. 
2000, Naef & Schupp 2009) or in close relationship contexts (Larzelere & Huston 1980). 
Holmes (1991) posits that the link between “generalized tendencies” toward trust and its de-
velopment in particular relationships has not been directly established. This follows from the 
empirical observation that trust is often highly dependent on the situational context. Extending 
the model of Mayer et al. (1995), McKnight et al. (1998) accommodate for this fact by treat-
ing “disposition to trust” as only one antecedent factor among others to influence expectations 
of trustworthiness and the willingness to take risks. Their model attempts to explain the regu-
larly high levels of initial trust between strangers, which, according to the authors, present a 
“paradox.” Notably, they argue that dispositional tendencies can have a direct effect on trust-
ing intentions, but may be mediated (and outweighed) by institution-based forms of trust and 
cognitive processes such as stereotyping and categorization—including reputational effects. In 
line with Rotter (1980) and Johnson-George and Swap (1982), they argue that dispositional 
tendencies to trust will have an effect primarily in new relationships or in one-shot situations 
with strangers—that is, when more specific situational information is not available.  
Empirically, Gill et al. (2005) show that individual dispositions to trust, as measured by a 
modified version of Rotter’s ITS, predict trusting intentions only “when information about the 
trustee’s ability, benevolence, and integrity is ambiguous” (ibid. 292, emphasis added). Build-
ing on the work of Mischel (1977), the authors introduce situational strength as a boundary 
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condition for the relation between dispositional trust and trusting intentions.
6
 If a situation 
contains strong cues about the trustworthiness of a potential trustee (cues can relate to many 
sources of trust-related knowledge, ranging from individual characteristics to institutional and 
normative structures), then individual dispositions and traits step back in favor of the available 
evidence and more specific trust-related knowledge. 
All in all, the development of a stable disposition to trust, much like a “personality trait,” 
seems to be one important factor in determining the build-up of trust in a particular trust prob-
lem. Dispositional differences between individuals have a measurable effect on a variety of 
trust-related constructs, and therefore must be respected when explaining the emergence of 
trust in a particular trust relation. However, it is important to keep in mind that external fac-
tors (“situational strength”) may moderate the impact of such generalized dispositions. Their 
influence in a particular context may be limited, and is itself highly context-dependent. 
3.1.4. Models of Trust Development 
An important stream of trust research focuses on the development and change of interpersonal 
trust in ongoing relationships (Lewis & Weigert 1985b, Rempel et al. 1985, Holmes 1991, 
Lewicki & Bunker 1995b, McAllister 1995, Jones & George 1998, Lewicki et al. 2006, Ferrin 
et al. 2008). Central to these models is the assumption that relationships continue over an ex-
tended period of time. By repeated interaction and iterated exchange, actors can develop mul-
tiple trust relations with each other, and acquire very specific trust-related knowledge. This 
research focuses on the evolution of expectations, intentions, and affect towards the other over 
time, as well as the perceptions and attributions of trustee characteristics, moral qualities, and 
motives. Furthermore, developmental models often implicitly assume a switching of roles be-
tween trustor and trustee, so that trust relations become reciprocal. In such a dynamic setting, 
the growth and decline of interpersonal trust within ongoing relationships is analyzed.  
To characterize the status of relationships, Lewicki et al. (1998) introduce the terms “relation-
ship bandwidth” and “relationship richness.” Relationship bandwidth describes “the scope of 
the domains of interpersonal relating and competency that are relevant to a single interperson-
al relationship [....] The broader the experience across multiple contexts, the broader the 
bandwidth” (ibid. 442). In the extreme case, a relationship with a very narrow bandwidth 
might offer only one opportunity to maintain a trust relation of the form “A trusts B with re-
                                                 
6 “According to Mischel (1977), situations can be characterized on a continuum from strong to weak. Strong situations have 
salient behavioral cues that lead everyone to interpret the circumstances similarly, and induce uniform expectations re-
garding the appropriate response. [ ... ] Thus, strong situations are said to suppress the expression of individual differences. 
Weak situations, on the other hand, have highly ambiguous behavioral cues that provide few constraints on behavior, and 
do not induce uniform expectations. [ ... ] In weak situations, the person has considerable discretion in how to respond to 
the circumstances. Thus, weak situations provide the opportunity for individual differences such as personality to play a 
greater role in determining behavior” (Gill et al. 2005: 293). 
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spect to X.” On the other hand, a large bandwidth permits the emergence of multiple trust re-
lations, so that “A trusts B with respect to X, Y and Z.” Moreover, relationship richness de-
scribes the “texturing of relationships” (ibid.), that is, the details of knowledge across the 
bandwidth. Relationship richness increases in an ongoing relationship because the parties ac-
quire more information about each other. This warrants trust becoming “fine-grained” (Gabar-
ro 1978) and differentiated with respect to each unique trust relation.  
Most dynamic models assume that trust starts at a low level and builds up incrementally over 
time as a result of experience (Lewicki et al. 2006). Generally speaking, the propellants be-
hind this gradual increase in trust are “mutually satisfying interactions” (Rempel et al. 1985). 
Changes in the level of trust are driven by the experience of rewarding or punishing outcomes, 
defined by the incentive structure of the trust problems encountered during repeated interac-
tion. These outcomes shape the subjective experience of trust in the form of individual cogni-
tion and affect: “Successful behavioral exchanges are accompanied by positive moods and 
emotions, which help to cement the experience of trust and set the scene for the continuing 
exchange and building of greater trust” (Jones & George 1998: 536). Importantly, a symbolic 
communication of trustworthiness perceptions alone is not sufficient to create an upward spi-
ral of mutually reinforcing levels of trust; the actual taking of risks (in the choice of trusting 
acts) and the observable cooperative responses (in the honoring of the trust) are necessary to 
fuel this development (Zand 1972, Ferrin et al. 2008). At the same time, “successful” interac-
tions open up the opportunity for further engagements, and warrant increases in the bandwidth 
and richness of the relationship—in this sense, “trust breeds trust,” as the actors can test the 
validity of their initial trustworthiness judgments and correspondingly increase mutual vulner-
ability and dependence when trust is honored. 
Models differ as to whether the evolution of trust is regarded as a continuous process or as a 
succession of discrete developmental stages. Continuous accounts, regularly proposed in the 
cognitive tradition of trust research, conceive of development as a Bayesian learning process 
in which the actors gradually accumulate trust-related knowledge and withdraw trust when it 
is failed (Deutsch 1958, Hardin 1993, Kramer 1996). Thus, specific expectations evolve out of 
past experience, and actors adjust their level of trust by updating these expectations based on 
the available evidence of trustworthiness. The emergence of specific expectations can be re-
cast as an augmentation of relationship richness, so that more precise judgments can be made 
within each unique trust relation. In other words, the ambiguity of expectations decreases over 
time. Naturally, when favorable expectations of trustworthiness have developed, this opens up 
an avenue to increase relationship bandwidth and—more generally—to extend the scope of 
cooperation (Zand 1972, Ostrom 1998)  
In contrast, a recurring theme in many psychological models of trust development is that in-
terpersonal relationships can be characterized by qualitatively distinct stages, and that the na-
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ture of trust, as well as its basis and subjective experience, change as the relationship matures 
(Rempel et al. 1985, Jones & George 1998, Lewicki et al. 2006). These stages are often re-
garded as hierarchical: in terms of time and emotional engagement, each stage requires addi-
tional investments by the actors involved (Rempel et al. 1985). For example, Lewicki and 
Bunker (1995) envision the evolution of trust as a sequence of hierarchical stages which they 
denote as (1) calculus-based trust, (2) knowledge-based trust, and (3) identification-based 
trust.  
(1) In the first stage, calculus-based trust, the choice of a trusting act is accompanied by a cal-
culation of the potential costs and benefits which the trustee (!) would incur by choosing to be 
untrustworthy. This amounts to a rational consideration of what Hardin (2001, 2002) de-
scribes as “encapsulated interest.” Essentially, the choice of a trusting act is justified in the 
trustee’s incentive to be trustworthy, and this incentive is grounded in the future value of 
maintaining the relationship. This also includes considerations of costs and benefits “outside” 
of the particular relationship—for example, a potential loss of reputation. In a similar fashion, 
Rempel et al. (1985) state that the first stage of trust development in intimate relationships 
(“predictability”) resembles a forecast of the partner’s future actions, which relies on an un-
derstanding of the “reward contingencies underlying potential actions” (ibid. 97).  
(2) By repeated interaction, expectations stabilize and relationships increase in bandwidth and 
richness, augmenting the value of the relationship itself. A shift to the second stage of 
knowledge-based trust (“dependability,” Rempel et al. 1985) occurs once the actors become 
solidly acquainted to each other and extend the relationship scope. This means that the actors 
acquire precise estimates of their characteristics, moral qualities and underlying value sys-
tems. As Jones and George (1998) argue, ongoing interactions and positive affective experi-
ences accompanying successful cooperation are also conducive to the emergence of shared 
interpretive schemes and the development of a common “frame of reference.” According to 
Lewicki et al. (2006), the interaction frequency, duration, intensity, and diversity of the chal-
lenges which the actors overcome in the ongoing relationship determine the point in time at 
which calculus-based trust shifts to knowledge based trust. Importantly, this stage includes an 
increased level of “attributional abstraction” (Rempel et al. 1985)—the focus of the trustor’s 
expectations moves away from assessments of direct consequences of specific actions to an 
overall evaluation of the qualities and characteristics of the trustee.  
Jones and George (1998) subsume these two stages under the rubric of conditional trust, a 
type of trust which is “consistent with the idea that one of the bases for trust is knowledge” 
(ibid. 536). Notably, conditional trust includes only a “pretense of suspension.” Although a 
trustee chooses a trusting act, this does not mean that uncertainty is internally removed at this 
stage, even though the trustee acts as if this were the case. Rather, the choice of a trusting act  
is often simply preferable to initial distrust, because it saves cognitive resources and allows 
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for a “tit-for-tat” retribution strategy at the same time (Deutsch 1958, Luhmann 1979). As the 
name suggests, conditional trust is prone to being withdrawn when expectations are failed, 
and quickly updated in a case of failure (“trust but verify”). According to Jones and George 
(1998), conditional trust is sufficient to enable most social interactions.  
(3) The third and last stage of “identification-based” trust occurs when the parties develop 
mutual identification with, and strong affect towards, each other. On the one hand, this means 
that the available knowledge is sufficient to induce a “full internalization of the other’s prefer-
ences” (Lewicki et al. 2006: 1009), which facilitates the development of common goals and 
shared values, and brings about a motivational change from pursuing self-interest towards 
maximizing joint outcomes. On the other hand, mutually developed and shared interpretive 
schemes now structure the subjective definition of the situation to such an extent that trust-
worthiness is regarded as unquestioned, “based on confidence in the other’s values” (Jones & 
George 1998: 537). This stage of unconditional trust signifies a “real” suspension of uncer-
tainty, which replaces the mere “pretense” thereof in conditional trust, and goes along with an 
increase in mutual attachment. Importantly, the attributions made to the other’s motivation 
now emphasize intrinsic (as opposed to external or instrumental) motives, such as the shared 
enjoyment of activities, the demonstration of affect, a sense of closeness, and a shared social 
identity that is established (Rempel et al. 1985). This third and last stage (“faith,” ibid.) exem-
plifies the real “leap of faith” that has occurred. The actors fully suspend uncertainty and 
doubt, and it is with a subjective certainty and emotional security that the relationship contin-
ues into the future—coincidentally, trustworthiness now is “taken for granted.” 
It is apparent that these developmental accounts closely resemble the distinction between cog-
nition-based and affect-based forms of trust introduced earlier. Rousseau et al. (1998) differ-
entiate “calculus-based trust” from “relational trust” and directly relate these types to McAl-
lister’s (1995) distinction of cognition and affect-based trust (see chapter 2.2.4). While calcu-
lus-based trust is assumed to rely on rational decision-making processes and on the principle 
of “trust but verify,” relational trust derives from repeated interactions between trustor and 
trustee, which fosters the development of concern and emotional attachment. Likewise, Kra-
mer (1999) holds that approaches to trust follow either a “rational choice” or a “relational” 
perspective, arguing that trust needs to be conceptualized “not only as a calculative orientation 
toward risk, but also as a social orientation toward other people and toward society as a 
whole” (ibid. 573), including the consideration of “self-presentational concerns and identity-
related needs” (ibid. 574), which may influence the subjective experience of trust and subse-
quently the choice of a trusting act.  
An important aspect in most developmental models is the fact that the perspectives of the ac-
tors involved change over time. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) describe the shifts between the 
different stages as “frame changes,” that is, changes in the prevalent means of interpersonal 
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perception.
7
 Jones and George (1998) highlight the importance of the development of shared 
interpretive schemes during repeated interaction. According to these authors, trust is experi-
enced through changing attitudes, which they define as “(1) the knowledge structures contain-
ing specific thoughts and feelings people have about other people, and (2) the means through 
which they define and structure their interactions with others” (ibid. 533). We have earlier in-
troduced the concept of a relational schema to denote such a cognitive structure.
8
 Generally 
speaking, the succession of different stages in trust development can be recast as the creation, 
modification, and gradual enrichment of specific relational schemata, serving as a source of 
trust-related knowledge and “framing” a shared definition of the situation. Like any other type 
of knowledge, these knowledge structures can acquire a taken-for-granted character and be-
come a matter of routine in familiar settings (figure 7).  
Figure 7: Stages of trust development, adapted from Lewicki & Bunker (1996: 156) 
 
Overall, models of trust development exemplify and extend our understanding of the anteced-
ents of interpersonal trust by highlighting the development of an important source of trust-
related knowledge: specific relational schemata, corresponding favorable expectations, and 
their associated affect and attachment. At the same time, developmental models highlight the 
fact that trust is related to different “modes” of subjective perception, ranging from more cal-
culative orientations to a securely rooted state of affect paired with suspension and mutual 
identification—they are indicative of a flexible degree of rationality involved in a trusting act. 
As Hardin (1993) correctly points out, it is important to keep in mind that “thick-relationship 
theories” of trust merely display one possible source of trust-related knowledge, and one 
                                                 
7 “The shift from calculus-based trust to knowledge-based trust signals a change from an emphasis on differences or contrasts 
between self and other (being sensitive to risk and possible trust violations) to an emphasis on commonalities between self 
and others (assimilation). The shift from knowledge-based trust to identification-based trust is one from simply learning 
about the other to a balance between strengthening common identities while maintaining one’s own distinctive identity in 
the relationship” (Lewicki et al. 2006: 1012). 
8 In psychological research, the concept of attitude is used much more generally, including as it does affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral orientations towards any object, whether material, immaterial, person, or “thing” (see Olson & Zanna 1993). 
Thus, relational schemata are more specific constructs than attitudes, restricted to interindividual orientations in a social 
context. They represent a combination of schemata towards the self, the other person, and the relationship in question, as 
well as interpersonal scripts, including expectations of thoughts, feelings, goals, and actions of both the self and the other 
(Baldwin 1992). 
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source of incentives for the trustee to be trustworthy. This does not give them conceptual or 
theoretical priority over other sources and related theoretical accounts. A general theory of 
trust must, however, contain “trust in thick relationships” as a special case.  
3.2. Sociological Perspectives 
3.2.1. Functions of Trust 
Sociological explanations of trust do not focus on the individual learning processes by which 
trust-related knowledge is acquired and accumulated into dispositional tendencies. They ask 
instead for the role that trust plays in the context of a human reality which is fundamentally 
social. This question naturally relates trust back to the social environment in which it is em-
bedded. Theories of learning and development create a necessary “input” from which this 
analysis can be carried out, whereas sociological conceptions stress the relational character of 
trust, in the sense that trust “must be conceived as a property of collective units (ongoing dy-
ads, groups, collectivities), not of isolated individuals” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 968). Trust, 
when mutually structuring subjective experience and action, is a property of the social system 
under scrutiny; in short, “the cognitive content of trust is a collective cognitive reality that 
transcends the realm of individual psychology” (ibid. 970). Its function is primarily sociologi-
cal because it is not needed outside of social relations. Accordingly, trust is regarded as an 
elementary precondition for a wide range of social processes. It presents a core phenomenon 
for sociological thought and theorizing (e.g. Garfinkel 1963, Blau 1964, Luhmann 1979, 
Durkheim 1984, Lewis & Weigert 1985a, Coleman 1990, Giddens 1990, Endress 2002, Möl-
lering 2006b).  
In order to understand the relevance of trust for the functioning of social systems at large, it is 
necessary to inspect the role which trust plays in social processes. As noted previously, the 
concepts of trust and familiarity point to the experience of a taken-for-granted life-world and 
indicate the acceptance of a large part thereof as an implicit background assumption for fur-
ther action. The routine and implicitness of social life occurs, however, in face of the ever-
present possibility of a breakdown of social reality as it is known, a crumbling of taken-for-
grantedness and of the routine “frames of reference” (Garfinkel 1963). Trust and familiarity 
constitute one important interactional resource preventing such a breakdown. In the words of 
Luhmann (1979), the need for trust emerges in face of the “complexity” of the social world 
through which each individual must navigate. This complexity needs to be resolved in order 
for individuals to remain capable of acting. Luhmann argues that trust is the most important 
psychological mechanism for the reduction of social complexity. We have already specified 
this social complexity when elaborating on the objective structure of trust: every basic trust 
problem includes irreducible social uncertainty. The interdependence of humans with respect 
to actions and outcomes (the “double contingency”) in most social situations (and in trust 
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problems in particular) constitutes a source of social uncertainty, and, incidentally, the source 
of social complexity.  
To resolve social complexity means to reduce the set of possible actions in face of contingent 
consequences, and to plan a course of action. As a psychological mechanism for the reduction 
of social complexity, trust “goes beyond the information it receives and risks defining the fu-
ture” (ibid. 20). Trust is in place when favorable expectations initiate the choice of a trusting 
act, and it bridges existing uncertainty by fixing a definite future as a viable option. The for-
mation and stabilization of expectations are therefore central processes in the reduction of 
complexity; likewise, they are central functions of trust. Notably, Luhmann argues that the 
learning, generalization, and development of mental schemata which abstract from reality are 
crucial elements that allow for such a functional reduction of complexity. While abstracted 
representations of the outside world work at a lower level of complexity than the actual envi-
ronment, this implies at the same time that they “exhibit fewer possibilities, or more order” 
(ibid. 26) than the environment. Luhmann describes the reduction of complexity as a change 
in the level at which uncertainty is made tolerable—with trust, external uncertainty is substi-
tuted by inner certainty in a movement towards “indifference.” 9  
At the same time, the suspension of social uncertainty results in a truncation of further search-
ing and retrieval processes and reduces individual cognitive load. Therefore, trust is regularly 
conceived of as an efficient strategy to deal with scarce cognitive resources (Lewis & Weigert 
1985b, Ripperger 1998: 258). By “extrapolating” past experiences into the future individuals 
save the cognitive resources which would be otherwise needed for the search of information 
and its deliberate processing. Consequentially, Lewis and Weigert (1985b) hold that trust is an 
alternative to rational prediction, reducing complexity “far more quickly, economically, and 
thoroughly.” This is because rational prediction, in face of high social uncertainty, is costly, 
time-consuming, in principal limitless, and may “complicate” decision making. On top of that, 
“information may reduce, but cannot entirely eliminate, perception of uncertainty about future 
results” (Lewis & Weigert 1985a: 462). Their proposed answer is that trust allows actors to 
act “as if” certain futures are not possible (viz. suspension). However, the reduction of com-
plexity and social uncertainty by suspension in a given situation necessitates that other cir-
cumstances are regarded, ceteris paribus, as unproblematic. Familiarity, as has been argued, is 
a precondition to trust. It is the power of trust and familiarity to effectively reduce social com-
plexity that qualifies them as sociological core phenomena and as a basis for almost all social 
                                                 
9 “Trust, by the reduction of complexity, discloses possibilities for action which would have remained improbable and unat-
tractive without trust. For this reason, the benefit and rationale for action on the basis of trust are to be found  ...  in, and 
above all, a movement towards indifference: by introducing trust, certain possibilities of development can be excluded 
from consideration. Certain dangers which cannot be removed but which should not disrupt action are neutralized” (Luh-
mann 1979: 25). 
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processes. In their absence, social action would be paralyzed by the intrusion of the enormous 
complexity of a contingent social world and by the unpredictability of the future. 
But sociological approaches to trust do not only scrutinize its functionality with respect to the 
individual capability of action. A second prominent theme is the analysis of the functions that 
trust performs with respect to the social systems in which it is developed and sustained. Many 
scholars regard trust as an indispensable ingredient for the functioning of social systems in 
general (Lewis & Weigert 1985a, b, Misztal 1996). Trust is seen as an efficient mechanism 
governing both market and nonmarket transactions (Arrow 1974, Bromiley & Cummings 
1995), and a sort of “ever-ready lubricant that permits voluntary participation in production 
and exchange” (Dasgupta 1988: 49). According to Sztompka, it “encourages sociability, par-
ticipation with others in various forms of associations, and in this way enriches the network of 
interpersonal ties” (1999: 105). By favoring communication, it also “encourages tolerance, 
acceptance of strangers, recognition of cultural or political differences as legitimate ... bridles 
expressions of inter-group hostility and xenophobia, and civilizes disputes” (ibid.). In this 
line, Ripperger (1998) concludes that one primary systemic function of trust is the generation 
of social capital. It constitutes an “organizing principle” (McEvily et al. 2003), in that it struc-
tures interaction patterns, stabilizes social structure, and mobilizes actors to contribute, com-
bine, and coordinate resources toward collective endeavors. On an even more fundamental 
level, it is regarded as a prime ingredient in the successful social integration of modern society 
at large and the maintenance of social order (Luhmann 1988, Giddens 1990, Misztal 1996).  
In asking for the social and systemic functions of trust, and in trying to understand the role 
that trust plays in social systems, it is necessary to extend the scope of the trust relation be-
yond the narrow frame that has been adopted so far. Trust, as a property of social systems, has 
to be understood in a much richer setting than that of a unidirectional trust relation devoid of 
context. By introducing the actor’s social embeddedness (chapter 3.2.2) and discerning the 
connection between trust and social capital (chapter 3.2.3), we will advance our understanding 
of the functions of trust for social systems at large (chapter 3.2.4) in the following sections. 
3.2.2. Social Embeddedness 
If trust is primarily a social phenomenon, then it cannot be understood without reference to 
the social structures surrounding the trust relation. As Luhmann argues, “trust occurs within a 
framework of interaction which is influenced by both personality and social system, and can-
not by exclusively associated with either” (1979: 6). Therefore, an adequate theory of trust 
must bridge micro, meso, and macrolevels of analysis. Purely cognitive models of trust devel-
opment provide a “necessary but not sufficient understanding of trust phenomena” (Kramer 
1999: 572), because trust emerges in a world that is rich in cultural meaning. Essentially, trust 
relations are not simply dyadic phenomena between two actors, but they normally occur with-
79 
 
in a larger context, often possess a history, and may be influenced by other actors and institu-
tions. Social embeddedness influences the strategies which trustors will use to solve a trust 
problem because it affects the availability of resources, determines the direct and indirect 
costs of action (that is, it influences the incentive structure of the trust problem) and governs 
the activation of norms and other cultural schemata (Heimer 2001). Social embeddedness in-
cludes relationships between a trustor and trustee (such as repetition, an interaction history, or 
the distribution of power), between the trusting parties and other members of a social system 
(for example social networks, reputation, group membership), and between actors and the rel-
evant social system or its properties (normative structure, cultural practices, a “climate” of 
suspicion or trust, legal frameworks etc.). Consequentially, when asking for the sources of 
trust-related knowledge which a trustor can use, and when thinking about how this knowledge 
will be used, we have to take into account the social embeddedness of trustor and trustee.  
Broadly speaking, social embeddedness refers to the constraining effects of ongoing social 
relationships on individual action (see Granovetter 1985, Uzzi 1997, Buskens & Raub 2008). 
The concept of embeddedness is based on the idea that actors must not be regarded as “atom-
istic” decision-makers, but as being embedded in networks of personal relationships—action 
always takes place in a social context. Networks of relationships between actors exert an in-
fluence on trust and trustworthiness primarily through the mechanisms of learning and control 
(Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994, Buskens & Raub 2002). Control implies that direct or indirect 
reward and punishment opportunities are available in response to the actions of the trustee. 
With control, the incentive structure of the trust problem changes, such that the long-term val-
ue of trustworthiness is higher to the trustee than the short-term gains of failing trust. Learn-
ing, on the other hand, is the mechanism by which a trustor can acquire more information 
about the trustee, either directly by past interaction, indirectly from third parties via reputa-
tion, or via the surrounding institutional structures—for example, from social roles or norms. 
As with micro, meso, and macrolevels of analysis, social embeddedness is differentiated into 
dyadic, network, and institutional embeddedness (see Buskens & Raub 2008). 
Dyadic Embeddedness refers to repeated interactions between two actors. It points to the tem-
poral-structural aspect of embeddedness, denoting a situation in which a history of interac-
tions between the trustor and trustee already exists, or in which trustor and trustee will likely 
face each other again in the future. To begin with, repeated interaction, if the “shadow of the 
future” is high enough, may increase the value of an ongoing relationship for the parties in-
volved, and persuade even purely self-interested actors of the advantages of conditional coop-
eration, because the long-term benefits of continuing the relationship outweigh the short-term 
incentives for defection (Trivers 1971, Axelrod 1984). At the same time, the trustor can exert 
influence over the trustee because a failure of trust can be sanctioned by a withdrawal of fu-
ture trust (“dyadic control”). If the incentive for abusing trust is not too high, this can give rise 
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to an equilibrium in which trust is always placed and always honored (Kreps 1990). A com-
mon term used is to describe such conditional cooperation is weak reciprocity (Gintis 2000c, 
Fehr & Schmidt 2006, Fehr & Gintis 2007). Weak reciprocity can be motivated by the long-
term, “enlightened” self-interest of the players; essentially, it requires that reciprocal strategies 
are profitable and maximize the players’ payoff in the long-rung.10 This does not mean, how-
ever, that the trustor can enforce trustworthiness or that behavior becomes deterministic. Alt-
hough expectations may become favorable and confident with dyadic embeddedness, a trust 
problem structurally requires a transfer of control over resources or events specified by the 
content of the trust relation—that is, even with dyadic control, a trustee might principally fail 
trust.  
The argument points, however, to the interesting relationship between trust and power. If the 
trustor did possess a large incentive to continue the trust relationship, then the threat of aban-
doning the relationship would not be credible. As Farrell (2004) notes, trust relationships can 
endure a certain amount of asymmetry in the distribution of power without leading inevitably 
to distrust.
11
 On one hand, ongoing relationships— especially when the actors have already 
invested many resources and developed emotional attachment (“sunk costs”)—are less likely 
to be highly asymmetrical in power, and will be of value for both parties. On the other hand, 
when power asymmetries exist, then the actor who has less interest in the continuation of the 
relationship has more power, in the sense that his threat of exit is more credible; consequen-
tially, he has less “need” to be trustworthy. This can hamper the development of trust, because 
(a) less powerful actors will often misconstrue and misinterpret the intentions of the more 
powerful one (“paranoid cognition,” Kramer 2004), (b) actors may have different time hori-
zons, in that the more powerful actor’s time horizon is shorter and more limited, and (c) 
asymmetries of power make it more difficult to coordinate a mutually beneficial equilibrium, 
because the more powerful actor has the incentive to renegotiate over the outcomes of cooper-
ation (Farrell 2004). These circumstances increase the social uncertainty that the less powerful 
actor has to face, and may lead to a point where trust is not possible anymore. When one actor 
is much more powerful than the other, he has no incentive to take into account the other’s in-
terests, has no reason to be trustworthy, and he is incapable of making credible commitments. 
Similarly, the less powerful actor has no incentive to be trustworthy, knowing that the other 
                                                 
10 In contrast, strong reciprocity describes intrinsically motivated behavior (costly punishment, or cooperation even when 
defection would maximize payoffs) based on other-regarding preferences, which appears suboptimal to standard game 
theory, but can be accommodated for in psychological game-theoretic models (see chapter 3.3.4.). 
11 Farrell defines power in the context of bargaining situations: “Parties who have many possible attractive alternatives should 
a particular relationship not work out will be more powerful than parties who have few such alternatives because they can 
more credibly threaten to break off bargaining, thus affecting the other’s feasible set” (Farrel 2004: 87). In exchange-
theoretic terms, power spells out the “principle of least interest.” Power relates to the distribution of interest and control 
over the resources which the actors in an exchange bargain about, and it is inversely related to the degree of dependence of 
one actor on the other (Esser 2000: 387f.). If A controls resources that B has an interest in, but no control over, than A is 
said to have power over B, or B is dependent upon A. 
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cannot be. In such a situation, “disparities of power are likely to give rise to mutual distrust” 
(Farrell 2004: 94). But if the development of trust reaches a stage where mutual identification 
and affect become a primary basis, then asymmetries in power are often concealed due to the 
shift of intentional attributions from extrinsic or instrumental to intrinsic motives (see chapter 
3.1.4), and minor failures of trust will be redefined such that the available relational schemata 
can be maintained (Holmes 1991). 
Dyadic embeddedness also allows specific expectations to be formed and stabilized, because 
actors can gradually learn about their dispositions, intentions, and motives (“dyadic learn-
ing”). As the relationship increases in bandwidth and richness, the actors increasingly uncover 
each other’s characteristics and establish a basis for stable and specific expectations. On top of 
that, repetition fosters the development of shared relational schemata and mutual attachment, 
leading to “thick” affective, identification-based forms of trust. At the same time, repetition 
fosters the consolidation of trust into routine action (Endress 2002: 64). Empirically, a sub-
stantial body of experimental research also documents the importance of dyadic embed-
dedness for the development of trust (Berg et al. 1995, Buskens & Weesie 2000b, Anderhub 
et al. 2002, Bohnet & Huck 2004, Engle-Warnick & Slonim 2004). 
Network Embeddedness describes the fact that both trustor and trustee normally interact with 
and maintain relationships to third parties. These can provide information or apply external 
sanctioning measures in response to actions taken in a trust problem. An important aspect of 
network embeddedness is that information about past behavior can disseminate into the net-
works, and also can be received from there, allowing for the emergence of reputation mecha-
nisms (Kreps & Wilson 1982, Camerer & Weigelt 1988, Burt & Knez 1995, Burt 2003, Fehr 
et al. 2008). Reputation is an important source of trust-related knowledge and a form of social 
capital for the actors in question (Coleman 1988). With reputation, actors can “detach” social 
capital from the context of specific transactions and generalize it to other exchanges. It thus 
grants a certain degree of transferability. With reputation, third parties take the role of “trust 
intermediaries” by providing trustors with information about a potential trustee and about his 
or her past behavior and trustworthiness (“network learning”). At the same time, in response 
to the reputation-information circulating within the network, third parties can themselves re-
ward and punish a trustee’s behavior by withdrawing future trust and refusing future coopera-
tion, by expressing social disapproval, or by inflicting otherwise costly sanctions (Burt & 
Knez 1995, Fehr & Fischbacher 2004). This increases the indirect costs of a failure of trust 
and opens up a “voice” option to the trustor, who can credibly threaten to damage reputation if 
the trustee does not act trustworthily. High network embeddedness also allows a trustor to 
more easily seek alternatives and “exit” the trust relation if the trustee is not trustworthy. 
Thus, network embeddedness can increase the power that a trustor has in a dyadic trust rela-
tionship. Both the threat of “exit” (by searching for alternatives) and the threat of “voice” (by 
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damaging reputation) change the basic structure of a trust problem (“network control”), in that 
additional incentives not to fail trust emerge (Buskens 2002).  
Generally speaking, network embeddedness can induce trust even among rational and selfish 
actors, because different “trigger strategies” become available to ensure trustworthiness. It can 
completely substitute dyadic embeddedness in situations where there are many potential trus-
tors and trustees, and an effective reputation mechanism is available (Buskens & Raub 2008). 
In such a situation, although there is no repeated interaction, the reputation-information that 
flows through a network can be sufficient to provide for favorable expectations of trustwor-
thiness. The likelihood for trust and trustworthy response increases with network density and 
with the probability that information about past behavior is transmitted to other potential trus-
tors (Coleman 1990, Buskens & Weesie 2000a). Empirically, experimental results also show 
that network embeddedness, in particular via reputation mechanisms, is conducive to the 
build-up of interpersonal trust (Camerer & Weigelt 1988, Anderhub et al. 2002, Bolton et al. 
2004, Bohnet et al. 2005).  
Lastly, with institutional embeddedness we take into account the broad cultural-normative en-
vironment, the institutions that surround a trust relation and function as a source of trust-
related knowledge (“institutional learning”) and as a structuring device for action (“institu-
tional control”). An institution is defined here as a socially shared and sanctionable expecta-
tion with respect to the conformity to a mandatory, predescribed rule (Esser 2000c). Institu-
tions constitute the rules of human interaction in a world of social interdependence and repre-
sent the relevance and incentive structures of a society. The incentives and sanctions provided 
for by institutions can be more or less formally regulated, and differ with respect to their mode 
of enforcement (Elster 1989, 2005). Norms are a class of institutions which are explicitly 
linked to internal or external negative sanctions. On the whole, institutions considerably 
change the opportunities and information available to actors in a trust problem (Zucker 1986, 
Shapiro 1987, Bachmann 1998, Ripperger 1998, Heimer 2001). We have already denoted two 
direct effects of institutions on trust in the form of the “structural assurance” and “situational 
normality” beliefs which they back up, and which contribute to the formation of expectations 
of trustworthiness and the willingness to be vulnerable (see chapter 2.3.1). This highlights two 
important aspects of institutional embeddedness: (a) institutions create a familiar background 
on which trust becomes possible, and (b) they provide the structural “safeguards” that enable 
trust between individuals in anonymous settings, even when other forms of social embed-
dedness are missing. Importantly, both structural assurance and situational normality are root-
ed in the sociological concepts of “normality” as proposed by Schütz, Garfinkel, and Luh-
mann, but they represent a more fine-grained distinction (McKnight & Chervany 2006).  
To begin with, institutions enable trust by creating a background of familiarity. This argument 
is directly related to the process of interpretation, the recognition of typical things already 
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known and the suspension of uncertainty into a routine of unconditional trust. If stored mental 
schemata can successfully be applied to interpret an immediate situation (and given that this 
situation is not “extraordinary”), perceived situational normality will be high, yielding a sense 
that “everything seems in proper order” (Lewis & Weigert 1985b: 974). This enables a trustor 
to feel comfortable enough to rapidly form a trusting intention toward the trustee in the situa-
tion, because interactions with others are likely to occur as expected and without surprising 
twists (Misztal 2001). In short, “a belief in situational normality means that the people in-
volved will act normally and can therefore be trusted” (ibid. 316). Both McKnight et al. 
(1998) and Misztal (2001) introduce situational normality by referring to Garfinkel’s (1963) 
well-known crisis experiments, in which he shows that trust and the routine frames of refer-
ence quickly break down when situational normality is disturbed. All in all, this notion of sit-
uational normality closely resembles Luhmann’s (1979) idea of familiarity as a precondition 
to trust.  
In a detailed analysis, Möllering (2006a, b) carves out a theory of trust in which institutions 
provide the “taken-for-granted expectations that give meaning to, but cannot guarantee, their 
fulfillment in action” (Möllering 2006a: 363). Building on the work of Schütz (1967), as well 
as of Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Garfinkel (1963), he sets the “natural attitude” of the 
life-world as the starting point for analysis. Institutions help actors to establish the “basic rules 
of the game” (Garfinkel 1963: 190f.) and to maintain stable and unproblematic interaction. 
That is, a major function of institutions is a reduction of complexity by providing socially 
shared information about the likely course of action in a social context—they do so, for ex-
ample, in the form of learned mental schemata about typical situations (frame), typical action 
sequences (scripts), typical actions by typical actors (role), or rules of action (norms, rules). 
Institutions do not simply take on the role of a third-party enforcer and guarantor—a role to 
which they are frequently restricted in economic accounts of trust. Instead, they must be re-
garded as “systems of rules and meanings that provide common expectations which define the 
actors as social beings” (Möllering 2006b: 61, emphasis added). They are not just passively 
consumed, but actively (re)produced in an ongoing process of symbolic interaction and 
“agency” (Emirbayer & Mische 1998), being both an objective fact of a socially constructed 
reality and an internalized part of individual identity at the same time. 
When institutions instill taken-for-granted expectations, the corresponding internalized mental 
schemata are often enacted without question, following a “logic of appropriateness” (March & 
Olsen 1989). For example, actors who have internalized an institution that demands placing or 
honoring trust in a particular situation will do so because doing otherwise would go against 
their own identity and against the objective reality of society (Zucker 1986). Trust is exercised 
because “everybody would do so in the same position,” and the actors who have internalized a 
relevant norm often adhere to its rule on a routine basis. According to Zucker (1986), institu-
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tion-based trust derives from socially shared expectations which include, for example, sym-
bols of membership in a group or profession, intermediary mechanisms such as contracts, 
guarantees, and regulations, and other sources of trust-related knowledge, such as norms and 
values. When the context of a trust problem indicates that certain institutions are part of the 
“rules of the game,” this enables trust between actors because they provide the means for a 
social definition of the situation. Ultimately, trust and trustworthiness can themselves acquire 
a taken-for-granted character so that “it may be literally unthinkable to act otherwise” (Zucker 
1986: 58) in a particular, familiar situation. As Kramer (1999) points out, rule-based forms of 
trust often trigger suspension without a conscious calculation of consequences. In essence, the 
sociological approach to trust suggests that institutions often routinely reduce social uncertain-
ty and complexity for individual actors, whose main concern is how to establish shared mean-
ing as a precondition for social action.  
One can distinguish three important types of institutions integral to the notion of institution-
based trust which characterize the institutional embeddedness of trust relations: (1) rules, (2) 
roles, and (3) routines (Möllering 2006b: 65f.). First, institution-based trust emerges and is 
sustained by a shared understanding regarding the system of rules specifying what behaviors 
are regarded as appropriate in a given situation. In the previous chapter, we have linked rule-
based trust to moral dispositions, norms, and values when looking at the normative element in 
the subjective experience of trust (see chapter 2.2.3). However, the notion of rules must be 
apprehended much more broadly. Importantly, rules include formal law and legal contracts. 
Law represents an institution that explicitly defines sanctionable norms, and, for example in 
the form of contract law, very effectively reduces social uncertainty (Zucker 1986, Ripperger 
1998). As Luhmann points out, “legal arrangements which lend special assurance to particular 
expectations, and make them sanctionable ... lessen the risk of conferring trust” (1979: 34). 
But instead of merely structuring action by changing the incentive structure, “contract law, 
trade associations and technical standards are social institutions that embody systems of rules 
[and meaning] for interaction,” which can become “a basis for trust, if rules are understood as 
cultural meaning systems” (Möllering 2006b: 67). Taken together, the notion of institution-
based and rule-based trust includes a broad class of “good reasons” behind expectations of 
trustworthiness (for example: the adherence to social norms and rule-based value systems, le-
gal institutions such as civil law, licensing, and guarantees) and it extends the meaning and 
functional scope of institutions from a perspective that treats them as “external” sanctioning 
devices to the central role they play not only in the social definition of the situation and the 
reduction of social uncertainty, but also with regard to the identity of the actors participating 
in the social system. 
Apart from rules, social roles are also regarded as an institutional basis for interpersonal trust 
(Barber 1983, Baier 1986, Meyerson et al. 1996). Social roles can be defined as sanctionable 
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expectations tied to a particular social position—they are a special case of a norm. Interper-
sonal trust enabled by social roles is “depersonalized” (Kramer 1999), because it is based on 
the knowledge that an actor occupies a particular social position and enacts a particular social 
role; it does not rest on specific knowledge of trustee characteristics. Roles evoke typical ex-
pectations concerning competence and “fiduciary responsibility” (Barber 1983), that is, the 
demands and obligations associated with a specific role. What is more, roles also embody typ-
ical sequences of action and typical patterns of identification and affect (Esser 2000c: 141f.). 
At the same time, they most directly reflect the normative and institutional structure of a soci-
ety: just as different social positions are structurally related to each other (for example, via 
hierarchy in an organizational context), so are the social roles that individual actors fill. In this 
way, roles establish a fixed and expectable pattern of interpersonal relationships and interac-
tion. They structure social positions, sanctionable expectations, and a potential course of ac-
tion. Since roles are internalized during socialization, actors in fact generate interpersonal 
trust on the basis of their identity and self-image when shared role expectations become a ba-
sis for action (Möllering 2006a: 362). To the extent that both the intention to fulfill the role 
and the competence to do so are convincingly signaled by the trustee and accepted by the trus-
tor, a trustor can choose a trusting act based on the knowledge of a normative role relation, 
even when dyadic or network embeddedness are absent (Buskens & Raub 2008). Taken to-
gether, social roles are conducive to interpersonal trust—a social role effectively reduces so-
cial uncertainty regarding the role occupant’s intentions and abilities and thus “lessens the 
need for and costs of negotiating trust when interacting with others” (Kramer 1999: 678). 
Lastly, an institutional basis of trust can be established from routines, which are “regularly 
and habitually performed programs of actions of procedures. They may or may not be sup-
ported by corresponding (systems of) rules and/or roles, and they represent institutions in as 
much as they are typified, objectified and legitimated, although their sense is mostly taken-
for-granted whilst they are performed” (Möllering 2006b: 69). For example, we have intro-
duced the notion of a script to denote a typical action sequence which is part of the typified 
and socially shared stock of knowledge. Scripts can become a basis for trust because the ac-
tors involved can take for granted that a known sequence of actions leads to expectable out-
comes, while vulnerability is subjectively minimized and not greater than in past interactions 
(Misztal 1996). Likewise, the routine provided by modern bureaucratic institutions confers 
predictability in the sense that public services can be routinely and repeatedly demanded and 
will function “until further notice”—they therefore easily produce trust. In many cases, the 
choice of a trusting act and the trustworthy response become part of routine itself: when a 
mother “entrusts” her child to the teacher in school, she does not ask whether trust in the char-
acteristics of the teacher is justified—her action is part of a daily routine in which doubts of 
this sort have been suspended. What is more, her action is embedded in an institutional envi-
ronment where competence, benevolent intentions, and the personal integrity of a teacher are 
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based on taken-for-granted role expectations. The routinization of action is also conducive to 
the development of trust in ongoing relationships as it helps the actors to develop shared in-
terpretive schemes and pass over the initial stages of a trust relation (Rempel et al. 1985, 
Jones & George 1998).  
So far, we have examined the effect of institutions on trust through the lens of situational 
normality, familiarity and taken-for-grantedness, and looked at different ways in which insti-
tutions ensure unproblematic interaction to provide a basis for interpersonal trust. The second 
aspect of institutional embeddedness considers structural assurance—“the belief that success 
is likely because such contextual conditions as promises, contracts, regulations, and guaran-
tees are in place” (McKnight et al. 1998: 478). The concept of structural assurance focuses on 
the sanctioning potential of institutions and their power to change the incentive structure of a 
trust game. It reflects a more “utilitarian” perspective on institutions, in which enforcement 
and deterrence become the reasoning on which a trustor can generate favorable expectations 
of trustworthiness. According to McKnight and Chervany (2006), structural assurance is a 
frequent antecedent to calculus-based forms of trust. 
If, from the trustor’s point of view, the effectiveness of an institution in bringing about a 
trustworthy response is taken for granted and its sanctioning potential is regarded as suffi-
cient, then social uncertainty is considerably reduced: the trustor does not expect the trustee to 
fail trust because he knows the consequences of a failure of trust, and he can count on the ef-
fectiveness of the institution in bringing about a trustworthy response. In the words of Hardin 
(2001), trust is “encapsulated” in the interests of the trustee, and the trustor, by taking into ac-
count the trustee’s rationale, can expect appropriate behavior. Essentially, structural assurance 
“may be thought of as a generalized comforting belief that reflects the effects of many types 
of mechanisms that support confidence in contextual actors because they provide safety-nets 
or prevent or redress losses due to opportunism” (McKnight & Chervany 2006: 38); it there-
fore grasps an important aspect of institutional embeddedness.  
For example, Shapiro (1987) discusses institutional embeddedness in the form of legal con-
tracts as a strategy for controlling the behavior of the trustee. Both parties engage in “norm 
making” by designing an appropriate institution in which rules, actions, and sanctions are 
specified. The contract changes the incentive structure of a trust problem such that the trustee 
does not have an incentive to fail trust, and it yields an amount of structural assurance suffi-
cient for the choice of a trusting act, even in one-shot situations between anonymous actors. 
Likewise, the internalization of a social norm can be recast as the installation of an internal 
sanction mechanism which changes the structure of the trust problem such that a failure of 
trust has negative consequences for trustee’s utility (Fehr & Schmidt 2006). If the context in-
dicates that norm-breaking behavior will be punished, and if the trustor believes that the trus-
tee has internalized relevant norms (including social roles), the trustor can feel “structurally 
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assured” and confidently expect a trustworthy response. Similarly, when reputation mecha-
nisms are in place, they represent an institutional safeguard which delivers the structural as-
surance conducive to interpersonal trust. With an efficient reputation mechanism in place, a 
failure of trust is sanctionable and inflicts losses on the utility of the trustee. On the other 
hand, structural assurance can also refer to institutions that change the incentive structure with 
respect to the utility of the trustor. Many forms of insurance, for example, confer structural 
assurance insofar as they mitigate the risk of interpersonal trust for the trustor. In the case of 
opportunism and the failure of trust, the inflicted damage will be restored. Then, the choice of 
a trusting act is likely because objective vulnerability is minimized.  
Note that all examples point to an important prerequisite for institution-based trust: as it is, the 
trustor needs to be convinced that the institution itself is effective. Problems of institution-
based trust almost immediately turn our attention to the problem of system trust, which has to 
be solved before institutions can be an effective basis for trust development. 
Overall, social embeddedness in its different variations is an integral part of a theory of trust. 
Since trust relations always occur in a social context, they are naturally constrained or en-
hanced by micro, meso, and macrolevel processes. Social embeddedness mitigates the risk of 
conferring trust because it provides opportunities for learning and control. Likewise, the con-
text creates a background of familiarity in front of which the choice of a trusting act is possi-
ble. The actors have to establish a common “frame of reference” in which action can take 
place and be filled with meaning. In this regard, institutions take a prime role in the process of 
socially defining the situation; they represent taken-for-granted expectations (in the form of 
rules, roles, and routines) which the actors can apply to an immediate trust problem. From the 
perspective of situational normality, they function as cultural meaning systems that structure 
and control social action, while from the perspective of structural assurance, they have the 
power to change the incentive structure of a trust problem and enforce norm-conforming be-
havior—if their effectiveness is taken for granted. On top of that, institutions often provide the 
degree of familiarity necessary to permit the suspension of doubts on a routine basis, enabling 
unconditional forms of trust. In sum, social embeddedness, as a “bedrock of trust” (Shapiro 
1987), enriches our understanding of interpersonal trust relations. It pins down sources of 
trust-related knowledge, emphasizes different mechanisms of learning and control, and high-
lights the important role of institutions for the generation of trust. The choice of a trusting act, 
from a perspective of dyadic, network, and institutional embeddedness, must be understood as 
a symbolic and meaningful act that relates to the context and social systems which “set the 
stage” for the particular trust relation.  
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3.2.3. Social Capital and Reciprocity 
In a socially embedded trust relation, the choice of a trusting act is normally accompanied by 
an implicit demand of a morally correct response and a normative obligation for the trustee to 
prove trustworthy. When trust relations are dyadically embedded and reciprocal, the fulfill-
ment of such an obligation constitutes a form of “asset” for the trustee. By fulfilling the obli-
gations that come with the placement of trust, and by spending resources in the form of time, 
money, or cognitive effort, the trustee equally invests in a future reciprocal demand on trust-
worthiness. This obligation constitutes a form of social capital for the trustee (Ripperger 
1998: 166).
12
 More pointedly, in an ongoing, dyadically embedded trust relation, both trustor 
and trustee alternately take the role of a creditor and debtor of social capital. Likewise, net-
work embeddedness can enable the creation of social capital in a trust relation, given that 
learning and control mechanisms are in place (Burt 1992, 2003). In this case, the social capital 
that a trustee invests in with his trustworthy response is not transaction-specific (that is, is not 
fixed to the particular trust relation), but his gained reputation constitutes a “generalized” 
form of social capital with respect to the social system (Dasgupta 1988: 175f.). 
It is not surprising that trust has been a focal point of research focusing on social capital and 
collective action (see Lewis & Weigert 1985a). The idea that trust plays an important role in 
the creation of social capital and the promotion of cooperation was already endorsed by Blau, 
who stated that “social exchange ... entails supplying benefits that create diffuse future obliga-
tions ... Since the recipient is one who decides when and how to reciprocate for a favor, or 
whether to reciprocate at all, social exchange requires trusting others” (1968: 454). From a 
functional perspective, trust is a mechanism for the production of social capital. This argu-
ment is based on several observations: (1) the choice of a trusting act usually initiates a trust 
relation and thus constitutes an opportunity for the creation of social capital, (2) a demand on 
social capital warrants trustworthy action of the trustee, (3) the trustee also has to “trust” that 
his moral demands on social capital will be fulfilled in the future (“trust” in this sense bridges 
the gap between the constitution of a demand on social capital and its future realization), and 
(4) objectively, the true value of social capital created depends on the trustworthiness of the 
trustor, that is, on whether future demands of the trustee will be in fact redeemed (Ripperger 
1998: 168). In short, the total amount of social capital within a social system is significantly 
influenced by the overall level of trust (determining the number and value of outstanding ob-
ligations) and trustworthiness (determining whether moral demands on reciprocal behavior are 
in fact “covered” by actual trustworthy responses).  
                                                 
12 Ripperger defines social capital as “interpersonal obligations of a social nature, which result from a moral demand on re-
ciprocally altruistic behavior” (1998: 166, present author’s translation). In a more general notion, social capital is defined 
here as the total value of resources and services which an actor can control via dyadic and network embeddedness (Esser 
2000b: 238, see also Bourdieu 1985, Portes 1998, Woolcock 1998).  
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The actors participating in social system can benefit from high levels of accumulated social 
capital, as it enables continual cooperation and investments that would otherwise be locked in 
“hold-up.” However, social capital is commonly regarded as a public good (Coleman 1988, 
1990: 315). It is often diminished or destroyed unintentionally because individual actors do 
not take into account the external effects of their actions. A trustee’s individual decision about 
trustworthiness, if observable or available as reputation information, has an external effect on 
other trust relations, because the overall level of “successful” cooperation within the social 
system changes. In consequence, third parties are indirectly affected by the actions taken in a 
particular trust relation. If it is common knowledge that many participants of a social system 
are not trustworthy, then cooperation and the production of social capital through the mecha-
nism of trust are severely hampered (Putnam 1993: 167). Defection undermines both trust and 
(future) trustworthiness, and thus the bases of social capital production. 
According to Ripperger, the fragility of trust and the public good character of social capital 
create a “consensus to collectively control the behavior of the trustee in a trust relation and 
protect the stock of social capital” (1998: 184, present author’s translation) with the help of 
social norms and other institutional measures for trust-protection. In the same line, Messick 
and Kramer argue that “our strong preferences for other’s actions lead us to endorse and pro-
mote rules of ethics and morality, including exhortations to be trusting and trustworthy, that 
may be beneficial to us if we can induce others to follow these rules” (2001: 98). These au-
thors see a possible solution to the risk of opportunism in the creation, institutionalization and 
internalization of social norms and rules which sustain trust and guarantee trustworthiness. 
Principally, these institutions aim to protect the future reciprocal demands that a trustee in-
vests into with his trustworthy response, and thus, serve to protect the stock of social capital. 
In fact, one of the main propellants behind an institutional protection of trust is its beneficial 
effect on the production of social capital (Fukuyama 1995, Ripperger 1998f., Sztompka 1999: 
105f., Messick & Kramer 2001, Burt 2003). 
The most prominent example of an institution that directly relates to the function of trust as a 
mechanism of social capital production is the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960), which has 
been identified as an almost universal norm across different cultures and different moral value 
systems. It directly addresses the need to “cover” outstanding reciprocal demands and ensure 
that social capital can be realized. The norm of reciprocity is a highly productive component 
of social capital production (Putnam 1993: 172), markedly decreasing transaction costs and 
bolstering cooperation. By far the most famous reciprocal strategy that has been examined is 
“tit-for-tat” (Rapoport & Chammah 1965), but the specific reciprocal norms that individuals 
learn vary significantly from culture to culture and across different types of situations (Ostrom 
2003). As a consequence of early socialization, actors tend to reciprocate each other’s behav-
ior in an almost reflexive way because they have internalized the rule, and social sanctions are 
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almost universally applied to violators (Allison & Messick 1990). Importantly, if actors have 
fully internalized the norm of reciprocity (or any other norm of trust-protection, for that mat-
ter), then motivations for action do no longer lie in the instrumental consequences on utility, 
but in an intrinsic value that emerges from norm-compliance, and in the form of a “bad con-
science” which inflicts negative psychological costs in the case of a failure of trust (Elster 
2005: 202f.). In a social system in which compliance to the norm of reciprocity is “the rule,” 
social exchanges can be more easily established because structural assurance is high, and rule-
based forms of trust and trustworthiness can be favorably expected. That is, the norm of reci-
procity functions not only to stabilize social relationships, but also as a “starting mechanism” 
to initiate social interactions and trust (Gouldner 1960). This boosts cooperation and the crea-
tion of social capital, and, coincidentally, allows trust relations to mature to advanced devel-
opmental stages in which a reliance on norm-compliance may even be no longer necessary 
and be replaced by shared routines and mutual identification. An effective norm of reciprocity 
thus is a prime example of a successful institutionalization of a rule to protect and maintain 
trust and trustworthiness (Ferrin 2008).  
3.2.4. Trust and Culture 
The institutionalization of trust is discussed by sociologists mainly in a historic perspective, 
and it is usually linked to the fundamental question of social order, which was first raised in 
the course of industrialization and modernization (Misztal 1996). For example, Durkheim 
(1984, [1893]) criticized “atomistic” social contract theories by showing that the noncontrac-
tual part of the contract, that is, the unspoken “et cetera assumptions,” qualifications, and pro-
visions for future action are backed up by society as a “silent partner,” through which con-
tracts as a social institution become viable. This noncontractual aspect of contracts and 
agreements is largely based on trust (Collins 1982: 12). To act with “good faith” in agree-
ments, promises, and contracts means that “et cetera assumptions” are respected and taken for 
granted. Otherwise, and from a position of distrust, any form of commitment would always 
appear incomplete and cooperation would be prevented by the insurmountable risks of oppor-
tunism. Durkheim developed this argument in light of his concept of “organic solidarity,” ac-
cording to which a moral consensus, based on the recognition of an increased interdependence 
(resulting from the division of labor) is a central source of integration and solidarity, even in 
modern societies.  
Parsons added to the idea that trust is an indispensable ingredient for the maintenance of so-
cial order by introducing the concept of generalized media of symbolic interaction (commit-
ment, influence, money, and power) as a basis for interaction, cooperation, and social integra-
tion (Parsons 1967, 1971). With the concept of a social media of exchange, he suggests the 
principal “channels” which structure, control, and sanction individual action and facilitate the 
continuous reproduction of social systems. Trust is regarded as a central foundation of these 
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media. According to Parsons, trust in their reliability, effectiveness and legitimacy is a prima-
ry condition for their functioning (Parsons 1963: 46ff.). In addition to that, trust is required to 
bridge unavoidable “competence gaps” (Parsons 1978: 46) between experts and lay-persons 
during professional interactions, which he regards as a key aspect of modernity and a product 
of increasing structural differentiation and specialization. In line with Durkheim, Parsons 
holds that the bases of trust lie in shared normative orientations: “People defined as sharing 
one’s values or concrete goals and in whose competence and integrity one has confidence 
come to be thought of as trustworthy individuals or types” (Parsons 1978: 47). 
Luhmann (1979) proposes that the transition from small and undifferentiated societies into 
modern technologically and organizationally complex social structures is paralleled by chang-
es in the types and functions of trust which are necessary to integrate them. As pointed out 
before, he distinguishes between interpersonal and system trust. Importantly, Luhmann em-
phasizes that the functioning of modern societies is less and less dependent on interpersonal 
trust, while system trust is becoming increasingly important—especially with respect to legit-
imacy of bureaucratic sanctions, safeguards, and the legal system (ibid. 48). A standard argu-
ment to underpin this view is that group size and other group-related attributes can drastically 
influence the effectiveness of social norms and the success of attempts to institutionalize them 
(Olson 1965, Hardin 1982). In short, learning and control mechanisms to detect and punish 
defectors can be more easily established in small groups, where there is also less scope for 
free riders to profit, and where cooperative efforts are more directly targeted towards specific 
individuals and outcomes. Likewise, Zucker (1986: 11f.) asserts, with regard to rule-based 
forms of trust such as social norms, that they may back up “local” forms of enforcement, 
while “global” environments and larger social systems need other foundations. Thus, in mod-
ern societies and large-scale market-based economies, it becomes increasingly difficult to es-
tablish trust based on institutions that function best in small-scale environments. Consequen-
tially, “local” mechanisms have to be replaced or complemented by other forms of institution-
al protection, which largely depend on system trust.  
In this line, Giddens states that modernity is marked by “disembedding, i.e. the ‘lifting out’ of 
social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite 
spans of time-space” (1990: 21). This is achieved by the use of symbolically generalized me-
dia of exchange (e.g. Parsons, Luhmann) and expert-knowledge systems, which also serve as 
“access points” to reembed complex social systems in concrete interactions and particular 
trust relations (for example, in the form of a patient-physician relationship). From this per-
spective, trust is integral to modern society because it is the mechanism that bridges the gaps 
in time and space and enables the reembedding of social systems via access points—
effectively, “all disembedding mechanisms ... depend on trust” (ibid. 26). In line with Luh-
mann, Giddens argues that there is an increased need for trust in modern societies. But he em-
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phasizes that the increased demand for trust pertains to both interpersonal and system trust 
simultaneously (e.g. system trust in the medical system and rule-based interpersonal trust in 
the physician), opposing Luhmann’s assertion that interpersonal trust becomes less important.  
In consequence, modern societies are typically marked by a build-up of institutional frame-
works (“trust settings,” “rounding frameworks of trust,” ibid. 35) to protect and maintain trust 
and the functioning of the system of society—for example, in the form of bureaucratic regula-
tions, standardization, professional ethics, legal sanctions, and insurance. As Shapiro puts it, 
“in complex societies in which agency relationships are indispensable, opportunities for agent 
abuse sometimes irresistible, and the ability to specify and enforce substantive norms govern-
ing the outcomes of agency action nearly impossible, a spiraling evolution of procedural 
norms, structural constraints, and insurance-like arrangements seems inevitable” (1987: 649).  
The evolving mix of local and global mechanisms for the protection and maintenance of trust 
is frequently analyzed from a macrolevel perspective. Taken together, different institutional 
measures for trust protection, the different norms, prevalent cultural practices, and legal safe-
guards merge into a unique trust culture: “Trust culture [...] is a system of rules—norms and 
values—regulating granting trust and meeting, returning and reciprocating trust; in short, rules 
about trust and trustworthiness” (Sztompka 1999: 99, see also Fukuyama 1995). A society’s 
trust culture circumscribes the totality of cultural and normative-institutional rules which con-
cern trust and trustworthiness, while presenting themselves as social facts sui generis and as 
properties of the social system (or, as Lewis & Weigert 1985b put it, as a “social reality”). As 
we have seen, these rules can stem from moral values and rule-based value systems (honesty, 
benevolence, integrity etc.), from diverse role expectations and shared social norms (reci-
procity, truth-telling, keeping secrets, being fair, etc.), from cultural practices (for example, 
the general rule of noblesse oblige, demanding exemplary conduct from those who have at-
tained elevated positions in the social hierarchy), and a plurality of “normalizing” institutions 
which enable rule-based form of trust; they may also describe more diffuse expectations per-
taining to trust and distrust, such as stereotypes and prejudices.
13
 Once a culture of trust 
emerges and becomes ingrained in the normative system of society, it can become a vital fac-
tor influencing both the choice of a trusting act and its trustworthy response. In an established 
“positive” culture of trust, “people not only routinely tend to, but are culturally encouraged to 
express a trustful orientation toward their society, its regime and institutions, fellow citizens, 
as well as their own life-chances and biographical perspectives” (Sztompka 1998: 21).  
                                                 
13 “In cultures of trust, some rules may be very general, demanding diffuse trustfulness toward a variety of objects, and ex-
pressing a kind of certitude about the good intentions of others, implied by overall existential security. There may also be 
more specific rules, indicating concrete objects as targets of normatively demanded trust or distrust. Object-specific cul-
tural trust or distrust is often embedded in stereotypes and prejudices [ ... ] There are also culturally diffuse rules demand-
ing and enforcing general trustworthiness” (Sztompka 1999: 68f.). 
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The concept of trust culture can be regarded as a continuation of a branch of political research 
focusing on the links and causal interrelations between culture and democracy. It is closely 
related to the ideas of “civic culture” (Almond & Verba 1972) and the “civil society” (Selig-
man 1997), and, paralleling the works of several other political trust researchers (Fukuyama 
1995, Putnam 1995), primarily represents a theoretical attempt to outline the cultural precon-
ditions for the functioning of modern democratic institutions. The emergence of a trust culture 
is characterized as a continuous process in which choices about trust and trustworthiness, in-
fluenced by surrounding social structures and the preexisting climate of trust, generate trust-
confirming or trust-disconfirming events. These experiences, normally widespread and social-
ly shared, cumulate and turn into routine, and eventually into normative rules (Sztompka 
1999: 119f.). In effect, positive experiences of trust furnish the development of a culture of 
trust; negative experiences will eventually generate a culture of distrust, or a “culture of cyni-
cism” (Putnam 1995). Notably, the trajectories of cultural development are “self-amplifying,” 
and can result in “virtuous loops” or “vicious loops,” depending on whether trust-confirming 
or trust-disconfirming events prevail (Sztompka 1999: 120). That is, if trust is usually hon-
ored, the process moves toward building a culture of trust, whereas failed trust pushes devel-
opment toward suspicion, which can damage even an established trust culture. 
Sztompka (1999: 122ff.) identifies five structural factors that determine the direction of cul-
tural evolution: (1) First, “normative coherence,” that is, a solid normative ordering of social 
life which raises a “feeling of existential security and certainty” (ibid. 122), is seen as encour-
aging trust and the development of trust culture. In our terminology, this refers to an aspect of 
high situational normality. Importantly, normative coherence means that trust-related norms 
(e.g. demands for honesty, loyalty and reciprocity) are effective and regarded as sanctionable, 
indicating what people will and should do, and making behavior predictable in ordered, un-
problematic “fixed scenarios” (ibid.). Sztompka contrasts this to a state of anomy, in which 
social rules and norm enforcement are “in disarray.” As a result of low situational normality, 
the perceived uncertainty and insecurity widely increases, pushing the cultural development 
towards a climate of distrust.  
(2) Second, the “stability” of the social structures at large—that is, whether social institutions, 
networks, associations, organizations, political regimes, and so forth are “long-lasting, persis-
tent and continuous” (ibid.) or change rapidly—will influence the development of trust cul-
ture. Continuity provides a basis for routinization and lends security and comfort in trust rela-
tions. The choice of a trusting act and a trustworthy response then easily become a matter of 
habit, whereas rapid social change (for example, in the case of revolutions) undermines situa-
tional normality—in phases of quick social change, “nothing is certain anymore,” and preva-
lent norms, social roles, everyday routines, and habitualized patterns of action may no longer 
be adequate, raising feelings of “estrangement, insecurity, and uneasiness” (ibid. 123). This 
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increases the probability that trusting expectations will not be met and that trustees will not 
respond as expected, triggering suspiciousness and the tendency to withhold trust.  
(3) Furthermore, the “transparency” of social organization—that is, whether information 
about the functioning, efficiency, and levels of achievement (as well as failures and patholo-
gies of social institutions) is available or not—is regarded as an important factor (ibid.). 
Transparency effects pertain to an aspect of system trust—if principles of institutional opera-
tion and the modus operandi of social systems are visible, then even failures or dysfunctions 
of the social system do not necessarily come as a surprise to actors. In this sense, transparency 
allows actors to “relate” to the social systems, assuring them about what can be expected. On 
the other hand, if principles of operation are vague and hidden, then a general climate of sus-
picion and distrust may emerge and hamper the choice of trusting acts, undermining a culture 
of trust.  
(4) Another factor is “familiarity” with the environment of the trust relation, which “breeds 
trust,” and produces a “trust-generating atmosphere” (ibid. 124) in which expectations of 
trustworthiness become favorable and confident. Sztompka links this directly to the “natural 
attitude” of the life world, providing security, certainty, and predictability, whereas in situa-
tions of “strangeness,” actors react with anxiety, suspicion, and distrust. Sztompka develops 
this point for the case of migrants and migrant communities, citing a classical study of Thom-
as and Znaniecki (1927) about Polish emigrants in the United States who suffered a great deal 
from unfamiliarity with their new environment, which raised a culture of distrust. 
(5) Lastly, “accountability,” that is, the presence of formal or informal agencies monitoring 
and sanctioning the conduct of a trustee, is regarded as conducive to the build-up of a positive 
trust culture. The concept of accountability can be directly restated in terms of structural as-
surance introduced earlier (see chapter 2.3.1): “Accountability enhances trustworthiness be-
cause it changes the trustee’s calculation of interest, it adds an extra incentive to be trustwor-
thy, namely to avoid censure and punishment” (Sztompka 1999: 88). Thus, when functioning 
institutions provide efficient control, the risk of opportunism and defection is decreased, and 
confident expectations of trustworthiness can be formed: “Everybody is confident that stand-
ards will be observed, departures prevented, and that even if abuse occurs it will be corrected 
by recourse to litigation, arbitration, restitution, or similar. This stimulates a more trustful ori-
entation toward others” (ibid. 125). 
On the whole, we can use the concept of “trust culture” to grasp the overall social conditions 
prevailing in a given society which are conducive or disruptive to the build-up of interperson-
al trust. Most accounts stress the positive side-effects of an existing culture of trust and the 
successful institutionalization of trust-related rules, roles, and routines: it increases “spontane-
ous sociability” (Fukuyama 1995: 27f.), “civic engagement” (Almond & Verba 1972: 228), is 
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regarded as highly productive component of social capital (Putnam 1993, 1995), and, overall 
as an “integrative mechanism that creates and sustains solidarity in social relationships and 
systems” (Barber 1983: 21). A well-established trust culture is frequently regarded as indis-
pensable and as a desirable “good” in itself: “A nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to 
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inher-
ent in a society” (Fukuyama 1995: 7). However, although positive consequences of an institu-
tionalization of trust are preferably accounted for, a strong culture of trust can also lead to un-
desirable consequences—for example, social closure and corruption—as Gambetta (1993) 
shows in working out the relevance of a culture of trust for the success of the Sicilian mafia. 
Whether a culture of trust should be regarded as a “good” in itself is a normative question 
which will not be subject of further analysis here.  
The most important result of the preceding analysis is that there exist a number of socially 
prescribed interpretive schemes or “trust settings” (Giddens 1990) to encourage trust on a cul-
tural basis. A “culture of trust” may emerge as a consequence of the co-evolution of local and 
global mechanisms for trust protection, which at the same time are a primary means for the 
social integration of modern societies. If trust becomes institutionalized, it is commonly pro-
duced on the basis of “how things are done” (Zucker 1986: 12); that is, based on habitualized 
cultural practices and routinely executed social roles and norms. The successful 
(re)production and maintenance of trust culture can be traced back to individual socialization 
and to the learning and internalization of relevant mental schemata. After all, it is the shared 
mental models and interpretive schemes that carry the “culture of trust.” Their application 
provides a ground for the development of rule-based interpersonal trust, following a “logic of 
appropriateness,” in which the cultural-normative context of situations guides the choice of a 
trusting act from the pillars of situational normality and structural assurance. 
Empirically, the study of cultural differences in trust is one of the most flourishing areas of 
current trust research (see Saunders et al. 2010 for an extensive review). Scholars scrutinize 
how trust relations develop within and across cultural boundaries, how the preconditions to 
trust differ between cultural domains, and how trust can be maintained in cross-cultural con-
texts. Overall, these studies, far too numerous to be reviewed in detail, lend considerable sup-
port to a perspective that acknowledges the influence of socialized and learned cultural mod-
els and the prevalent “trust culture” on the practical development of trust. For example, a 
number of studies have demonstrated differences in the observed levels of trust and trustwor-
thiness between different cultural domains (for example, “individualist” versus “collectivist” 
societies). It has also been found that culture influences the production of trust-related cues in 
relationships, and, by providing the “interpretive lens” used during interaction, serves as a fil-
ter for the signals emitted from others. Trust may be backed up by the recognition of (shared) 
cultural identity, but cultural boundaries may also become a barrier to trust when the context 
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is becoming increasingly unfamiliar to the actors. Some researchers have argued that the na-
ture and quality of trust vary greatly over different cultural domains, and that, accordingly, the 
meaning of trust also differs. One important methodological conclusion that can be drawn is 
that trust research must take into account the cultural idiosyncrasies and peculiarities stem-
ming from the prevalent trust culture when conducting empirical research. The influence of 
“culture” on trust is considerable, and the continuing empirical support provided by intercul-
tural trust research suggests that any broad conceptualization of trust must take into account 
its cultural roots, and refer to the learned stock of trust-related knowledge that defines the 
scope and extent of trust. 
3.3. The Economics of Trust 
3.3.1. The Rational Choice Paradigm 
The economic perspective on interpersonal trust marks a “current mainstream” (Möllering 
2006b: 13) and “major approach” (Bigley & Pearce 1998: 411) to the phenomenon of trust, 
linking it to the paradigm and theory of rational choice (e.g. Gambetta 1988b, Coleman 1990, 
Cook 2001, Hardin 2002, Ostrom & Walker 2003). The abstract simplicity of economic mod-
els allows a formal representation of complex ideas in a clear and parsimonious way, and 
highlights the “logic” of decisions in situations with a well-defined objective structure, mak-
ing rational choice approaches the “most influential images of trust” (Kramer 1999: 572) in 
contemporary research. Simply put, interpersonal (dis)trust is warranted or withheld by ra-
tional utility-maximizing actors who, in face of constraints and directed by their preferences, 
goals, and incentives, have to make a decision about the choice of a trusting act.  
But what is a “rational” and “utility-maximizing” decision? How are “preferences” and “in-
centives” represented, and how do actors come to make a choice? Before we can proceed to 
highlight the ways in which interpersonal trust is modeled, it is important to circumscribe the 
theory of rational choice and to pin down fundamental assumptions of the rationalist para-
digm. Notably, “rational choice theory” is not a unified theoretical framework, but the term 
subsumes under its umbrella a number of different variants (such as expected utility theory, 
game theory, evolutionary economics, and marginal analysis). Yet, all variants have some 
methodological and theoretical considerations in common which are characteristic of the ra-
tionalist paradigm. The following postulates can be characterized as the “hard core” of the ra-
tional choice research program (see Elster 1986a, Hedström & Swedberg 1996, Esser 1999b: 
295f., Opp 1999, Boudon 2003, Gintis 2007, Kirchgässner 2008: 12ff.). 
First, rational choice theory rests on the principle of methodological individualism. This prin-
ciple holds that social phenomena must be explained in terms of individual actions (Coleman 
1990: 11f., Esser 1999a: 91f.). The main unit of analysis is the single actor; collective phe-
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nomena such as cooperation, the production of a public good, the conclusion of a contract, or 
the functioning of “perfect markets” are analyzed and explained from an individual perspec-
tive. Methodological individualism can be distinguished into a “strong” and a “weak” version, 
which differ with respect to the way that social aggregates and collective phenomena are 
treated in the explanans (Hedström & Swedberg 1996). While the strong version does not ac-
cept any references to aggregates, the more prominent position, which also informs the pre-
sent work, is a position of weak methodological individualism, which accepts that not all ele-
ments in the explanans of a scientific explanation need to be dissolved into the individual-
level components—for reasons of tractability and “for the sake of realism” (ibid. 131). For 
example, effective social norms (a product of individual action) need not be explained again 
in terms of third party compliance when it can be convincingly argued that they objectively 
shape the constraints an actor faces when defining a situation. 
Second, explanations in the rationalist paradigm are explicitly analytical and intentional. Any 
rational choice explanation proceeds by first constructing a model of the situation to be ana-
lyzed. In doing so, only the essential elements are abstracted from the problem at hand. Thus, 
the final object of analysis is an analytical abstraction of reality, representing the vehicle of 
explanation. Of course, the model is incomplete—but to the extent that it captures the “essen-
tial” ingredients, it will shed light on the real world situation that it is intended to explain. On 
top of that, human action is assumed to be intentional and principally understandable; expla-
nations recur to the intentions of actors in explaining the choice of action. “An intentional ex-
planation [...] seeks to provide an answer to the question of why actors act the way they do; 
and to explain an action intentionally means that we explain the action with reference to the 
future state it was intended to bring about” (Hedström & Swedberg 1996: 132). This allows 
the researcher to “understand” action in the sense postulated by Weber. As Coleman notes, 
“Rational actions of individuals have a unique attractiveness as the basis for social theory. If 
an institution or a social process can be accounted for in terms of the rational actions of indi-
viduals, then and only then can we say that it has been ‘explained’. The very concept of ra-
tional action is a conception of action that is ‘understandable’, action that we need ask no 
more questions about” (Coleman 1986: 1). 
Third, every actor is assumed to have clear preferences which motivate concrete behavioral 
goals, define the actor’s interests and allow him to direct his behavior towards alternatives of 
choice. Preferences are the fundamental source of motivation and must satisfy certain condi-
tions in order to be suitable for modeling rational action (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). 
Importantly, they must be complete, meaning that all alternatives can be compared pairwise 
and brought into a preference relation, and transitive, meaning that no logical errors occur in 
the full preference relation that includes all alternatives. Furthermore, preference must satisfy 
the principle of independence, requiring that a preference relation between two alternatives 
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must not be distorted by introducing a third one. Lastly, preferences are assumed to be contin-
uous, so that preference orderings cannot be lexicographic. These assumptions of “choice 
consistency” are fundamental for the rationalist paradigm because they ensure that preferences 
can be represented by a numerical function to evaluate the alternatives. An actor is supposed 
to act according to his own preferences only, and not according to the preferences of others. 
Of course, his preferences may take into account the interests of others, and thus an actor may 
come to act benevolently, altruistically, or malevolently; his preferences may also include pro-
social orientations that shift his goals away from “self-interest seeking with guile” (William-
son 1975: 9). But the “axiom of self-interest” is normally supposed: the actor acts in accord-
ance with his own preferences. Preferences reflect the actor’s idea of value as they have been 
developed during socialization (Esser 1999b: 359f., Kirchgässner 2008: 12). 
Fourth, every decision problem contains opportunities and restrictions. Opportunities come in 
the form of a set of alternatives among which the actor can choose. It is not necessary that “all 
possible” alternatives are known to the actor, but the alternative-set must be fixed in a given 
decision problem. Any alternative is connected to some course of action and a number of re-
sulting consequences. In addition, certain restrictions limit the freedom of choice and the 
scope of action (that is, they narrow down the alternative-set to a “feasible set”). For example, 
the income of an actor, the market prices of goods or the legal framework are objectively 
“given” and cannot be changed, ruling out certain alternatives. A decision-maker has to re-
spect these “material” constraints, but the scope of action may also be limited by a number of 
“social” constraints, for example by social norms and institutions which prevent or proscribe 
certain courses of action. Generally, the environment is characterized as being subject to scar-
city: resources such as time, money, energy, and so forth, are not available in unlimited 
amounts, which means that certain actions, although desirable, cannot be executed because 
material, cognitive, or physical resources are lacking. 
Fifth, the actor possesses information about the choice situation. This information may be per-
fect or imperfect (see chapter 2.2.2 already). With perfect or “full” information, the actor 
knows his preferences and he can also determine precisely the consequences of each alterna-
tive. If other actors are involved and the situation is one of strategic choice, then his infor-
mation includes the knowledge of their preferences as well. On the other hand, if information 
is not perfect, an actor will have to make a decision based on his beliefs about possible action 
opportunities and their effects. If these beliefs pertain to future events and states, they are 
normally labeled “expectations”; these may be unambiguous or ambiguous. Thus, imperfect 
information introduces an aspect of risk or ambiguity, which pertains not only to future states 
(i.e. the consequences of a course of action) but also to the preferences of other actors in-
volved, so that an actor does not know for sure which preferences and intentions other actors 
have. This mirrors the aspect of irreducible social uncertainty resulting from the imperfect 
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knowledge of other’s preferences and the corresponding intentions and motivations, which we 
have already discussed. Preferences, constraints, and information are the basic ingredients of a 
model of rational action. 
Sixth, given preferences, restrictions, and information, an actor evaluates the different alterna-
tives at his disposal, taking into account the costs and benefits of each alternative, weighing 
the pros and cons of the consequences, and finally choosing an action. Preferences define the 
actor’s interests, and actions serve the purpose of fulfilling these interests (the principle of in-
strumentalism). If preferences are consistent, they can be expressed by a numerical function (a 
“utility function”) which the actor uses to evaluate the alternatives and to determine their utili-
ty. The core nomological assumption of the rational choice framework is the principle of utili-
ty maximization: an actor chooses that alternative which best satisfies his interest (Elster 
1986a). That is, actors maximize their utility subject to the beliefs and the constraints they 
face. We can say that an action is rational if it satisfies the principle of utility maximization 
under constraints.
14
 Rationality in this sense means that, given preferences and restrictions, the 
actor is able to determine the course of action which he prefers to all others or, at least, to de-
termine those courses of action which he prefers and those about which he is indifferent. With 
these assumptions, rational action appears “reasonable” or “appropriate” to the extent that, 
given the constraints and available information, the actor chooses a course of action which 
best serves his own interest. The principle of utility maximization represents the basic rule of 
choice on which the “logic of selection” rests in the rational choice paradigm. Note that an 
actor’s decision is ultimately directed by the expected consequences of action (the principle of 
consequentialism).  
This behavioral model is the nomological core of the rational choice paradigm, commonly 
identified by the assumption that preferences and constraints affect behavior and that individ-
uals in some way maximize. A formal specification of the postulates is given by expected util-
ity (EU) theory and its close relative, subjective expected utility (SEU) theory (see Schoe-
maker 1982, Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 167f.). EU theory is rooted in the core assumptions pre-
sented above, but it specifies more precisely how preferences and restrictions are causally 
linked to action, and thereby formulates a concrete choice rule. It reveals the relation between 
the independent variables “expectations,” “evaluations,” and the dependent variable “choice 
of action.” Given a set of alternatives A = (A1, ... Ax) and consequences C = (C1, ... Cy), an 
actor evaluates the consequences according to his utility function, so that U(C) = (U1, ... Uy). 
The information available is expressed in the form of probabilities P = (p11, ... pxy) which de-
note the likelihood that a certain consequence will eventuate, given that a specific alternative 
                                                 
14 The axioms of transitivity and completeness ensure that a decision will maximize the utility of an actor (if he follows his 
preferences), and are therefore sufficient to induce rationality in the above sense (Mas-Collel et al. 1995: 6).  
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was chosen. The expected utility of an alternative Ai then can be found by weighing the utili-
ty-evaluated consequences with their probability of occurrence so that  
EU(Ai) = pi1*U1 + pi2*U2 + ... + piy * Uy = ∑ p(i)U(i) 
The principle of utility maximization demands that the alternative with the highest expected 
utility is chosen. While EU theory assumes that the objective probabilities of the occurrence 
of events are known to the actors, SEU theory emphasizes that the available information about 
events is often limited, or deviates from the objectively true value. To accommodate for this 
fact, objective probabilities are replaced with subjective counterparts by means of a transform-
ing function P = w(p), so that SEU(Ai) = ∑ w(p(i))U(i), and expected utility is represented by 
subjective expected utility (Edwards 1954, Savage 1954).  
3.3.2. Modeling Trust 
If the choice of a trusting act is to be represented formally, then all variables which influence 
the trustor’s decision must be identified and included in a model of the decision process. An 
intuitive formal model of the choice of a trusting act was given by Coleman (1990: 91f.) in his 
conception of trust as a binary choice under risk. Note that trust, in rational choice models, is 
defined in terms of observable, instrumental choice behavior. The model will serve as a start-
ing point for our further exploration of the “economics of trust.” 
Coleman states that trust problems are special cases of the more general class of decisions un-
der risk: “The elements confronting the potential trustor are nothing more or less than the con-
siderations a rational actor applies in deciding whether to place a bet ... If the chance of win-
ning, relative to the chance of losing, is greater than the amount that would be lost (if he los-
es), relative to the amount that would be won (if he wins), then by placing the bet he has an 
expected gain; and if he is rational, he should place it” (ibid. 99). Coleman proposes formally 
grasping all relevant aspects of a trust problem in three variables: First, the potential gains G, 
relative to the status quo, which may be obtained in the case of a trustworthy response. Se-
cond, the potential loss L, relative to the status quo, which would be incurred if the trustee 
were not trustworthy; and third, the subjective probability p, which represents the trustor’s 
subjective estimate of the probability that a trustworthy response occurs. In effect, all trust-
related knowledge is represented by the single expectation of trustworthiness, p. Both G and L 
represent the trustor’s evaluation of the consequences (see figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Coleman´s trust model 
 
Following logic of SEU, and assuming that exactly two alternatives (trust or distrust) exist, 
Coleman points out that a rational trustor chooses a trusting act if SEU(trust) > SEU(distrust), 
that is, if p/(1-p) > L/G. In essence, the model hypothesizes a threshold value for p, defined in 
relation to G and L, which is sufficient to induce the choice of a trusting act. This corresponds 
to Gambetta’s (1988a) idea of trust as a threshold value to which the actual expectations are 
compared. The idea is also indicative of the core of the rationalist paradigm: a trustor will ra-
tionally trust a trustee if he perceives a net expected gain. As Gambetta notes, optimal thresh-
old values will vary subjectively as a result of individual dispositions, and will change with 
situational circumstances (represented here by G and L). Once a favorable expectation ex-
ceeds the threshold, the actor will engage in risk taking behavior and choose a trusting act. 
Coleman suspects that every individual has a standard estimate of p, accruing to situations in 
which one deals with strangers (deriving from dispositional tendencies and generalized expec-
tations), although p can be replaced by specific expectations p
+
 in close relationships, which 
are normally higher than their generalized counterpart (Coleman 1990: 104). This redraws the 
distinction of generalized and specific expectations made by Rotter.  
Some authors argue that, in order to speak of trust “proper,” it is necessary that the potential 
losses involved exceed the potential gains, so that L>G (Deutsch 1958, Luhmann 1979: 24). 
This implies that p > 0.5 and establishes a special requirement in order to interpret an expecta-
tion as favorable.
15
 Only if the subjective probability of a trustworthy response is greater than 
the subjective probability of a breach of trust, will the actor engage in choosing a trusting act. 
Coleman explicitly rejects such a position, maintaining that trust is similar to a bet in which 
the alternative with a higher subjective expected utility is chosen. In his view, social embed-
dedness and institutional mechanisms (such as repetition, reputation, and social norms) are the 
most important sources of trust-related knowledge, because they enable effective incentive 
                                                 
15 L>G implies L = G+x, x>0; so that pG > (1-p)L ↔ pG > (1-p)(G+x)  p > 0.5 (G+x)/ (G+0.5x). It follows that p >0.5, 
since (G+x)/(G+0.5x) > 1. 
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mechanisms to protect and safeguard trustworthiness, especially in close communities with 
intact communication structures and a high flow of information (Coleman 1990: 100, 108f.). 
It is worth noticing the high level of abstraction of Coleman’s model. It formulates conditions 
which allow an outside observer to interpret certain choices of action as trustful. His concep-
tion of trust aims at an explanation of choice behavior. While the choice of a trusting act is the 
explanandum, the underlying rational choice principles (SEU theory) represent the means to 
understand and causally explain it. Scrutinizing the model for the role of information and 
knowledge, it is apparent that trust is crucially dependent on the trustor’s subjective expecta-
tion p. Coleman notes that, in many situations, p, L and G are known with varying degrees of 
certainty, and further states that p is often least known, which is why actors should engage in a 
search for information. This “will continue so long as the cost of an additional increment of 
information is less than the benefit it is expected to bring” (ibid. 104). Yet, ultimately, trust 
hinges on the “fixed” model variables, and, centrally, on the (unambiguous!) expectation of 
trustworthiness. As Harvey (2002b: 291) notes: “In the language of economics, trust can be 
viewed as an expectation, and it pertains to circumstances in which agents take risky actions 
in environments characterized by uncertainty or informational incompleteness.” The perspec-
tive on trust taken by rational choice advocates therefore is an articulately cognitive one, and 
Hardin aptly notes that “my assessment of your trustworthiness in a particular context is simp-
ly my trust of you” (Hardin 2002: 10, emphasis added, see also Gambetta 1988: 217). Note 
that this implies a special causal relation between expectations and trust: expectations and 
evaluations explain trusting behavior, and thus are causal antecedents. 
The abstractness of the decision problem modeled by Coleman results from the fact that the 
model variables are not further specified; they are assumed to condense all experience and the 
knowledge of the trustor, as well as his evaluations in a particular trust problem, reflecting the 
individual’s history of learning and socialization as well as perceptions of current situational 
constraints or opportunities. The model displays the interdependencies between the basic vari-
ables which influence choice, but it leaves open the question of their emergence and formation 
in a specific situation—preferences, the alternative-set and information must be “fixed” in or-
der to satisfy the axioms of rational choice. Although Coleman accepts recourse to specific 
and generalized expectations, and admits to processes of information search, his perspective 
does not allow a conception of trust in which interpretation and prereflective processes play 
any further role. Evaluations and expectations are given, and they define trust completely. The 
notion of trust as a mechanism for the reduction of social complexity thus receives a very 
unique reading: trust is not a “reason” for a particular course of action or a process that fosters 
to the formation of favorable expectations; it is merely a characteristic of action, which re-
sults, along the way, if the constellation of the model’s components is accordingly favorable. 
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A reduction of complexity, or a notable “suspension” of uncertainty, must have already taken 
place.  
3.3.3. Encapsulated Interest 
Hardin (1993) remarks that rational choice approaches to interpersonal trust are characterized 
by two central elements: the first element is the trust-related knowledge of the trustor, ex-
pressed in his expectations. Expectations assume a prominent role in almost all economic 
models of interpersonal trust (Hardin 2003: 81). Although the trustee’s preferences and inten-
tions are private information and can never be known with certainty, the trustor can condense 
his knowledge into an estimate of how likely a trustee will respond in a  trustworthy manner, 
using the different categories of trust-related knowledge. However, as Hardin (1993: 153) la-
ments, many models of trust—including the one of Coleman—only implicitly refer to the se-
cond fundamental element: the actual incentives of the trustee to be trustworthy and to fulfill 
the trust. They are, as Hardin claims, equally important to any rational choice account of trust: 
“you trust someone if you have adequate reason to believe it will be in that person’s interest to 
be trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant time [...] one’s trust turns not on one’s own 
interests, but on the interests of the trusted. It is encapsulated in one’s own judgment” (Hardin 
1993: 152f.). Therefore, a rational trustor must “take a look at the world from his [the trus-
tee’s] perspective as it is likely to be when it comes to his having to fulfill his part of the 
agreement” (Dasgupta 1988: 51). Taking the perspective of the trustee is reasonable, as the 
trustor must assume that the trustee is an equally rational, utility-maximizing actor. In contrast 
to a narrow contemplation of self-interest and “bald expectations” (Hardin 2003: 83), the en-
capsulated-interest account of trust advises a more sophisticated understanding of the trustee’s 
interests, opportunities, and constraints. 
With respect to the relative neglect of the trustee’s rationale, Hardin points out that, “surpris-
ingly, much of the literature on trust hardly mentions trustworthiness, even though implicitly 
much of it is primarily about trustworthiness, not about trust” (2002: 29). In order to model 
the choice of a trusting act, we first have to understand the decision of the trustee, assuming 
an equal amount of rationality, and then to “encapsulate” it in the trustor’s decision. There-
fore, Hardin goes on to argue, the trustee’s rationale is indeed of primary concern for trust re-
search. The encapsulated-interest account suggests that the trustee’s choice must be analyzed 
with equal scrutiny, and it shifts our focus towards a simultaneous consideration of both actors 
(and decisions) involved in the trust problem.  
One step in this direction is to include the trustee as a second actor into the economic models. 
The “parametric” decision problem of the trustor, as formulated by Coleman, is then recast in 
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terms of strategic interaction between trustor and trustee. These types of problems can be ana-
lyzed using the apparatus of game theory (see Fudenberg & Tirole 1991, Gintis 2000b).
16
 Un-
surprisingly, game theory represents a major stream of research in the rational choice ap-
proach to trust (James 2002b, Camerer 2003, Buskens & Raub 2008). 
Game theoretic models are used to analyze situations of strategic interdependence, problems 
of cooperation or coordination, and social dilemmas. An “extensive form game” consists of a 
tree-like structure with nodes. Each node indicates which player can make a move at that 
node. A move consists of an action that a player can take at a node, choosing from a set of ac-
tions belonging to the node. At the end-nodes of the game tree, the player’s payoffs are indi-
cated. A general assumption is that of common knowledge: the game is known to each actor, 
each actor knows that it is known to each actor, and so forth. Game theory is unexceptionally 
concerned with the question of equilibrium, that is, whether and which outcome(s) of an inter-
action, given the strategic situation, can be rationally expected. The assumption of player ra-
tionality means that each player engages with the goal of maximizing expected utility. The 
solution to a game theoretic problem is described in terms of players’ strategies, which speci-
fy what each player would do at each decision node of the game. Player’s strategies must sat-
isfy certain properties that put constraints on what a rational actor should do. In the famous 
“Nash Equilibrium” (Nash 1950), each player chooses a strategy that is a best response and 
maximizes his expected payoff, given the strategies of all other actors. In Nash equilibrium, 
no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy, given that the other players play their 
equilibrium strategy. In this sense, Nash equilibrium behavior is the basic game-theoretic 
specification of individual rationality. The concept of “Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium” (Selten 
1965, 1975) is an equilibrium refinement which rules out irrational behavior off the equilibri-
um path. Subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of strategies which form a Nash equilibrium 
for the game and also for each subgame (that is, for each part of the game tree which can be 
considered a proper game tree and thus forms a subgame). 
The most basic game that can be used to model interpersonal trust is known as the “trust 
game” (Camerer & Weigelt 1988, Dasgupta 1988, Kreps 1990). It was informally introduced 
in chapter 2.1.2 when describing the basic trust problem. In trust research, the trust game is 
considered a benchmark scenario; it resembles a one-shot interaction between two actors A 
(the trustor) and B (the trustee) and it contains all the structural ingredients of the basic trust 
problem but a more general formulation of payoffs (figure 9):  
                                                 
16 The following short introduction is necessarily brief, keeping an emphasis on understanding and intuition rather than on 
mathematical precision with respect to terminology, proof of theorems, and modeling approaches to trust. 
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Figure 9: The trust game 
 
The status quo payoffs are represented as the pareto-inefficient “punishment” outcomes PA, 
and PB. Honored trust yields “reward” payoffs RA and RB, and failed trust means that the trus-
tor receives the “sucker” payoff SA, while the trustee can gain the “temptation” payoff TB. The 
game is fully described by adding the following payoff relations: SA<PA<RA, that is, the trus-
tee receives a net gain from honored trust, but incurs a loss from a failure of trust, and 
PB<RB<TB, that is, the trustee has an incentive to fulfill trust (there are mutual gains from 
trust/trustworthiness), but there is also a temptation to defect.  
The game has a unique solution in terms of each player’s strategies. The only subgame-perfect 
Nash-equilibrium that exists is for the trustor to always distrust and the trustee to always fail 
trust. The surprising prediction from game theory, and the “paradox” solution presented by the 
benchmark scenario, is that a rational trustor would never choose a trusting act, because a ra-
tional trustee would always fail trust.
17
 The trust game is therefore a classical example of a 
“social dilemma,” in which pareto-efficient collective outcomes are prevented by individual 
rationality (Ostrom 1998, 2003). Of course, this prediction crucially hinges on the assumed 
payoff structure of the game. If the trustee’s payoffs for being trustworthy somehow were 
larger than his payoff for failing trust, the equilibrium prediction would be a combination of 
strategies in which trust and trustworthiness prevailed. As suggested by the encapsulated-
interest account, incentives for the trustee to fulfill trust may lead to a more efficient equilib-
rium. But the benchmark scenario neglects potential effects stemming from social embed-
dedness. There are no histories, no reputation, and neither institutions nor social norms influ-
ence the purely self-interest actors. It is a “raw” game devoid of the social, institutional and 
cultural context.  
                                                 
17 This kind of forward reasoning is introduced by “backward induction,” which is necessary to establish subgame-perfection: 
starting from the terminal nodes and working backwards toward the start, each best move at each node is determined. 
Since the trustee would choose to fail trust in order to gain the payoff TB, we can reduce the decision problem of the trus-
tor to a choice between the “safe” alternatives PA and SA. Since we have PA > SA, the trustor will rationally choose to dis-
trust. 
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In the above model, an explicit assumption is that the players are perfectly and completely 
informed about all aspects of the game—an assumption which is at odds with real-life situa-
tions, where information about preferences, motivations, and utility is private. To make the 
trust game more realistic and to model the aspect of asymmetric information and social uncer-
tainty, we can introduce imperfect information in the sense that the trustor does not know 
which type of trustee he will meet (Harsanyi 1967, 1968). The trustee can either be a trustwor-
thy or an untrustworthy type. The trustor is only informed about the probability p of a random 
move of nature which determines the trustee´s type at the beginning of the game. In the pic-
ture shown below, the trustee is trustworthy with a probability of p, since then RB > TB*; he is 
not trustworthy with a probability of (1-p, in which case TB > RB and the trustee always fails 
trust (see figure 10). 
Figure 10: Trust game with incomplete information 
 
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of this refined game is straightforward to identify. Choosing 
the alternative of distrust yields the expected status quo payoff EU(distrust) = PA. By choos-
ing a trusting act, the trustor´s expected utility is EU(trust) = p RA + (1-p) SA, so that a rational 
trustor would choose a trusting act if PA < p * RA + (1-p) SA. Rearranging terms yields the fol-
lowing equilibrium condition for trust: p > (PA-SA) / (RA-SA). Note that this equilibrium solu-
tion of the two-player game coincides with Coleman´s formulation of the choice of a trusting 
act, once we reinterpret the random move of nature as the trustor´s subjective expectation of 
trustworthiness p. Generally, most economic models can be easily extended to incorporate 
imperfect information, but the derivation of equilibria and formal analysis become increasing-
ly complex. In the following, we will stick to games with complete and perfect information 
for ease of demonstration. 
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A voluminous body of empirical evidence suggests that the benchmark prediction of the 
standard trust game is quite pessimistic in comparison to what actors actually do in real-life 
situations, or in behavioral experiments, where trust and reciprocity are much more frequently 
observed (see James 2002b, Ostrom & Walker 2003, Fehr & Schmidt 2006, Johnson & Mislin 
2011). In order to explain the discrepancy between theoretical predictions and empirical re-
sults, the basic trust game has been modified in many alternative ways to incorporate incen-
tive effects stemming from dyadic, network, and institutional embeddedness. The common 
element of these modifications is that they change the incentives in such a way that it will not 
be rational for a trustee to exploit trust (James 2002b).  
A very prominent example is to bring an aspect of history and dyadic embeddedness into the 
game by repeating the stage game (Axelrod 1984, Kreps 1990, Gibbons 2001, Anderhub et al. 
2002, Bicchieri et al. 2004). As noted before, dyadic embeddedness enables mutual learning 
and control, and thus changes the way in which trustor and trustee will reason about the game. 
The possibility of repeating successful interactions creates a mutual interest in continuation, 
and serves as a means of encapsulating the interests of the other party. At the same time, un-
wanted sequences of play can be punished by exiting the trust relation and threatening to re-
fuse future cooperation. This allows for more complex strategies that include contingent deci-
sions in each round based on the outcomes of previous rounds. The trustee has to counterbal-
ance his short-term interests of failing trust with his expected future pay-offs, and the incen-
tives may change in such a way that a trustworthy response can be rationally expected. For-
mally, if the stage-game is repeated a number of times t, with probability vƐ[0,1] after each 
round, then the present expected value of some repeated outcome X equals to EU(X,t) = X + v 
* X + ... + v
t-1 
* X + v
t
 * X = X / (1 – v) in the limiting case of an indefinitely repeated game, 
where v represents the “shadow of the future” (Axelrod 1984). The larger v, the more im-
portant future outcomes become. It can be easily verified that trust and trustworthiness are op-
timal strategies in the indefinitely repeated trust game if v ≥ (TB - RB) / (TB – PB).
18
 Note that 
the equilibrium condition is independent of the trustor’s payoffs—it refers solely to the trus-
tee’s rationale, formally restating an argument of encapsulated interest.  
The equilibrium is subgame-perfect and relies on the trustor playing a “grim trigger strategy.” 
In this strategy, the trustor will distrust for the rest of the repeated game once the trustee has 
failed trust. The result is based on several implicit assumptions: first, it is assumed that the 
threat of exit is credible. Second, there is common knowledge of the game and its payoff-
structure. And lastly, it is implicitly assumed that all actions can be perfectly monitored with-
                                                 
18 The trustee can expect EU(honor) = RB / (1-v) if he is always trustworthy. A one-time defection with subsequent distrust 
yields the net discounted payoff EU(fail) = TB + v * PB / (1-v). The trustee will honor trust if EU(honor)>EU(fail), which, 
after rearranging, yields the condition v ≥ (TB - RB) / (TB – PB). Since we have PB<RB<TB, the right-hand side represents 
the “temptation” of the trustee to defect, relative to the reward from honoring trust and the status quo. 
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out additional monitoring costs. Even if these assumptions appear rather stringent, the equilib-
rium condition above proves that trust and trustworthiness can be supported in a repeated 
game between rational, selfish actors. In fact, following the “folk theorem” for repeated 
games (Fudenberg & Maskin 1986, Fudenberg & Tirole 1991: 150f.), there exist a large num-
ber of such equilibria, including the reciprocal tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod 1984) and other 
trigger strategies in which the trustor withdraws trust only for a limited number of times. This 
form of conditional cooperation is also termed “weak reciprocity” in the sense that it is sup-
ported and can be accounted for in terms of self-interest (Gintis 2000c). Empirically, repeti-
tion fosters trust both when the trust game is played with limited and unlimited time-horizon 
(Engle-Warnick & Slonim 2004, 2006). 
Dyadic embeddedness and the emerging trigger strategies which sustain trust can be interpret-
ed as a form of dyadic control: in close resemblance to reputation within social networks, in-
formation about past behavior is evaluated and influences future contingent action. If both 
trustor and trustee are embedded into social networks via third-party relationships, then net-
work learning and control, by which information about past behavior is transmitted to other 
potential trustors, can take an influential role in establishing trust and trustworthiness (Burt & 
Knez 1995, Bohnet et al. 2005). While dyadic embeddedness necessitates that the two parties 
meet again in the future, this need not be the case with network embeddedness and reputa-
tion—here, interactions are typically one-shot or marked by uncertainty as to whether the in-
teraction partner stays the same (e.g. a temporary buyer-seller relationship on eBay). Howev-
er, “historic” information about the trustee’s past behavior is available to the trustor when 
making a choice in the stage game. The folk theorem and the trigger strategy argument pre-
sented above extend straightforwardly to these situations: a reputation mechanism may pro-
vide the incentives for a rational trustee to induce trustworthiness, because other potential 
trustors can refuse future cooperation and withhold trust if the trustee’s reputation indicates 
that he is not trustworthy and has previously failed trust. The related economic models be-
come rather complex and need not be spelled out in detail here (see Raub & Weesie 1990, 
Buskens & Weesie 2000a, Buskens 2003), but they provide a solid economic underpinning of 
reputation and network embeddedness to the development of interpersonal trust. 
3.3.4. Contracts and Agency 
While both repetition and reputation rely on some sort of “history” of play, several other re-
finements and alterations have been proposed and incorporated into the trust game to account 
for the fact that, even in one-shot situations with neither a dyadic history nor available reputa-
tion information, trust and trustworthiness are regularly higher than predicted by the bench-
mark scenario. These variants add a number of institutional solutions to ensure that a rational 
trustee can be induced to act trustworthily, and a rational trustor can be motivated to trust—
showcasing once more the importance of the encapsulated-interest notion of trust to economic 
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modeling. The most commonly analyzed institutions are binding contracts, hostage posting or 
other forms of “credible commitment,” and punishment and sanctioning mechanisms, or com-
binations thereof. All in all, these solutions address aspects of institutional embeddedness.  
As with repetition and reputation, binding contractual agreements between the trustor and the 
trustee modify the incentives of the trust game in such a way as to make the trustworthy op-
tion preferable to the trustee (Malhotra & Murnighan 2002, Colombo & Merzoni 2006, Ben-
Ner & Putterman 2009). A very simple modification for the one-shot benchmark scenario 
would be a penalty b>0 that the trustee incurs if he fails trust. A second possibility would be 
some form of additional reward a>0 for being trustworthy. Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
contract has some transaction cost c>0 to the trustor, which include negotiation and monitor-
ing, as well the costs of enforcement (James 2002). The following figure shows the payoff 
modifications to the trust game for a contract which includes both punishment and reward, 
and is costly to implement (figure 11): 
Figure 11: Trust game with contracts 
 
In this situation, the trustee will sign the contract and honor trust if a+b > TB-RB, that is, 
whenever the contractual incentives compensate the opportunity costs from not failing trust. A 
rational trustor will be willing to negotiate the costly contract as long as RA-PA > a+c, that is, 
whenever the monitoring costs and the rewards that need to be paid to B do not exceed the 
increase in wealth relative to the status quo. If the parameters of the contract are fixed accord-
ingly, then the contract is sufficient to induce a pareto-efficient equilibrium in which trust and 
trustworthiness prevail. 
Another institutional solution frequently proposed considers instances where the trustee com-
mits himself to a trustworthy response (Weesie & Raub 1996, Raub 2004, Bracht & Feltovich 
2008, Servatka et al. 2011) by means of a preplay decision in which he invests in a credible 
signal in order to communicate trustworthiness. Depending on the specific way such commit-
ment is modeled, the trustor puts his future utility into “escrow,” either by directly transferring 
some amount of his income to the trustor, so that the trustor can keep it if trust is failed, or by 
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investing into a “hostage” that he loses if he fails trust. The hostage may or may not be re-
dressed to the trustor to compensate his losses. In any case, the hostage is a “sunk cost” that 
cannot be recovered (one example of such a hostage would be a product guarantee that a 
manufacturer give to its products). Consider the simple case where the hostage is a “sunk 
cost” and not redressed (see Bracht & Feltovich 2008). If the trustee chooses to post a hostage 
of value h, then the reduced subgame that results after the precommitment stage would in-
clude the following payoffs payoffs (figure 12):  
Figure 12: Trust game with pre-commitment and hostage posting 
 
Thus, the trustee’s response depends on the size of the hostage. It can be easily seen that the 
hostage serves as a credible signal to commit to trustworthiness if it is large enough. In the 
example, the hostage binds the trustee if h > TB - RB, so that it exceeds the potential gain from 
failing trust. Raub (2004) develops a more complicated model which includes imperfect in-
formation with respect to the type of the trustee, as well as uncertainty with respect to exoge-
nous events (contingencies that may bring about an unfavorable outcome irrespective of the 
trustee’s actual choice of action). He explicitly models the preplay stage in which the trustee 
can choose whether to post a hostage or not, and derives necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a “pooling equilibrium,” in which trustworthy and untrustworthy types of trustees use the 
hostage (it is thus not a reliable signal of trustworthiness), and “separating equilibrium,” in 
which only trustworthy types use the signal (in which case it is reliable). Importantly, he de-
rives upper and lower bounds on the value of the hostage for it to be used by trustees and ac-
cepted as a credible signal by trustors in the different equilibrium conditions. The hostage-
value is dependent upon the amount of exogenous and endogenous social uncertainty. A 
closely related form of “commitment” that is beneficial to the buildup of trust is gift-giving 
(Camerer 1988). 
Lastly, the trust game can be modified to include options for punishment and sanctioning of 
the trustee by first parties (Bohnet & Baytelman 2007), by third parties (Fehr & Fischbacher 
2004, Charness et al. 2008), or by some external device which ensures that a failure of trust 
has a substantial cost to the trustee. The models closely resemble the formal solutions present-
ed above—essentially, incentives and the utility function of the trustee are modified such that 
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a trustworthy response can be “rationally” expected. Empirically, punishment options are reg-
ularly found to be effective as a means to ensure trustworthiness (Fehr & Gächter 2000a, 
2002a, Houser et al. 2008, Mulder 2008, but see the discussion below). 
A theoretical framework that can be used to further explore the intricacies of economic solu-
tions to trust problems is principal-agent theory (PAT, see Mas-Colell et al. 1995: 477f.). 
Generally speaking, PAT is concerned with situations in which one actor (the principal) hires 
another actor (the agent) to perform a task which will bring him some gain in return (“agen-
cy”). The principal’s gain is, however, directly related to the agent’s performance. The agent 
has to make an effort and incurs costs to perform the task, but he also receives a reward that is 
linked to his performance, or paid as a fixed wage. Being a utility-maximizing rational actor, 
the agent would ideally like to “shirk” instead of “work” in order to minimize his effort and 
yet still earn the income as specified in the contract. The principal, on the other hand, suffers 
from limited information concerning the agent’s skill and preferences, and he cannot directly 
monitor the agent’s performance once the contract has been signed. That is, he faces substan-
tial social uncertainty and vulnerability with respect to the fulfillment of the contractual obli-
gations. All in all, the “raw” structure of the principal-agent-problem closely resembles a 
basic trust problem (Shapiro 1987, Ensminger 2001): the principal is in the positions of a trus-
tor who must decide whether to trust the agent with respect to his characteristics and motiva-
tion to perform. The agent is in the position of a trustee, who may or may not fulfill the con-
tent of the trust relation (the task) and has an informational advantage concerning his skill and 
preferences. Therefore, “trust in an agency relationship means that the principal perceives the 
agent to be motivated to put in the full effort required to produce the principal’s benefit and to 
justify the agent’s reward, even though opportunism cannot strictly be ruled out” (Möllering 
2006b: 32). 
A core tenet of PAT is that whenever an individual engages another individual to whom some 
decision-making authority is given via a transfer of control, a potential agency problem exists, 
and agency costs (that is, transaction costs in the form of signaling and monitoring costs) are 
incurred, diminishing overall welfare. The agency problems discussed within PAT pertain to 
asymmetric information before concluding a contract (adverse selection), the motivational 
problem of the agent (moral hazard), and stagnation due to potential investments that the prin-
cipal might have to undertake before concluding the agreement, which, if their return is uncer-
tain, might undermine any contractual engagements in advance (hold-up). To overcome the 
problem of adverse selection, moral hazard and hold-up, PAT proposes different solutions 
(“mechanism design”), whereby an efficient solution to the problem of agency must minimize 
the agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The problem-set of PAT can straightforwardly be 
transferred to problems of interpersonal trust (Ripperger 1998: 63f., Heimer 2001, James 
2002a).  
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The PAT framework can be used to inform trust research in two ways: First, it suggests that 
contracts and other incentive mechanisms are suitable for backing up institution-based forms 
of trust, as outlined above. Contracts and legal arrangements covered by enforceable punish-
ment opportunities can be regarded as a suitable “foundation” for further trust development, 
and initiate legitimate forms of  institution-based trust (Shapiro 1987, Lorenz 1999). Second, 
trust relationships can be interpreted as an informal agency relation, which means that the ap-
paratus of PAT can be used to analyze trust in terms of implicit psychological contracts 
(Rousseau 1989, Robinson 1996, Ripperger 1998). In this perspective, trust represents a cost-
free solution to the problem of agency, rather than its basic problem; this perspective vividly 
explicates the celebrated notion of trust as a social “lubricant” (Dasgupta 1988: 49) governing 
transactions and reducing transaction costs.  
Explicit contracts are not unequivocally accepted as a solution to the problem of trust. In the 
literature, it is debated whether trust and control are mutually exclusive (Das & Teng 1998, 
2001, Möllering 2005b).
19
 As some researchers claim, the organization of monitoring and 
sanctioning procedures is complex, and the very existence of formal control mechanisms has 
the potential to undermine trust by creating an atmosphere of distrust (Fehr et al. 1997, 
Ostrom 2000, Fehr & Gächter 2002b, Hardin 2002: 127). For example, contractual relations 
may require overt calculation so that the involved risks become salient. The unwanted side-
effects of contracts can stem from monitoring activities, threat, or litigation. These actions 
may evoke conflict, opportunism, and more defensive responses. Put sharply, “trust is not a 
control mechanism, but substitutes for control ... People do not need to develop trust when 
their exchange is highly structured and easily monitored ... Some controls actually appear to 
signal the absence of trust and, therefore, can hamper its emergence” (Rousseau et al. 1998: 
399).  
Empirical studies have provided evidence that contractually safeguarded exchange relation-
ships tend to “crowd out” intrinsically motivated trust (Frey & Jegen 2001, Malhotra & Mur-
nighan 2002, Fehr & List 2004, Mulder et al. 2006). As Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) point 
out, explicit contracts lead the parties involved in the trust relation to attribute their behavior 
to the contract (“situational attribution”) rather than to favorable characteristics of the other 
(“dispositional attribution”). Since contracts present a very salient situational feature, and 
since behavior will be regarded as strongly regulated, “contractually mandated cooperation 
may provide an insufficient basis for continued cooperation if contracts are no longer availa-
ble ... Someone who has only been known to cooperate under the constraints of a binding con-
                                                 
19 For example, Möllering claims that “trust and control each assume the existence of the other, refer to each other and create 
each other, but remain irreducible to each other” (2005: 283). In a similar fashion, Noteboom asserts that “trust and control 
are substitutes in that with more trust there can be less control, but they are also complements, in that usually trust and 
contract are combined, since neither can be complete” (2006: 247).  
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tract, might not, in the absence of the contract, be expected to cooperate because he or she is 
not seen as trustworthy” (ibid. 538). In contrast, informal mechanisms such as promises and 
assurances (“nonbinding contracts”), by their very nonrestrictiveness, should lead to positive 
dispositional attributions if the exchanges are successful, and therefore allow for the develop-
ment of favorable specific expectations of trustworthiness. On top of that, a contractual solu-
tion to a trust problem must always be a second best solution in terms of efficiency, because it 
has an agency cost to it, which decreases the trustor’s net benefit and overall welfare. 
Do contractual agreements and more generally, all other forms of institutionally safeguarded 
trust, in fact not belong to the phenomenon of interpersonal trust, then? Clearly, the answer to 
this question depends on our definitional choices. As suggested at the very beginning of this 
work, a basic trust problem is marked by social uncertainty and vulnerability, and the choice 
of a trusting act is frequently explained by recurrence to favorable expectations of trustwor-
thiness. Superficially, one could argue that in situations of high institutional regulation, the 
basic trust problem is nonexistent because incentives change in a way that makes trustworthy 
responses certain, thereby removing a core aspect of the trust problem. What is more, trustors 
obviously do not develop specific expectations about trustee characteristics once they can 
base their choices on structural assurance, as the empirical evidence suggests. When the insti-
tutional safe-guards are removed, observed levels of trust are lower as compared to dyads 
where trust has been developing on an informal basis. This adds to the “crowding-out” argu-
ment, and seems to invalidate institutional safeguards as a basis for trust. 
Yet, for the aim of developing a broad conceptualization of interpersonal trust, it is irrelevant 
which source of trust-related knowledge constitutes the starting ground for favorable expecta-
tions in the particular instance. Note that a contract, or any other institution for that matter, 
does neither remove the trustee’s principal option to fail trust, nor the social uncertainty inher-
ent in the trust problem, even when economic modeling suggests that it does. This claim hing-
es on the implicit assumption that system trust and structural assurance are close to perfect, 
and questions of enforcement are not an issue. The fact that institutions are mostly “taken for 
granted,” aptly recognized as familiar, confidently expected to regulate behavior, and thus 
breeding institutional trust, does not, on a theoretical level, make them less valid factors for a 
causal explanation. On the contrary, the much more interesting question arises how actors 
achieve the conditions that foster institution-based trust, given that they can never be “certain” 
about the effectiveness of an institution. In fact, when institutional (for example, legal) en-
forcement is uncertain, as is the case in countries with high political instability and weak en-
forcement, low levels of system trust can prevent even the seemingly unproblematic contract-
based solution to the problem of interpersonal trust (Sztompka 1996, Bohnet et al. 2001). 
Once institutions are taken into account, we have to address the aspect of system trust and 
structural assurance (Luhmann 1979, McKnight et al. 1998), which shifts the problem of in-
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terpersonal trust to a “second-order” problem of system trust as a basis for institutional trust. 
In economic models, it is implicitly assumed that institutional back-ups of trust are actually 
enforceable.  
While the problem of agency is classically solved by designing appropriate institutional 
mechanisms that rely on formal, extrinsic, monetary incentives to control the behavior of the 
trustee, the psychological interpretation of PAT suggests their replacement with trust as an 
informal mechanism, which, in combination with reliance on internal incentives, sanctions 
and rewards, constitutes an “implicit” agency relationship (Robinson 1996, Ripperger 1998). 
Basically, accepting the trustor’s investment constitutes a form of implicit psychological con-
tract between the trustor and trustee, in which the rights and obligations accruing to the con-
tent of the trust relation are determined (Rousseau 1989, 1995). This includes sanctionable 
expectations of trustworthiness stemming from the placement of trust as well as the acquisi-
tion of moral demands on future trustworthiness by the trustee. The main distinction between 
explicit and implicit contracts is that the latter are not directly enforceable by third parties—
only the parties involved can determine whether an agreement has been violated and pursue 
its enforcement. But similarly to the explicit approach, this requires that action be directed by 
appropriate incentives. The psychological variant of PAT therefore turns to internal sanction-
ing and reward to explain intrinsically motivated decisions. To account for such motivational 
sources in corresponding economic models, it is necessary to extend the standard apparatus of 
economic theory. Preferences must include “soft factors,” such as the internalization of norms, 
altruism, fairness considerations, and feelings of guilt—that is, they must include the social 
preferences of actors. 
3.3.5. Social Preferences 
Repetition, reputation, contracts, and external punishment are examples of how the interests of 
the trustor and the trustee can become encapsulated by embedding the trust game in a social 
context. Apart from external incentives and sources of motivation, internal incentives also in-
fluence the trustee and trustor’s decisions. For example, a trustee might have internalized a 
social norm which he feels compelled to honor, or might be guided in his behavior by moral 
principles that he values highly: both of these possibilities are likely to impact his judgment 
and choice of action. Likewise, certain standards of fairness or justice may motivate the trus-
tee while reasoning about trustworthiness, and would have to be taken into account when 
modeling the trustworthy response. A trustee might try to judge whether a reciprocal response 
is “justified,” and he might feel guilty when failing trust, fear the repercussions of breaking a 
social norm, or derive some intrinsic utility from being a “good-doer.”  
Empirically, a large number of experiments have called into question the exclusive focus of 
economic models on material self-interest (Fehr & Fischbacher 2002, Fehr & Gintis 2007). It 
115 
 
seems as though actors respect not only their own well-being, but also that of other actors in-
volved in the exchange. Presumably, this is one prime reason why hypotheses of standard ra-
tional choice models, such as the benchmark scenario trust game, are regularly rejected by 
empirical data. The existence of social preferences implies that the utility of an actor depends, 
in some way or the other, on the utility of the interaction partners, on their actions, their inten-
tions, or on the process of interaction (see Kolm & Ythier 2006 for an extensive review). In 
short, social, other-regarding preferences cause an internalization of external effects of action, 
which is sometimes interpreted as “bad conscience,” and equated with internal mental costs 
and rewards (Rilling et al. 2002, Fehr & Schmidt 2006, Fehr & Camerer 2007). Recent neuro-
science studies suggest that social preferences play an important role in trust problems (Zak 
2004, Fehr et al. 2005, Zak 2005, Baumgartner et al. 2008, Fehr 2008), a finding that is also 
supported by data from behavioral experiments (Cox 2002, Bohnet & Zeckhauser 2004, Cox 
2004). Social preferences are activated genuinely in social contexts, and differ from prefer-
ences to take unsocial risks even on a neural basis (Fehr 2008). Thus the simple analogy of 
trust “as a subcategory of risk” does not hold once we regard the neural processes involved. 
To model social preferences in an economic model, it is necessary to extend the apparatus of 
standard game theory to include psychological factors (Geneakoplos et al. 1989, Battigalli & 
Dufwenberg 2009). Importantly, in a psychological game, the utility of an actor not only de-
pends on the outcomes of the game but also on his beliefs before, during or after play. This is 
captured by assuming belief-dependent preferences, combined with an assumption of rational 
Bayesian belief-updating at every node in the game tree. In addition, psychological games al-
low for higher-order beliefs (“A believes that B believes that ...”) that can capture belief-
dependent motivations, intentionality, and, more generally, conjectures about other actor’s 
states of mind. The equilibrium concept used to analyze psychological games is “psychologi-
cal sequential equilibrium,” a sophisticated refinement of subgame perfection. Informally 
speaking, in a psychological sequential equilibrium, actors play strategies which are optimal 
given their beliefs, and they hold beliefs which are optimal and turn out to be true, given the 
strategies played (the requirement of consistency of player’s assessments). 
In the simple case of altruistic preferences, an actor will evaluate the outcome of an interac-
tion depending on the payoffs that other actors receive, in addition to his own payoffs (Andre-
oni 1990, Levine 1998). Altruism implies a positive correlation between the utility of an actor 
and the utility-level of those actors who are influenced by his actions. Therefore, altruistic 
preferences motivate action independently of external constraints. The satisfaction of altruistic 
preferences represents an intrinsic incentive for trustworthy behavior: the trustee then is moti-
vated to act in a trustworthy manner because he gains additional utility from doing good. In 
the economic framework, this incentive exists as long as the additional utility from altruistic 
action compensates the opportunity costs from not failing trust. More concretely, assume that 
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an altruistic trustee B has the following utility function: UB = α * A(X) + β* B(X), where 
A(X) and B(X) denote the material payoffs of the trustor and the trustee at an end-node of the 
decision tree. The weights α and β determine the relative importance of each actor’s payoff to 
the utility of the trustee. The ratio α/β can be interpreted as the social orientation of the actor 
(Lahno 2002: 63). The actor is egoistic and strictly maximizes his own utility if α is zero, and 
he is purely altruistic or completely socially oriented if β is zero (figure 13): 
Figure 13: Trust game with altruistic preferences 
 
Assuming these preferences and applying the model to the trust game, a trustee is trustworthy 
whenever α/β > (TB–RB) / (RA–SA). In this case, the trustee’s expected utility from altruistic 
trustworthiness is larger than the expected utility from failing trust, because the welfare-level 
of the trustor is taken into account. The trustor’s choice of action, when accounting for the 
trustee’s rationale, thus depends on his belief about the social orientation of the trustee. This 
can be captured in a standard trust game with imperfect information.  
A closely related class of models considers preferences of fairness and inequity aversion (Fehr 
& Schmidt 1999, Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). The main difference in modeling is that the out-
comes are now evaluated against some normative standard of equity. For example, in the Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) model, players experience disutility whenever they perceive an outcome 
as inequitable; that is, whenever they are worse off relative to some reference point, or when-
ever other players are worse off relative to some reference point. The relative standing of the 
players is included in the preferences as a potential disutility that accrues whenever the out-
comes deviate from the normative default. Thus, fairness considerations and inequity aversion 
can motivate a trustworthy response if the trustee perceives that a failure of trust would put 
the trustor into a disadvantage. 
Such models of altruistic and equity-oriented preferences can explain trustworthy behavior. 
Therefore, they appear to be a suitable vehicle for an explanation of interpersonal trust in 
terms of “encapsulated interest.” However, they are incompatible with a bulk of empirical ev-
idence showing that individuals are regularly prone to punish others for their behavior, even if 
punishment is costly and does not yield any additional material payoffs (Fehr & Gächter 
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2000a, 2002a, Gintis et al. 2003, Fehr & Fischbacher 2004, Charness et al. 2008). In other 
words, individuals frequently choose actions that do not suggest a completely unconditional 
interest in the utility of others, or a mere concern for distributional fairness. What is more, 
when assuming preferences of the above kind, then “only outcomes matter”—that is, actors 
have preferences over the ex-post distribution of wealth, but they do not evaluate the process 
by which the final outcomes have been arrived at (Falk et al. 2008).
20
 
In contrast, empirical data suggest that humans elicit a kind of strong reciprocity, in the sense 
that both reward and retaliation can be intrinsically motivated and triggered by the actions of 
others, independent of the immediate impact on material payoffs. That is, actors are not unan-
imously motivated by concern for the utility of others, but their concern is dependent on what 
other actors choose to do given the circumstances. Such a possibility opens up when we as-
sume that actors condition their choice of action and the evaluation of final outcomes by the 
intentions ascribed to others. This was already suggested by Gouldner, who asserted that the 
norm of reciprocity is not unconditional: “To suggest that a norm of reciprocity is universal is 
not, of course, to assert that it is unconditional ... obligations of repayment are contingent up-
on the imputed value of the benefit received ... the resources of the donor ... the motives im-
puted to the donor ... and the nature of constraints which are perceived to exist or be absent” 
(Gouldner 1960: 171, emphasis added).  
A model of such intention-based strong reciprocity was proposed, for example, by Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006).
21
 In this model, reciprocity is dependent on how kind or unkind an action 
is perceived to be, relative to some evaluative standard; and perceived kindness triggers a re-
ciprocal response, given the available strategies. Actors judge the kindness of an action at eve-
ry decision node by reasoning about the intentions which have potentially motivated the ob-
servable action, and by evaluating their inference relative to some fairness standard, such as 
equity. Furthermore, they assess the influence of their own actions on the utility of others, as 
expressed in a measure of reciprocation. The product of the terms “kindness” and “reciproca-
tion” enters the utility function of the actor as an additional utility that models strong reciproc-
ity; it is weighted with person-specific parameter τ, so that UB = B(X) + τ * kindness * recip-
rocation (notation and representation are simplified here to capture the essentials of the mod-
el). The parameter τ can be interpreted as a result of individual socialization; it captures how 
strongly the norm of reciprocity has been internalized. The size of τ determines the relative 
weight of reciprocal motivations in comparison to purely material self-interest B(X). If an ac-
                                                 
20 With regard to a wide class of equity-models of fairness (all of which are based on preferences over outcome distributions, 
just as the altruism model presented above), Falk et al. note that “recently developed inequity aversion models ... are in-
complete because the neglect fairness intentions” (2008: 289) and, documenting further empirical evidence, argue for the 
importance of intentions. 
21 Related models were proposed by Rabin (1993), Charness & Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (2004). See Fehr & 
Schmidt (2006) for a discussion. 
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tor attributes kind intentions to the other player and sees opportunities to increase the other’s 
utility (the product term is positive), then he can maximize his own utility with positive recip-
rocal behavior. Likewise, if an action if perceived to be unkind, and if punishment opportuni-
ties which diminish the other actor’s utility exist (the product term is again positive), then an 
actor can maximize his utility with negative reciprocal responses.  
In a reciprocity equilibrium, the actors choose actions that (1) are best responses in the sense 
of a subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium, and (2) are consistent with the initial beliefs that 
prove to be correct during play (Falk & Fischbacher 2006: 302)—the reciprocity equilibrium 
is a psychological equilibrium. Importantly, note that reciprocity is in fact motivated by social 
preferences, and not by expected future payoffs, as in the case of retaliatory tit-for-tat and oth-
er conditionally cooperative strategies. Thus, even in one-shot situations without dyadic em-
beddedness and a history of play, actors will react to kind and unkind actions, and can in-
crease their utility by choosing an “appropriate” response. With respect to the problem of in-
terpersonal trust, the model predicts that a trustor’s choice of a trusting act depends on his be-
liefs concerning the reciprocity parameter τ of the trustee. Trustworthiness, when motivated 
by strong reciprocity, can increase the trustee’s utility, and its probability depends on the size 
of the investment made by the trustor (Falk & Fischbacher 2000). The result is intuitive: the 
probability of a trustworthy response increases with the “importance” of the trust relation. A 
trustee will feel more compelled to honor trust placed in him if there is a large risk involved 
and “much is at stake” for the trustor. However, the model does not suggest a differentiation 
between actors—the inclination to act reciprocally is the same with friends or strangers. There 
is also no further reference to the normative-cultural context in which the particular trust prob-
lem is embedded. 
The approach showcases the intrinsic value of action to the actors when complying with a 
norm of reciprocity. In the language of economics, it is the opportunity cost of a foregone util-
ity gain that the actors incur if, given attributed intentions, they do not choose a reciprocal re-
sponse. Importantly, compliance to the norm of reciprocity can be optimal and utility maxim-
izing; the intrinsic motivation does not enter the model in the form of an anticipated punish-
ment cost. As pointed out in chapter 3.2.2., honoring trust also constitutes a moral demand on 
future reciprocation since trustworthy responses are usually connected to some form of cost 
and effort. Apart from the direct effect of norm-compliance on utility, this adds an indirect 
incentive to respond trustworthily.  
Considering the empirical evidence, intention-based reciprocity models have received consid-
erable support from experiments—however, their applicability does not universally extend to 
all domains of social life: apparently, these models work well in the domain of “revenge” and 
negative strong reciprocity, whereas the support for “reward” triggered by kindness and posi-
tive strong reciprocity is rather mixed (Fehr & Schmidt 2006). This is particularly daunting 
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with respect to the problem of explaining interpersonal trust in one-shot situations, where we 
cannot fall back to arguments involving weak reciprocity and dyadic embeddedness as a 
means to encapsulate the interests of the trustor. It is precisely the consideration of such in-
trinsically motivated positive reciprocity which would matter as a means to compel the trustor 
to trust in the first place.  
In the reciprocity model presented above, norm-compliance was modeled in terms of a utility-
enhancing process, displaying the intrinsic motivation and value that can stem from compli-
ance to an internalized norm. But the internalization of a social norm during socialization is 
also accompanied by the installation of a “conscience”—an internal sanctioning mechanism 
that regulates behavior and ensures the structuring power of norms effectively by making 
compliance and adherence to the norm internally sanctionable (Elster 1989).
22
 As it is, the 
moral demands on reciprocal trustworthiness that a trustee earns by honoring trust are “bal-
anced” by the fact that the trustor holds sanctionable expectations in the form of a moral obli-
gation to reciprocate his trust in the first place. If these moral obligations are not met, their 
violation triggers feelings of guilt and shame in the trustee, and anger in the trustor (Elster 
2005).  
A failure of trust creates psychological costs for both parties, and they increase in the degree 
to which a relevant norm has been internalized (Ripperger 1998: 152). The sources of guilt are 
diverse—fairness and equity considerations, perceived moral obligations of reciprocal re-
sponse, given promises and commitments, expectations of appropriate role performance and 
the like can all become a matter of disappointment for the actors involved. In economic terms, 
“a guilt-averse player suffers from guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to 
what they believe they will get” (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006: 1583). In contrast to purely 
outcome-based models of distributional fairness, guilt-aversion models are an example of 
psychological games in which higher-order beliefs, that is, conjectures about the other’s state 
of mind, are critically important. With respect to the trust problem, the trustworthy or un-
trustworthy response by the trustee is the causal factor that triggers guilt. Essentially, if trust is 
failed even when the trustee believes that the trustor expects a favorable response, this induces 
a feeling of shame and guilt in the guilt-averse trustee, which is expressed as a disutility. 
The choice of a trusting act not only indicates that the trustor rationally expects a trustworthy 
response, but it potentially conveys a positive appraisal of the trustee’s characteristics, an 
acknowledgement of his abilities and integrity, and an appeal to his sense of moral duty and 
                                                 
22 With respect to the sanctioning potential of norms, Elster notes: “Social norms have a grip on the mind that is due to strong 
emotions their violations can trigger. I believe that the emotive aspect of norms is a more fundamental feature than the 
more frequently cited cognitive aspects. If norms can coordinate expectations, it is only because the violation of norms is 
known to trigger strong negative emotions, in the violator himself and in other people” (Elster 1989: 100). 
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loyalty. In essence, it is the trustee’s self-image to which those positive expectations cater that 
is “at stake” for the trustee when deciding about trustworthiness. The trustee’s readiness to 
answer these implicit appeals with a trustworthy response is also termed trust responsiveness 
(Guerra & Zizzo 2004, Bacharach et al. 2007), that is, the “tendency to fulfill trust because 
you believe it has been placed in you” (Bacharach et al. 2007: 350).  
An internal guilt and sanctioning mechanism can be formalized with the help of psychological 
games (see Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2007, 2009). When applied to the trust game, the prefer-
ences of the trustee are modeled in such a way that his utility not only depends on material 
payoffs, but also on his beliefs about the trustor’s state of mind. If the trustee believes that 
honoring trust is favorably expected by the trustor, a failure of trust will lead to a decrease in 
utility. In a simple case, the trustee’s utility function for a failure of trust is given by UB = TB 
– λB * ϴB, where ϴB is player B’s second-order belief about the trustor’s first-order expecta-
tion of trustworthiness, and λB describes an individual parameter of “guilt sensitivity.” This 
sensitivity parameter reflects individual learning and socialization histories and absorbs inter-
individual differences in guilt-aversion aversion (figure 14): 
Figure 14: Trust game with guilt aversion 
 
The extent to which the trustee experiences guilt depends on his assessments of the trustor’s 
state of mind: the more the trustee is convinced that trustworthy actions are actually expected 
by the trustor, the higher are the psychological costs that result from a failure of trust. A guilt-
averse trustee will be trustworthy whenever ϴB > (TB-RB)/λB. This threshold decreases with 
guilt sensitivity and increases with the opportunity cost of not failing trust. When the trustee 
observes the choice of a trusting act, he updates his belief to ϴB ≥ (PA-SA) / (RA-SA). In other 
words, a trustee can rationally infer that the trustor’s expectation must exceed the threshold 
derived for the simple trust game with incomplete information. This means that, since beliefs 
are updated during play, the trustor can use the choice of a trusting act as a strategic signal to 
evoke trustworthy responses, given that his belief p about ϴB is high enough. This is known as 
psychological forward induction (Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2009). Essentially, it can be 
shown that models of guilt-aversion involve equilibria in which trustors rationally choose to 
trust in anonymous one-shot situations, given that both the number of “socialized” players in 
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the population and the probability of meeting a guilt-averse player are sufficiently enough 
(Kandel & Lazear 1992, Servatka et al. 2008).  
Models of guilt-aversion can explain trustworthy responses in one-shot situations and serve as 
a means to encapsulate the interests of the trustor. However, empirical support for them seems 
to be limited. While some experimenters report results that support guilt-aversion as a motiva-
tional factor in rational choice considerations (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006, Bacharach et al. 
2007, Charness & Dufwenberg 2007, Reuben et al. 2009), others report only weak to no evi-
dence (Vanberg 2008, Ellingsen et al. 2010) and argue that it empirically plays only a minor 
role. An important theoretical drawback of guilt models is that they explain positive strong 
reciprocity, but they are unable to account for the large range of punishment activities found 
in human behavior (Fehr & Schmidt 2006). As with reciprocity, guilt-aversion is limited to 
certain domains of human action. Put sharply, when taken together, the empirical evidence 
seems to suggest that social preference models do sometimes play an important role during 
choice, but sometimes they do not.  
This confronts us with a serious problem that emerges with the continuing advancement of 
psychological game theory and refined game-theoretic models: which model is valid, and un-
der which circumstances? When can we assume social preferences to be part of an actor’s util-
ity function, and when not? The proposed models can explain a variety of empirical observa-
tions, but they are often limited to specific situations, sometimes to very particular experi-
mental games; irregularities in other domains of application are routine. As the number of 
proposed psychological mechanisms increases and as the range of potential preferences be-
comes increasingly heterogeneous, the question of “which model will provide a valid explana-
tion under which condition” becomes increasingly important—and to date, it has remained 
unanswered (Fehr & Schmidt 2006, Kroneberg 2006a). More pointedly, social preferences 
explain behavior for an exogenously given utility function, but they are not concerned with 
the question of its emergence. A successful definition of the situation is an implicit ex ante 
assumption that is not further problematized in economic accounts. The introduction of exog-
enous changes to preferences brings with it the potential charge of being an immunizing strat-
agem—any behavioral change can ex post be “explained” by referring to changed preferences 
(Smelser 1992, James 2002b). All in all, models of social preferences present an important 
development within economic theory to account for the fact that the self-interest hypothesis, 
as formulated in the core axioms of traditional rational choice theory, is regularly violated. 
But, as Fehr and Schmidt rightfully conclude: “While the current models clearly present pro-
gress relative to the self-interest approach, the evidence ... also makes it clear that further the-
oretical progress is warranted. There is still ample opportunity for improving our understand-
ing of other-regarding behavior” (2006: 684).  
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3.3.6. The Limits of Rational Choice 
The criticism of social preference models is one example of a substantial debate that has 
sparked around the rational choice framework, questioning its applicability and appropriate-
ness in the context of human decision making in general. In short, the axiomatic assumptions 
of rational choice have been repeatedly called into question both on theoretical and empirical 
grounds, and researchers have consequentially started to demarcate the limits of rational 
choice (Elster 1979, 1986b, Hogarth & Reder 1987, Cook & Levi 1990, Coleman & Fararo 
1992).
23
  
Empirically, a large number of anomalies and paradoxes have been detected which are at odds 
with the fundamental postulates of the rationalist paradigm. For instance, the preference tran-
sitivity axiom is regularly violated by humans, even in simple choice problems, indicating that 
people do not conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility (Allais 1953, 1979). 
Decision-makers tend to give a higher weight to “known” probabilities than to “unknown” 
ones, and humans do not deal with ambiguity in the same way as with risk, suggesting that 
probabilities are not linear and additive as proposed in the SEU framework (Ellsberg 1961). 
What is more, risk preferences seem to differ between the domains of gain and loss; humans 
may be risk-seeking with respect to gains and risk-averse with respect to losses and, in addi-
tion to such loss aversion, exhibit status quo biases and regret (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). 
Biased perceptions of probabilities, that is, overestimation or underestimation of desired or 
undesired outcomes, can even lead to a complete reversal of preferences (Lichtenstein & 
Slovic 1971, Tversky et al. 1990, Slovic 1995). Researchers have also cast doubt on the as-
sumption that decision making is independent of irrelevant situational features (“framing ef-
fects,” see chapter 4.2), and have questioned the implicit assumption of reference independent 
utility (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, Kahneman 2003).  
Quite generally, it has been found that in a majority of cases the equilibrium predictions of 
economic theory are reached only in very competitive environments, whereas they fail in 
nonmarket situations with a less ordered structure (Ostrom 2003). Psychologists have uncov-
ered a myriad of “biases” in judgment and decision making which indicate that the normative 
framework of rational choice is not a valid empirical description of human decision making, 
and these findings have resulted in calls for the revision of the standard economic model 
(Mellers et al. 1998, cf. Gintis 2007). An ever-growing body of research indicates significant 
and systematic empirical deviations from the hypotheses of SEU theory and the standard ra-
tional choice behavioral assumptions—on the whole, “psychologists, sociologists, and econ-
omists have produced huge number of observations which cannot easily be explained within 
                                                 
23 This section presents only a very brief sketch of the voluminous body of critique; it is necessarily incomplete and selective. 
The reader is referred to the literature presented here for a more exhaustive discussion. 
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the rational choice paradigm” (Boudon 2003: 8). This discrepancy and inconsistency between 
theoretical predictions and empirical data has challenged the postulates of rational choice the-
ory. Most critique is directed towards the unrealistic behavioral assumptions underlying ra-
tional choice, drawing upon the fact that observed behavior is often “radically inconsistent” 
(Simon 1978) with the SEU framework.  
For example, the assumption of full and perfect information about the environment and com-
mon knowledge of preferences and the game structure (a requirement for equilibrium predic-
tion), has been criticized as an unrealistic idiosyncrasy of homo oeconomicus. Rarely are real-
world actors perfectly informed about the true preferences of other players, nor are they able 
to immediately comprehend the complete incentive structure or all interdependencies of a de-
cision problem. Full information assumptions have been accepted as empirically falsified even 
by economists. According to Gintis, rational expectations and beliefs, which represent such 
“always” limited information, are the most “underdeveloped member” (2007: 15) of the ra-
tional choice trilogy of expectations, preferences, and constraints because there is no compel-
ling analytical theory of how rational agents acquire and update their beliefs. The empirical 
invalidity and inadequacy of the full information assumption is a serious objection to the 
standard model, as it cannot deliver an explanation of optimal information search and the 
ways by which limited information is coped with to reach equilibrium (Arrow 1987).  
A closely related source of criticism is the treatment of preferences within the rational choice 
paradigm (March 1978, Slovic 1995, Rabin 1998, Fehr & Hoff 2011). Preferences are treated 
as exogenously given, and they are assumed to be stable and time-consistent for the purpose 
of the analysis—the qualification of stable and parsimonious preference functions ensures that 
the framework is not empirically empty (Vanberg 2004). Considering the available evidence, 
these assumptions are optimistic at best. Apart from the above-mentioned choice-
inconsistencies questioning the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) axioms on utility func-
tions, humans elicit preferences that change with varying time-horizons (“hyperbolic dis-
counting”), so that it is impossible to rationally assess the best outcome in terms of utility at 
the instant of decision making. That is, utility functions at different points of time are inter-
temporally inconsistent with one another (Frederick et al. 2002). Moreover, empirical evi-
dence suggests that preferences are often generated “on the spot” in response to the choice or 
judgment task, and do not enter as an invariable constant (Payne et al. 1992, Tversky & Si-
monson 1993). The introduction of models of social preferences in the last section illustrates 
the fact that researchers have started to hypothesize about different utility functions in an at-
tempt to make economic models of decision making more realistic, and to accommodate for 
the variety observed in behavior and choice. However, this approach involves the methodo-
logical drawback that “rational choice theorists are forced to create new ‘utility functions’ for 
each deviation from rationality” (Weber et al. 2004: 284). These “wide” conceptions of ra-
124 
 
tional choice (as opposed to “narrow” conceptions which center on pure self-interest, see Opp 
1999), provide no limitations on the set of explanatory factors that might be introduced as ad-
ditional utility terms, but they are “formulated so expansively that they absorb every alterna-
tive hypothesis” (Green & Shapiro 1994: 184). The scope and power of rational choice theory 
is severely limited by the fact that the rationalist paradigm does not offer a theory of prefer-
ence formation, even when social outcomes clearly depend on preferences (Friedman & 
Hechter 1988). In short, while rational choice theories explain behavior for a given utility 
function, they cannot account for their emergence (Bicchieri 2006). 
Another caveat against the orthodox rational choice paradigm concerns the assumption of per-
fect rationality and strict utility maximization. Homo oeconomicus is often envisioned as be-
ing a “hyper-rational” (Weber et al. 2004) agent, a sort of walking computer that, given pref-
erences and beliefs, can instantaneously calculate the costs and benefits of his actions. As Sel-
ten puts it, “full rationality requires unlimited cognitive abilities. Fully rational man is a myth-
ical hero who knows the solutions to all mathematical problems and can immediately perform 
all computations, regardless of how difficult they are” (Selten 2001: 14). In contrast, psycho-
logical research in human judgment and decision making has convincingly demonstrated that 
cognitive capacities for rational calculations of the sort proposed in economic models are lim-
ited (Payne et al. 1992, Gigerenzer & Selten 2001). This indicates that the decision-making 
behavior of “real” human beings cannot conform to the ideal of full rationality. The postula-
tion of perfect rationality has been supplemented by propositions of human bounded rationali-
ty, as introduced, for example, in the works of Simon (1955, 1978).
24
 According to Simon, 
human decision making can be more adequately described as a process of satisficing, in con-
trast to the ideal-type maximizing behavior of the perfectly rational actor. A satisficing actor 
will be “doing the best” under the irremovable constraints of limited cognitive capacity and 
notoriously scarce and uncertain information, and will process information only to the extent 
that suffices to reach a certain aspiration-level of utility. While the axioms of rational choice 
postulate a form of “substantial rationality,” it is preferable to regard the “procedural rationali-
ty” of the decision-making process as well.25 When formalizing accounts of bounded ration-
ality, the cost of information processing and search have to be included into the decision-
making process (Riker & Ordeshook 1973, Heiner 1983). In sum, perfect rationality is a rather 
hypothetical “limiting case” (Ostrom 2003) of human bounded rationality. 
                                                 
24 “Rationality is bounded when it falls short of omniscience. And the failures of omniscience are largely failures of knowing 
all the alternatives, uncertainty about relevant exogenous states, and inability to calculate consequences” (Simon 1979: 
502); see also the very informative discussion of the concept of bounded rationality in Selten (2001). 
25 This notion of adaptive bounded rationality is consistent with the theoretical frameworks developed in evolutionary psy-
chology (Tooby & Cosmides 1992), evolutionary game theory and biology (Gintis 2000), and social cognition (Chaiken & 
Trope 1999), which will be discussed in chapter 4. 
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Furthermore, in the rational choice paradigm rationality ultimately centers on intentionality, 
self-interest, maximization, and the consequentialism of action and choice. Even in extended 
models of “wide” rational choice accounts, actions are always instrumental and outcome-
oriented. In contrast, sociological theorists throughout have stressed the noninstrumental char-
acter of action, as exemplified, for example, by Weber’s distinction of “axiological” and “in-
strumental” rationality (Boudon 2003). In Weber’s sense, actions are always meaningful and 
should be understood as based on reason, but such reasons can take forms other than cost-
benefit considerations. The notion of rationality can therefore be noninstrumental, and must 
be given a new “content” in some situations. According to Elster, the instrumentality of ac-
tions cannot be extended to domains such as friendship, love, and respect: “Altruism, trust and 
solidarity are genuine social phenomena and cannot be dissolved into ultra-subtle forms of 
self-interest” (1979: 146). He contends that the rational choice paradigm cannot account for 
these aspects of social life and turns to norms as an “autonomous” motivational factor which 
lies outside of self-interested utility considerations. In essence, norms “override” the rationali-
ty of self-interest. In a similar fashion, researchers have stressed the importance of rules and 
adaptive rule-based choices as an alternative to consequence-based maximization (March & 
Olsen 1989, March 1994, Vanberg 1994, 2002, 2004). This complements the conceptions of 
rule-based trust, based on “shallow” decision making. But as we have seen, norms, rules, and 
social institutions do not stand outside the utility considerations of rational actors in the ra-
tionalist paradigm. They matter only insofar as they are parameters in the actor’s calculation 
of whether or not to choose some course of action. It is, however, questionable (both on theo-
retical and empirical grounds) whether strict rationality and self-interest maximization consti-
tute the sole and only “logic” of decision making in social settings (Messick 1999, cf. 
Kirchgässner 2008). 
Taken together, a number of theoretical arguments demarcate the limits of rational choice as a 
general framework of decision making, adding to the enormous body of empirical evidence 
that highlights violations of its fundamental postulates. These challenges naturally transfer to 
the problem of modeling and explaining interpersonal trust with its help. In fact, they are of 
particular importance when studying interpersonal trust, where a tension between “rational” 
and “irrational,” conditional and unconditional, cognitive-based and affect-based conceptuali-
zations has always been a fundamental aspect of theorizing. With respect to the game-
theoretic approaches, Hardin aptly notes that, “despite their clarity in many respects, the game 
representations of various interactions do not unambiguously tell us about trust. The broad 
range of potential reasons for player’s choices is not narrowed to trust, self-interest, normative 
commitments or any other motivation” (Hardin 2003: 98).  
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3.4. Is Trust Rational? 
The explanative strategy adopted by economists in the explanation of interpersonal trust is to 
“create” and model the incentives for the trustee to be trustworthy. Trustees honor or fail trust 
because of the costs and benefits attached to honoring or breaking trust. By making the trust-
worthy option more desirable in terms of individual utility, whether internally or externally 
motivated, one can thereby “encapsulate” the interests of the trustor in the trustee’s rationale. 
The choice of a trusting act is regarded as a conscious, maximizing and deliberate decision 
based on the trustor’s expectation of trustworthiness (Coleman 1990, Hardin 2001). The cost-
benefit considerations may take into account contextual factors and incentives from social 
embeddedness (dyadic, network, and institutional learning and control), they may include 
conjectures about trustee characteristics (benevolence, competence, integrity, and predictabil-
ity) and his state of mind (internalization of reciprocity norm, guilt-aversion), they may be 
“biased” by generalized expectations and individual predispositions to trust, and we can justly 
assume that they are backed-up by the prevalent culture of trust inherent in the social system 
and the structural assurance and situational normality beliefs conferred thereby—even when 
these aspects are not part of explicit economic modeling. The higher a trustor’s expectation in 
a particular situation, the more likely it is that he decides to choose a trusting act. As it is, the 
rational choice perspective of trust takes a very specific perspective on the phenomenological 
foundation characterizing interpersonal trust: it is a deliberate and “effortful” decision that 
takes place after an assessment of all relevant incentives which might potentially motivate the 
trustee. As Möllering is apt to point out, the conceptual starting point for economic accounts is 
“first and foremost wariness, if not paranoia, of opportunism ... the underlying models are 
conservative in that they emphasize the pervasiveness of opportunism, the risk of exploitation 
and the costs of safeguards against the detrimental actions of others” (2006b: 24). 
As we have argued in chapter 2, assumptions concerning the subjective experience of trust are 
most divergent. It is a matter of lively debate whether trust, as a mental phenomenon, is con-
nected to reflective processes and the consultation of reason; whether actors do trust “con-
sciously” and calculate the risks and utilities involved and act upon them—or whether trust 
includes the suspension of doubt, a perception the trust problem “as if” there were none, and 
therefore a considerable unawareness of the risks and incentives. The tension between these 
conflicting theoretical perspectives and the promise of their future reconciliation has been a 
prime motivation for this work. The exposition of the game-theoretic perspective in the last 
sections has presented us with a perspective on trust in which the role of reason is clear-cut: 
trustor and trustor do explicitly reason about their choices, taking into account their vulnera-
bilities and all relevant risks and incentives. The basal logic of the choice of a trusting act is 
similar to a “bet” on risky alternatives, and the rational actor can make such a choice because 
he compares and evaluates the alternatives at hand. This necessitates the stability, unambigui-
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ty, and cognitive availability of expectations. The choice of a trusting act is then a behavioral 
“by-product” of these expectations. All extended models of the basic trust game, such as those 
modeling embeddedness and social preferences, or adding additional incentives for trust and 
trustworthiness, conform to the same principle. The cognitive-reflective perspective on trust is 
vividly expressed in Luhmann’s conceptual distinction between familiarity, confidence, and 
trust: “The distinction between confidence and trust depends on perception and attribution. If 
you don’t consider alternatives (every morning you leave the house without a weapon!), you 
are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the 
possibility of being disappointed by the actions of others, you define the situation as one of 
trust” (Luhmann 1988: 97, emphasis added). In this cognitive perspective, trust always in-
cludes a conscious acceptance of the risk and vulnerabilities included in the trusting act; it is 
conceived of as a rational choice among risky alternatives. 
In contrast to economic accounts, many psychological and sociological conceptualizations 
emphasize the prereflective nature, emotionality, and unconditionality of trust. From that per-
spective, trust “can also be shown to be thoughtless, careless and routinized, and thus to re-
quire no unnecessary expenditure of consciousness, especially if expectation approaches cer-
tainty” (Luhmann 1979: 24). Luhmann’s claim is reminiscent of the idea of a noncognitive 
leap of faith (Lewis & Weigert 1985b) enabled by trust, a suspension of risk built on taken-
for-grantedness (Möllering 2006b), and it also hints to the subjective experience of trust as a 
predominantly emotional attitude (Holmes 1991, Lahno 2001, Karen 1996), to mutual identi-
fication and a “non-cognitive security” (Becker 1996) in which the trustor’s “trustful” state of 
mind becomes the interpretive lens that interferes with a cold cognitive assessment of trust-
worthiness. As Karen puts it, “the harms they [the trustees] might cause through failure of 
goodwill are not in view because the possibility that their will is other than good is not in 
view” (1996: 12). While uncertainty is seen as part of the objective structure, it is not regarded 
as part of the subjective perception. Essentially, trust is intangible to reflective reasoning be-
cause it logically precedes deliberation; it is already part of the process of definition of the 
situation. This alternative viewpoint must be taken into account in a broad conceptualization 
of trust. 
To some researchers, the economic approach also poses a serious definitional problem be-
cause trust, based on prudence, is not considered to be proper trust at all (March & Olsen 
1989, Williamson 1993, Miller 2001, James 2002b).
26
 In this line, Williamson laments that 
                                                 
26 Such definitional quarrels are nonetheless irrelevant in the context of this work. Neither are “narrow” definitions of trust 
helpful when elaborating on a broad conceptualization of interpersonal trust, nor it is the researcher’s task to speculate 
about the “essential” and “realistic” nature of trust—as conceptual nominalists, we have to acknowledge the fact that trust 
can have a broad phenomenal and experiential basis, and therefore need to include, not rule out, “rational” forms of trust 
in our theoretical framework. In fact, the related arguments beg the question of why people trust when doing so does not 
involve incentives for the trustee. 
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“calculative trust is a contradiction in terms” (1993: 463). Essentially, economic approaches 
are “designed to explain trust away” (Möllering 2006b: 43) because the incentive structure, 
when it is appropriate for a trustworthy response, does remove the vulnerability to exploita-
tion that gives trust its very meaning (Miller 2001, James 2002b). As Lewis and Weigert note, 
“trust begins where prediction ends. The overrationalized conception of trust, by reducing it to 
a conscious, cognitive state presumably evidenced by cooperative behavior, totally ignores the 
emotional nature of trust” (1985b: 976). In fact, even in the social preference models intro-
duced above, norms and emotions remain an instrumental means to achieve a desired end. In 
criticism of Coleman’s approach, Misztal laments that “self-interest exploits social norms to 
punish untrustworthiness” (1996: 80). These shortcomings of economic accounts, even more 
so in light of the irrefutable limitations of the rational choice paradigm, have stirred concern 
even among rational choice advocates of trust, putting its descriptive adequacy into question 
(Kramer 1999).  
Hardin, arguing in favor of the rationalist perspective, rightly admits: “Trust is not a risk or a 
gamble. It is, of course, risky to put myself in a position to be harmed or benefited by another. 
But I do not calculate the risk and then additionally decide to trust you; my estimation of the 
risk is my degree of trust in you. Again, I do not typically choose to trust and therefore act. 
Rather, I do trust and therefore choose to act” (Hardin 1993: 516). But such an argument 
completely fails to explain trust in the first place. The way out taken by him and most econo-
mists (e.g. Coleman 1990) is to equate trust and trusting expectations—trusting expectations 
are regarded causal antecedents to behavioral trust. Consequentially, there is nothing beyond 
the cognitive categories of trust-related knowledge (as expressed in the trustor’s expectation) 
which enable the rational choice of a trusting act. Thus, the implicit assumption in rational 
accounts is that “the lands of interpretation and expectation are directly connected (if not one 
and the same),” as Möllering (2001: 413) points out. 
Yet, numerous trust researchers contend that expectations—if perceived at all—are merely a 
consequence of prereflective processes in which trust already plays a role. In this perspective, 
trust is not reducible to expectations, but it constitutes a logical antecedent. This view is right-
ly expressed in the idea of a “cognitive leap” and suspension as a consequence of interpreta-
tion, and it is implicitly made in the distinction between conditional and unconditional forms 
of trust (Jones & George 1998), the many claims of trust as “an unintended outcome of rou-
tine social life” (Misztal 2001: 323, emphasis added), based on taken-for-grantedness and sit-
uational normality. In the words of Elster, cultural tradition and social norms enable the 
choice of a trusting act by “overriding” rational considerations. These forms of shallow trust 
are not based on effortful decision-making processes, but indicate a rather low level of ration-
ality and cognitive deliberation (Messick & Kramer 2001). In a sense, they describe the 
choice of a trusting act as based on simple heuristic processes, substituting the idea of rational 
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choice with a logic of appropriateness in which the adaptive use of rules, roles, routines and 
emotions as rules of thumb, under the constraints of bounded rationality, helps to “quick-step” 
interpersonal trust. 
The preceding discussion suggests that trust and rationality are closely intertwined. Whether 
trust is a rational choice or not is a key question to which trust researchers within the different 
research paradigms have given multifaceted and divergent answers. While economic ap-
proaches emphasize rationality, many sociological and psychological accounts maintain that 
trust indicates the absence of rationality. If we take a look at the broad picture that arises, one 
conclusion we might draw is that the approaches are inconsistent, contradictive, disconnected, 
and stand next to each other in a relatively independent fashion. At first sight, any further the-
oretical integration is prevented because of the huge differences in the underlying assumptions 
concerning interpretation, choice, and the degree of rationality involved.  
A more fruitful alternative is to ask for the common ground that would allow “rational” and 
“nonrational” accounts of trust to be united and integrated. A most promising avenue in this 
respect is to put the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice into the focus 
of trust research. The reason for this stipulation is simple: considering all, rationality seems to 
be a key dimension that helps us to discriminate and integrate the various typologies of trust 
which have been proposed. Cognition-based versus affect-based, calculus-based versus identi-
fication-based, conditional versus unconditional trust: most typologies implicitly rest on spe-
cific assumptions concerning the amount of rationality involved in the choice of a trusting act. 
Moreover, they differentiate trust with respect to the categories of trust-related knowledge that 
are applied.  
The two aspects (category of trust-related knowledge and the degree of rationality involved) 
are often mixed up and woven together in an inconsistent and contradictory way. In essence, 
rationality is not regarded as a proper and independent dimension of the typological space of 
trust, and thus is not “orthogonal” to the categories of knowledge used to solve a trust prob-
lem. Instead, types of knowledge and their mode of application are portrayed as fixed and in-
terwoven. But one apparent reason for the diversity of typologies proposed is the fact that 
knowledge can be processed and applied in different ways, and whether we focus on more 
automatic or rational processes in interpretation and choice will eventually necessitate creat-
ing a new “type” for each category of trust-related knowledge and each degree of rationality 
we assume. 
The solution that will be put forth in the following is to regard rationality as an endogenous 
result of internal cognitive processes. In this sense, it has to be understood as a fundamental 
ingredient in the solution of trust problems, and a basic dimension of the trust concept itself. 
This necessitates a turn to social-psychological frameworks, which have started to accumulate 
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evidence of human adaptive rationality. In the “dual-processing” approach to cognition, ra-
tionality is seen as bounded but also highly flexible and adaptive to internal and external con-
straints. The degree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice thus will dynamically 
change, and it is principally independent of the categories of trust-related knowledge that are 
applied. Ultimately, adopting such a perspective of adaptive rationality paves the way to a 
broad integration of different approaches to trust under a common theoretical umbrella. In or-
der to move towards such broad account, we will now turn to the concept of adaptive rational-
ity. 
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4. Trust and Adaptive Rationality 
“Human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors whose two blades are the structure  
of task environments and the computational abilities of the actor” (Simon 1990: 7). 
In recent years, an ever-growing part of trust research has been concerned with the various 
ways in which cognitive processes influence, bias, and determine the choice of a trusting act. 
An idea that has gained increasing attention is that there in fact exist a number of different 
“routes to trust” which can be taken by a trustor faced with a trust problem. The propositions 
are very diverse, but they have in common the principal idea that trust may be the product of 
cognitive shortcuts which help to facilitate information processing and reduce the cognitive 
load of the trustor, in order to free up sparse cognitive resources and processing capacity. Es-
sentially, they are indicative of a variable degree of rationality involved in the choice of a 
trusting act and, more generally, of the adaptive rationality inherent in interpretation and 
choice. 
To grasp the concept of adaptive rationality, we will take a close look at the “dual process 
paradigm,” which explicitly takes into account the particularities of the human cognitive sys-
tem with respect to individual-level rationality. The concepts developed in this research tradi-
tion can fruitfully inform trust research. Broadly speaking, dual-process models assume that 
human cognition may occur in either a rational or an automatic mode. These are not only 
characterized by very distinct functional properties, but in fact make use of different neuronal 
systems in the brain, and are thus “hard-wired” into the human cognitive architecture. While 
the automatic mode is intuitive, emotional, fast, effortless, and associative, the rational mode 
is slow, serial, effortful, and controlled. This dual-processing framework can be usefully ap-
plied to trust problems, as it suggests that different processing modes—that is, different de-
grees of rationality—are involved in interpretation and choice when solving a trust problem.  
The contingent and flexible use of different processing strategies in trust problems also points 
to the context-dependence of information processing, and, incidentally, to the context-
dependence of trust. Exploring the role of the context in trust research, we find that its influ-
ence is most often taken for granted and left implicit. However, it is a key factor in dual-
processing accounts of cognition, governing the mode of information processing that individ-
uals adopt. It influences the accessibility and activation of knowledge, and determines, among 
other factors, whether and when trustors use more “heuristic” or more “elaborate” strategies to 
solve a trust problem. In short, when thinking trust in terms of adaptive rationality, we must 
respect and account for the context in our theoretical models. 
In a logical next step, we need to ask about the determinants of information processing and 
answer the pressing question of how and when the degree of rationality changes in response to 
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internal and external factors. The dual-processing paradigm has carved out four central deter-
minants of the processing mode: (1) opportunities to engage in controlled processing; (2) the 
motivation to do so; (3) the availability, accessibility, and context-dependent applicability of 
knowledge; and (4) tradeoffs between effort and accuracy. However, as the dual-processing 
paradigm is scattered among different thematic domains and research traditions, specific ac-
counts rarely inform each other or collect existing knowledge into a broad picture combining 
these determinants in a general framework. Of most immediate concern is the fact that there is 
no theoretical model available that tells us precisely how the four determinants are functional-
ly related to each other, and how adaptive rationality may, in fact, be modeled. Most theories 
are content with listing a set of “moderators,” leaving the question of their precise interplay 
open. Moreover, existing theory does not explain how interpretation and choice are connected, 
that is, how we could causally model the links between adaptive rationality, interpretation, 
and choice. 
To this end, I will discuss the “Model of Frame Selection” (MFS), a sociological model of 
adaptive rationality that has been developed over the last two decades with the aim of provid-
ing the general theory of action. A unique feature of this theory is that it connects adaptive 
rationality to interpretation and choice, by focusing on the process of “mode selection.” The 
process of mode selection is modeled and conceived of as an autonomous, regulative 
achievement of the cognitive system, in which the degree of rationality that actors use during 
knowledge application is determined. The model derives a clear and formally precise formula-
tion of the process of mode selection from minimal assumptions; it also spells out the “selec-
tion rules” which govern the activation of mental schemata in the different processing modes, 
and thus establishes a causal link between an actor’s adaptive rationality, interpretation, and 
choice.  
In developing this perspective of adaptive rationality, I use the model to causally explain both 
conditional and unconditional types of trust. With a tractable behavioral model at hand, it is 
apparent that rationality must be regarded as a key dimension of the trust concept. Important-
ly, the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice can dynamically change. It is 
not fixed, and therefore either automatic or rational processes may prevail both during the def-
inition of the situation, and the choice of a trusting act. The perspective of adaptive rationality 
helps to integrate seemingly contradictory accounts of trust, because it gives evidence for the 
fact that trust researchers focus on different aspects (interpretation or choice) of the trust prob-
lem, and assume different modes (rational or automatic processing) when theorizing about a 
particular solution. The chapter closes with the development of a theoretical model that pin-
points the mode selection thresholds governing interpretation and choice in a trust problem, 
and with a definition of trust that takes care of actors’ adaptive rationality and with a state-
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ment of general model propositions. The model will be used in chapter 6 to develop and test 
empirical hypotheses in a controlled laboratory experiment. 
4.1. Different Routes to Trust 
While the mainstream of trust research draws it foundations from the rationalist paradigm, a 
number of contributions—backed up by advancements in cognitive psychology—suggest that 
trustors often use “mental shortcuts” and heuristic strategies to solve a trust problem. These 
approaches not only accept human bounded rationality as a foundational starting point for 
theorizing, but they also demonstrate the implications of the limited cognitive capacity and 
bounded rationality of humans when thinking about interpersonal trust. The following para-
graphs present a general overview of the variety of models which have been proposed in favor 
of a bounded-rationality approach to trust. 
To begin with, some authors hypothesize specific heuristics which work as a direct shortcut to 
generate interpersonal trust. For example, Burnham et al. (2000) postulate the existence of a 
mental “friend-or-foe” module (FOF) and its use in trust problems. The FOF module is con-
ceptualized to be an adaptive mechanism of the brain which automatically changes perceived 
cooperativeness or competitiveness, releasing trustors from the need for otherwise costly and 
effortful mental accounting. “Friend-or-Foe detection primes you for greater expected benefits 
than without it. It sets you up preconsciously for a maximizing decision. If you get surprised, 
you have to reconsider with more cognitive resources ... It is a heuristic routine which saves 
having to think carefully about every decision, but it is not an irreversible commitment” 
(Burnham et al. 2000: 61, emphasis added). The FOF module is triggered by immediate situa-
tional cues, and it is considered to be “part of the human autonomic decision processing ca-
pacity” (ibid.).  
Generally speaking, FOF detection alters the perceived likelihood of a trustworthy response 
before trustors consciously perceive it. In other words, it directly influences the formation of 
the trustor’s expectation of trustworthiness. In the case of a “foe” being detected, expectations 
become unfavorable, because the cognitive system becomes attentive and suspicious to oppor-
tunism and breaches of trust. Unfortunately, Burnham et al. (2000) do not further specify or 
model the FOF mechanism. Empirically, they demonstrate that a change in the experimental 
instructions of a repeated trust game (referring to “partners” versus “opponents”) has dramatic 
effects on the observed levels of trust and trustworthiness over an extended period of time. 
In the same line, Yamagishi et al. (2007) hypothesize the “social exchange heuristic” (SEH), 
which—if activated—completely suppresses the perception of opportunities for defection. 
The heuristic is also regarded as an evolutionary adaptation of the human organism for facili-
tating social exchange, and is a “cognitive bias that perceives free riding in a situation as nei-
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ther possible nor desirable” (ibid. 10). The SEH is activated by cues that hint at the presence 
of a situation of social exchange. More concretely, actors are assumed to make subjective in-
ferences about the true state of the world, and evaluate the potential errors of this inference 
process. According to the authors, the inference evaluation process is unconscious and auto-
matic; it is concerned with the question of whether or not free riding is likely to be detected, 
and whether punishment is a credible threat. The inference process has two possible outcomes 
which correspond to the possible states of the world (“sanctioning” or “not sanctioning” free 
riders). Accordingly, two different errors may be committed, if the result of the inference pro-
cess does not correspond to the true (Figure 15): 
Figure 15: Inferences and the SEH, adapted from Yamagishi et al. (2007: 266) 
 
If an actor makes the “sanctioning” inference (that is, if the presence of sanctioning mecha-
nisms is detected as a credible threat), this automatically activates the SEH. Thus, whenever a 
situation is defined as being under social control, the alternative of defection is simply sup-
pressed from perception. Applied to a trust problem, both trustor and trustee could define the 
situation as one of social exchange and, if so, they would not even consider the possibility for 
a failure of trust. This clearly contradicts standard economic models, where the prospective 
costs of defection are weighed against the prospective gains. The SEH is conceptualized as an 
adaptive-evolutionary heuristic for the detection of situations of social exchange, and, similar 
to the FOF module, is assumed to be “hard wired” into the human brain. 
The models of Burnham et al. (2000) and Yamagishi et al. (2007) are formulated in the tradi-
tion of evolutionary cognitive psychology (Cosmides & Tooby 1992). This paradigm regards 
heuristics as specialized adaptations of the mind to solve particular problems. As Cosmides 
and Tooby argue, social cognition consists of a rich set of “dedicated, functionally special-
ized, interrelated modules to collectively guide thought and behavior” (1992: 163). Further-
more, cognitive adaptations are highly domain-specific. They argue that the domain of social 
exchange has been of particular importance in human evolutionary history, which is why spe-
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cific adaptations for social exchange (“social heuristics”) are likely to have evolved over time. 
This heuristics perspective can be contrasted to the “general-purpose reasoning” approach 
prevalent in the social sciences, where human problem-solving is assumed to be achieved by 
content-independent procedures, such as logical inference and propositional calculus. As 
Cosmides and Tooby argue, the domain of social exchange activates behavioral and inferen-
tial rules that cannot be accounted for in terms of general-purpose reasoning.  
Although the models introduced above emphasize human bounded rationality, the fact that 
they each propose a very fixed and specific heuristic to solve the trust problem is limiting to a 
broad conceptualization of trust. Obviously, invoking a specific heuristic can explain interper-
sonal trust in some instances, but other avenues to the choice of a trusting act can be imagined 
and should not be omitted. Following this approach, we would have to add to the list, for ex-
ample, a “feeling-as-information” heuristic to account for affect-based types of interpersonal 
trust; a “relational schema” heuristic to explain unconditional identification-based trust; and a 
“routine-application-of-rules” heuristic to account for instances of rule-based institutional 
trust; and so on (for a more detailed discussion of heuristics and their use, see section 4.2.3). 
On the other hand, the choice of a trusting act may very well be subject to cost-benefit consid-
erations and attempts to make rational inferences about trustworthiness. That is, the “trust as a 
social heuristic” approach is informative, but incomplete when it comes to specifying the 
broad phenomenological foundation of interpersonal trust. Nor does it capture the full range 
of phenomena which we can relate to interpretation and choice in trust problems.  
One possible solution to this problem of “incompleteness” is to ask when and how the differ-
ent heuristics govern interpretation and choice, and when they are not used but instead re-
placed by a more elaborate reasoning and inference process. In this line, Fehr and Tyran 
(2008), examining the process of expectation formation in simple “price-setting games,” de-
mand that the degree of rationality is treated as an endogenous variable, which must be relat-
ed to the costs of error detection, and the costs of making false decisions. They note that “a 
key question ... is to identify the conditions under which limited rationality occurs and when it 
affects aggregate outcomes in economic interactions ... The strategic environment may change 
the amount of individual level irrationality” (ibid. 354). Unfortunately, Fehr and Tyran do not 
offer a formal model of this proposition. But the idea of treating the degree of rationality as an 
endogenous variable has a promising theoretical advantage over the trust-as-heuristic ap-
proach in offering a general explanation of how and when the use of heuristics versus rational 
decision-making processes will occur. In short, it suggests thinking about actors’ adaptive ra-
tionality, which is not just bounded, but at the same time flexible and adaptive to the envi-
ronment and internal constraints.  
Adaptive rationality, if it does form part of human cognitive architecture, will come to bear in 
trust problems as well. The idea that trustors might vary in the degree of rationality they adopt 
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in solving a trust problem has been proposed by Ziegler (1998), who discusses individual 
forecasting abilities with respect to the precision of trustworthiness expectations, and relates 
them to the mental costs incurred by cognitive processing and increased attention. He argues 
that a higher precision level of expectations is connected to higher mental costs and therefore, 
when limited cognitive capacities exist, such precision is often not attainable. A related argu-
ment was made by Williams (2001), who proposes that the processing of trust-related 
knowledge regularly happens in a heuristic, category-based fashion. The category-based pro-
cessing of trust-related information is not something actors always and intentionally opt for, 
but a result of limited cognitive capacities. It triggers “category-based affect and beliefs,” 
which then influence trusting expectations and intentions. Principally, both Ziegler and Wil-
liams argue that the use of heuristics is not simply “hard-wired,” but is instead dependent on 
internal and external conditions to which the cognitive system needs to respond. 
Even more thought-provokingly, Hill and O’Hara (2006) sketch a theory of trust in which 
both conscious and unconscious strategies for the placement of trust exist. They argue that the 
automatic-spontaneous choice of a trusting act is a heuristic “default rule,” and they substanti-
ate their argument by reference to the “feeling as information” paradigm (Clore 2000), ac-
cording to which subjective emotional experiences can be heuristically used as an internal 
source of information during judgment and decision making. Likewise, Keren (2007) argues 
that, “while trust is an indispensable component of our daily life, it is not consistently (and 
continuously) raised in our awareness. Unless there is a reason, or unless primed in one way 
or the other, the question of trust remains in a dormant state. In most situations, and in most of 
our daily social encounters, as long as the assessed risk is sufficiently small, we tend to as-
sume trust by default” (ibid. 252, emphasis added). In short, given that humans suffer from 
bounded rationality and scarce cognitive resources, the choice of a trusting act may sometimes 
be characterized by the involvement of a rather low level of cognitive effort; it may be war-
ranted as a “default” decision, rooted in a state of routine springing from taken-for-
grantedness; or it may be directly motivated from feelings and emotions, rather than being the 
result of an explicit reason-based judgment. 
This suggests that flexible information-processing strategies and subjective experiences can 
be fruitfully combined into a broad conception of trust. In a model by Schul et al. (2008), trust 
and distrust span a continuum of mental states which, at the endpoints involve (1) the use of 
routine strategies and a subjective feeling of security in the state of trust, and (2) the nonrou-
tine use of elaborated processing strategies, linked to a feeling of doubt, in the state of distrust. 
The temporary state of the mental system on this dimension of adaptive rationality determines 
the processing, acquisition, and elaboration of new information and its integration into judg-
ments. As the authors argue, trust is intrinsically connected to the use of “routine” infor-
mation-processing strategies and always accompanied by subjective security, while distrust 
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must be regarded as a result of more “elaborate” strategies that go along with a subjective 
state of doubt. However, their model does not explicate how and when a shift in the continu-
um of processing strategies occurs, and it neglects the possibility that trust may also spring 
from doubtful, rational inference processes.
1
 Such a “dualistic” conception of trust, which ex-
plicitly includes “routine” action and “elaborate” decision-making strategies, is also empiri-
cally supported by a study of Krueger et al. (2007). Based on the analysis of fMRI data and 
decision times, they separate conditional trusting strategies from unconditional ones. Not only 
do these strategies differ in the cognitive costs associated with them, but their existence can be 
traced back to the preferential activation of distinct neuronal systems.  
Clearly, the contributions reviewed above take a very different view of interpersonal trust than 
does a pure rational-choice approach. The models point to processes which precede the choice 
of a trusting act and structure the way in which the environment and the trust problem itself is 
perceived; in effect, they demonstrate potential candidates for an explanation of the “leap of 
faith,” which, as Möllering argues, “is far from rational” (2001: 411). This review leads us to 
two important conclusions. First, the perspective of a preconscious, mental structuring of per-
ception demonstrates the importance of interpretation and the definition of the situation as a 
substantial aspect of interpersonal trust. We have to clearly differentiate between the process-
es of the definition of the situation and the subsequent choice of action if we want to disentan-
gle the phenomenon of interpersonal trust. Both aspects—interpretation and choice—will 
have to be respected simultaneously, though separately.  
Second, these authors suggest that interpretation and the choice of a trusting act may be 
marked by an adaptive use of different processing strategies. Far from being self-evident, re-
searchers often implicitly assume that the choice of a trusting act occurs with a flexible degree 
of rationality. It is instructive to reinspect Luhmann’s apparently cognitive account under the 
rubric of adaptive rationality; as he contends, “trust merges gradually into expectations of 
continuity, which are formed as the firm guidelines by which to conduct our everyday lives” 
(Luhmann 1979: 25, emphasis added). Trust can be defined by the way in which information 
is dealt with in a particular situation, meaning that “primary support of trust comes from the 
functions it plays in the ordering of information processing internal to the system, rather than 
directly from guarantees originating in the environment” (ibid. 27, emphasis added). With his 
distinction between trust and confidence, Luhmann took a particular position concerning the 
rationality of trust, putting it close to the cognitive, rational-choice perspective. But as we 
have argued previously, the conceptual distinction between trust, familiarity, and confidence 
                                                 
1 Of course this is, above all, a definitional problem. Obviously, the definition of trust as proposed by Schul et al. (2008) re-
fers to trust as a state of perceived security, “non-reflectiveness,” and the absence of doubt. In a broad conceptualization of 
trust, limiting the phenomenological basis in this way is unnecessary restrictive.  Another problem with their approach is 
that adaptive rationality and trust are virtually the same—there is no difference between the prevalent processing state and 
the ascription of “trust” to the trustor, once the information-processing state is known. 
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is not well-defined and is fraught with inconsistencies on account of their gradual nature and 
mutual overlap (Endress 2001). All in all, the question of how information is processed in a 
trust problem seems to be a key aspect of the trust phenomenon which needs to be answered. 
Apart from the necessity of analytically separating interpretation from choice, it is thus equal-
ly important to be precise about the processing strategies involved in each stage, in order to 
improve our understanding of interpersonal trust. The important lesson that can be taken is 
that, “whether or not action is founded on trust, amounts to an essential distinction in the ra-
tionality of action which appears capable of attainment” (Luhmann 1979: 25). We would have 
to add that, “whether or not the choice of a trusting act is conditional or unconditional 
amounts to an essential distinction in the degree of rationality in action.” As we will see, cog-
nitive psychology has drawn a picture of homo sapiens that testifies to the idea of human 
adaptive rationality, bounded in comparison to the ideal-type rational actor, yet flexible and 
highly adaptive to situational constraints, and by no means inefficient. Taken together, the 
discussion suggests that, apart from the missing link of interpretation and the subjective defi-
nition of the situation, a broad conceptualization of trust must respect a second factor funda-
mental to the emergence of interpersonal trust—namely, the degree of rationality involved in 
interpretation and the choice of a trusting act. A broad theory of trust will have to specify the 
process leading to its endogenous determination. In fact, it will be argued in the following that 
a broad conceptualization of trust must respect endogenous, adaptive rationality as a funda-
mental dimension of the trust phenomenon itself.  
But when will the choice of a trusting act be guided by routine, emotions, and heuristics, and 
when will it approximate a rational choice? Can we say more about the degree of rationality 
involved in interpretation and choice? As we will see, adaptive rationality is not a black box, 
and in order to understand its operation and functioning, we must return to the missing link of 
interpretation. Both the definition of the situation and variable rationality go hand in hand, and 
they are of primary importance to the phenomenon of interpersonal trust.  
4.2. Adaptive Rationality 
4.2.1. The Dual-Process Paradigm 
A theoretical paradigm that explicitly takes into account human variable rationality is the so-
called “dual-process” paradigm (see Chaiken & Trope 1999, Smith & DeCoster 2000, 
Kahneman 2003, Evans 2008). The principal assumption that unites researchers in this tradi-
tion is that human information processing is accomplished by two underlying, yet fundamen-
tally distinct, cognitive systems, and that humans flexibly use both “routes” and the infor-
mation-processing strategies associated with their activation. Generally speaking, the models 
postulate the existence of two ideal-type modes of information processing: a parsimonious 
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“heuristic” mode—applied whenever the situation suggests the applicability of simple rules 
and associations—and an “elaborate” mode, which demands that cognitive capacities and suf-
ficient motivation are available. While the first mode can be interpreted as a quick-and-dirty 
human approach for arriving at sufficiently good answers effortlessly and efficiently, the se-
cond mode involves a problem being solved by effortful mental operations, that is, by hard 
thinking and reasoning (Smith & DeCoster 2000). Dual-process models have been applied in 
many areas of research, such as social cognition (Fiske & Taylor 1991, Liberman 2006), per-
suasion research (Petty & Cacioppo 1986), judgment under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahne-
man 1983), and choice (Camerer et al. 2005). Recently, the framework has received support 
up from neuroscience studies linking the theoretical concepts of the framework to the underly-
ing neuronal systems of the brain (Lieberman 2007, Rilling & Sanfey 2011). 
Before we continue, it is necessary to clarify some terms which need a more detailed specifi-
cation at this point. The term perception describes “the interface between the outer and the 
inner world” (Bodenhausen & Hugenberg 2009: 2). Stimuli from the environment create sig-
nals (visual, auditory, etc.) that can be sensed. Perception means that the perceiver converts 
these signals into the basic, psychologically meaningful representations that define his or her 
subjective experience of the outer world, while using the different processing routes. Of 
course, previously unknown, unfamiliar, and new sensory input can also be “perceived”: the 
novelty of the sensory input is itself a meaningful perception with direct consequences for at-
tention and higher-order inference (see below). If a meaningful percept is achieved, it can 
serve as an input to higher-order cognition, such as thinking, reasoning, or inference. Thus, 
perception is a basic process that precedes most other activities relating to the outer world. For 
example, the visual perception of a number of objects (“book,” “Mr. Smith,” “table,” “child”) 
can deliver the input for higher-order inference processes, such as a subjective definition of 
the situation, which is primarily concerned with interpreting complex social situations (“Mr. 
Smith is reading a book to his daughter at the table”). But the basic components—material 
objects, people, actions, symbols, social contexts—have already been perceived.  
While perception can be understood as the first step in social cognition, attention must be re-
garded as the first step in perception (Bodenhausen & Hugenberg 2009). In the fashion of a 
“spotlight” or a “zooming lens,” attention puts into focus only a limited number of stimuli at 
one time. A small number of stimuli from the environment receive attention, are selected for 
further scrutiny, and reach the threshold of awareness, while many others receive little atten-
tion—attention is a scarce resource. The question of which stimuli will be ignored and which 
will be attended to is one of the central problems of the cognitive system, and it is generally 
solved in terms of selective attention. This necessitates that information must be initially and 
preattentively processed to some extent. Preattentive scans of the environment are necessarily 
fast, work on a low level of stimulus features, and directly access the sensory system. These 
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“natural assessments” (Kahneman & Frederick 2002) of the cognitive system include recon-
naissance of physical properties such as size, distance, loudness, and speed, and of more ab-
stract properties, such as similarity, surprise, or affective valence. The capturing of attention 
can occur in an “active” or a “passive” fashion. It is passive (or “bottom-up”) when attention 
is allocated automatically as a reaction to stimuli in the environment, for example because 
they appear quickly, surprisingly, and without warning, when they are inconsistent with stored 
schematic knowledge, or when they are evaluated as a threat. Likewise, unknown, novel and 
atypical experiences automatically attract our attention. A term that is often used to describe 
the fact that an event or stimulus receives selective attention is salience (Higgins 1996). As 
Higgins points out, salience “refers to something that does not occur until exposure to the 
stimulus, and that occurs without a prior set for a particular kind of stimulus, such as a belief 
about or search for a particular category” (ibid. 135). Salience is itself context-dependent: in a 
red world, grey is salient. On the other hand, attention can be captured actively (or “top-
down”) when the subjective state of the perceiver influences its allocation. For example, 
preexisting affective states (fear, anxiety, happiness etc.), goals, expectations, and other acti-
vated mental schemata can guide our attention, direct the activation of knowledge, and have a 
direct influence on how and where attention is focused (Bodenhausen & Hugenberg 2009).  
A term closely related to the concept of attention is consciousness. In this work, this work will 
refer to the subjective state of mental content (such as perception, thoughts, and feelings). 
More precisely, being conscious means that something is represented in individual subjective 
experience, and is potentially available for use in further processes. “From a meta-cognitive 
perspective, mental content can stand in one of three relations to consciousness. It can be gen-
uinely unconscious. It can be ‘experientially conscious’, that is, existing in the ongoing expe-
rience without being reflected on. It can be ‘meta-conscious’ and be explicitly represented as a 
content of one’s own consciousness” (Winkielman & Schooler 2009: 52). Thus, conscious-
ness differs subtly from attention, because not all content that exists in our ongoing experience 
need to be in the metaconscious focus of attention. Yet conscious mental content is accessible, 
that is, available to verbal report and higher-level processes, such as judgment, reasoning, and 
deliberate decision making. The distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness is 
often related to the preferential activation of the different processing routes. In essence, con-
sciousness enables higher-order processing of information (logical inference, reasoning, cal-
culus), whereas unconsciousness is associated with the fast and parsimonious “heuristic” 
mode (ibid.). This distinction seems to be justified insofar as operations of the elaborate route 
always involve operations on working memory, to which individuals have conscious access. 
Nevertheless, the simplification “conscious=rational, unconscious=automatic” is misleading, 
because automatic processes are also involved in supplying information to the working 
memory when the elaborate route is taken (Evans 2009). 
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Lastly, the term intuition generally describes the idea that judgments and decision making oc-
cur with little consciousness of the underlying processes (Strack & Deutsch 2009). The con-
cept of intuition is commonly connected to a dominance of affect and “gut-feelings” in sub-
jective experience (Kahneman & Frederick 2002), but also to simplifying processes such as 
categorization, stereotyping, automatic pattern recognition, and the use of rules of thumb 
(Glöckner & Witteman 2010). As Strack and Deutsch conclude, “although intuition is an idea 
that everybody appears to understand (at least intuitively), the meaning of intuition as a scien-
tific concept is less clear ... intuitive judgments can be described by both the simplifying pro-
cesses and their accompanying subjective experiences or feelings” (2009: 179f.). While psy-
chologists direct their attention to underlying processes, the everyday meaning of intuition 
points towards the accompanying phenomenal experience. All in all, there is agreement that a 
multiplicity of different autonomous processes are responsible for creating what we common-
ly experience as intuition, subsuming many implicit operations of the cognitive system, to 
which we have no conscious access. Only the outcome of such implicit processing “pops up” 
in our consciousness and may (or may not) enter the focus of attention. Thus, the term intui-
tive indicates that judgments and decisions directly reflect impressions generated by a selec-
tive activity of automatic cognitive processes outside of consciousness, rather than being 
based on a more systematic reasoning process (Kahneman 2003). 
Considering the proposed two processing modes and their underlying cognitive systems, re-
searchers have come up with a host of terminological labels (of “near epidemic proportions,” 
Evans 2008) to emphasize their difference. The following table summarizes the semantic di-
versity that authors have introduced in describing the distinct systems (table 1):   
Table 1: Terminology of the dual-process paradigm 
 Processing Modes Author 
 Heuristic Systematic Chaiken1980 
 Intuitive Extensional Tversky & Kahnemann 1983 
 Peripheral Central Petty & Cacioppo 1986 
 Automatic Controlled Bargh 1989 
 Categorization Individuation Fiske & Neuberg 1990 
 Theory-driven Data-driven Fazio 1990 
 Experiential Rational Epstein 1996 
 Automatic Rational Esser 1996 
 Associative Rule Based Sloman 1996 
 
System 1 System 2 
Smith & DeCoster 2000 
 Stanovich & West 2000 
 Impulsive Reflective Strack & Deutsch 2004 
Despite the terminological variety, there is considerable agreement on the characteristics that 
distinguish the two processing modes (Kahnemann 2003). Authors agree that processing via 
the heuristic, intuitive, and associative automatic mode and its underlying cognitive system 
takes almost no effort, and is usually marked by the absence of consciousness; that is, its op-
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eration and activity do not come into the focus of attention; they are neither intentional nor 
under the deliberate control of the actor. Interpretation, the subjective definition of the situa-
tion, and choice rely on simple heuristics and rules of thumb, guided by situational cues and 
the routine application of learned schemata, scripts, and routines. As Smith and DeCoster 
(2000) argue, the automatic mode draws directly from the human slow-learning memory sys-
tem, which stores information gradually and incrementally, so that general expectancies, 
based on average, typical properties of the environment, can emerge. That is, the knowledge 
stored in the slow-learning memory is highly associative, “schematic,” and concerned with 
regularities. As such, automatic processing “operates essentially as a pattern-completion 
mechanism” (ibid. 110), based on the retrieval, association, and categorization of similarities 
between stored knowledge and salient cues from the environment. Pattern completion via the 
slow, associative memory-system can also recall affective responses and evaluations associat-
ed with an object, and thus automatically activate attitudes. 
In short, the automatic mode is “fast, effortless, associative, implicit, slow-learning and emo-
tional” (Kahnemann 2003: 698). Answers provided by the automatic route and the associative 
cognitive system simply “pop” into the head, and may not seem to have any justification other 
than intuition—they become part of the stimulus information, rather than being seen as part of 
the perceiver’s own evaluation or interpretation (Smith & DeCoster 2000). Therefore, the au-
tomatic activation of schematic knowledge structures has a great potential to affect judgment 
and decision making. Empirically, accordant effects have been related to, for example, the au-
tomatic activation and application of attitudes (Fazio 1990a), stereotypes (Fiske & Neuberg 
1990), probability judgments (Kahneman & Frederick 2002), the execution of routines and 
rules of thumb as standard solutions to reasoning problems (Sloman 1996), thinking and rea-
soning (Epstein 1991), and the evaluation of persuasive messages (Chaiken 1980).  
More recently, researchers have proposed that the automatic mode comprises in reality a set of 
interrelated autonomous and highly specialized subsystems (Tooby & Cosmides 1992, Sta-
novich 2004, Evans 2008). For example, the social heuristics introduced above (FOF framing 
and SEH) can be considered part of the autonomous operation of the fast, automatic cognitive 
system. Generally, it includes “domain-general processes of unconscious learning and condi-
tioning, automatic processes of action regulation via emotions; and rules, discriminators, and 
decision-making principles practiced to automaticity” (Glöckner & Witteman 2010: 6). The 
automatic cognitive system operates on neuronal structures which are evolutionarily older 
than those associated with its rational counterpart, and it is often regarded as providing a di-
rect perception-behavior link (Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001). 
On the other hand, the systematic, extensional, controlled, rational mode and its underlying 
(and evolutionarily younger) cognitive system is marked by consciousness and selective atten-
tion to mental content and situational stimuli; it is not based on the intuitive use of heuristics 
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and routines, but rests on an explicit, elaborate, and controlled reasoning process, which is 
“constrained by the amount of attentional resources available at the moment” (Bargh 1989: 4). 
Furthermore, it involves the search, retrieval, and use of task-relevant information, accompa-
nied by the application of abstract analytical rules. Processing in the rational mode can be de-
scribed as a conscious, controlled application of “domain-general” rules, abstract thinking and 
reasoning. In short “it allows us to sustain the powerful context-free mechanisms of logical 
thought, inference, abstraction, planning, decision making, and cognitive control” (Stanovich 
2004: 47). However, it would be wrong to simply equate the rational route with logic: the 
concept of “systematic” processing is much broader, as it also includes, for example, the abil-
ity to engage in hypothetical thought and mental simulations, and it delivers an inhibitory 
function in that it monitors and suppresses influences from the automatic route (Evans 2008).  
As Smith and DeCoster (2000) point out, processing in the rational mode uses both the slow 
and the fast memory system. In contrast to the slow memory system, the fast memory system 
is responsible for rapidly constructing new representations “on the spot,” binding together in-
formation about novel aspects of experience in the particular context. It therefore allows reac-
tion to new information and new situations. The short-term memory works as a “global work-
space” into which both the automatic and the rational cognitive systems can “broadcast” their 
output, to enable a conscious reasoning process (ibid.), but this occurs at the cost of a relative-
ly slow and serial operation. Moreover, humans can intentionally access and process previous-
ly stored knowledge to modify and refine judgments and decisions, for example when careful-
ly evaluating a new persuasive argument, or when using individuating information to form a 
specific expectation of trustworthiness during an interaction. Taken together, the rational route 
is “slow, serial, effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled” 
(Kahnemann 2003: 698). A primary function of the underlying cognitive system is “to moni-
tor the quality of mental operations and overt behavior” (ibid. 699), which implies that “doubt 
is a phenomenon of System 2” (ibid. 702), i.e. it is intrinsically tied to activation of the ration-
al mode. 
Apart from postulating those two different modes of information-processing, dual-process 
theories are also concerned with the interplay of the automatic and rational systems. Although 
there is still considerable debate (see Smith & DeCoster 2000, Evans 2008, Evans & Frankish 
2009), some important insights have emerged. Importantly, “highly accessible impressions 
produced by System 1 control judgments and preferences, unless modified or overridden by 
the deliberate operations of System 2” (Kahnemann 2003: 716, emphasis added; see also 
Haidt 2001, Stanovich 2004, Strack & Deutsch 2004 and Thompson 2009). In other words, 
the automatic mode and its cognitive architecture are active “by default,” while the systemat-
ic, rational cognitive system is activated in addition to this only when it is required to inter-
vene in, correct, or support the operations of the intuitive system.  
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As pointed out before, the capturing of attention and the activation of the rational cognitive 
system can happen in either a passive or an active fashion, and this is highly context-
dependent. Evolutionary adaptive heuristics, such as friend-or-foe detection, automatic facial 
recognition, generic monitoring of the audio-visual field for unexpected stimuli, the detection 
of pattern mismatches between stimuli and stored knowledge, and the use of internal signals 
such as (negative) emotions can all trigger the intervention of the rational system. Theoretical 
support for such a “default-interventionist” (Evans 2008) conception of dual processing comes 
from an evolutionary perspective: assuming that an elaborate reasoning process is time con-
suming and energy intensive, it is highly adaptive for an organism to fall back on “fast and 
frugal” procedures whenever they deliver an appropriate solution to a problem, allowing at the 
same time scarce cognitive resources to be saved (Gigerenzer & Goldstein 1996, Gigerenzer 
& Selten 2001, Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011).  
A number of dual-process models explicitly relate information-processing modes to overt be-
havior and action (Bargh & Barndollar 1996, Bargh et al. 1996, Dijksterhuis & Bargh 2001, 
Strack & Deutsch 2004), assuming that both direct and indirect links between perception and 
behavior exist. For example, Strack and Deutsch point out that “in the reflective [rational] sys-
tem, behavior is guided by the assessment of a future state in terms of its value and the proba-
bility of attaining it through this behavior. In the impulsive [automatic] system, a behavior is 
elicited through the spread of activation to behavioral schemata” (2004: 229).2 Thus, in the 
automatic mode, perception is directly connected to behavior, building on the spreading acti-
vation of stored knowledge structures and the resulting activation levels. At the same time, the 
engagement of the rational mode exercises an inhibitory function on impulsive responses, and 
allows for a choice which approximates a rational decision-making process. According to 
Fazio, “the critical distinction between the two models centers on the extent to which the be-
havioral decision involves effortful reasoning as opposed to spontaneous flowing from indi-
viduals’ definition of the event that is occurring” (Fazio 1990a: 91).  
Therefore, when the associative system delivers a sufficiently useful solution to a task (i.e. of 
interpretation or choice), and the fit between stored knowledge and perceptual input is high, it 
is not necessary to override or intervene with more effortful cognitive processes. Taken to-
gether, dual-process models demonstrate the notion of human bounded rationality as adaptive, 
highly flexible, and responsive to situational constraints. Note the striking similarity between 
the default-interventionist interpretation of dual-processing and sociologists’ theories of eve-
ryday routine based on taken-for-grantedness (i.e. Schütz & Luckmann 1973). As pointed out 
                                                 
2 They define a “behavioral schema” as an associative cluster that “binds together frequently co-occurring motor representa-
tions with their conditions and their consequences ... behavioral schemata and their links to other contents in the impulsive 
system can be understood as habits” (Strack & Deutch 2004: 229). Importantly, behavioral schemata can be easily activat-
ed by automatic processes, and perceptual input can automatically activate elements in the associative memory system 
linked to behavioral schemata. 
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previously, situations appear problematic and interrupt the routine only to the extent that the 
available knowledge is not sufficient to define them, that is, when “coincidence between the 
actual theme and the potentially relevant elements of knowledge does not occur sufficiently 
for the mastery of the situation in question” (Schütz & Luckmann 1973: 236)—in the termi-
nology of the dual-process framework, this amounts to saying that in problematic situations, 
the automatic pattern-matching process of the associative cognitive system fails. However 
“with routine coincidence, ‘interpretation’ is automatic. No explicitly judging explication oc-
curs in which, on the one hand, the situation and, on the other hand, the relevant elements of 
knowledge come separately into the grasp of the consciousness to be compared to one anoth-
er” (ibid. 198).  
It is natural to transfer the framework of dual-processing to the problem of interpersonal trust. 
Suspension and the “leap of faith,” the question of conditional versus unconditional trusting 
strategies, the emergence of institutional, rule-based forms of trust, contrasted with the idea of 
a trust as a rational choice—from a dual-processing perspective, many of these aspects can 
essentially be answered in terms of the preferential activation of distinct cognitive systems, 
their information-processing state, and the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and 
the choice of a trusting act. The decisive question is whether the default mode of associative 
pattern recognition, paired with a routine application of trust-related knowledge, occurs 
smoothly and without interruption, or whether internal or external events trigger an activation 
of the elaborate rational mode. The dual-process paradigm provides a promising avenue for a 
broad conceptualization of interpersonal trust: it emphasizes that human rationality is bounded 
and variable, and more concretely specifies how such bounded rationality is to be understood. 
Importantly, it suggests that actors can use either an automatic or a rational mode of infor-
mation processing in a trust problem, and provides a tool which allows trust researchers to 
incorporate the broad phenomenological foundations of trust. Unconscious, associative rou-
tines in judgment and decision making can prevail in situations that do not call for activation 
or intervention of the rational system. In such cases, actors may not be conscious at all of the 
trust problem, which explains the notion of “blind” trust, paired with an absence of doubt and 
of consciousness of the vulnerabilities involved. On the other hand, a trust problem may also 
be approached in terms of a thoughtful reasoning process and approximate a maximizing deci-
sion, linked to an activation of the rational mode and the underlying cognitive system.  
4.2.2. Context Dependence 
The idea of a contingent, flexible use of different processing strategies in a trust problem 
points to the significance of the context and the surrounding social environment for our under-
standing of interpersonal trust. As we have seen, the context of a trust relation defines the rel-
evance of trust-related knowledge; it is central to interpretation, expectation formation, and 
the choice of a trusting act. A dual-processing perspective suggests that the context of the trust 
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relation also influences the preferential activation of the automatic or rational mode of infor-
mation processing and the underlying cognitive systems. Both effects must be considered 
simultaneously when thinking about interpersonal trust. 
The context-dependence of perception, judgment, and choice has been known in the social 
sciences for a long time, and it is commonly referred to as “framing” (Tversky & Kahneman 
1981, 1986, for reviews see Kuhberger 1998, and Levin et al. 1998). The term was initially 
used in a strict sense to denote inconsistencies in human decision making—“framing effects” 
circumscribe the empirical observation that the wording of experimental instructions, the for-
mulation of a decision problem (that is, its “framing”) and other apparently superficial chang-
es in presentation all exert systematic effects on judgment and choice. According to Tversky 
and Kahneman, the reason for these effects is a change in the way in which the decision-
maker interprets the situation.
3
 Framing effects were initially regarded as a shortcoming of the 
human mind; the cognitive heuristics proposed in the attempt to explain them were regarded 
as a “bias” to rationality.4 But as our understanding of human cognition has advanced, re-
searchers have reinterpreted the meaning of “framing effects,” no longer regarding them as 
flaws, but instead conceiving of them as adaptive and “ecologically rational” (Allison & 
Messick 1990, Gigerenzer 2000). In a broad sense, a framing effect refers “to an internal 
event that can be induced not only by semantic manipulations but may result also from other 
contextual features of a situation and from individual factors” (Kuhberger 1998: 24). It is, in 
short, a synonym for the context-dependence of human cognition and the definition of the sit-
uation. Framing effects demonstrate that human actors flexibly use the signals available in the 
environment during the process of defining the situation and their subsequent choice of action.  
By influencing the subjective definition of the situation, the context of a decision problem in-
fluences perception of others, as it “sets the frame” in which a person’s behavior is evaluated 
and judged (Kay et al. 2008). For example, when the context indicates the relevance of a so-
cial norm, actors commonly define the situation accordingly, so that, on the level of overt be-
havior, norm compliance becomes more likely and observed behavior of others will be evalu-
ated relative to the norm (Bicchieri 2002, 2006). Framing effects have been consistently 
(re)produced in many judgmental and choice tasks, including prisoner’s dilemma situations 
(Deutsch 1973, Liberman et al. 2004), public good games (Sonnemans et al. 1998, Cookson 
                                                 
3 “We use the term ‘decision frame’ to refer to the decision-maker’s conception of acts, outcomes and contingencies associat-
ed with a particular choice. The frame that a decision maker adopts is controlled partly by the formulation of the problem 
and partly by norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision maker” (Tversky & Kahnemann 1981: 453, em-
phasis added). 
4 In their article, Kahnemann and Tversky (1981) introduce three specific cognitive heuristics in an attempt to explain the 
susceptibility of humans to framing effects in judgment and decision making under risk: the availability heuristic (people 
assess the probability of an event by the degree to which instances of it are “readily available” in memory), the representa-
tiveness heuristic (the likelihood of an event is assessed by its similarity to stereotypes of similar occurrences) and the an-
choring heuristic (judgment is based on some initial value, or “anchor,” from previous experience or social comparison 
and adjustments from that value from experience).  
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2000), and trust games (Burnham et al. 2000). All in all, researchers have convincingly 
demonstrated that human decision making is highly context-sensitive, and that humans readily 
respond to subtle contextual cues such as “the name of the game” (Kay & Ross 2003, Liber-
man et al. 2004), the presence or absence of material objects associated with particular social 
environments (Kay et al. 2004), the formulation of decision problems in terms of gain and loss 
frames (Tversky & Kahneman 1981, 1986, Andreoni 1995, Keren 2007), and many more.  
A second psychological research paradigm that has extensively studied the prevalence of the 
automatic effects of situational cues to judgment, choice, and performance is the so called 
“priming” paradigm (see Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Wheeler & Petty 2001). Generally, prim-
ing research has been concerned with the unconscious activation and automatic use of stored 
knowledge structures, such as stereotypes, heuristics, scripts, schemata, and social norms, by 
presenting (“priming”) them in unrelated tasks, often even subliminally. As Higgins (1996) 
points out, priming essentially operates as a manipulation of construct accessibility: the situa-
tional stimuli presented automatically trigger a spreading activation of the stored cognitive 
constructs. The constructs, once primed, are readily used by humans in consecutive tasks, and 
influence judgment and decision making in construct-consistent ways. In sum, “it is now ac-
cepted as common knowledge that exposure to specific trait constructs, actual behaviors, or 
social group members (whose stereotypes contain trait and behavioral constructs) can result in 
the nonconscious expression of the activated behaviors” (Wheeler & Petty 2001: 212). For 
example, if a stereotype about elderly people is activated, then subjects walk more slowly; 
likewise, exposing subjects to words related to rudeness versus politeness has assimilative 
consequences on behavior in subsequent discussions (Bargh et al. 1996). Importantly, envi-
ronmental cues can also automatically activate motivational states and behavioral goals 
(Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Förster et al. 2007, Förster & Denzler 2009). When subjects are 
made aware of the primes, their influence disappears, which demonstrates the controlled in-
tervention of the rational system in otherwise automatic processes (Higgins 1996). Priming 
research has demonstrated the automaticity of judgments and behavior in domains such as so-
cial perception (Baldwin et al. 1990, Andersen et al. 1996), stereotyping (Devine 1989), emo-
tional appraisal (Lazarus 1991a), persuasion (Chaiken et al. 1989), and attitudes and judgment 
(Greenwald & Banaji 1995). The results of framing and priming research jointly point to the 
central role of the context in the activation and use of stored knowledge. Priming theory sug-
gests that the environment and situational cues may set in motion automatic processes that 
influence the definition of the situation and behavior, without any conscious awareness on the 
part of the decision-maker. 
To comprehend the importance of these findings for our understanding of interpersonal trust, 
let us reinspect the different theoretical approaches to trust discussed in the last chapter for 
their standpoint on context-dependence. For example, the proposition of basic trust and its 
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merging into a generalized and stable disposition to trust as a personality trait were qualified 
by the finding that their influence varies with “situational strength”—their influence will be 
high only when strong cues indicating trustworthiness are absent (Gill et al. 2005). Develop-
mental models of trust naturally imply that trustor and trustee can identify and make use of 
cues that indicate the relevant trust-related knowledge, for example to guide the contingent 
use and activation of relational schemata. As pointed out by Gambetta (1988a), the threshold 
for favorable expectations of trustworthiness varies both in accordance with subjective and 
objective (contextual) circumstances, such as stake size. With respect to perceived characteris-
tics of the trustee, Mayer et al. point out that “the trustor’s perception and interpretation of the 
context of the relationship will affect both the need for trust and the evaluation of trustworthi-
ness” (1995: 727, emphasis added), and they relate contextual factors to attributed characteris-
tics of benevolence, ability, and integrity. Context-dependence is implicit in most sociological 
approaches emphasizing the importance of social embeddedness and the impact of social 
norms and culture on the build-up of trust. In these accounts, the effectiveness of institutions 
and structural assurance not only rests on system trust, but crucially depends on their situa-
tional salience and appropriateness. Likewise, context is most relevant in accounts focusing 
on situational normality, taken-for-grantedness and corresponding routine in the choice of a 
trusting act.  
Rational choice models of trust (take, for example, Coleman’s model) assume that generalized 
expectations of trustworthiness p are replaced by specific expectations p
+
 in cases where indi-
viduating information is accessible. Without further elaboration, these accounts maintain that 
expectation formation is context-dependent, in that varying cognitive knowledge structures 
are activated and become situationally relevant. Moreover, extensions to the standard trust 
game, such as psychological games and models of social preferences, are developed on the 
basis of an exogenously given set of preferences and “initial beliefs.” Yet as Dufwenberg et 
al. (2011) empirically demonstrate, initial beliefs are highly context-dependent—one primary 
effect of the context can be found in a shift in first and second-order beliefs. In other words: a 
change in the context influences those variables which are exogenous to the economic models. 
The authors conclude that, “framing effects can be understood as a two-part process where (i) 
frames move beliefs, and (ii) beliefs shape motivation and choice” (ibid. 14).5 Contextual 
framing effects have been interpreted in the economic framework as determining the refer-
ence points involved in evaluating other players’ intentions and their fairness or equity con-
cerns. But, as previously indicated, empirical evidence suggests that preferences and utility 
functions themselves may depend on context, and may change in response to the environment 
                                                 
5 Thus, guilt-aversion and reciprocity models may be an adequate formal representation of a given set of initial beliefs, yet 
they cannot account for the more important aspect that looms over them: the origin of “initial beliefs.” In economic mod-
els, the context-dependence of trust is accounted for by a change in initial beliefs, which have a decisive impact on the 
strategies played. 
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and the stimulus context (Mellers et al. 1998: 457, Fehr & Hoff 2011). All in all, across disci-
pline borders, context-dependence is an ever-present (although sometimes only implicit) ele-
ment of trust theorizing. 
For the whole enterprise of trust research, Ostrom declares that “the most immediate research 
questions that need to be addressed using second-generation models of human behavior relate 
to the effects of structural variables” (2003: 63), notably the impact of the physical, cultural, 
and institutional environment conveyed to the trustor in the form of situational cues. Yet alt-
hough the importance of the context for interpersonal trust has been regularly recognized by 
trust researchers, historically and “across intellectual traditions, scholars have given limited 
attention to the role of the [social] context” (Lewicki et al. 1998: 441). In short, while its im-
portance is never denied, the elaboration of context-sensitive models has remained elusive. 
Unsurprisingly, trust researchers have more recently started to emphasize the role of “situated 
cognition” in our understanding of interpersonal trust (e.g. Kramer 2006, Nooteboom 2007). 
Kramer introduces the “intuitive social auditor” model, according to which “it is assumed that 
individuals possess various kinds of cognitive and behavioral rules to use when (1) trying to 
make sense of a given trust dilemma situation and (2) decide how to react on the basis of the 
interpretation they form of the situation” (ibid. 71). In this process, the trustor uses “orienting 
rules” to help decode and categorize a trust problem prior to action, “interpretation rules” to 
interpret the response of the trustee, and “action rules” representing “beliefs about what sort of 
conduct is prudent and should be employed in a trust dilemma situation” (ibid.). These rules 
include and reflect the various cognitive knowledge structures that people use to navigate 
through trust problems: “People’s mental models include their social representations, which 
encompass everything they know about other people, including all of their trust-related beliefs 
and expectations, their self-representations ... and their situational taxonomies (e.g. their be-
liefs about the various kinds of social situations they are likely to encounter in their social 
lives)” (ibid. 82, emphasis in original). Kramer argues in favor of bounded-rationality and 
heuristic-processing approach, arguing that the application of orienting and interpretative rules 
is automatic and relatively mindless, if features of the situation are familiar and the context 
seems routine. Unfortunately, he does not further develop these propositions into a tractable 
theoretical model. However, his assertions are highly reasonable from the dual-processing 
standpoint. As previously argued, trust is often envisioned as being “blind” and unreflective, 
characterized by an absence of doubt. Given that doubt is a feature of the rational system (see 
Kahneman 2003, Evans 2008), the idea of unconditional, “shallow” trust points to the use of 
an intuitive, automatic mode of information processing in trust problems and during the 
choice of a trusting act.  
A related point has been made by Huang and Murnighan, who propose that the beginnings of 
trust development “may occur beneath our conscious radar, via automatic, non-conscious 
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cognitive processes” (2010: 63). They experimentally show that subliminally priming rela-
tional schemata of relatives and close friends influences trusting behavior towards strangers. 
Their research addresses identification-based unconditional trust, and it demonstrates that the 
priming and subsequent automatic application of trust-related constructs can transfer even to 
unfamiliar contexts. A similar argument can be made with respect to the activation of other 
trust-related schematic knowledge structures, such as social norms, roles, and routines. They 
are often applied in a relatively automatic fashion, and point towards an automatic mode of 
information processing in trust problems. This perspective would also fit to the distinction be-
tween “affective-based” and “cognition-based” types of trust. As we have seen, the automatic 
mode is often characterized as impulsive, intuitive, and emotional. For example, affective 
states associated with interpretive schemes are likely to become activated along with the par-
ticular mental model, thereby “rounding up” the trustor’s subjective experience. At the same 
time, they reassure the trustor of a continued reliance on the automatic mode in the case of 
positively valenced affective states. On the other hand, the arousal of negatively valenced af-
fective states inhibits a direct cognition-behavior link, and triggers rational-system interven-
tion and doubt. Such a state of the cognitive system is presumably connected to the emergence 
of types of conditional trust or distrust.  
All in all, from a dual-processing perspective, situational cues that are associated with stored 
trust-related knowledge can be assumed to be highly decisive in determining the mode of in-
formation processing in a trust problem, the type of activated trust-related knowledge, and, as 
a result, the type of trust we can expect. Context fulfills a double function in this conceptual-
ization of trust. First, it determines the relevance of trust-related knowledge and influences the 
definition of the situation. In this respect, the impact of the social environment on the emer-
gence of interpersonal trust is often emphasized (Deutsch 1973, Mayer et al. 1995, McAllister 
1995, McKnight et al. 1998, Kramer 2006, Keren 2007). Trust researchers assume that trus-
tors can readily extract the relevant situational features which allow for the appropriate defini-
tion of the situation, which is the first step in the trust process—as Möllering notes, “the state 
of expectation needs to be understood as the ‘output’ of the trust-process ... it may become 
function ‘input’ for actions (risk-taking, cooperating) and associations (relationships, social 
capital) which in themselves, however, should not be confounded with trust...the process of 
trust ends with a state of expectation and begins with interpretation” (2001: 415).  
But secondly, and even more importantly, the context influences the degree of rationality in-
volved in solving a trust problem. The human cognitive system directly builds on perceptual 
input in regulating the mode of information processing. Obviously, when taking into account 
human cognitive architecture, the process of trust may begin even before a conscious and de-
liberate interpretation of the situation has been made, and without the inclusion of effortful 
reasoning or decision-making processes. This is the case when the automatic mode of infor-
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mation processing is furnished by salient and appropriate situational cues. If the routine of 
everyday behavior can be maintained by successful pattern recognition and by the “matching” 
of situational stimuli with preexisting stored interpretive schemes, then the allocation of atten-
tion, the conscious awareness of trust problems, and doubtful reasoning processes about the 
choice of a trusting act may be fully absent. 
4.2.3. Heuristics and Mental Shortcuts 
The preceding sections have highlighted various routes by which humans can take shortcuts to 
judgment and decision making in a trust problem. Essentially, these shortcuts demonstrate that 
variable levels of rationality can be involved in the choice of a trusting act. Conceptually, they 
are often linked to the activation of the automatic route to information processing; in effect, 
stored associative knowledge structures and heuristics become a basis for unconditional trust. 
Some of these heuristics may be “hard-wired” (FOF, SEH); others may be learned over time 
(for example, generalizations such as frames, scripts, or stereotypes). Their unifying charac-
teristic is that they relieve individuals of the need to approach the trust problem in terms of an 
effortful, systematic, and maximizing decision, and they can be applied to solve a trust prob-
lem automatically and without much conscious effort.  
However, when we look closer, we inevitably encounter a confusing variety of such possible 
shortcut routes to trust—in fact, there is not only one way of solving a trust problem automati-
cally and heuristically. As stated at the outset of this chapter, theoretical accounts which spec-
ify only one heuristic mechanism are necessarily incomplete. The important lesson that can be 
taken from adopting a dual-processing perspective in trust research is that adaptive rationality 
itself must be regarded as a basic dimension of the trust concept. We cannot think trust with-
out thinking adaptive rationality. And when doing so, we have to concede that the “automatic” 
part of decision making is as multifaceted as is its rational counterpart, where the decision 
problem faced by a maximizing decision maker may take on a variety of specifications (see 
chapter 3.3).  
In fact, the term “heuristic” has been used in the literature in various not necessarily consistent 
ways, and to date, there has been an abundant number of proposed mechanisms and processes 
which are regularly subsumed under the label “heuristic” (see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier 2011 
for a comprehensive review). The picture is complicated by the fact that there are competing 
ideas of how heuristics should be defined, and how they relate to the processing modes. For 
example, Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier define a heuristic as “a strategy that ignores part of the 
information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or accurately than 
more complex methods” (2011: 454, emphasis added). This view references the paradigm of 
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adaptive decision making introduced by Payne et al. (1993), who collected and worked out a 
number of heuristic decision-making strategies.
6
 Notably, this definition is quite narrow be-
cause the concept of a heuristic refers exclusively to simplifying choice rules, which are ap-
plied in a relatively controlled fashion in choice problems. We will have to add the important 
point that heuristics can also be applied with the goal of arriving at an interpretation and a 
subjective definition of the situation more quickly, frugally, or accurately than with more 
complex methods. For our purposes, then, the term “heuristic” cannot be limited to simplify-
ing choice rules.  
A much broader definition is proposed by Chaiken et al. (1989), who define heuristics as 
“learned knowledge structures that may be used either self-consciously or non-self-
consciously by social perceivers” (ibid. 213). These knowledge structures include declarative 
and procedural knowledge, such as frames and scripts, all of which may be used to simplify a 
task such as interpretation, judgment, or decision making.
7
 In this regard, choice rules are 
merely a special case. Generally speaking, many forms of trust-related knowledge, such as 
relational schemata, generalized expectations, roles and norms, schematic knowledge of situa-
tions (frames, or “situational taxonomies,” in Kramer’s words) and behavioral scripts can be 
used as heuristics to simplify a trust problem. Importantly, “when processing heuristically, 
people focus on that subset of available information that enables them to use simple inferen-
tial rules, schemata, or cognitive heuristics to formulate their judgments” (ibid. 213). In other 
words, heuristic processing is largely based on the heuristic cues available in the environment; 
interpretation, judgment, and choice are accomplished by using available knowledge, instead 
of by relying on a more detailed analysis of information.  
One complicating factor is that heuristics can be used in both an automatic and a rational fash-
ion (Chen & Chaiken 1999, Kahneman & Frederick 2002). On one hand, individuals need not 
necessarily be aware of their use of heuristics —only the heuristic cue that leads to the activa-
tion of the heuristic, and the result of its application are part of conscious experience. For ex-
ample, merely seeing a doctor in professional clothing (a cue) may be sufficient to trigger the 
use of a judgmental heuristic, such as “doctors are competent and trustworthy” (rule), which 
influences judgments of trustworthiness (result). That is, “although heuristic processing en-
tails, minimally, an awareness of a heuristic cue in the environment, this does not imply that 
                                                 
6 For example, the lexicographic heuristic (select an alternative which is best in terms of the most important attribute, i.e. 
“take the best”), the equal weights heuristic (ignore probabilistic information), the satisficing heuristic (consider one alter-
native at a time in their natural order, and select an alternative if its attributes reach an “aspiration level”), or the elimina-
tion by aspects heuristic (determine the most important attribute, eliminate all alternatives that do not reach a threshold, 
and continue with the next attribute until one alternative is left). 
7 Broadly speaking, declarative knowledge is stored knowledge of facts and events. It is often symbolically coded, associa-
tive, and it can be consciously accessed. On the other hand, procedural knowledge is tacit knowledge of “how to do 
things”. It includes the skills we have learned, and it cannot be expressed directly. Procedural knowledge also includes 
habits and routines of everyday behavior.  
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perceivers are necessarily aware of the activation of a corresponding heuristic that occurs as a 
result of encountering this information, or of their application of this rule to their current 
judgmental task” (Chen & Chaiken 1999: 86). On the other hand, heuristics can also be used 
in a controlled fashion; one prominent example is the choice rules referred to above, which 
can be applied in a rational or an automatic fashion. Although the idea of using heuristics is 
often linked to the automatic mode of information processing and the activation of the under-
lying fast, associative, and “intuitive” cognitive system (e.g. Fazio 1990, Strack & Deutsch 
2004), heuristics can also be applied in a controlled reasoning process. Yet as Chen and 
Chaiken (1999) argue, the larger share of our day-to-day heuristic processing is in fact auto-
matic and unconscious.  
Following the above definition, heuristics are elements of learned knowledge. However, sub-
jective experiences may simultaneously serve as heuristic cues, and also as judgmental heuris-
tics. They present an exceptional case of mental shortcuts which do not fall directly into the 
scope of the definitions given above, although they have been regularly described as heuris-
tics.
8
 According to Schwarz and Clore (1996), the affective, cognitive, and bodily states of an 
individual form an important part of his subjective experience, and serve as signals that influ-
ence the way in which information is processed. We have already looked at the “affective” 
aspect of this proposition in chapter 2.2.4. Affective experiences, such as mood and emotions, 
can have a direct influence on the processing mode; negatively valenced affective signals 
which indicate a problem foster vigilance and the adoption of detail-oriented elaborate pro-
cessing, whereas benign signals promote an automatic processing mode (Schwarz 1990, Bless 
& Fiedler 2006). But at the same time, affective feelings can serve as a heuristic in their own 
right ("affect heuristic", Slovic et al. 2002). Individuals use affective feelings as a source of 
summary information, qualitatively different from stored knowledge, in order to judge a tar-
get. In the context of interpersonal trust, this was termed the “feeling of rightness” involved in 
a trusting act, indicating that trustors rely on their currently perceived affective state as sum-
mary information to judge the trustworthiness of a trustee. By asking themselves “How do I 
feel about it?” emotions are often used as experiential heuristic information to form a variety 
of judgments (Forgas 2002). As Chen and Chaiken (1999) argue, subjective experiences are 
particularly prone to being used automatically, or “intuitively.” 
This also holds for “cognitive” experiences such as ease of retrieval, processing fluency, the 
feeling of knowing, and familiarity (see Bless et al. 2009, Greifeneder et al. 2011). Cognitive 
experiences indicate whether or not the cognitive apparatus is working smoothly—the internal 
                                                 
8  As Strack and Deutsch point out, intuitive judgments “use cues that are less complex, which can be found either in the en-
vironment or as an internal response to the environment, such as affective and non-affective feelings, conceptual activa-
tion, and behavioral responses” (2009: 190). Thus, a dual-system perspective suggests that various and “potentially very 
different processes generate the simplifying cues that may feed into judgments” (ibid.), although all of them can contribute 
to the more general experience of “intuition.” 
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functioning of the mind and the ease or difficulty with which processing occurs may also be-
come a subjective experience. As with affective experiences, cognitive experiences can have a 
pronounced impact on individual information processing. Disruptive experiences which signal 
the presence of problems in processing (low fluency, difficult retrieval, unfamiliarity) are like-
ly to trigger a systematic mode of information processing. Similar to affective feelings, cogni-
tive feelings are used as heuristic summary information that influences the evaluation and 
judgment of targets. For example, targets are evaluated more positively whenever their stimuli 
can be processed fluently (Reber & Schwarz 1999, Reber et al. 2004), and individuals often 
make use of the ease with which information comes to mind as a substitute for content infor-
mation in forming a judgment (Tversky & Kahneman 1973, Schwarz et al. 1991).  
Cognitive experiences can be fruitfully connected to the theoretical concepts prevalent in the 
trust literature. For example, fluency and ease of retrieval experiences directly impact our 
sense of situational normality, and therefore relate to the build-up of trust. In this line, Greif-
eneder et al. (2010) empirically demonstrate that the experience of ease of retrieval influences 
the choice of a trusting act and the attributions of procedural fairness. When thinking about 
few (easy) or many (difficult) unfair aspects of a trust game, subjects tend to rely on ease of 
retrieval, in that a recall of few negative aspects (high fluency and ease of retrieval) results in 
less behavioral trust and in lower ratings of procedural fairness, whereas a recall of many neg-
ative aspects (low fluency and ease of retrieval) results in more trust and in higher ratings of 
fairness. Researchers have also accumulated evidence that processing fluency elicits positive 
affect. In other words, error-free processing “feels good” because it indicates a positive state 
of affairs within the cognitive system and the outer world (Winkielman et al. 2003). Thus, the 
heuristic use of cognitive feelings may be relevant to the build-up of interpersonal trust and, 
supposedly, it is especially important in initial trust formation and one-shot situations, where 
more specific sources of trust-related knowledge are unavailable.  
The above sections suggest that a comprehensive definition of a heuristic would characterize 
it as “a learned knowledge structure or subjective experience which may be used either self-
consciously or non-self-consciously by social perceivers to make interpretation, judgment, 
and choice more quickly than with more complex methods.” Thus, when we use the term heu-
ristic, we indicate that a task, such as interpretation, has been simplified internally by cogni-
tive or experiential shortcuts. In this line, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) propose that attrib-
ute substitution—the reduction of complex tasks to simpler operations—is in fact the defining 
characteristic of heuristics: “judgment is said to be mediated by a heuristic when the individu-
al assesses a target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that ob-
ject—the heuristic attribute—which comes more readily to mind” (2002: 53).  
The relevance of heuristics to trust is clear: heuristics influence expectations of trustworthi-
ness and alter the subjective experience of trust; if paired with an automatic processing mode, 
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they may even prevent a conscious elaboration of the trust problem. This explains the notion 
of unconditional trust as portrayed by psychological and philosophical trust researchers. Un-
conditional trust is regularly connected to the application of learned knowledge structures 
(generalized expectations, schemata, scripts), and to the preferential impact of subjective ex-
periences (affect, familiarity). These two classes of heuristics, paired with the assumption of 
their automatic use, can quite generally account for those types of trust which are regularly 
denoted as unconditional (i.e. identification-based, affect-based, rule-based trust). Thus, “intu-
ition” during the choice of a trusting act can have a broad phenomenological foundation, rang-
ing from the swift application of relational schemata, rules, roles, or routines, to the “heuris-
tic” use of affective and cognitive experiences and the preattentive influence of “hard-wired” 
fast and frugal heuristics, such as SEH or FOF. In the case of unconditional trust, it is charac-
teristic that these heuristics are applied in the automatic mode. Otherwise, the results of the 
heuristic process are merely integrated into a controlled and systematic judgment; they may be 
called into question and revised. Such elaborate and controlled reasoning process is character-
istic of conditional trust.  
4.2.4. The Neuroscience of Trust 
In a very recent development, trust researchers have used neuroscience techniques such as 
brain imaging, brain stimulation, the study of brain lesions, psychophysical measurements, 
and pharmacological interventions to study the neurobiological processes involved in trust 
(Zak 2007, Fehr 2009, Rilling & Sanfey 2011). The neuroscience of trust has emerged as one 
of the most important offspring of the more general and rapidly advancing field of “neuroeco-
nomics” (Zak 2004, Camerer et al. 2005). Neuroeconomic research focuses on the physical 
substrate of the cognitive system—brain regions, neural circuits, neural activity, and so 
forth—to infer details about the black box of the brain and explore its functioning in individu-
al behavior in social decision making situations. In short, neuroeconomics seeks to ground 
economic behavior in the details of the brain’s functioning.9  
The two broadest findings that this research field has contributed confirm the core tenets of 
the dual-processing paradigm: (1) human behavior is, to a large extent, automatic and (2) be-
havior is strongly influenced by finely tuned affective systems which intervene and interact 
with the deliberative system (Camerer et al. 2005). Interacting with humans and making deci-
sions in a social context reliably activates areas associated with affect and emotions. What is 
more, there is ample evidence that social preferences have a “neural correlate.” Cooperation, 
reciprocation, and the altruistic punishment of others activate neural circuitry that overlaps 
                                                 
9 The following section presents a brief overview over the rapidly growing field of neuroeconomics without going into much 
detail. Excellent summaries and informative introductions to neuroscience, its terminology, and its methodology, can be 
found in Zak (2004), Camerer et al. (2005) and Rilling and Sanfey (2011).  
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closely with circuitry anticipating and representing other types of rewards (Fehr & Camerer 
2007). At the same time, the activation of circuitry associated with negative emotional states, 
such as fear or disgust, can be observed in response to inequity, nonreciprocity, and the viola-
tion of expectations, both real and hypothetical (Sanfey 2007). Interacting with a real human, 
in contrast to with a computer, genuinely activates a number of areas associated with the “the-
ory of mind” (Rilling et al. 2002). Furthermore, dealing with social uncertainty substantially 
differs from dealing with nonsocial risks—on a neural basis, social and nonsocial risks cannot 
be equated (Fehr 2009). Brain imaging studies have also substantiated the distinction between 
risk and ambiguity—which both activate different areas of the brain (McCabe et al. 2001)—
and have revealed a number of specific neural circuits involved in the implementation of and 
the compliance to social norms, as well as in dealing with potential conflicts among norms 
(Spitzer et al. 2007). Even more intriguingly, a number of studies have explored the modulat-
ing effect of hormones such as testosterone and serotonin on neural structures, showing that 
they can dampen or excite brain activity, thereby strongly influencing behavior (Rilling & 
Sanfey 2011). 
In these and many related studies, a number of regions of the brain which are regularly in-
volved in social decision making and social interaction have been identified. Generally speak-
ing, regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) are associated with control and inhibition of emo-
tional impulses stemming from components of the automatic system, such as the amygdala 
(fear, betrayal aversion, processing of potential threats), the anterior insula (aversive respons-
es to unreciprocated cooperation, norm violations, empathy), and the striatum (a mid-brain 
dopamine cell region which is speculated to provide the brain’s general reward system). The 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) is crucially involved in evaluating long-term bene-
fits of cooperative relationships and abstract rewards, and in regulating emotional reactions. 
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) exerts cognitive control for overriding selfish 
impulses, and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) is involved in overriding aversive 
reactions to unfair treatment (ibid.). These regions have been found to be frequently involved 
in social interaction and, more importantly, during interpretation and choice in trust problems. 
Neuroeconomic studies have unveiled a number of results that help to trace the emergence of 
trust back into the neural components of the automatic and rational system, and to the chemi-
cal and neural processes involved. To begin with, judgments of trustworthiness are directly 
related to automatic amygdala activation, with untrustworthy faces increasing activation lev-
els, even when the judgment is made implicit (Winston et al. 2002). Consequentially, patients 
with amygdala lesions consistently overestimate other people’s trustworthiness, suggesting 
that the role of the amygdala in processing potential threats and dangers extends to the domain 
of social interaction in trust problems (Adolphs et al. 1998). Another region that is crucially 
involved in the choice of a trusting act is the VMPFC. Lesions in this area result in less trust 
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in trust games (Krajbich et al. 2009). Since the VMPFC registers long-term benefits that could 
emerge from a successful trust relation, it potentially helps to surmount the immediate fear of 
betrayal associated with the decision to trust that stems from the amygdala (Sanfey & Rilling 
2011). Krueger et al. (2007) have further identified the paracingulate cortex (PCC) and septal 
area (SA) regions as being involved in the choice of a trusting act. The PCC is a neural struc-
ture involved in mentalizing and inferring the mental states, feelings, and beliefs of others, 
while the SA is intricately connected to social attachment behavior. Using functional imaging 
to explore the neural activity in a trust problem, Krueger et al. (2007) also show that different 
trusting strategies—conditional and unconditional—result in the preferential activation of dis-
tinct neuronal systems. While unconditional trust selectively activates the SA, conditional 
trust selectively activates the ventral tegmental area (VTA), an area linked to the evaluation 
of expected and realized rewards. Conditional and unconditional trusting strategies differ not 
only with respect to their behavioral outcomes, but also with respect to their decision times, 
which become increasingly shorter over time for unconditional trust. 
Furthermore, there seems to be a fundamental connection between neural activity in the SA 
and trust: the SA plays an important role in the release of the neuropeptide oxytocin (OT)—a 
key hormone involved in a number of complex social behaviors, such as maternal care, pair 
bonding, and social attachment. In a widely-received study, Kosfeld et al. (2005) exogenously 
manipulated OT levels and found that trust significantly increased in comparison to a control 
condition. At the same time, OT did not decrease risk-aversion in general, but its effects were 
limited to the social risks arising from interaction in the trust problem. In a follow-up study, 
Baumgartner et al. (2008) could replicate these results and, combining the design with neural 
imaging techniques, found that OT treatments reduce activity in the amygdala, mid-brain, and 
striatum areas, all of which are critical in signaling and modulating fear responses. They con-
cluded that OT reduces fearful responses to the social uncertainty involved in trust problems, 
enhancing the subject’s ability to overcome social uncertainty and choose a trusting act. Fur-
thermore, OT treatments, although effectively manipulating trusting behavior, influenced nei-
ther measures of mood, calmness, or wakefulness (ibid.) nor the subject’s expectations of 
trustworthiness (Kosfeld et al. 2005). In economic terms, this suggests that OT does not influ-
ence beliefs, but directly shapes social preferences, leaving more general risk and ambiguity 
aversion preferences unaffected (Fehr 2009).  
Taking things together, the neuroscience approach to trust enables researchers to focus on the 
effect of particular brain structures on interpretation and choice in a trust problem. Essentially, 
it attempts to pin down those neural correlates of the automatic and rational systems which are 
crucially involved in the choice of a trusting act. The studies presented here suggest that there 
is a strong connection between trusting behavior and neural processes. As Zak and Kugler 
boldly put it, “trust is chemical” (Zak & Kugler 2011: 143). Even when one’s developmental 
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history, prevailing social norms, and current events influence the trusting strategies a trustor 
adopts, they do so by modulating OT release, which, according to Zak and Kugler (2011), 
may potentially constitute the single causal pathway through which trust and trustworthiness 
can be explained. However, components of both the automatic and rational system are in-
volved in influencing the judgment of trustworthiness and the choice of a trusting act. There-
fore, on a more general theoretical level, it is important to know when the different neuronal 
structures are active and are determining trust. Having established and specified the principal 
routes by which trust can build up, it is now our task to be more precise about the determi-
nants of the processing modes and the degree of rationality involved in the choice of a trusting 
act. 
4.3. Determinants of Information Processing 
The most immediate question that arises when thinking about interpersonal trust in terms of 
the dual-process notion is naturally, when exactly can we expect each mode to occur? When is 
the emergence of a certain “type” of trust likely? When are heuristics used automatically to 
solve a trust problem? In other words, how does the human cognitive system solve the prob-
lem of mode selection and adaptive rationality? Obviously, a number of factors determine the 
mode in which information is processed, and these pave the route along which the trust prob-
lem is approached. Both individual and situational factors have to be considered when think-
ing about the determinants of information processing. To date, researchers have offered a 
plethora of variables that potentially define, influence, and moderate the processing mode (see 
Chaiken & Trope 1999). These lists of “moderators” are often paradigm-specific, and general-
ly portray the fact that cognition responds flexibly to the environment and to the task struc-
ture. However, given the fact that the human cognitive system is highly adaptive, it is likely 
that such lists can never be comprehensive or complete. As it is, many of the proposed varia-
bles can exert multiple effects under different circumstances, serving as cues, as information, 
as mere “biasing” factors, or at times as determinants of information processing; a variable 
that increases information processing in one context may decrease it in another, depending on 
intrinsic factors such as personal relevance or active goals (Petty & Wegener 1999). Principal-
ly, researchers argue that moderating variables have an impact on information processing via 
their influence on one of the four main determinants which have surfaced as central to the de-
gree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice:
10
 Shared by most dual-processing 
models is the proposition that (1) opportunity, and (2) motivation crucially determine whether 
information is processed in a more automatic or a more rational fashion (Smith & DeCoster 
2000). In reviewing the existing literature, Mayerl (2009: 117) suggests a distinction between 
                                                 
10 The following review is necessarily short and incomplete. For an extensive overview, the reader is referred to the volume 
edited by Chaiken and Trope (1999), who join articles by the most influential scholars of the field. 
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situational, individual-intrinsic, and thematic dimensions of opportunity and motivation. 
Moreover, most dual-process models emphasize (3) the accessibility of stored knowledge and 
its fit with situational stimuli as an important determinant (Higgins 1996, Kahneman 2003). 
Lastly, (4) the cognitive costs and efforts associated with different processing strategies are 
decisive in determining the degree of rationality and the decision strategies used (Payne et al. 
1993).  
4.3.1. Opportunity 
The factor of opportunity emphasizes that the cognitive resources of humans are limited by 
both individual and situational constraints which may prevent the engagement of the rational 
mode. It refers to the available processing time and attentional resources, and denotes whether 
or not the opportunities to engage in rational information processing do actually exist. If op-
portunities do not exist, then the processing of information by the rational route is simply not 
feasible. According to Fazio, “situations that require one to make a behavioral response quick-
ly can deny one the opportunity to undertake the sort of reflection and reasoning that may be 
desired” (1990a: 92). This aspect refers to the situational dimension of opportunity; it princi-
pally equates to available time and the presence or absence of time pressure.  
Apart from that, opportunity involves an individual-intrinsic dimension, which refers to ability 
and cognitive capacity (Kruglanski & Thompson 1999). While ability denotes general cogni-
tive skills and estimated “self-efficacy,” that is, one’s own judgment of how effectively in-
formation can be processed, cognitive capacity refers to the general availability of the scarce 
resource of attention and the temporary “cognitive load” (Shiv & Fedorikhin 2002) experi-
enced by the decision-maker. As suggested by research on ego-depletion (Baumeister et al. 
1998), even minor acts of self-control, such as making a simple choice, use up the limited 
self-regulatory resources available. Likewise, engaging with concurrent tasks at the same time 
drastically limits the amount of available cognitive resources. Whether or not an individual 
can access his or her cognitive resources, and whether or not they are “free” to use, is an im-
portant determinant of individual-intrinsic opportunity. Lastly, thematic opportunity pertains 
to the objective presence or absence of thematic knowledge with respect to a given decision 
problem, and the individual ability to make an appropriate judgment in a certain thematic do-
main (Eagly & Chaiken 1993).  
4.3.2. Motivation 
The motivation to engage in a controlled, systematic, rational mode of information-processing 
also has situational, individual-intrinsic, and thematic subfactors. Principally, the lack of mo-
tivation to engage in effortful reasoning inhibits the engagement of the rational mode. Situa-
tional motivation describes the perceived “importance” of a task or decision-problem, and the 
perceived “responsibility” for an outcome (Eagly & Chaiken 1993), as well as the “fear of in-
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validity” (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 1990) when making a judgment. It can be influenced, for ex-
ample, by making judgments public or by having third parties or experts observe and evaluate 
the decisions. Furthermore, the prospective gains and losses involved in the situation, that is, 
the objective structure and the stakes of the decision are important determinants of situational 
motivation (Payne et al. 1993). Likewise, surprise and salient cues can increase the situational 
motivation to engage in more elaborated processing by passively capturing attention. 
Psychologists have emphasized individual-intrinsic factors of motivation, such as “need for 
cognition” (Cacioppo & Petty 1982), “accuracy-motivation” (Chaiken 1980, Petty & Caciop-
po 1986), and “faith in intuition” (Epstein et al. 1996). These are regarded as relatively stable 
personality traits influencing the tendency to engage in rational or automatic modes of deci-
sion making. In short, “people with a preference for intuition base most of their decisions on 
affect, resulting in fast, spontaneous decisions, whereas people with a preference for delibera-
tion tend to make slower, elaborated, and cognition-based decisions” (Schunk & Betsch 2006: 
388). Concerning thematic motivation, it is influenced by factors such as individual involve-
ment, the personal relevance of a judgment or decision task in the specific thematic domain, 
and target ambivalence and security in judgment (Eagly & Chaiken 1993). Strack and Deutsch 
(2004) emphasize the role of affect as a situational and thematic-motivational determinant. 
Negative emotional reactions to stimuli often trigger the activation of the rational mode, while 
positive affective states promote a more “top-down” automatic processing (see also Bless et 
al. 1996, Bless & Fiedler 2006).  
Moreover, goals and expectations influence the mode of decision making by influencing mo-
tivation. Active goals and expectations can foster more rational processing of information, for 
example, when a desired outcome calls for systematic elaboration, or when expectations direct 
attention towards a systematic analysis (Fiske 1993, Bargh et al. 2001, Molden & Higgins 
2005). Likewise, they can also prevent a more detailed analysis and foster the automatic 
mode, if the current goals do not ask for an accurate decision. Goals harbor an individual-
intrinsic and a situational-thematic dimension, as they are often context-specific, but at the 
same time they may be influenced by individual (long-term) values and higher-order goals 
which actors seek to achieve. 
4.3.3. Accessibility, Applicability, and Fit 
Accessibility is the ease (or effort) with which particular mental contents come to mind. As it 
is, “the accessibility of a thought is determined jointly by the characteristics of the cognitive 
mechanisms that produce it and by the characteristics of the stimuli and events that evoke it” 
(Kahneman 2003: 699). In a nutshell, “accessibility can be defined as the activation potential 
of available knowledge” (Higgins 1996: 134, emphasis added). Thus, accessible knowledge is 
capable of being activated and used, but it exists in a rather latent state. It is important to dif-
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ferentiate accessibility from availability—that is, whether or not some particular knowledge is 
actually stored in the memory system. Availability is a necessary condition for accessibility: if 
availability is zero, then accessibility is zero as well (Higgins 1996). The general position is 
that “the greater the accessibility of stored categorical knowledge, the more likely that it 
would be used to categorize stimulus information” (ibid. 133). Thus, interpretation and the 
subjective definition of the situation, the way individuals make sense of a situation and form 
judgments, is based on that information which is most accessible at the moment. Situational 
stimuli which foster the activation of stored knowledge increase its temporary accessibility. If 
mental contents are temporarily accessible, then they readily come to mind and are activated 
and used during the processing of information—the results of framing and priming research 
introduced earlier exemplify this perspective.  
But accessibility has an individual-intrinsic dimension as well, often referred to as chronic 
accessibility. While temporary accessibility is the source of context effects in judgment and 
decision making, chronically accessible information lends judgments and decisions some con-
text-independent stability (Schwarz 2009). Importantly, researchers have shown that chronic 
accessibility increases the likelihood that knowledge is activated and used in a task or judg-
ment. With respect to attitude activation, Fazio notes that “the likelihood of activation of the 
attitude upon mere observation depends on the chronic accessibility of the attitude” (1990: 
81). That is, chronic information has a higher activation potential than nonchronic information 
(Higgins 1996: 140f.).  
Remember that the automatic mode and its underlying cognitive system are often character-
ized as associative pattern recognition mechanisms. Whether pattern recognition succeeds or 
fails is an important trigger in rational system interventions—a situation appears problematic 
and calls for a systematic analysis to the extent that stored knowledge is not sufficient to mas-
ter it. Thus, when thinking about the way in which the mode of information processing is de-
termined, we have to consider not only the accessibility of stored knowledge, but also its ap-
plicability (or “fit”) with respect to the perceptual input as a determinant of actual knowledge 
activation (Higgins 1996: 154f.).  
To describe the degree of perceived overlap between stimulus data and stored knowledge and 
its applicability, we will henceforth use the term match. The more features of the stimulus are 
in line with the stored knowledge (the higher the match), the higher the likelihood that the 
construct will be activated and used to categorize the stimulus. A high match between stimu-
lus and accessible stored knowledge can be sufficient to trigger an automatic behavioral reac-
tion. For example, relating to the domain of attitudes, Fazio proposes that “behavior simply 
follows from a definition of the event that has been biased by the automatically activated atti-
tude. Neither the activation of the attitude from memory nor the selective perception compo-
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nent require conscious effort, intent, or control on the part of the individual” (Fazio 1990a: 84, 
see also Fiske & Neuberg 1990). 
Some authors suggest that a high match is connected with cognitive fluency experiences, 
which go along with an automatic use of heuristics, even when the heuristic itself does not get 
a “grip on the mind.” According to Thompson, “heuristic outputs are delivered into conscious 
awareness accompanied by a metacognitive experience that is largely ... determined by the 
fluency with which the output was retrieved” (2009: 177). In other words, cognitive experi-
ences such as fluency and ease of retrieval can be interpreted as the experiential side of infor-
mation processing, based on the accessibility, applicability, and fit of mental content. As 
Thompson furthermore argues, the strength of the cognitive experience of fluency is a key 
trigger of rational system interventions: with high fluency, interventions are unlikely to occur; 
with low fluency, the probability for a rejection of heuristic judgments and a controlled re-
evaluation of information is high. In either case, the accessibility of stored knowledge struc-
tures and their match to situational features are the most important promoters of the automatic 
processing mode and the cognitive experiences that go along with it. 
4.3.4. Effort-Accuracy Tradeoffs 
Dual-process models assume that processing modes and decision strategies differ in the men-
tal effort, or “costs,” attached to them, and that a tradeoff between the anticipated effort in-
curred and the anticipated accuracy provided is made when selecting a decision strategy. For 
example, Payne et al. (1988, 1992, 1993) analyze different choice rules with respect to the 
necessary elementary information processes (that is, basic operational steps such as retrieving 
some value from memory, storing a value in memory, executing an addition, comparing alter-
natives on an attribute etc.). They show that the “weighted additive rule,” a strategy resem-
bling expected utility maximization, is by far the most cognitively effortful decision strategy 
available. On the other hand, simpler heuristic strategies are less costly in terms of cognitive 
effort, but they are also less accurate, with a random choice being the least effortful and least 
accurate method. The authors propose that effort-accuracy tradeoffs are the principal mecha-
nism governing the contingent selection of decision-making strategies. Most dual-process the-
ories agree in proposing such a “sufficiency principle.” In short, individuals “will employ a 
systematic strategy when reliability concerns outweigh economic concerns, and a heuristic 
strategy when economic concerns predominate” (Chaiken 1980: 754). 
What are the efforts, or “costs” that actors incur with processing? We can define mental effort 
as the number of attention-demanding operations needed to be executed in working memory 
in order to perform a task (Kahneman 1973). Mental effort is directly connected to physiolog-
ical processes of energy mobilization, and can therefore be measured, for example, in terms of 
cardiovascular responses and neural activity (Fairclough & Mulder 2011). The difficulty of a 
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task is one important determinant of mental effort, as it dictates whether it is necessary to 
make attention-demanding computations (Mulder 1986). Empirically, researchers have shown 
that increases in task complexity can shift information processing to more heuristic strategies 
(Payne 1976, Heiner 1985). This suggests that effort-accuracy tradeoffs are involved in de-
termining processing modes. However, such effects cannot be regarded in isolation from other 
determinants, in particular from intrinsic and extrinsic cognitive motivation. Increases in task 
complexity can also encourage more elaborate processing; actors may differ in intrinsic accu-
racy motivation and “need for cognition,” which influences effort-accuracy tradeoffs. More 
generally speaking, social psychology has portrayed humans as “cognitive misers” (Fiske & 
Taylor 1991) and, in a refined metaphor, as “motivated tacticians” (Fiske 2004) who quickly 
use prior knowledge and cognitive shortcuts to avoid the effortful route of rational processing 
whenever it is affordable, but who nevertheless can flexibly alter the amount of processing 
involved in a judgment or decision whenever it is necessary to do so. The idea that effort is 
one important determinant of information processing is a recurring theme in most dual-
processing accounts. 
Concerning the interaction of the determinants, dual-processing models converge on some 
important points, although the precise way they interplay is still widely debated. First and 
foremost, there is widespread consensus that both opportunity and motivation are necessary 
conditions for selecting the rational mode (Chaiken 1980, Petty & Cacioppo 1986, Fazio 
1990a, Strack & Deutsch 2004). An absence of either factor prevents the intervention of the 
rational system, simply because it is not feasible, or because it is not required. Second, as sug-
gested by the accuracy-effort frameworks, the costs of using a more elaborate strategy are 
negatively correlated with accuracy. This tradeoff is directly reflected in an interactional pat-
tern involving effort and motivation: according to the “sufficiency principle” (Chen & 
Chaiken 1999), perceivers attempt to strike a balance between minimizing cognitive effort and 
satisfying their current motivational concerns. While a high “accuracy motivation” to elabo-
rate principally increases the likelihood of using the rational mode, high costs and effort may 
counterbalance and demotivate its usage.  
Furthermore, accessibility and applicability are deemed to be of importance in most models: 
individuals, when processing automatically, rely on that content which is most accessible 
when performing a specific task. However, accessibility alone is not sufficient because the 
automatic activation of stored knowledge also depends on the match between the schema and 
stimulus input (Fazio 1990a, Fiske & Neuberg 1990, Higgins 1996). Thus, only when acces-
sibility and applicability are highly matched, can the routine of pattern recognition be main-
tained and stored knowledge be applied automatically. On the other hand, a mismatch be-
tween perceptual input and accessible stored knowledge increases the motivation to intervene 
with the rational system, given that sufficient opportunities and motivation exist (Fiske et al. 
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1999). The default interventionist perspective here puts forward puts a special emphasis on 
the role of the match in determining the processing mode: as long as no problems occur and 
the situations encountered match the stored knowledge, the default of automatic routine in 
everyday behavior can be maintained, given that an actor is not motivated to engage in a ra-
tional elaboration.  
4.4. Dual-Processing: A Critical Assessment 
Taking things together, the dual-processing paradigm constitutes a valuable resource that can 
inform trust research because it demonstrates adaptive rationality as a fundamental character-
istic of human (inter)action. This fact must not be taken lightly: presumably, adaptive rational-
ity is involved in every choice of a trusting act and plays a role in every solution to a trust 
problem. Prior to the rise of the dual-processing paradigm, trust researchers pointed to trust as 
a “mix of feeling and thinking”; the results achieved in this area can now help us to better un-
derstand the determinants and influence of adaptive rationality, to improve the behavioral and 
phenomenological foundations of interpersonal trust (i.e. its subjective experience), as well as 
to lead the way to a causal explanation of different “types” of trust.  
A most valuable conclusion that can be drawn in the face of dual-processing research is that 
adaptive rationality must be regarded as a fundamental dimension of the trust concept itself. 
Any attempt to explain trust with the use of only one “route” and without reference to the pro-
cessing state of the cognitive system must necessarily remain incomplete. The neglect of 
adaptive rationality is one reason for the diverse and often conflicting ideal-type classifica-
tions discussed in the preceding chapters (i.e. calculus-based versus affect-based trust). In 
fact, these types can easily be integrated along the dimension of adaptive rationality. But trust 
theory shares with the dual-processing paradigm the dilemma that, although detailed specifi-
cations exist for each “type,” the causal links between them—that is, the more general theory 
that would connect them—are missing.  
It is worthwhile to note that dual-processing accounts are relatively silent when it comes to a 
precise explication of the interplay between the four fundamental determinants and their link 
to action. The research reviewed above has convincingly demonstrated the existence of indi-
vidual adaptive rationality. It has gathered important insights about how the determinants in-
fluence the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice. But to date there has 
been no theoretical account available that unites all variables and explicates their interplay at 
the same time. Furthermore, the models proposed—in stark contrast to the paradigm of ration-
al choice—do not offer explicit selection rules that would govern the definition of the situa-
tion and the selection of scripts and of actions, meaning that the actual link between cognition 
and action cannot be formally established (Esser 2000a: 239f., Mayerl 2009: 52f., 151f., 
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2010). In other words, what is lacking is a tractable formal model of adaptive rationality, and 
its theoretical connection to interpretation, action, and choice.  
This state of affairs is certainly due to the fact that the questions asked by cognitive science 
and social psychology are very domain-specific, so that theoretical and empirical answers 
provided by the different research paradigms within the dual-processing tradition do not nec-
essarily combine into a coherent picture. As Smith and DeCoster (2000) point out, many dual-
processing accounts one-sidedly emphasize one determinant of the modes over the others, 
simply because the experimental procedures used to test the particular theories warrant that 
the neglected variables can be assumed to be “available and unproblematic.”11 Thus, the high 
domain-specificity of existing dual-process models prevents a more general look at the find-
ings, and their integration into a coherent and general model (Smith & DeCoster 2000, Evans 
2008). 
The lack of formalization in existing dual-process theories has another drawback: as it is, ex-
isting theories often tend to create lists of important determinants (“moderators”) without 
bringing them into a functional relationship (Esser 2001: 257, Mayerl 2009: 13). In particular, 
this is true for the specification of the interaction between the “match” of symbolically 
charged situational elements with stored knowledge structures and the other determinants of 
the processing modes, such as opportunity, motivation, and effort. The current state of dual-
processing theory lessens its attractiveness as a main explanatory vehicle for the phenomenon 
of interpersonal trust. From a methodological standpoint, the lack of formalization of the pre-
cise interplay of these variables is a notable flaw, because it is not possible to derive precise 
and testable hypotheses (Kroneberg 2006a, Mayerl 2009). Essentially, the paradigm does not 
provide a solid micro theory of action which can establish a causal mirco-mirco transition in 
our logic of explanation. 
Furthermore, dual-process theories, although they certainly admit the idea of context-
dependence, do not directly and systematically incorporate the social definition of the situa-
tion as a conceptual feature, that is, they do not incorporate the fact that the environment 
which informs perception and choice is always socially prestructured. In the dual-process ac-
counts, the inclusion of structural social conditions is achieved by a translation into motiva-
tional and capacity-related constructs. As pointed out, dual-process models pick up the effect 
of cognitive categorizations (i.e. a sudden “mismatch”) only via their indirect effect on other 
determinants, such as motivation. Likewise, the extent to which a situation is regarded as 
                                                 
11 “For example, people generally have access to information needed to formulate an attitude about an object whenever they 
are motivated to do so (Fazio 1990), so little theoretical attention need be given to cognitive capacity. Conversely, partici-
pants in problem-solving studies in cognitive laboratories are assumed to be motivated by the task instructions to attempt 
to perform the task adequately (Sloman 1996), so theories can emphasize capacity and take motivation for granted” (Smith 
& DeCoster 2000: 125). 
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structured by social norms (“situational strength”) is picked up by current dual-process theo-
ries only indirectly through an effect on motivation (“accuracy” and “impression” motivation, 
Chen & Chaiken 1999, Fazio & Towles-Schwen 1999: 100f., see also Strack & Deutsch 
2004), even if the requirement for better theoretical elaboration has been recognized (Kay & 
Ross 2003, Smith & Semin 2004, Kay et al. 2008). In stark contrast, sociological theories of 
action have stressed the importance of symbolically structured and socially defined situations 
to action in general (Mead 1967, Blumer 1969) and to the establishment of interpersonal trust 
in particular (Lewis & Weigert 1985b, Jones & George 1998), which, above all, is a social 
phenomenon that cannot be explained with exclusive reference to intra-individual (dual-
)processes of cognition. Aiming for a broad conceptualization of the social phenomenon of 
interpersonal trust, it is imperative to include the objective, social definition of the situation in 
the set of central variables of the model, while at the same time keeping up the important no-
tion of adaptive rationality in theorizing about interpretation and choice. 
Although important insights can be gained by adopting a dual-processing perspective, it has 
several downsides that limit its potential use as an explanatory vehicle for the phenomenon of 
interpersonal trust. From a methodological standpoint, it is a hindrance that a causal link to 
choice and action cannot be established apart from very general propositions. Focusing on 
single determinants of information processing, the interplay of the factors has been relatively 
neglected, so that the notion of adaptive rationality remains somewhat mysterious: how pre-
cisely is the degree of rationality connected to opportunity, motivation, accessibility, and ef-
fort? How does adaptive rationality translate into action? Furthermore, the social environment 
is of prime importance in the establishment of interpersonal trust. This goes beyond a mere 
dual-process notion of person-perception and social cognition (Fiske & Neuberg 1990, Fiske 
et al. 1999) because the institutional and cultural structure of a trust relation has an influence 
over and above the cognition of individuals. The sources of familiarity, taken-for-grantedness, 
and routine which support unconditional trust are found in the structural conditions surround-
ing the trust relation, and therefore may root unconditional trust in other factors than an auto-
matic application of pre-established relational schemata or stereotypes.  
What is needed, taking everything into consideration, is a theory less specific and more gen-
eral than existing dual-process models, in the sense that it must combine a specification of the 
processes of interpretation and choice with a direct reference to adaptive rationality. If the 
causal mechanism behind adaptive rationality can be specified and connected to those related 
to action, the explanatory power of existing theoretical frameworks of trust could be greatly 
improved because a reductive explanation of the different “types” (of automatic versus ration-
al, conditional versus unconditional trust, etc.) from a more general theory is possible. To ad-
vance our understanding of interpersonal trust, then, is to go beyond the descriptive work of 
creating typologies and to causally model adaptive rationality. Essentially, we need to specify 
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a comprehensive micro theory of action which can provide and establish the necessary transi-
tions between structural conditions and aggregate outcomes in our logic of explanation and at 
the same time accommodate for the impact of adaptive rationality on interpretation and 
choice. 
4.5. The Model of Frame Selection 
4.5.1. Modeling Adaptive Rationality 
In the following, I want to show how trust can be understood from a perspective of adaptive 
rationality. To this end, the focus is on the micro-theoretical core on which any explanation of 
a social phenomenon rests: the general theory of action that is being used. As I have argued, 
both the rational choice paradigm and the dual-processing approach entail a number of clear 
disadvantages which lessen their attractiveness as a vehicle of explanation. These shortcom-
ings have been discussed in the previous chapters at large. In my view, the most problematic 
state of affairs in current trust research is that neither of the available micro theories of action 
is capable of reflecting what we already know about adaptive rationality, let alone boiling the 
concepts down into a formally precise and tractable model.  
A theory that incorporates both aspects of a social definition of the situation and the idea of 
human adaptive rationality at the same time is the “Model of Frame Selection” (see Esser 
1990, 1991, 2001, Kroneberg 2006a, Esser 2009, 2010, Kroneberg 2011a). The Model of 
Frame Selection (MFS) assumes that a subjective definition of the situation is a necessary and 
central condition for establishing and maintaining the capacity to action (Esser 2001: 239f.). 
The completion of this interpretive process is accompanied by the activation of mental sche-
mata which contain situationally relevant knowledge structures. In the context of interpersonal 
trust, these may include, for example, specific or generalized expectations, role expectations 
and social norms, knowledge about institutional mechanisms, and relational schemata linked 
to particular significant others, such as a familiar trustee. All in all, the totality of activated 
mental schemata structures the perspective of the actors in a given situation.  
It is helpful to analytically separate mental schemata into two broad classes: (1) frames, that 
is, mental models of typical situations, and (2) scripts, broadly understood as “programs of 
behavior,” that is, mental models of typical sequences of action in typical situations (see chap-
ter 3.1.1 already). Importantly, the concept of a frame refers to a socially shared interpretive 
scheme, or a “situational taxonomy” (Kramer 2006), which actors use to make sense of a giv-
en situation, answering the question “What kind of situation is this?” (Goffman 1974). Note 
that most frames are part of the socially shared stock of knowledge, or “culture” of a society, 
and they are internalized and learned during socialization (Berger & Luckmann 1966). The 
activation of a frame defines the primary goals of the social situation, simplifies the individual 
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goal structure, and prescribes the relevant social production functions (Lindenberg 1989, 
1992). The framing of the situation is influential because, once the situation is defined accord-
ing to a frame, certain programs of behavior, routines, values, and even emotions are activated 
in the form of associated scripts. In this way, the process of framing and the definition of the 
situation limit the set of possible and “meaningful” courses of action. Frames direct attention 
toward specific elements within the situation—they are “selective” and constitute a heuristic 
which actors use to simplify the process of interpretation. Being part of the actor’s stock of 
learned associative knowledge, frames are connected to situational objects which indicate 
their appropriateness, that is, they readily contain the heuristic cues which function as signifi-
cant symbols and trigger their activation.  
The activation of a frame, according to the principle of spreading activation, activates scripts 
which have been associated with the frame in the past. Scripts, in contrast to frames, have a 
direct reference to action and choice in that they contain relevant declarative and procedural 
knowledge, and are organized with respect to goals (Schank & Abelson 1977). They present 
mental models of typical actions within typical situations, and therefore rely on a preceding 
successful definition of the situation. The concept of a script will be used broadly in the fol-
lowing to include social norms and roles (Elster 1989) and cultural conventions (Bourdieu 
1984), as well as routines, habits, and emotional programs that might become activated in a 
particular frame and situation (see Abelson 1981). Since scripts are context-specific, the selec-
tion of a script can only occur after a frame has been selected, and the situation has been ini-
tially defined. Together, frames and scripts provide actors with the knowledge critical for an-
swering the questions, “What kind of situation is this?” and, “How am I expected to behave in 
such a situation?” The selection of both frames and scripts is guided by the “logic of appropri-
ateness.” That is, actors are first and foremost motivated to most accurately decode the situa-
tions they encounter in order to decide what to do.  
In their combined effect, frames and scripts define the actor’s point of view in a particular sit-
uation. One important implication of this concerns the preferences of actors, which are varia-
ble and influenced by situational circumstances within the MFS. In contrast to the rational 
choice paradigm, preferences are not treated as fundamental, axiomatic initial conditions, but 
they are coded in the temporarily accessible mental schemata available to the actors. These 
may change in response to the context, and so may preferences. In consequence, the scope and 
application of rational choice models which assume a certain utility function (for example, a 
social preference such as reciprocity) is necessarily limited, in the sense that they apply only 
to situations where the actor has already activated a corresponding frame (for example, “situa-
tion of social exchange”) and a relevant script (for example, “norm of reciprocity”), which 
jointly generate the preference in question. Since frames and scripts are part of a society’s cul-
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ture, the actor’s preferences are, for the most part, culturally determined (Schütz & Luckmann 
1973: 243f., 261f., Fehr & Hoff 2011).  
After having selected a frame and a script an actor must finally choose an answer to the ques-
tion, “What am I going to do?”12 Note that answers to this question are to a large extent struc-
tured by the activated frames and scripts. Activated frames and scripts narrow down the feasi-
ble set of alternative actions, they shape the preferences used to evaluate the consequences of 
action, and they influence the formation of expectations. Thus, when an actor decides on a 
course of action, his choice has been significantly shaped by preceding interpretive processes 
and the mental schemata activated in their course. Taking things together, a link from inter-
pretation to action proceeds in three stages which jointly lead to a behavioral response in the 
form of an action: actors first select a frame with which to interpret a situation (frame selec-
tion), they then select a script and program of behavior which is deemed relevant given the 
frame (script selection), and they finally choose an action (action selection, see figure 16):  
Figure 16: The model of frame selection, adapted from Kroneberg (2011a: 128) 
 
As indicated in the figure above, all selections may occur with a variable degree of rationality, 
that is, with a particular processing mode. In keeping with our terminology, the processing 
modes will be called the automatic and the rational mode. The properties of the two modes 
were described in chapter 4.2.1: the rational mode represents a conscious and deliberative 
choice, in which the particular alternatives for a selection, their consequences and probabili-
ties, costs and benefits, are analyzed and systematically evaluated. This approximates the 
maximization of subjective expected utility. In the automatic mode, an alternative is selected 
unconsciously, based on its temporary accessibility, and following immediate cues in the en-
vironment. The MFS holds that each selection (frame, script, action) can occur in an automat-
ic or rational mode.  
                                                 
12 Decision-making theories such as RCT typically focus on this third and last stage of the sequence. By including the inter-
pretive stages of frame and script selection, the MFS admits that behavior is structured to a large extent by activated men-
tal models, which in turn depend on the properties of the social situation. Therefore, the model can explain the variability 
of preferences which are taken for granted in economic models. 
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4.5.2. The Automatic Mode  
Before thinking about how the processing mode and the “route” on which trust is built up is 
determined, we have to define the selection rules for each stage (frame, script, action) which 
govern their activation (see Kroneberg 2006, 2011a: 129ff.). In other words, we ask how the 
selection of a mental schema can be modeled and formalized, given that a particular mode is 
in effect. Selection rules specify the causal mechanism that defines the outcome of each stage, 
and therefore are the “nomological core” of our theory of action. In this sense, they are a most 
important aspect in an explanatory theory of trust that goes beyond mere descriptive accounts 
or typologies. Assume that the actor has to “select” alternatives among a set of frames F = 
(F1... FN), scripts S = (S1 ... SN), and actions A = (A1 ...AN). Note that the term “selection” is 
used here to denote that one mental schema is selected out of the set of potential alternatives, 
and is then activated. This does not mean that a “selection” is necessarily a conscious choice 
made by the actor. On the contrary, the automatic mode is characterized by the distinct ab-
sence of systematic processing efforts and consciousness.  
A selection in the automatic mode is based on the temporary accessibility of mental models. It 
corresponds to undisturbed pattern recognition and a routine execution of knowledge by the 
associative cognitive system. Therefore, the selections are based on immediate situational per-
ceptions and the resulting activation level of mentally accessible schemata. As pointed out by 
Strack & Deutsch (2004), the pathway to behavior in the automatic mode is via a spreading 
activation of behavioral schemata. Therefore the activation weights (AW) of the schemata are 
decisive in determining which alternative is ultimately selected. The simple selection rule 
governing all selections in the automatic mode is to activate the alternative with the highest 
activation weight. Thus, based on the spreading activation of associative knowledge initiated 
by the perception of heuristic cues, actors interpret a situation with the most accessible frame, 
activate the most accessible script, and execute the most accessible course of action, given a 
frame and script. This all happens automatically and without a conscious or deliberative effort 
on the part of the actor. In order to give this proposition substance, we have to define the acti-
vation weights of each stage. 
A frame selection in the automatic mode is directly guided by the experienced match mi be-
tween a frame and the cues available in the situation. In other words, the activation weight of 
the frame directly corresponds to the fit between stored situational knowledge and the per-
ceived situational cues. According to Esser (2001: 270), the activation weight of a frame de-
pends on three factors:  
(1) the chronic accessibility ai of the frame, that is, the actor’s general disposition to interpret 
situations in a specific way. Chronic accessibility of a frame denotes an individual actor’s 
“disposition” to interpret a situation according to stored knowledge which has a high activa-
tion potential. It specifies how easily a frame can become activated, and how strongly it is an-
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chored in the associative memory system. The parameter is directly related to socialization, 
experience and learning, and it represents a relatively stable individual property.
13
  
(2) the presence of situational objects oi in the situation. These serve as a heuristic cue and are 
triggered to indicate the validity and appropriateness of a frame. It is through this parameter 
that the model captures objective-situational variance and the influence of the context on the 
activation weights. Any element of the situation can become a situational object—items, indi-
viduals, actions, or communications. The relevant condition is that the cue is salient and in-
dicative of the applicability of the frame under consideration. This is in turn determined by: 
(3) the associative link li between the frame and the situational object. This individual parame-
ter captures how strongly situational cues are connected to a particular frame and signify and 
symbolize a certain meaning of the situation to the actor. It thus captures an aspect of “associ-
ative strength” (see Fazio 2001, 2007) between an object and its mental representation.  
 
All three factors jointly represent the necessary conditions for a high match. Formally, this 
implies that the parameters must be related to each other multiplicatively. To formalize the 
activation weight of a frame, we can hence write:  
AW(F) = mi = ai * li * oi  all parameters Ɛ [0,1] 
In the automatic mode, the frame with the best fit to the present situation—that is, the frame 
with the maximum match—is selected. Generally speaking, the match and activation weights 
of a frame represent how familiar a situation is to the actor. With a perfect match, the envi-
ronmental cues can be easily decoded using available knowledge. On the other hand, if the 
match is low, then the situation is unfamiliar to the actor, and, in the words of Schütz, “routine 
knowledge not sufficient to master it.” New and unfamiliar situations will express themselves 
through a low chronic accessibility of a relevant interpretive scheme (a<1) and/or in a weak 
associative link between the frame and environmental cues (l<1), which then cannot be 
properly decoded even when they are objectively present (o=1). On the other hand, if the actor 
has strongly anchored the frame (a=1) and knows the relevant cues (l=1), the match may also 
be low if the situation is ambiguous and the cues in the environment do not unambiguously 
indicate a certain meaning (that is, if o<1).  
                                                 
13 Kroneberg uses the term availability to describe “general dispositions to adopt a certain interpretation” which are based on 
“divergent experiences throughout the life-course that vary systematically with socialization in different social contexts” 
(2011a: 130, present author’s translation). However, Higgins (1996) uses the term accessibility to describe the activation 
potential of knowledge, and proposes that chronic accessibility indicates “individual differences, including crosscultural 
differences, in the ‘theories’ or viewpoints people possess” (1996: 139, see chapter 4.3.3). Comparing the terminology, it 
is apparent that Kroneberg’s “availability” refers to “chronic accessibility” in Higgins’ sense—a persisting, long-term in-
dividual property that defines the general accessibility of the frame. To minimize confusion, we adopt Higgins’ terminolo-
gy in the following, and differentiate between the aspects of chronic and temporary accessibility. 
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Likewise, the activation weight of a script depends on several interrelated factors (see Krone-
berg 2011a: 131f.). As with the activation weight for a frame, these factors represent the nec-
essary conditions for a high activation weight of a script:  
(1) the chronic accessibility aj of the script, denoting how “strongly” the script is rooted in the 
associative memory system. Similarly to a frame, a script can be more or less chronically ac-
cessible and thus feature a lower or higher latent activation potential in the associative 
memory system. For example, think about a social norm. The degree of norm-internalization 
can be directly reinterpreted in terms of chronic accessibility. Highly internalized norms will 
more easily be retrieved as behavioral schemata guiding behavior, because they are chronical-
ly accessible to the actor. Similarly, when thinking about routines, chronic accessibility corre-
sponds to the degree of “habitualization” of the routine. All in all, the variable denotes a rela-
tively stable “trait” of the actor.  
(2) the temporary accessibility aj|i of the script. This variable captures a situational influence in 
script activation in terms of two sources. First, temporary accessibility depends on the associa-
tive strength between the (situationally relevant) frame and a script. Given that the situation 
has been defined in a certain way, certain knowledge structures, by means of spreading activa-
tion, will be more or less accessible.
14
 Second, the temporary accessibility of scripts can also 
be influenced directly by the presence of situational objects indicating the appropriateness of 
certain actions. In short, temporary accessibility can be altered by internal and external fac-
tors. 
(3) the match mi of the activated frame, which is assumed to have an independent influence on 
the activation of scripts in general. In short, the more familiar a situation is, and the more 
“certain” the actor is about the validity of a particular interpretation, the higher is the probabil-
ity that a script related to the frame will be activated. Taken together, the activation weight of 
a script, including all three as necessary conditions, can be multiplicatively written as: 
AW(S|F) = mi * aj* aj|k = AW(F) * aj* aj|k  all parameters Ɛ [0,1] 
Script selections in the automatic mode follow the rule that the script with the highest activa-
tion weight is selected. From the above equation, we can see that this not only depends on the 
experienced “match,” and therefore on the amount of (or lack of) ambiguity with which a sit-
uation has been defined. In addition, the frame needs to be associated with a certain script and 
to “point towards it,” and the script needs to be chronically accessible in memory.  
                                                 
14 For this reason, the accessibility parameter is written with reference to the frame: aj|i.. At the same time, the influence of 
situational objects could in principle be accomplished by breaking the parameter down into additional factors and model-
ing their interplay (Kroneberg 2011a: 132). This can be done whenever it is of analytical importance.  For ease of exposi-
tion, we will stick to the sparser notation. 
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The selection of an action in the automatic mode occurs within a predefined situation, and on-
ly after a relevant script has been activated. Routine action is possible only if the script does 
regulate the course of action to a satisfactory degree: although scripts, as “programs of behav-
ior,” contain knowledge about typical sequences of action and expected behavior in typical 
situations, they are often open to interpretation and may not be detailed enough to unambigu-
ously select one action out of the set of potential alternatives. That is, the activation weight of 
an action depends on the degree of regulation ak|j to which the script dictates a certain action 
(compare, for example, the famous “restaurant” script, which is relatively open, to a rule-
based social norm such as “do not lie!”). If the script does not regulate the course of action to 
a satisfactorily degree, then routine action is not possible. Second, the activation weights are 
also dependent on the overall activation level of the script. That is to say, if actors are uncer-
tain about the appropriateness of a script, then a spontaneous and automatic behavioral re-
sponse based on routine is unlikely, even when the script does regulate the action to a high 
degree. Thus, the activation weight of an action can be summarized as: 
AW(A|S,F) ) = AW(S|F) * ak|j   all parameters Ɛ [0,1] 
Note that, by including the activation weight of the script, all parameters in the two preceding 
stages are also relevant necessary conditions for the automatic selection of an action. An actor 
will automatically select the action with the highest activation weight whenever the situation 
can be defined unambiguously (a high match mi), an appropriate script is accessible (a high 
activation weight AW(S|F) of the script), and the course of action is strongly regulated (high 
degree of regulation ak|j). Typical instances would be, for example, routine everyday behavior 
and unconditional norm compliance in highly typical situations. On the other hand, even when 
situations are completely unambiguous and an appropriate script is available (AW(S|F) = 1), 
activation weights will be low if the script does not regulate action to a degree that allows for 
a spontaneous execution of stored behavioral schemata.  
4.5.3. The Rational Mode  
In the rational mode, the selection rules for each alternative and stage are built on a quite dif-
ferent logic. Actors will compare, evaluate, and select available alternatives in an effortful and 
deliberative reasoning process. In doing so, they also follow a “logic of appropriateness” in 
that they are motivated to identify the most appropriate alternatives, given the situational cir-
cumstances. Since the selections resemble a rational, utility-maximizing choice, the selection 
rules of SEU theory can be applied to model the stages (see Kroneberg 2011a: 135f.).  
Frames and scripts differ with respect to their effectiveness in defining a situation appropriate-
ly and in helping to identify the correct course of action. Thus, when elaborating on a proper 
frame or script, actors are primarily concerned with the question of whether or not the alterna-
tive they scrutinize is acceptable. Instead of weighing costs and benefits for each alternative 
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(as is the case when rationally choosing an action), actors form an expectation about the ap-
propriateness of the considered frame or script. In the case of a frame, the appropriateness 
belief pi closely corresponds to the match mi—however, it is in fact perceived and experienced 
as an expectation. All factors which determine a match in the automatic mode can become 
problematic and subject to an elaborate reasoning process, in the case of a frame selection in 
the rational mode: actors think about the fit between situational stimuli and available interpre-
tive schemata, and in doing so, they can contemplate on the presence of relevant situational 
objects (orc), the significance of these cues for the particular frame (vrc), as well as the appro-
priateness of a particular interpretation (arc) itself. Overall, the appropriateness belief pi of 
frame i is forged from these parameters, so that:  
pi = orc* vrc* arc  all parameters Ɛ [0,1] 
As stated before, “appropriateness” is the main concern governing selection of a frame in the 
rational mode. This means that the motivation behind, and the utility attached to, the different 
alternative frames, is constant over the range of alternatives. It is, quite generally speaking, 
that utility which actors derive from forming an appropriate perspective of the world. It can be 
represented by introducing some constant utility term Uapp, so that the expected utility of a 
frame can be written as:  
SEU(Fi) = pi * Uapp  
In this sense, the decisive factor during a rational and conscious definition of the situation is 
the appropriateness belief pi.
15
 In a similar fashion, actors can elaborate on the appropriateness 
of a script in order to answer the question “Which behavior is appropriate in the particular sit-
uation?” The appropriateness belief pj of a script can be constructed similarly to the appropri-
ateness belief of a frame. It addresses the questions of whether situational cues are available; 
whether they are significant for the particular script, and whether the script is appropriate giv-
en the frame, so that:  
SEU(Sj) = pj * Uapp 
Lastly, the selection of an action in the rational mode is characterized by a conscious and 
elaborate evaluation of the available alternatives in terms of expectations, costs, and benefits. 
To this end, one can utilize the apparatus of rational choice theory to model the choice of an 
action. Importantly, the MFS interprets these models substantially, that is, as expressing the 
process of rational choice in a psychological sense (Kroneberg 2011a: 142). For example, in 
applying SEU theory, one can denote the expected utility of each alternative action as:  
                                                 
15 See Kroneberg (2011a: 137f.) for some important exceptions, including the case of wishful thinking and the impact of emo-
tions, which can be modeled as additional utility terms. 
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SEU(Ak|Fi, Sj) = ∑ p(F,S) * U(F,S) 
The brackets indicate that both expectations and utility (i.e. preferences) depend on the pre-
ceding selection of frame and script. It is apparent that any action selection (both in the ration-
al and automatic mode) is structured by the processes of frame selection and script selection. 
This pinpoints the importance of the definition of the situation for decision making and the 
choice of action: frames and scripts activate specific knowledge structures, such as (primary) 
goals, values, emotions, and programs of behavior. These have a direct effect on expectations 
and utility. The activation of frames and scripts narrows down the “feasible set” of alterna-
tives that come into question, and which can be scrutinized at all. It also determines how con-
sequences are evaluated. In other words, frame and script activation shapes the preferences 
and the individual goal structure of an actor.  
Having defined the selection weights in the rational mode, let us formally establish the selec-
tion rules governing each selection in the rational mode: 
(1) F* = argmax SEU(Fi) for all F Ɛ F(F1, ... Fn) 
(2) S* = argmax SEU(Sj|Fi) for all S Ɛ S(S1, ... Sn|Fi) 
(3) A* = argmax SEU(A|Fi,Sj) for all A Ɛ A(A1, ... An|Fi,Sj) 
For example, an actor will select that frame Fi for which SEU(Fi) > SEU(Fj) for all jƐF, j ≠ i 
and will select a script for which SEU(Si) > SEU(Sj) for all j Ɛ S, j ≠ i, respectively. He will 
choose that frame, script, and action which, given the alternative set, has the highest expected 
utility.  
The selection rules which govern the selections in either mode establish a causal link between 
interpretation and choice in both modes. In formalizing these processes, the MFS draws from 
important insights gained in the dual-processing paradigm, and it also utilizes the framework 
of rational choice theory. Within dual-processing accounts, the activation levels of mental 
schemata and their temporary accessibility are regarded as crucial determinants governing au-
tomatic activation and use of stored knowledge (Fazio 1990a, Fiske & Taylor 1991, Higgins 
1996, Strack & Deutsch 2004). These concepts have been formalized and rendered more pre-
cise in the preceding section, by specifying the components of the activation weights and de-
fining their functional relationships. From rational-choice theory, the model adopts the axioms 
of instrumental rationality to model the selection of frames, scripts, and actions in the rational 
mode. In doing so, it links rational choice concepts to more fundamental categories found in 
cognitive science: the accessibility of stored knowledge, the associative strength of mental 
schemata, and the heuristic cues and situational stimuli of the environment. Importantly, the 
rational selection of frames and scripts is guided by the formation of appropriateness beliefs 
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during a conscious elaboration on the presence of situational stimuli and their match with 
available knowledge. Thus, the process of expectation formation, implicitly assumed in ra-
tional choice accounts of trust, is made transparent by specifying the parameters and elements 
which influence the degree of ambiguity experienced within a situation, with respect to stored 
mental schemata, that is, by formalizing appropriateness beliefs and by pinning down the cog-
nitive foundation in the form of frames and scripts. At the same time, the rational choice of 
action is reconstructed as a special case of a more general principle—that of adaptive rational-
ity in interpretation and choice. Thus, both conditional and unconditional decisions, intuitive 
and intentional choices, deliberate and automatic inferences and interpretation, can be recast 
in terms of the more general process of adaptive rationality.  
4.5.4. The Mode-Selection Threshold 
Selection rules establish a link between mental schemata and their activation for each mode. 
But the MFS additionally tries to explain under which conditions a specific mode will govern 
a particular selection (see Esser 2001: 257f., Kroneberg 2011a). To begin with, if the degree 
of rationality involved in interpretation and choice is assumed to be variable, then the mode of 
information processing itself must be thought of as the outcome of some process—this pro-
cess is termed mode selection; it determines which selection rules the actor applies in a situa-
tion. Clearly, mode selection should be governed by the “sufficiency principle” (Chen 1980) 
and effort-accuracy tradeoffs (Payne et al. 1993): while the actor would always prefer to be 
most accurate in his selections, the costs and efforts associated with elaborate processing 
counterbalance the tendency to intervene with an engagement of the rational mode.  
Mode selection is an unconscious, preattentive, and autonomous process that determines 
whether an actor shifts attention to an issue or not; whether an actor does subjectively face a 
selection problem of interpretation and choice at all—or whether he spontaneously activates 
the alternative with the highest activation weight without conscious awareness and attention. 
A model of mode selection must incorporate the insights of dual-processing theory into the 
determinants of information processing. But to go beyond a listing of potential “moderators,” 
it is necessary to derive a functional relationship between the determinants of opportunity, 
motivation, accessibility, and effort by formulating their interdependencies in a decision-
theoretical framework. Then, by linking mode selections to selection rules, we can establish 
the link between adaptive rationality, interpretation, and choice. 
Trivially, the alternatives which can become an outcome of the mode-selection process are the 
automatic and rational modes of information processing. In order to make the process trans-
parent, the MFS formalizes it in analogy to a subjectively rational decision. That is to say, alt-
hough mode selection does not represent a conscious maximizing choice, the apparatus of ra-
tional choice theory will be utilized in order to systematically derive and formalize the process 
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in decision-theoretical terms. The “sufficiency principle” is then embodied in the decision-
making rules used to model the optimal allocation of cognitive resources. For the purpose of 
modeling adaptive rationality and carving out the “decision logic” behind mode selection, we 
need to pin down the expected payoffs of both alternatives. 
As pointed out before, mode selection is subject to effort-accuracy tradeoffs, the rational route 
being the more effortful alternative, which potentially (but not necessarily) provides more ac-
curate results. Whether the activation of the rational mode pays off as compared to reliance on 
the autopilot, is crucially dependent on two factors (Kroneberg 2011a: 145f.): (1) the 
(non)existence of opportunities to engage in a more elaborate reasoning process and (2) the 
presence or absence of potential inference errors that an actor commits when actually follow-
ing the alternative which would be activated in the automatic mode. Jointly, these factors de-
fine four states of the world, in which opportunities are (or are not) present and in which the 
immediately available schema is (or is not) appropriate. 
The true state of the world is not known with certainty to the actor, but learning, experience, 
and situational criteria permit an actor to have a subjective estimate of it. However, these as-
sessments are not part of conscious experience. In sticking with the SEU analogy, we will re-
fer to them as “expectations,” but it is important to understand that all the parameters of mode 
selection cannot be consciously accessed. They represent a result of preattentive environmen-
tal scans and, in this sense, they constitute a “natural assessment” (Kahneman & Frederick 
2002) achieved autonomously by the cognitive system, as is the selection of the processing 
mode itself.  
Formally, let p (0,1) denote the assessment of sufficient opportunities for reflection. This ex-
pectation corresponds to the probability that elaboration in the rational mode is feasible and 
can be successfully accomplished. Conversely, (1—p) indicates how likely it is that the cur-
rent situation does not afford enough opportunity to engage the rational mode. Second, the 
activation weights AW(...) of an alternative frame, script, or action are used to assess the 
probability that the particular alternative is in fact optimal. Thus, a high activation weight in-
dicates that it is appropriate to activate the alternative. Likewise, (1—AW) represents the 
probability that an inference error is made when selecting the alternative under scrutiny, 
which potentially incurs some cost. For each selection stage, the corresponding activation 
weights AW(Fi), AW(Sj|Fi) and AW(Ak|Fi,Sj) will be relevant. The assumption of a direct link 
between activation weights and inference error assessments shows how immediate perception 
and spreading activation translate into processing-mode determinants. 
Since the mode selections in each stage are formally identical, we restrict ourselves in the fol-
lowing to presenting the determination of the processing mode for a frame. Similar formula-
tions for the stages of script and action selection can be derived by replacing the correspond-
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ing activation weights. In the case of a frame, the relevant activation weight is the match mi, 
which indicates the fit between the frame i and the current situation. Upon entering a situation, 
some initial frame i will attain the highest activation weight, and will therefore be subject to 
the question of whether or not it should be followed automatically (“initial categorization,” 
Fiske & Neuberg 1990). Note that an alternative frame will be considered only if the appro-
priateness of the initial frame is doubted, and thus if frame selection occurs in the rational 
mode. We can interpret the match mi as the actor’s expectation that frame i is in fact appropri-
ate. Conversely, (1—mi) represents the probability that frame i is not appropriate, and some 
other interpretive schema is correct. 
Combining both elements, we can construct inferences of the probabilities of the four possible 
states of the world. These represent natural assessments of whether (or not) opportunities for 
reflection are sufficient and whether (or not) the initial frame is appropriate. For example, the 
probability of the occurrence of a state of the world in which no opportunities for reflection 
exist, and in which the initial frame is valid is (1–p) * mi. Likewise, p * (1-mi) corresponds to 
the probability that sufficient opportunities exist and the initial frame is not valid. Having de-
fined subjective probabilities thus, we are left to define the actual payoffs to a selection made 
in each mode and under each true state of the world, in order to model the consequences that 
the selections in different modes have in each state of the world (table 2): 
Table 2: Mode-selection and the subjective states of the world 
Alternative States of the World and Subjective Probabilities of Occurrence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Opportunity sufficient? Yes Yes No No 
Initial Frame Valid? Yes No Yes No 
Subjective Probability p * mi p * (1-mi) (1-p) * mi (1-p)* (1-mi) 
Mode Selection Outcome: 
Rational Mode Ui - C Urc - C Ui - C -Cf - C 
Automatic Mode Ui -Cf Ui -Cf 
The utility associated with the initial frame i is Ui. This utility can be realized whenever frame 
i is selected and i is in fact the true state of the world (cases 1 and 3). The adoption of frame i 
in a state of the world in which it is not valid results in a wrong definition of the situation, in 
which case the actor incurs some costs Cf>0 if he follows his initial categorization (cases 2 
and 4). The engagement of the rational mode is always associated with costs C>0, represent-
ing the mental effort incurred in the form of time and energy consumption. The actor can 
fruitfully “capitalize” on these costs if sufficient opportunities do exist and if the initial frame 
i is not valid (case 2). In this case, an alternative frame j will be discovered in the process of 
forming appropriateness beliefs, and the actor can realize some alternative utility Urc associat-
ed with the adoption of this frame j.  
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In all other cases, the actor would be better off following the initial frame in the automatic 
mode: If frame i is valid and opportunities exist, then the actor will rationally discover that the 
initial frame is valid, but also incur costs which could have been saved (case 1). If frame i is 
valid and opportunities do in fact not exist, then the reasoning process will not lead to a suc-
cessful redefinition of the situation, and the actor will have to rely on his initial frame i, while 
incurring the processing costs (case 3). If frame i is not valid and opportunities do not exist, 
then the actor will not discover the appropriate alternative, but will make a false interpretation 
and incur the costs of rational processing C on top of it (case 4).  
We can derive the expected utility associated with the two modes by following the principles 
of SEU theory. Weighing the payoffs of each consequence with their associated probabilities, 
we get: 
SEU(automatic) = p*mi*Ui + p*(1-mi)*(-Cf) + (1-p)*mi*Ui + (1-p)*(1-mi)*(-Cf) 
SEU(rational) = p*mi*(Ui-C) + p*(1-mi)*(Urc-C) + (1-p)*mi*(Ui-C)+ (1-p)*(1-m)*(-Cf-C) 
The selection of the rational mode is contingent on the condition that SEU(rational) > 
SEU(automatic). Simplifying this inequality yields the following threshold condition which 
governs the activation of the rational mode: 
p*(1-mi)*(Urc+Cf) > C 
This inequality can be interpreted intuitively: actors will engage in an elaborated reasoning 
process whenever the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Thus, the MFS allows us to de-
rive the argument of trading accuracy against effort in selecting decision strategies in a very 
general fashion, starting from the idea that inferences about the states of the world determine 
the processing mode. Adding assumptions concerning the possible outcomes in each state of 
the world, inference errors and their potential costs and benefits, the SEU principles provide 
an answer that is surprisingly consistent with dual-process research: whenever sufficient op-
portunity exists (p) and an alternative frame is valid (1-mi), the actor can realize the utility 
from an appropriate definition of the situation (Urc) and avoid the cost of defining the situation 
inappropriately (Cf).  
The cost-term C, that is, the amount of expected mental effort involved in the rational mode, 
has both a situational and an individual-intrinsic component. It varies with the complexity of 
the task (Payne et al. 1993) and with individual processing abilities, such as general intelli-
gence and task-specific skills (Mulder 1986). The term (Urc+Cf) represents the opportunity 
cost of making a false selection (Kroneberg 2011a: 148). It can be easily translated into moti-
vational constructs such as “accuracy motivation” (Chaiken 1980) or “fear of invalidity” 
(Fazio 1990) and represents the element of motivation as a core determinant of information 
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processing.
16
 In particular, the importance of a selection, which may vary with structural pa-
rameters such as stake size, can be captured by Cf. In scrutinizing the model, it is easy to lo-
cate the other determinants as well. The element of opportunity is directly introduced with the 
parameter p, which captures situational constraints such as time-pressure and cognitive load, 
as well as individual-intrinsic factors such as processing capacity and ability. By treating the 
activation weights as the relevant informational cues to the generation of subjective expecta-
tions about the states of the world, the model directly makes use of schema accessibility, and 
also establishes a link with the presence of heuristic cues within the environment. It supports a 
spreading-activation argument in the form of associative links li between situational objects 
and particular mental schemata, and it invokes the hierarchical structure of schemata, spread-
ing activation among frames, scripts, and actions (as formalized in the parameters aj|I and ak|j). 
We can rearrange the threshold condition to display SEU(automatic)>SEU(rational), so that 
the model demonstrates the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to select the automatic 
mode during frame, script, and action selection: 
Automatic Frame Selection:   mi   > 1– C / (p * U) 
Automatic Script Selection:   mi * aj|i * aj  > 1– C / (p * U) 
Automatic Action Selection:  mi*aj|i*aj*ak|j  > 1– C / (p * U) 
In this formulation, it is easy to see that a high match—that is, a clear and unambiguous defi-
nition of the situation—is a fundamental precondition for automatic selection in all stages 
from interpretation to choice. The rational mode is not selected if the initial match is high, and 
high processing costs (C), insufficient opportunity (low p), or a lack of motivation (low U) 
shift the threshold to a low level. On the other hand, an ambiguous definition of the situation 
and a low match foster activation of the rational mode. The model restates the default-inter-
ventionist proposition that routine persists as long as the environment presents itself as un-
problematic. Consider the case where m = 1 and a “perfect match” prevails. Under these cir-
cumstances, an actor will always select a frame in the automatic mode.
17
 Interpretation is 
spontaneous and fully automatic, because an appropriate frame is accessible and fits the avail-
able situational cues.  
However, the automatic activation of scripts and the unconditional execution of actions, in 
comparison to a frame selection, rest on increasingly stricter preconditions, since additional 
constraints must be met in order to select the automatic mode. For a script to be selected au-
tomatically, it must additionally be stored in the memory system (aj) and associated with the 
                                                 
16 We will subsume both elements and use the shortcut notation (Urc+Cf) = U in the following. 
17 Since C >0, U > 0 and p (0,1), the right-hand side of the equation is restricted to the interval )-∞,1). 
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particular frame (aj|i). If actions are to be selected automatically, the script additionally needs 
to regulate a course of action to a satisfactory degree (ak|j). Only in this case does a direct link 
between perception and behavior in the sense of a “spontaneous flowing from individuals’ 
definition of the event” (Fazio 1990: 91) to a behavioral outcome exist, which then solely 
rests on the spreading activation of behavioral schemata (Strack & Deutsch 2004). Such con-
ditions are met, in particular, in the case of social norms, value-based rule systems, and rou-
tine habits. 
The model demonstrates adaptive responses in the degree of rationality to potential inference 
errors, as stipulated by Fehr and Tyran (2008). It recasts the idea that inference errors are a 
primary determinant of managing social situations, as exemplified in the social exchange heu-
ristic (Yamagishi et al. 2008), and as postulated in “error management theory” (EMT, Hasel-
ton & Nettle 2006). According to EMT, the relative magnitude of potential inference errors 
determines the evolutionary direction of prosocial perception biases. However, they are not 
regarded as a primary key to interpretation. In the “social exchange heuristic” stipulated by 
Yamagishi et al. (2008), which was introduced at the beginning of chapter 4, actors are as-
sumed to act fully rationally once the automatic process of SEH activation is terminated. 
However, the MFS suggests that the processing of inference errors occurs on a much more 
dynamic and continuous basis. The activation of the SEH can be reconstructed as a special 
problem of frame selection with respect to defining a situation as one of social exchange and 
activating a corresponding frame and script. In the model of Yamagishi et al. (2008), actors 
are severely limited with respect to the set of interpretational schemata they possess. The 
model considers only two frames: “detection / sanctioning” and “no detection / no sanction-
ing,” and actors—somehow—define the situation automatically. Once the situation is defined, 
actors act fully rationally. However, in the MFS framework, other possibilities exist. Both in-
terpretation and choice can be executed with a variable degree of rationality. This degree may 
change in response to situational circumstances and potential inference errors that are inferred 
according to the natural assessments of opportunity and appropriateness. In fact, the pro-
cessing of fictive error signals and potential inference errors seems to play a key role in trust 
problems as well, as shown in a fMRI-study conducted by Lohrenz et al. (2007). 
The model helps to explain the unconditionally of normative routine often observed in human 
action, which contradicts standard rational choice theory (see Elster 1989, Boudon 2003). In 
contrast to a rational-choice explanation, unconditional norm compliance can be understood 
and explained in terms of automatic schema-activation and routine execution of scripts, ad-
dressing a completely different “logic” of action selection than that of the instrumental maxi-
mization of subjective expected utility. This is reminiscent of the idea that highly internalized 
norms can “override” rational choice and that rule-based decisions must be understood as al-
ternatives to consequence-based maximizations (March & Olsen 1989, Vanberg 1994). On the 
182 
 
other hand, if scripts do not regulate action to a satisfactorily degree, actions will have to be 
selected in the rational mode. In this case, actors must perform maximizing operations of the 
sort proposed in rational choice models. For example, game-theoretic formalizations are im-
mediately applicable if there is some strategic interdependence: given that a particular frame 
has been selected, a particular script activated, and given that action is selected in the rational 
mode, norm compliance, for example, can be explained in terms of psychological cost-benefit 
considerations, in which the actors take into account the (dis-)utility stemming from norm 
compliance, and (potentially) the other-regarding preferences they and others have activated 
during interpretation.  
By specifying the mechanism of mode selection, the model goes beyond the traditional ration-
al choice framework, because the conditions and range of rational choice models and the ap-
plicability of economic models in general are spelled out. The introduction of frame selection 
and script selection as processes prior to action explicates the proposition of “frames moving 
beliefs moving choice” (Dufwenberg et al. 2011) and of “culture shaping preferences” (Fehr 
& Hoff 2011). These propositions put forward the importance of a socialized stock of cultural 
knowledge of typical situations and typical sequences of actions for individual interpretation 
and choice. Within the MFS framework, we reconstruct a selection that approximates a ra-
tional choice merely as a special case, one that actors will perform when routine mental sche-
mata are inaccessible, when situations are interpreted as important and nonroutine, or when 
the motivation to override automatic categorizations is very high. In the case of automatic se-
lections, the decision logic behind selection of frame, script, and action is completely different 
to that of preference-based utility maximization, building on the spreading activation of men-
tal schemata which can trigger a direct perception-behavior link. 
Note that we can also derive very specific interaction hypotheses from the model which go 
beyond traditional sociological theories of action, the rational-choice framework, and modern 
dual-processing accounts. Generally speaking, all model parameters are associated with each 
other and linked to each other, thereby jointly influencing the mode-selection threshold. That 
is, the postulation of interaction effects between the model parameters is a model-inherent fea-
ture which always has to be accounted for, and which can be predicted in its direction and 
scope (see Kroneberg 2011a: 151f., 2011b, and chapter 6 below). A most important implica-
tion of the model concerns the maintenance of unconditional routine, and its interplay with the 
cost-benefit structure of a situation. More specifically, the adaptive rationality approach de-
veloped here delivers specific answers to the question of how “high stakes,” impact the pro-
cessing mode and the decisions of an actor, and how incentives interplay with other parame-
ters, such as script internalization and chronic frame accessibility. 
According to the economic “low-cost hypothesis” (Diekmann & Preisendörfer 1992, 2003, 
Rauhut & Krumpal 2008), norm compliance is dependent on the cost and benefits associated 
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with its implementation—the probability of norm compliance decreases with increasing costs. 
This is in fact a very general feature of all traditional and broad RCT approaches: norms are 
part of the cost-benefit calculations that rational actors carry out. Thus, there is always a 
“price” to norm compliance which, if too high, will be outweighed by the prospective gains of 
not following the norm (or attitude). According to the economic low-cost hypothesis, attitude-
conforming behavior can be expected in low-cost situations only. Looking at the mode selec-
tion threshold, we can see that a high match (the match mi approaches the value of one) can 
trigger the automatic mode even if the direct cost of doing so becomes very high and has se-
vere utility-related consequences. This effect is even more pronounced if no opportunities ex-
ist or if the decision process has high cognitive costs C in addition. The special role of the 
match and the categorizations delivered by the associative memory system in restricting and 
diminishing the influence of instrumental concerns is a feature which also contradicts the clas-
sical “Theory of Reasoned Action” (Ajzen & Fishbein 1980) and the “Theory of Planned Be-
havior” (Ajzen 1985), it is not predicted in generic dual-process models (Mayerl 2010). 
The conceptualization of the match itself reveals another important difference. The magnitude 
of the match mi depends on the chronic accessibility of a mental schema (ai), its link to situa-
tional objects (li) and the presence of situational objects (oi). Together, these are necessary 
conditions for a high match, and we can predict an interaction between them: a high match 
(and the selection of the automatic mode) relies both on the presence of situational cues as 
well as a high chronic accessibility of related mental schemata and their mental association. In 
contrast, the influence of situational cues is expected to decrease in generic dual-process ac-
counts with increasing chronic accessibility of an attitude (Mayerl 2010: 42). All in all, the 
model presents a range of theoretically new and contrasting hypotheses with respect to the 
cognition-behavior link to trust which have not been developed in, and are not covered by, 
existing dual-process theories and the rational choice framework. 
4.6. Explaining Conditional and Unconditional Trust 
From the perspective of adaptive rationality, the prominent conceptualizations of interpersonal 
trust found in the literature appear to be much less conflicting than they seem prima facie. 
One fundamental ingredient in a broadened understanding of the phenomenon is the assump-
tion of adaptive rationality on the part of the trustor and trustee, which must be respected and 
explained as an endogenous parameter during trust development. Research across many disci-
plines has demonstrated that human rationality is not only bounded, but also flexible and high-
ly adaptive. If we want to advance our understanding of the phenomenon of trust, we have to 
take these insights to the heart of our theory, that is, to the microlevel theory of action, to the 
actor models we apply—to trustor and trustee—and to the decision-logic and micro-mirco-
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transition that follows. If we take the notion of adaptive rationality to be central to human 
cognition, then all aspects of interaction must be regarded from that perspective.  
If we think about the different “types” of trust that have been put forth by trust researchers 
from the perspective of adaptive rationality, it is obvious that the most important difference 
between them is the degree of rationality involved (e.g. calculus-based; conditional trust ver-
sus affect-based, institution-based, or rule-based trust; and so forth). In essence, adaptive ra-
tionality is a central dimension of the trust concept. We cannot understand trust without refer-
ence to adaptive rationality and individual processing states, and without understanding the 
underlying mechanisms and processes governing their selection. The framework that will be 
developed in the following can be used to derive and explain both unconditional forms of trust 
(trust without doubtful and conscious elaboration), and conditional forms of trust (in which 
the trustor subjectively faces the trust problem and elaborates on his future course of action). 
More importantly, the framework we will develop aims for a specification of the conditions 
that must be met in order for the one or the other type of trust to emerge.  
The MFS, by providing a very general perspective on rationality and decision making, allows 
trust researchers to reinterpret seemingly contradictory and disconnected concepts under the 
common umbrella of adaptive rationality. To see how we can join existing theory and remedy 
theoretical problems, it is instructive to review Luhmann’s analytical separation of trust, fa-
miliarity, and confidence and to contrast his approach to the social-psychological perspective. 
All of them being “different modes of asserting expectations—different types, as it were, of 
self-assurance” (Luhmann 1988: 99), the three concepts proposed by Luhmann describe dif-
ferent ways of dealing with ambiguity, a state in which actors regularly remain incapable of 
action. Trust, according to Luhmann, manifests itself in a “particular style of attitude” (ibid. 
27), but, in contrast to confidence, requires a conscious acceptance of risk. For this reason, 
Luhmann is often pushed into the corner of rational choice and appropriated by rational 
choice advocates (e.g. Hardin 1993, Sztompka 1999: 60). However, Luhmann is unequivocal 
in that he does not address a rational choice of action with his statements. As he states in the 
last chapter of his book:  
“If one were to take as a yardstick the concept of rationality in decision-making theories—be it that of the rational 
choice in the employment of means, or that of optimizing—one would from the outset fall into a too narrow concep-
tual frame of reference which cannot do justice to the facts of trust. Trust is not a means that can be chosen for partic-
ular ends, much less an end/means structure capable of being optimized. Nor is trust a prediction, the correctness of 
which could be measured when the predicted event occurs and after some experience reduced to a probability value 
[...] Trust is, however, something other than a reasonable assumption on which to decide correctly, and for this reason 
models for calculating correct decisions miss the point of the question of trust” (Luhmann 1988: 88). 
Luhmann is uniquely concerned with the problem of interpretation and the definition of the 
situation. Recasting his ideas within the MFS, we see that his concept of confidence equates to 
frame selection in the automatic mode, while his concept of trust describes frame selection in 
the rational mode. Quite generally, we can hypothesize that actors will use a larger share of 
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their cognitive resources when defining situations in the rational mode, accompanied by a se-
lective focus of attention. The trustor then consciously perceives the trust problem; he knows 
that the result depends on the actions of the trustee and that a failure of trust is among the trus-
tee’s viable options. In the case of trustful action, the trustor nevertheless defines the situation 
sufficiently confidently as to reassure himself about the reasonability of his trusting choice. 
But with the concept of adaptive rationality at hand, we see that Luhmann’s conceptualization 
is limited and incomplete. His analytical separation of confidence from trust categorically ex-
cludes any notion of “unconditional” trust, which other researchers claim to be a primary 
characteristic of the phenomenon. It also warrants the question of what the difference between 
confidence and familiarity really is (Endress 2001). 
In contrast, recent social-psychological work has objected to Luhmann’s position, and linked 
trust to the routine use of simple inference rules, while claiming that distrust (not trust!) en-
tails the nonroutine mode of information processing, a deliberate assessment of expectations 
of trustworthiness, and of the intentions of the trustee (Schul et al 2008). Trust and distrust 
are, in essence, conceptualized as endpoints on a continuum of information-processing states 
of the cognitive system which are linked to particular subjective experience of the trust prob-
lem:  
“When a state of trust is active, one tends to believe, to follow the immediate implications of the given information. 
In contrast, when a state of distrust is active, one tends to search for non-obvious alternative interpretations of the 
given information, because distrust is associated with concealment of truth. Thus, in distrust, the mental system be-
comes more open to the possibility that the ordinary schema typically used to interpret the ongoing situation may 
need to be adjusted” (Schul et al. 2008: 2).  
In this perspective, interpretation and the use of inference rules, as well as the behavioral re-
sponse, are also fixed to the state of information processing, but in a way completely opposite 
to that proposed by Luhmann. When approximating a favorable and unambiguous definition 
of the situation, the spontaneous use of schemata becomes more likely.
18
 Empirically, Krueger 
et al. (2007) also show that different neuronal systems become active in trust decisions, de-
pending on the processing strategy which trustors use to make the choice: “Conditional trust 
assumes that one’s partner is self-interested and estimates the expected value of past deci-
sions; ... it is cognitively more costly to maintain. In contrast, unconditional trust assumes that 
one’s partner is trustworthy and updates the value of one’s partner with respect to their char-
acteristics and past performance, ... it is cognitively less costly to maintain” (ibid. 1).  
                                                 
18 “Psychologically, this means that in the former case [of full trust], individuals believe that the other has only benign inten-
tions, shares their interest totally, and what he or she says is unquestionably valid. In the case of extreme distrust, individ-
uals are equally confident that the other’s intentions are totally malign, his or her interests are wholly incompatible with 
their won, and what he or she asserts is best interpreted according to a theory they have about how, given the situation, 
others would likely try to dupe them” (Schul et al. 2008: 9). 
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The notion of adaptive rationality in interpretation and choice helps to reconcile such contra-
dictory positions, because it suggests that interpretation, choice, and the degree of rationality 
involved in either stage must be treated as analytically separate and distinct, yet at the same 
time flexible. In short, actors can flexibly use different “routes to trust.” With respect to the 
problem of interpersonal trust, the subjective definition of the situation is central. Interpreta-
tion precedes the formation and stabilization of expectations of trustworthiness, and it affords 
a restriction of the feasible set of alternatives by activating trust-related mental schemata. This 
enables a significant reduction of social complexity. But this process can be automatic or ra-
tional, conscious or unconscious—trustors need not necessarily be aware of the trust problem 
and the relevant expectations of trustworthiness. In concluding interpretation, they have nev-
ertheless acquired a particular attitude towards the situation which structures their perspective. 
The more problematic the definition of the situation has been, the more likely it is that the au-
tomatic process of pattern recognition has been truncated. Conditional and unconditional be-
havioral trusting strategies can be used by trustors in the aftermath of interpretation. The mode 
of action selection then depends on how unambiguously the situation could be defined, and 
how strongly the activated scripts and other schemata regulate action.  
A conceptualization of trust along the dimension of adaptive rationality, paired with an analyt-
ic separation of interpretation from choice, exemplifies how trust can be understood as a 
mechanism for the reduction of social complexity, and it gives meaning and substance to the 
notion of “suspension” and the “leap of faith.” If we scrutinize the model to answer the ques-
tion of where complexity is effectively reduced, the process of frame selection and the defini-
tion of the situation naturally acquire the most important role (see Möllering 2006a, b). Fram-
ing processes are directly connected to the formation of expectations of trustworthiness, to a 
shaping of the “initial beliefs,” preferences, and the activation of trust-related schemata, as 
well as emotional programs and values which orient trustful behavior, once they become acti-
vated. But all this can happen spontaneously and without any allocation of attention. It can 
likewise occur with a conscious capture of attention, and in controlled elaboration. 
Situations can be defined right from the outset in such a way that the trustworthiness of the 
trustee is subjectively never questioned. A prominent example would be dyadically embedded 
exchange relationships, for example a friendship or a partnership. Models of interpersonal 
trust development (see chapter 3.1.4) can be abstractly understood as the emergence and for-
mation of shared relational schemata which serve as a trust frame for the relationship. They 
include attributes of trust and trustworthiness and organize the particular trust relation (see 
chapter 5 below). Similarly to an attitude towards others, trust, in this sense, must be learned 
and rooted in the memory system in the form of trust-related knowledge. This argument also 
applies to forms of institution-based trust in which a trustee receives a favorable attribution of 
trustworthiness in that the trustor can apply a learned categorization (a stereotype, a social 
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role) or because the interaction takes place in a context where norms and institutions serve as 
“rounding framework of trust” (Giddens 1990) in that their relevance and structural assurance 
is recognized and met with a sufficiently strong chronic accessibility of corresponding scripts. 
Another instance would be everyday routines that involve trust problems which have been 
previously solved, and now belong to the world of the typical. That is to say, “suspension” 
and the “leap of faith” occur at the interpretive stage of frame and script selection, and they 
must be principally understood as a synonym for the automatic activation of relevant trust-
related knowledge. We “leap” into trust and “suspend” uncertainty when a schema that har-
bors sufficiently confident expectations is automatically activated during interpretation. Adap-
tive rationality and context-dependent mode selections are the key mechanisms behind the 
“leap of faith.”  
Focusing on the selection of actions, we can use the notion of “unconditional trust” even with 
reference to action and observable behavior. That is, the choice of a trusting act can also be 
automatic if action selection occurs following the activation of a sufficiently regulative script 
(for example a rule, role, or routine). The mode selection thresholds indicate that this case is 
tied to more stringent preconditions concerning the internalization of mental schemata, their 
temporary accessibility, and the degree of regulation of relevant scripts. In short, the complete 
causal chain of ideal-type “blind” and unconditional trust is located in the context-dependent 
mode selections from frame and script to action selection; it extends from interpretation to 
choice. In this sense, unconditional trust does in fact equate to a reduction, or “suspension,” of 
risk and ambiguity into subjective certainty, by means of “overdrawing” information as a re-
sult of mode selection and automatic schema application (see chapter 2.2.3). 
On the other hand, we can also think of trust in terms of the rational and analytic processing of 
information, and we need to separately address the stages of interpretation and choice again. 
For one, if the situation cannot be defined automatically, the trustor has to engage in a more 
elaborate process of interpretation. This has several consequences: first, the trustor necessarily 
becomes conscious of the trust problem. The failure of pattern recognition will be experienced 
in terms of low processing fluency and the “doubtful” intervention of the rational system. In 
scrutinizing the situation, the fact that the choice of a trusting act involves a risk and entails 
vulnerabilities will enter the subjective experience of the trustor. Second, given that the ra-
tional system intervenes, the formation of appropriateness beliefs can be directly related to the 
generation of trustworthiness expectations, because “appropriateness,” in the context of the 
trust problem, concerns the question of whether or not the situation can be appropriately de-
fined as one in which trustworthiness is warranted. In doing so, the trustor compares and eval-
uates different potential interpretations which make use of relevant trust-related knowledge, in 
order to assess the trustee’s trustworthiness. Additionally, rational elaboration of the trust 
problem entails that the trustor, during interaction, acquires additional individuating infor-
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mation about the trustee, and performs assessments of trustee characteristics in order to scru-
tinize his trust-warranting properties of benevolence, integrity, ability, and predictability. 
To this end, the trustor accesses and tests a range of available schemata (i.e. stereotypes, roles) 
for their appropriateness, retrieves individuating trust-related information, and scrutinizes the 
situation for the “situational strength” of normative regulation, for structural assurance, situa-
tional normality, and so on. Of course, he may still arrive at a conclusion that trustworthiness 
expectations, as suggested by the immediate categorization, are still valid and applicable. But 
schema-driven categorizations can be “overridden” by the intervention of the rational system. 
Adopting a very general view on the phenomenon, we cannot, in advance, determine which 
particular category of trust-related knowledge will become relevant in a specific situation—all 
we can say is that their activation is guided by a controlled reasoning process, and that, sub-
jectively, the trustor’s inference will accumulate and feed into his “feeling of rightness” with 
respect to the choice of a trusting act. Trust then is “bothersome” (Messick & Kramer 2001), 
and may be accompanied by anxiety, deference, and doubt. In this sense, conditional trust 
does in fact equate to a reduction of ambiguity into risk by assessing appropriate knowledge 
(see chapter 2.2.3).  
Once the situation is defined, the trustor must make a decision. In the ideal-type case of condi-
tional trust, this also happens in the rational mode of information processing. Economic mod-
els of trust and trustworthiness can be used for explaining the choice of a trusting act whenev-
er the elaborated mode of information processing prevails in the final stage of action selection. 
The trustor will then consciously weigh costs and benefits according to his expectations, and 
will finally make his decision on the choice of a trusting act. If the context of the trust prob-
lem indicates the relevance of social norms, then social preference models can be utilized to 
explain the choice of a trusting act, meaning that norms are treated as additional arguments in 
the extended calculations executed by trustor and trustee. 
Note that, as the stages of interpretation and choice are principally independent, a rational def-
inition of the situation need not accumulate into the rational choice of the trusting act, nor vice 
versa. Imagine, for example, that the situation is initially ambiguous simply because of 
“noise” with respect to the situational cues. During a rational interpretation, the trustor can 
reduce the noise and filter the relevant cues which allow for the activation of some appropriate 
frame. Given that the selected frame has a strongly regulating script attached to it, the choice 
of a trusting act may nevertheless be performed automatically, even when the situation has 
initially been defined in the rational mode. Similarly, a situation that is unambiguous with re-
spect to interpretation may not regulate a trustful course of action to a satisfying degree (i.e. 
low structural assurance, an open script). Then the choice of a trusting act will be conditional, 
but the expectations used by the trustor during his rational choice have been preconsciously 
structured by automatic interpretive processes.  
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From this dualistic perspective, it is easy to follow critiques of the rational choice approach to 
trust, which often condemn a systematic neglect of the full range of the phenomenon (Lewis 
& Weigert 1985b, Williamson 1993, Endress 2002, Möllering 2006b). Instrumental cost-
benefit considerations with respect to the consequence of action must be understood as being 
merely one special case. Conceptually, the term “trust” can be used in two very different 
ways. On the one hand, it can refer to the structuring of perception and the definition of the 
situation. In this reading, “trust” stands for the formation and stabilization of favorable expec-
tations embedded in stored mental schemata which contain trust-related knowledge. But we 
can use the term with reference to the aspect of action and choice, more specifically, with re-
spect to the choice of a trusting act. In this case, the trustor has defined the situation already, 
and is concerned with the selection of script and action.
19
 In acknowledging adaptive ration-
ality, we must conclude that either step can occur automatically or rationally.  
Trust researchers have difficulties in integrating their theoretical contributions precisely be-
cause the analysis is usually limited to only one stage (interpretation or choice), assuming one 
mode of information processing (automatic or rational), and fully neglecting the potential 
adaptivity thereof. Trustors, if the definition of the situation is automatic, do not perceive the 
trust problem as such, because the situation can be confidently defined according to existing 
knowledge structures which include relevant favorable expectations. In the ideal-type case, 
even the selection of action and the choice of a trusting act occur automatically. This is the 
idea of “blind” trust warranted on routine grounds that suppresses vulnerability and suspends 
doubt from subjective perception, and is not accessible to the actor—only a failure of trust 
will trigger the trustor’s realization that a trust problem did indeed exist.  
Taken together, in adopting the MFS perspective of adaptive rationality paired with the ana-
lytical separation of interpretation from choice, trust research is equipped with a theoretical 
framework that can be used for the explanation of a broad range of phenomena related to ob-
servable trusting choices and trustworthy responses. This necessitates a rethinking and rede-
velopment of the terminology of trust. “Automatic” and “rational” processes may co-occur 
within the trust problem, and when theorizing about trust, we have to be clear as to whether 
we address interpretation or choice, rational or automatic modes of information processing. 
The perspective of trust and adaptive rationality developed here also warrants that trust is 
highly dynamic (this is issue will be further explored in chapter 5). 
                                                 
19 Hardin’s explication of the trust-action relation is a prime example: “Trust is not a risk or a gamble. It is, of course, risky to 
put myself in a position to be harmed or benefited by another. But I do not calculate the risk and then additionally decide 
to trust you; my estimation of the risk is my degree of trust in you. Again, I do not typically choose to trust and therefore 
act. Rather, I do trust and therefore choose to act” (Hardin 1993: 516). His statement indicates that trust is “already in 
place” when a choice is made—the process of interpretation is implicitly taken for granted. 
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Generally speaking, we are concerned with the selection of a trust frame Ft, which the trustor 
can use to unambiguously define a trust problem. A trust frame entails sufficiently favorable 
expectations of trustworthiness. As will be argued in the next chapter, relational schemata, by 
means of which actors frame their personal social relationships, are a particularly important 
type of trust frame for interpersonal trust. The framing of the situation with the help of a trust 
frame therefore entails, in the ideal-type case, a subjectively unambiguous and favorable ex-
pectation of trustworthiness, which may (or may not) be part of subjective experience. If the 
trust frame is selected in the rational mode, the trustor perceives the trustee as trustworthy, 
because his favorable expectations exceed the subjective threshold necessary for inducing 
trust. Thus, concerning a trust frame Fi, we assume that:  
(1) A trust frame is linked to an appropriate script, that is, aj|k=1.  (A1) 
(2) The script regulates action to a high degree, such that ak|j=1.  (A2) 
Since the trustor can activate a script that sufficiently regulates action (for example, the reci-
procity norm, rules of friendship, an appropriate social role), there is no doubt as to what the 
appropriate course of action is—namely, trusting act and trustworthy response—should the 
trustor start to consciously elaborate on the trust problem in the rational mode. A trust frame, 
in the ideal case, contains knowledge that suggests a favorable trustworthy response by defini-
tion. 
In a given trust problem, the success of pattern recognition and the degree of ambiguity expe-
rienced is represented by the match mt. Thus, when thinking about the activation of a trust 
frame, we can write the thresholds for the automatic mode for the process of frame and action 
selection, using A1 and A2, as: 
(1) Frame Selection: mt > 1 – C / p * (Urc+Cf) 
(2) Action Selection: mt * aj > 1 – C / p * (Urc+Cf) 
The unconditional choice of a trusting act occurs whenever mi * aj > 1 – C / p*(Urc+Cf). If the 
threshold for the automatic selection of a trust frame is satisfied, interpretation, and choice are 
automatic. This demonstrates the “leap of faith” in trust, as occurring on the level of mode se-
lection. The trust problem itself does not get a “grip on the mind” of the trustor, and neither 
does his expectation of trustworthiness. On the other hand, rational elaboration during inter-
pretation will foster a conscious perception of the trust problem. In the case of rational action 
selection, trustors will engage in cost-benefit considerations similar to those proposed in eco-
nomic theory, respecting, for example, both the direct and indirect costs of norm compliance 
and defection. This additional cognitive effort can be saved if trust is automatic, in which case 
the trustor chooses a trusting act without any further scrutiny of the trust problem. Both possi-
bilities lead to the observable behavioral outcome: the choice of a trusting act. The trustor can 
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also choose to distrust. However, this entails an activation of the rational system, harboring 
doubt, and a breakdown in the routine of pattern recognition. Distrust is always “reflective,” 
in that the trustor will, at least for a minimum of time, pay attention to the fact that a trust 
problem exists, even if distrust occurs swiftly, or even “automatically”, for example, because 
a relevant stereotype has been activated. The following picture schematically displays the 
complete model of trust and adaptive rationality as specified in this section (figure 17): 
Figure 17: The model of trust and adaptive rationality 
 
In most general terms, we can define trust as an actor’s definition of the situation that involves 
the activation of mental schemata sufficient for the generation of a favorable expectation of 
trustworthiness and the subsequent conditional or unconditional choice of a trusting act. This 
definition is, of course, very general and does not take care of the respective content of trust-
related knowledge. The “typological” specification of trust depends on what category of trust-
related knowledge is being used, and in which mode of information processing it is applied. 
Note that the present definition merges psychological aspects and a notion of trust as a “state 
of mind” with the behavioral aspect of action. It includes the aspect of intentionality, once we 
keep in mind that expectations are a precursor to intentions—however, the “willingness to be 
vulnerable” and the inherent intentionality rise to conscious perception only in the rational 
mode. The choice of a trusting act can causally be traced back to an attempt at rational infer-
ence, at assessing trustee characteristics, and rationally weighing the expected costs and bene-
fits of action and the activation of specific expectations, as well as to a routine execution of 
trust-related knowledge (relational schemata, rules, roles, routines) and a reliance on heuristic 
shortcuts in interpretation and choice. In the case of unconditional trust, “reassurance” and the 
“leap of faith” take place on the level of mode selection (!), the parameters of which display 
the individual’s history of learning and socialization. Only in the case of conditional trust will 
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trustors consciously access the expectation of trustworthiness. In this case, the context deter-
mines the relevance of trust-related knowledge and enables, via appropriateness beliefs, the 
formation and generation of expectations of trustworthiness. The model of trust thus put for-
ward incorporates and reductively explains both types of conditional and unconditional trust. 
4.7. Theoretical and Empirical Implications 
The model of trust and adaptive rationality bears a number of theoretical and empirical impli-
cations. In this section, I will derive a number of general propositions and prepare for an em-
pirical test. As it is, the mode-selection threshold for the automatic selection of an action k, 
given frame i and script j, can be written as: AW(Ak) = mi * aj|i * aj * ak|j > 1 – C / (p * 
(Urc+Cw)). Principally, to see how the mode-selection threshold is affected by a parameter 
change, one can vary the desired parameter, holding all other variables constant, and analyze 
its effect on the threshold. For example, a decrease in opportunity p will always lower the val-
ue of the right-hand side of the threshold. For a given match, mental effort, opportunity cost 
and motivation, this implies that the likelihood of a selection in the automatic mode increases. 
We will systematically develop such propositions in the following.
20
  
To demonstrate how the model can be used to derive these general propositions, it is helpful 
to simplify the threshold using assumptions A1 and A2 (see chapter 4.6). Assume that we are 
looking at a social norm as a source of trust-related knowledge. If a norm is appropriate in the 
social situation which constitutes the trust problem, then the above threshold can be simpli-
fied, because (A1) the adopted trust frame Fi will unequivocally prompt to the script of the 
norm, so that the temporary accessibility of the normative script aj|i=1, and (A2) the norm, will 
unequivocally regulate the course of action. For example, in the case of a reciprocity norm, a 
trustworthy response is normatively demanded, prompting to a trustful choice, and thus ak|j=1. 
In this case, the choice of a trusting act is unconditional and rule-based whenever 
mi * aj > 1 – C / (p * (Urc+Cw)) 
Note assumptions A1 and A2 were already established when defining an ideal-type trust 
frame, which (1) unambiguously defines a trustee as trustworthy, (2) includes favorable ex-
pectation of trustworthiness and (3) prompts to the choice of a trusting act as a unique course 
of action. The trust frame Fi, by definition, involves aj|i = ak|j =1. From this model, a number of 
propositions can be derived. First, in analyzing the effect of the match mi, it is easy to see that,  
                                                 
20 Apart from propositions about simple main effects, the multiplicative link between the model parameters suggests that 
there exist a number of interaction effects. These will be developed in full detail in chapter 6. 
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Proposition 1 (ambiguity): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in a 
trust problem increases with the match mi of a relevant trust frame i. 
This proposition addresses the process of pattern-recognition in the stage of interpretation, and 
the aspect of “situational normality” as a basis for trust. If the situation is ambiguous and ini-
tial categorization yields only a low activation weight of the trust frame (a low match mi), 
then the process of smooth pattern-recognition will be disturbed and actors will have to en-
gage in a more elaborate process of interpretation. This also reduces the likelihood of a subse-
quent unconditional choice of a trusting act, since the match is carried over into the stage of 
action selection. Broadly speaking, proposition 1 establishes situational normality as a basis 
for trust, as mirrored in the question of a high versus low match of a trust frame.  
Importantly, the subjective (un-)ambiguity represented in the match can have several reasons: 
actors may lack the appropriate knowledge to interpret the situation, they may be unable to 
link the available situational cues to the frames stored in memory, “noise” may make it diffi-
cult to interpret the cues, or relevant cues may themselves be absent or ambiguous. Thus, to be 
more precise, we can to decompose the match into its constituents. As it is, mi = ai * li * oi and 
a high match depends both on the chronic accessibility of a frame, its link to situational ob-
jects, and their unambiguous presence as an object in the situation. Thus, we can furthermore 
state that, 
Proposition 1.1 (frame accessibility): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting 
act in a trust problem increases with the chronic accessibility ai of a relevant trust frame.  
Proposition 1.2 (cues): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in a trust 
problem increases with the presence of cues oi indicating the appropriateness of relevant a 
trust frame. 
Proposition 1.3 (link): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in a trust 
problem increases with the link li between salient situational objects and a relevant trust 
frame. 
“Salience” here refers to salience in Higgins´ sense (see section 4.2.1). As we know, there can 
be internal (top-down) and external (bottom-up) reasons for a shift of attention to a particular 
stimulus. How precisely a situational object reaches the focus of attention and attains situa-
tional salience is, of course, an empirical question. The important point is that some objects 
will be perceived and thus be salient in the stage of interpretation, and some initial categoriza-
tion will be made based on the spreading activation that these stimuli trigger. The link li refers 
to the “associative strength” (Fazio 2001, 2007) between situational objects and the mental 
model of the initial categorization.  
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Next, the model also predicts an effect of script-internalization. The parameter aj captures the 
chronic accessibility of a relevant script; for example, that of a trust-related norm. If it is high, 
the script including the norm will be readily accessible given a definition of the situation that 
indicates its appropriateness. Thus,  
Proposition 2 (script internalization): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting 
act in a trust problem increases with the chronic accessibility aj of a relevant script. 
In fact, since we have aj|i = ak|j =1, the degree of internalization is a crucially decisive factor 
governing the conditionality or un-conditionality of trust. Of course, in a more general exam-
ple, we would also have to address the question of temporary accessibility aj|i and, if the script 
was not a norm, its degree of regulation aj|k. These have been ruled out in the simplifying ex-
ample of an ideal-type trust frame; the corresponding additional propositions can be easily 
deduced.  
Together, the match mi of the frame and chronic accessibility aj of the script define the left-
hand side (the activation weight AW) of the mode-selection threshold. Further propositions 
can be derived when looking at the right-hand side and the remaining parameters. To begin 
with,  
Proposition 3 (opportunity): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in a 
trust problem increases with decreasing opportunity p to activate the rational mode. 
Most importantly, this addresses an aspect of situational opportunity in the form of time pres-
sure and cognitive load and its related individual-intrinsic counterparts of cognitive capacity. 
For example, opportunity is low with high time-pressure or when there is high cognitive load 
(a concurrent processing of several tasks, for example). Similarly, opportunity can be low if 
thematic opportunity is absent, that is, if thematic knowledge with respect to a given decision 
problem is missing and the individual ability to make an appropriate judgment in a certain 
thematic domain is deemed insufficient. A lack of opportunity increases the likelihood of the 
activation of the automatic mode and use of heuristics. On the other hand, if opportunities do 
exist, then actors are more likely to engage in the rational mode because it is feasible. This 
proposition refers to both the stages of interpretation and choice alike.  
Furthermore, the mental effort and costs C incurred with the activation of the rational mode 
are relevant to trust. From the threshold, we see that:  
Proposition 4 (effort): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in a trust 
problem increases with the effort C associated with the activation of the rational mode. 
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Activating the rational mode always incurs some costs in the form of time and energy con-
sumption. A situational factor that crucially influences this parameter is task complexity 
(Payne et al. 1992). A very complex task involves a large number of mental operations which 
have to be carried out in order to solve the problem at hand, increasing the perceived effort 
and mental costs associated with an elaborate processing mode. Note that task complexity can 
vary between different instances of a trust problem. Even when the necessary basic steps of 
interpretation do not add “excessive” demands on the cognitive system, the structure and 
complexity of the trust problem vary, for example with social embeddedness. Nevertheless, a 
rational elaboration during interpretation and choice will unescapably incur some effort which 
only a selection in the automatic mode can liberate the actors of.  
There is also an individual-intrinsic aspect of effort and mental costs. It can be interpreted as 
being determined by individual cognitive ability. Different individuals may experience a dif-
ferent effort associated with the same task, simply because their cognitive abilities differ. 
Consequentially, they will associate different costs with a reflective reasoning process in the 
rational mode, both with respect to interpretation and choice. Low cognitive ability individu-
als may therefore be more prone to use unconditional trusting strategies. Thus, the cost pa-
rameter can also be interpreted as capturing an inter-individually stable difference:  
Proposition 5 (motivation): The probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in a 
trust problem decreases with the motivation to activate the rational mode. 
In the model, motivation is captured by the two components Urc and Cf, which represent, re-
spectively, the additional utility that the identification of a correct frame or action yields, giv-
en that the initial categorization is wrong (Urc), and the disutility of making an inference error 
by following a wrong initial categorization (Cf). Jointly, they represent the opportunity cost of 
making an error and therefore translate into the motivation to engage in a more elaborate rea-
soning process. To abbreviate, simply write (Urc+Cf) = U. The values of the parameters de-
pend on the incentive structure of the trust problem and on the initial categorization that a 
trustor adopts. 
An interesting implication of the model is the following: depending on whether the initial cat-
egorization suggests trust or distrust, that is, harbors a favorable or unfavorable expectation of 
trustworthiness, the trustor will attend to a different part of the incentive structure of the trust 
problem as a motivational basis during mode-selection. In short, a “trustful” and favorable 
initial categorization will push a trustor into focusing on the potential harm that a failure of 
unconditional trust can have, and the potential utility increase of withholding trust. On the 
other hand, a “distrustful” and unfavorable initial categorization will focus the trustor´s moti-
vation around the potential benefits of a trustworthy response and the potential utility increase 
it affords as compared to the status quo. That is, different parts of the incentive structure will 
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become relevant to mode-selection in terms of motivation, depending on the initial assessment 
of trustworthiness (we can furthermore assume that the potential harms of failed trust always 
come to the attention of the trustor whenever an elaborated reasoning process has been initiat-
ed). 
To see why this is the case, remember that the trustor can receive “reward” payoffs R if the 
trustee is trustworthy, incur “sucker” payoffs S if the trustee fails trust, and can opt for “pun-
ishment” outcomes P if he distrusts and maintains the status quo (the payoff relation is 
S<P<R).  
It is easy to see that, if the initial categorization mi defines the trustee as trustworthy (it pro-
vides a favorable assessment of trustworthiness), then Cf = |P–S|, which represents the experi-
enced disutility relative to the status quo that the unconditional choice of a trusting act and a 
subsequent betrayal of trust yield to the trustor. Furthermore, Ui = R, that is, following the ini-
tial categorization yields the reward payoffs when the trustee is in fact trustworthy; and lastly, 
Urc = P, because the trustor can reach the status quo payoffs and prevent the sucker payoff if 
he switches into an unfavorable assessment if the trustee is indeed not trustworthy. Thus, U = 
(Urc + Cf) = (P + |P-S|). Note that, for a favorable initial categorization, it is especially the po-
tential harm S of a failure of trust and the status quo scenario P that matter as a motivational 
determinant of mode-selection. 
In contrast, if the initial categorization suggests that the trustee is not trustworthy, then Cf = 
|P–R|, that is, the trustor makes a wrong decision by sticking to his initial categorization 
whenever the trustee is in fact trustworthy. The trustor then incurs an opportunity cost because 
he forfeits the potential gain R that he could have attained if he had not followed his initial 
categorization realizing the status quo payoffs P. Secondly, Ui = P, because the trustor can 
reach the status quo payoffs whenever he follows his initial categorization in a state of the 
world where the trustee is in fact not trustworthy. Lastly, Urc = R, that is, the trustor can im-
prove his utility from P to R if he revises his initial judgment and switches to a favorable as-
sessment when the trustee is in fact trustworthy. All in all, we have U = (Urc + Cf) = (R + |P–
R|). In other words, it is especially the potential gain R and the status quo scenario P that are 
relevant as a motivational basis for a trustor in the case of an unfavorable initial categoriza-
tion. 
R and S represent a situational aspect of motivation and what is “at stake” for the trustor. If 
the content of the trust relation is about an issue that is of high importance and promises high 
utility for the trustor, much can be gained, but much can also be lost. A failure of trust struc-
turally involves “sucker” payoffs S which relatively put the trustor in a worse position than 
distrust and the maintenance of the status quo P (see chapter 3.3.3). Therefore, when the trust 
problem structurally involves a high utility-increase |P–R|, in the case of a trustworthy re-
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sponse, and a high utility decrease |P–S|, in the case of failure, the activation of the rational 
mode and a subsequent conditional choice of a trusting act become more likely because the 
motivation to engage in the rational mode is high. Although we cannot know which initial 
categorization a trustor will adopt a priori, we can summarize both aspects of the incentive 
structure – the rewards R and the sucker payoffs S, relative to the status quo, as two important 
structural-situational components of cognitive motivation U. 
There is more to this – relatively technical – argument. As we have seen, many authors argue 
that trust is often warranted as a “default” strategy (Luhmann 1979: 73, Jones & George 1998, 
Hill & O´Hara 2006, Keren 2007, Schul et al. 2008) because it is cognitively less costly to 
maintain, often culturally pre-defined as a socially shared rule and therefore preferred to ini-
tial distrust. At the same time, social psychological approaches sketch the human cognitive 
system as being built around a type of “default-interventionist” architecture (Kahnemann 
2003, Evans 2008). Therefore, it may come to no surprise that most conceptualizations of trust 
emphasize the aspect of vulnerability over that of the potential gain involved in trust. If the 
above holds true, then our cognitive system is biased towards a potential detection of the 
harms involved in the trust problem, because a trustworthy initial categorization is adopted 
“by default”. Structurally, it is the potential loss we can incur that is relevant to the mode-
selection of interpretation and choice, given that we start from a default assumption of trust-
worthiness. A number of experimental studies have been concerned with the effects of “stake 
sizes” on decision-making and problem solving, and the results overall point into a direction 
that conforms to proposition P5.
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Propositions P1-P5 concentrate on main-effects that can be derived from a comparative-static 
analysis of the model without looking at any interactive effects between the variables. In addi-
tion, a number of corollary propositions can be derived from P1-P5. To begin with, a trust-
frame, in the ideal-type case, entails a favorable expectation of trustworthiness. If the frame is 
unambiguously valid, then there is no doubt about the trustworthiness of the trustee. In other 
words, the degree of ambiguity experienced in the situation by the trustor will directly influ-
ence the expectation of trustworthiness, and the match mi can be regarded as a direct equiva-
lent of the expectation of trustworthiness. If a trust frame is unambiguously valid, then expec-
tations of trustworthiness can be stabilized at a favorable value of the expectation. 
Proposition 6 (interpretation/expectation): The trustor´s expectation of trustworthiness in-
creases with the match mi of a relevant trust frame.  
                                                 
21 This issue is more fully explored in section 6.2.3 below. 
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The pattern-recognition of stored mental models and the natural assessment of the match and 
processing fluency involve the context-sensitive application of knowledge under the head-
note of adaptive rationality. Thus, P6 reformulates the suggestion that frames could explain 
the formation of initial beliefs (in that “frames move beliefs move choice”, Batigalli & 
Dufwenberg 2009) and it delivers an explanation for the context-dependency of these initial 
beliefs. However, this observation is traced back to the “appropriateness” of trust-related 
knowledge and use of endogenous adaptive rationality. In addition to assuming that choice is 
preceded by a framing stage, the model states that framing simultaneously influences the sub-
sequent degree of rationality. At the same time, the match defines the appropriateness beliefs 
of the trustee, and therefore fixes expectations and second-order beliefs. This “analogy” be-
tween the match and expectations can be established because we have defined a relevant trust-
frame to include a favorable expectation of trustworthiness. In this way, appropriateness and 
expectations coincide. If the trustor switches to the rational mode, then the expectation of 
trustworthiness will be a consciously perceived representation of the appropriateness belief pi. 
We also have seen that unconditional selections (of frames, scripts, actions) are based on the 
re-cognition of stored mental schemata and their routine automatic application, in which a di-
rect link from associative memory to behavior, via spreading activation and respective activa-
tion weights, does exist. An automatic selection of an action describes a completely different 
“logic of selection” than that of an instrumental choice. The automatic use of stored schemata 
follows the activation weights, whereby the influence of instrumental variables is suppressed. 
This can statistically be interpreted as a negative interaction effect between the parameters of 
mode-selection and instrumental (rational-choice related) variables. Thus,  
Proposition 7 (instrumental variables): The influence of instrumental variables (first- and se-
cond-order beliefs, incentives etc.) in a trust problem decreases with the match mi of a rele-
vant trust frame. 
Lastly, we can address the issue of discriminating between automatic and rational selections 
in general. On the surface, conditional and unconditional trust result in the same outcome; in 
both cases, the observable overt behavior is the choice of a trusting act and a transfer of con-
trol or resources to the trustee. However, we can hypothesize that the use of mental “short-
cuts” does in fact have an effect on the time that a trustor needs to reflect upon the trust prob-
lem in order to make a decision about the choice of a trusting act. An elaborated reasoning 
process inescapably uses up some time, and should (on average, even if the differences are 
minimal), take longer than a blind and unconditional choice based purely on automatic pro-
cessing. This hypothesis is also supported by empirical studies showing that unconditional 
trusting strategies have a lower decision time than conditional trusting strategies (Krueger et 
al. 2007). In short, decisions based on automatic information processing should be faster as 
compared to deliberative decisions because heuristics are quickly accessible, and rational 
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cognitive operations are time-consuming. As Schunk and Betsch put it, “maximizing is a 
highly cognitive process, involving conscious weighting, and information search, for example, 
which requires more cognitive capacity than affective-intuitive, satisfying decisions” (Schunk 
& Betsch 2006: 394). 
Proposition 8.1 (decision time): The decision times using the automatic mode are shorter than 
the decision times using the rational mode. 
Proposition 8.2 (trusting strategies): Unconditional trust has a shorter decision time than 
conditional trust. 
Propositions P1-P8 can be translated into a set of empirical hypotheses and tested using an 
experimental design. If the model is applied to other problems than that of an ideal-type trust-
frame, the specification of the model parameters (i.e. our simplification aj|I = ak|j =1) may need 
to be adjusted, and additional propositions can be added for these parameters accordingly.  
So far, we have only looked at propositions of main effects. A number of additional and very 
interesting model propositions can be generated when more than one parameter of the thresh-
old is varied simultaneously. As the model suggests, the final “balance” of the left- and right-
hand side of the mode-selection threshold jointly depends on the value of all parameters in-
volved. This means that the effect of a change in one variable depends on the value of another. 
For example, it is easy to see that the effect of cognitive motivation can be compensated by a 
high match. Statistically, this translates into a predicted interaction between motivation and 
chronic accessibility, or any other component of the match, for that matter. A high match may 
completely suppress and counter-balance the effect of cognitive motivation. Likewise, we 
have to expect an interaction between motivation and opportunity, between motivation and 
effort, as well as between effort and opportunity, and so forth. As it turns out, a number of 
specific interaction effects are a model-inherent feature that harbors a set of predictions which 
contrast both standard psychological and economic models. These interaction hypotheses will 
be fully developed in chapter 6.3 below. At this point, we formulate the following general 
proposition: 
Proposition 9 (parameter interactions): All model parameters simultaneously define the 
mode-selection threshold value. The effect of a change in one parameter depends on the value 
of all other parameters that simultaneously define the threshold. Therefore, all parameters of 
the mode-selection threshold are connected in second- and higher-order interactions. 
Overall, the model of trust and adaptive rationality developed so far helps to spell out the con-
ditions of conditional and unconditional trust. It directs our attention towards the parameters 
of mode-selection, which have to be understood as the primary cause for a “leap of faith” in 
trust. As propositions P1-P9 demonstrate, a number of important theoretical stipulations can 
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be derived from a static-comparative analysis of the mode-selection threshold. Chapter 6 of 
the book presents an attempt of an empirical experimental corroboration, including a specifi-
cation of testable hypotheses which make use of propositions P1-P9. 
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5. The Social Construction of Trust 
“More or less consciously, agents can contribute to the development of the trust-inducing contexts, which, in turn, 
enable them to trust more easily” (Möllering 2005: 6). 
In the preceding chapters, we have approached the phenomenon of trust from the trustor’s 
perspective, relating it to individual adaptive rationality, interpretation, and choice. In other 
words, we have restricted ourselves to an analysis of trust as residing in the psychological 
state of the trustor who “passively” responds to the environment and seeks a solution to the 
trust problem. Importantly, the immediate situation and its context define the relevance of 
trust-related knowledge. By providing the situational objects and cues that govern the pro-
cessing mode and trigger the activation of associated frames and scripts, they serve as a basis 
for interpretation and choice and the context dependent adjustment of rationality.  
In this chapter, we will take a look at how the trust relation, as a social system, is “actively” 
constituted by the actors involved. Far from being a passive achievement, interpretation and 
the subjective definition of the situation are normally reached in symbolic interaction with 
others, and rely on a dynamic process of communication. At the same time, communication is 
at the root of the constitution of social systems. Any social system can be reconstructed as a 
genetic sequence of meaningful communications, in which the actors’ subjective definitions 
of the situation temporarily converge into a shared social definition of the situation. This pro-
cess of social framing reflexively structures the situation, and also the context. Actors use a 
socially shared stock of knowledge to interpret situations, and in doing so, they externalize 
meaningful symbols that confirm its appropriateness. Therefore, social structure continuously 
reproduces itself in a reflexive process of structuration and “agency.” Concerning trust, this 
suggests that (1) trustor and trustee actively constitute the social system of a trust relation in a 
process of social framing, and (2) the context of the trust relation is not static, but highly dy-
namic and shaped by the actors involved. 
Furthermore, the media which actors use to communicate (language, writing, generalized me-
dia of exchange, etc.) differ with respect to their abilities to transmit meaning and their capa-
bilities to reduce ambiguity or overcome situational constraints. Many trust researchers argue 
that face-to-face communication is the most effective means of socially framing a trust prob-
lem, because it provides a very rich set of cues which trustors can make use of. On the contra-
ry, “lean” media restrict information and are not conducive to a build-up of trust, because they 
convey fewer cues, increase anonymity, and open up the potential of defection. Apart from 
verbal and nonverbal communication, the tangible actions involved—the choice of a trusting 
act and its (un)trustworthy response—can become a significant symbol for facilitating social 
framing as well. All in all, a number of different signals convey how the parties “view” the 
status of the relationship.  
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The analysis of communication media points to another aspect: communication is often “rela-
tional” and addresses the relationship orientations of the actors involved. Such relational 
communication defines and changes the status of a relationship. This information is coded in 
the relational schemata which actors use to define the trust problem. As will be argued, rela-
tional schemata constitute a very important class of trust-related knowledge, because most of 
our social relations are in fact dyadic, and we often use relational schemata in “transference,” 
even when a particular significant other is absent. In addition, relational schemata are hierar-
chically structured and exist even for highly generalized types, such as interactions with “a 
stranger.” Furthermore, not only do relational schemata include information about the status 
of the relationship and of the interaction partner, but they also define the identity of the actor 
within that relationship. This means that interpretation does not only concern the definition of 
“external” elements, but also concerns the actor’s self-concept, or identity. In short, during 
social framing, actors reciprocally define both their identity and social identity as well.  
The concept of identity can be fruitfully connected to trust research. Firstly, personal identity 
comprises the stable “traits” and disposition to trust, which we have discussed in chapter 3.1. 
Secondly, the actor’s social identity comprises collective and relational self-concepts, which 
also serve as a springboard for trust and motivate the choice of a trusting act. For instance, 
trust researchers have argued that trust can be based on a salient group identity and collective 
identification with other social aggregates. In line with several identity theory approaches, 
these models hold that a salient social identity triggers a shift in the level of self-identification, 
leading to a focus on aggregate-level goals. Likewise, “in-group favoritism” and categorical 
attributions of trustworthiness in the form of “stereotyping” can aid and support the choice of 
a trusting act. Relational identities which are included in, and framed by, relational schemata, 
achieve similar effects with respect to dyadic relations with significant others. An important 
mechanism behind these effects is “self-verification” and the confirmation of an adopted iden-
tity, whereas a mismatch between the standards of identity adopted and those confirmed by 
others often triggers defensive behaviors and distrust. 
This naturally leads to the question of which identities actors adopt in a situation. Since identi-
ties are activated during the subjective definition of the situation, they are equally subject to 
symbolic interaction and communication events. At the same time, this means that actors can 
intentionally try to mimic a false identity—for example, one that is known to be associated 
with a trustworthy reputation. Thus, the process of “identity signaling” constitutes an im-
portant stage that precedes the conventional trust problem. All in all, the perspective we de-
velop emphasizes that the social construction of trust is actively achieved in a process of 
communication between trustor and trustee, in which conditions favorable for a build-up of 
trust are produced.  
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In the last sections of this chapter, we will take a look at “active trust,” and the strategies 
which trustor and trustee may use to manage trust and trustworthiness. Active trust implies 
that the performances of the actors involved, and the actions they take to produce trust, enter 
the focus of interest. One paradigm that can inform such a perspective is “impression man-
agement” research, which is unequivocally concerned with how individuals can manage their 
self-presentation and the impressions they convey to others. Trust, in this sense, can be active-
ly produced by different “performative strategies” of self-presentation, such as increasing the 
other’s commitment, showing similarity, displaying trustworthy characteristics, managing the 
other’s emotional threats, or producing the appearance of situational normality. All in all, the 
discussion of active trust development, impression management, and the particular trust man-
agement strategies which can be applied completes the picture of the social framing perspec-
tive. It adds to the “logic of explanation” of the trust phenomenon the last step of a micro-
macro transition to the collective outcome of a trust relation. The discussion shows that trust 
has to be understood as an ongoing process of reflexive structuration in which both trustor and 
trustee—sometimes intentionally, sometimes automatically—achieve a shared definition of 
the situation, favorable expectations, and a confident choice of a trusting act. 
5.1. Defining the Context 
5.1.1. Symbolic Interaction 
The model of adaptive trust developed in the last chapter combines objective and subjective 
elements of the situation in the process of framing, in order to explain conditional and uncon-
ditional types of interpersonal trust. The processes of mode selection and interpretation de-
pend on the availability and accessibility of mental schemata, as well as on the presence of 
situational cues which serve as indicators of the appropriateness of a particular trust frame. 
The match between frames and cues available in the environment decisively influences the 
activation of trust-related schemata, the selection of the processing mode, and the particular 
definition of the situation an actor adopts.  
Importantly, frames do contain associative knowledge about the situational cues which serve 
as a trigger for their activation. In an environment that is primarily social, it is reasonable to 
assume that a majority of these cues consist of actions of other actors. Their overt behavior is 
not only an observable objective “fact,” but also represents a subjectively meaningful symbol 
with a cognitive, expressive, and appellative function to an observer. If an actor can decipher 
the meaning of an action—that is, recognize it as an indicator of the other’s intentions and as 
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an expression of the other’s situational definition—it is a significant symbol (Mead 1967).1 
Importantly, a significant symbol objectifies the perspective of its sender within the social en-
vironment and conveys his idea of a future course of action, his intentions, and his meaning to 
those who can observe it and interpret it correctly. In this way, significant symbols form a ba-
sis on which other actors can adjust their own definition of the situation. 
If actors, intentionally or unintentionally, influence each other’s situational definitions by ex-
pressing purpose and meaning through significant symbols to reach a social definition of the 
situation, we speak of symbolic interaction (Blumer 1969, 1974). During symbolic interaction, 
actors utilize a number of different media (or “symbol systems,” such as language, writing, 
and generalized media of exchange), which systematically convey a specific, culturally and 
institutionally determined meaning. Media therefore provide a vast repertoire of ready-made 
significant symbols that can be used to indicate one’s own perspective to others. Because they 
effectively transfer meaning, media have the power to influence others’ interpretations and 
define their “appropriate” frames of reference in a particular context. Ultimately, a shared un-
derstanding of meaning and the social definition of the situation, reached during symbolic in-
teraction lay the ground for cooperation. In the words of Blumer, “the fitting together of lines 
of conduct is done through the dual process of definition and interpretation ... established pat-
terns of group life exist and persist only through the continued use of the same schemes of in-
terpretation; and such schemes of interpretation are maintained only through their continued 
confirmation by the defining acts of others” (Blumer 1966: 538). In doing so, individuals 
symbolically influence each other’s interpretations until they interlock in a congruence of at-
tributed meaning. Symbolic interaction allows for a flexible coordination of action because 
the actors, by making use of media, adjust their interpretations empathically and converge on 
a shared definition of the situation. 
However, a social definition of the situation does not occur immediately and by itself. It is 
actively produced by the actors in a reflexive process of communication. Quite generally, 
communication can be regarded as “the mechanism through which human relations exist and 
develop—all the symbols of the mind, together with the means of conveying them through 
space and preserving them in time. It includes the expression of the face, attitude and gesture, 
the tones of the voice, words, writing, printing, railways, telegraphs, and whatever else may 
be the latest achievement in the conquest of space and time” (Cooley 1983: 61, emphasis add-
ed). In other words, communication can be defined as a shorthand for symbolic interaction 
with the help of media (Esser 2000a: 248). Communication is always selective: a sender has 
                                                 
1 Mead more generally regarded any gesture—“those phases of the [social] act which bring about adjustment of the response 
of the other” (Mead 1967: 44) as significant symbol, if it conveyed an idea about a future course of action: “When, now 
that gesture means this idea behind it [shaking a fist to indicate the idea of a possible attack] and it arouses the idea in the 
other individual, we have a significant symbol” (ibid.). 
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to select information from a repertoire of “open possibilities” (Luhmann 1995: 140), formu-
late a message, and choose the medium by means of which it will be transmitted. The receiver 
has then to receive, decode, and understand its meaning. Communications may fail when a 
wrong selection is made by the sender, by the receiver, or by both. Normally, actors are aware 
of the openness and selectivity inherent in the process of communication. Taken together, the 
successful emission, transmission, and reception of a message (including the correct decoding 
of its meaning) constitute an elementary unit of communication. For communication to con-
tinue, several elementary units must sequentially connect to each other. In other words, a 
meaningful continuation of communication requires some opportunity to follow up with new 
elementary units of communication and a successful linkage to past sequences. 
To denote the fact that a link between elementary units of communication may be successfully 
achieved, Luhmann (1990, 1995: 137ff.) uses the term structural coupling. Importantly, he 
argues that social systems must be understood as a continuous aligning sequence of elemen-
tary units of communication. The constitution of social systems rests on a sequential structural 
coupling of elementary units of communication, and requires a “synthesis of information, ut-
terance and understanding (including misunderstanding)” which “has to be recreated from sit-
uation to situation by referring to previous communications and to possibilities of further 
communications which are not restricted by the actual event” (1990: 3). Elementary units of 
communication must convey the minimal meaning necessary for reference by further commu-
nication and for a continuation of the social system. Frames and scripts—the cultural and 
normative stock of knowledge shared by the actors—facilitate this continuation by providing 
answers to the questions, “What kind of situation is this?” and, “What am I supposed to do?” 
Actors can thus easily decode the meaning of the typical actions and typical situations they 
encounter; they routinely interpret the typical significant symbols communicated. Stable so-
cial systems are temporarily constituted on this foundation of routine cultural knowledge 
which enables the “structuration” (Giddens 1984) of social systems and the “agency” 
(Emirbayer & Mische 1998) of human behavior. 
Any social system can be reconstructed as a genetic sequence of meaningful communication, 
which the actors, as the “personal systems,” initiate and sustain using the “cultural system” of 
internalized frames and scripts to aid them. Within the MFS framework, we can understand 
the constitution of social systems as a process of social framing (Esser 2001: 496). Social 
framing describes sequences of individual frame selection and action selection, their aggrega-
tion into a new objective social situation, and feedback into new individual framing processes. 
Actors interpret situations and “externalize,” or communicate, their intentions and interpreta-
tions in the form of actions and significant symbols. This changes the objective situation for 
other actors involved, and feeds back into the next sequence of individual framing and choice. 
In this way, social systems are endogenously and “reflexively” created by the actors; and 
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communication guides individual framing into a temporary convergence of attributed meaning 
(figure 18):  
Figure 18: Communication and social framing 
 
A trust relation is clearly a social system. Its emergence and continuation also depends on 
structural coupling and the temporary convergence of communicated meaning. If achieved by 
the actors involved, this is expressed in the (confident) choice of a trusting act and a trustwor-
thy response. The trust relation as a social system is “locally” constituted within a particular 
social environment as result of social framing sequences. It is guided by the application of 
shared interpretive schemata, which are reflexively activated during communication. Unsur-
prisingly, a number of trust researchers have argued that trust must be traced back to a sym-
bolically negotiated social definition of the situation, to an (implicit or explicit) orientation of 
trustor and trustee which rests on a shared (implicit or explicit) understanding of the logic of 
the situation, and which constitutes and symbolizes itself in the “meaningful” choice of a 
trusting act and its trustworthy response (Jones & George 1998, Endress 2002, Kramer 2006, 
Möllering 2006).  
At the same time, the constitution of a trust relation is tightly connected to the constraints and 
properties of individual adaptive rationality during the framing processes. The attribution of 
meaning and the meaningful continuation of communicative sequences both rely on a constant 
interpretive effort on the part of the actors involved. For unconditional trust to emerge, the 
chains of communication associated with a trustful course of action need to unfold without 
problematic interruptions, and significant symbols must be effortlessly decoded, so that a 
structural coupling of communicative acts smoothly accumulate into the choice of a trusting 
act and its trustworthy response.  
So far we have approached the phenomenon of trust from the trustor’s perspective, relating it 
to individual framing, adaptive rationality, and information processing. In other words, we 
have restricted ourselves to an analysis of trust as residing in the psychological state of the 
trustor who passively responds to the environment. But the above arguments demonstrate that 
communication is decisive for the development of trust, because it actively defines the context 
in which those individual framing processes occur. Möllering uses the term “reflexive structu-
ration” (2006: 99) to describe this endogenous feedback between the context, communica-
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tions, interpretation, and choice in all trust problems. A symbolic-interactionist perspective on 
interpersonal trust suggests that trust relations must always be reciprocally and actively de-
fined, in that communication serves as the springboard for interpretation. In short, the context 
of the trust relation is not static. It is highly dynamic and endogenously shaped by the actors 
involved, by their actions and communication.  
5.1.2. Language and other Signals 
The channels on which elementary units of communication are transmitted differ with respect 
to their ability to overcome situational constraints (such as time, location, distance, and per-
manence), resolve ambiguity, and convey symbolical meaning. Consequently, they are often 
classified according to their richness (Daft & Lengel 1984, 1986), which describes the “vary-
ing capacities for resolving ambiguity, meeting interpretation needs, and transmitting data” 
(Trevino et al. 1987: 557).
2
 For example, direct face-to-face interaction is considered to be a 
particularly “rich” channel, because it allows for instant audio-visual feedback and delivers a 
multitude of symbolical cues (vocal tone, emotional expression) to the actors. That is, dyadic 
face-to-face interactions possess a particularly high amount of symbolic content (Daft & Len-
gel 1986). On the other hand, “lean” channels are more indirect (a written email, a television 
broadcast, a phone call), generally emit fewer cues, restrict feedback, and are less effective in 
resolving ambiguity and equivocality (ibid.). Overall, communication channels “differ in the 
extent to which they are able to bridge different frames of reference, make issues less ambig-
uous, or provide opportunities for learning in a given time interval” (Rice 1992: 477). 
With respect to interpersonal trust, this suggests that channel richness is an influential factor 
determining the build-up of trust (Hollingshead 1996, Meyerson et al. 1996, Alge et al. 2003). 
For example, Rockmann and Northcraft (2008) propose that the richness of the communica-
tion channel directly affects the build-up of both cognition-based and affect-based trust, as it 
is related to the frequency of deception and defection. For one, lean media encourage defec-
tion because “they offer fewer social context cues, driving individuals to feel more anony-
mous” (ibid. 108), and also because the deceiver has to control fewer potential “leakages.” On 
the other hand, “as the richness of the medium increases, the potential deceiver would need to 
control more aspects of his or her communication to be successful in the deception attempt” 
(ibid.). In sum, they state that rich media, by providing multiple cues and information, facili-
tate conditions conducive to the build-up of trust, whereas lean media make it more difficult 
to gather information, and encourage opportunistic behavior. Empirically, they find that face-
to-face communication generates the highest levels of trust and trustworthiness, as compared 
                                                 
2 Communication researchers commonly use the term “media richness” to refer to the technical and informational constraints 
pertaining to different communication channels. The term “media” is used by then in a slightly different meaning from 
that adopted here, i.e. it does not refer to different symbol systems, but to the different technical channels which can carry 
the symbol systems. 
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to communication mediated by video or computer (see also Valley et al. 1998, Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner 1999, Alge et al. 2003, Wilson et al. 2006).  
These results are in line with a large body of empirical work that has examined the effect of 
communication in a variety of social dilemmas. Quite generally speaking, communication via 
language has been found to be a prime factor boosting trust development, and the experi-
mental results showing that it enables trust and cooperation have, over the decades, accumu-
lated into an enormous bulk of evidence (see, for example, Loomis 1959, Dawes et al. 1977, 
Isaac & Walker 1988, Orbell et al. 1988, Sally 1995, Ostrom 2000, Bicchieri 2002, Malhotra 
& Murnighan 2002, Ostrom 2003, Charness & Dufwenberg 2006). Notably, face-to-face in-
teractions are usually found to be much more effective than any other form of interaction in 
inducing trust. Nevertheless, communication may indeed become “cheap talk” (Farrell 1987) 
when the messages and the media channels become so sparse that only minimal information 
can be transmitted (Bracht & Feltovich 2009). Normally, however, human language offers an 
endless repertoire of significant symbols to convey one’s perspective to others. It is the most 
important medium of communication in the development of trust and for the successful con-
stitution of a trust relation. The interpretation of linguistic symbols is therefore a fundamental 
aspect of trust development and a primary means of overcoming trust problems (Bacharach & 
Gambetta 2001). 
A particularly effective variant comes in the form of promises. Promises refer to “obliging” 
yet nonbinding commitments of the trustee to reciprocate the risky investment of the trustor. 
At the same time, they represent a direct “invitation” to choose a trusting act. In contrast to the 
“cheap talk” predictions of rational choice, promises are often very successful in convincing 
the trustor of one’s trustworthiness and initiating the choice of a trusting act. Presumably, this 
is because the normative obligations that reverberate in trust and trustworthy response are 
made explicit in the promise. Empirically, promises have been found to induce trust even in 
“one-shot” situations (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006). However, as Charness and Dufwen-
berg note, in making a promise, it is critical that trustees communicate personal intentions and 
formulate their promises in a personal style.  
Many scholars contend that nonverbal communication (or "body language", see DePaulo 
1992, Burgoon & Hobbler 2002) is of equal importance.
3
 For one, nonverbal communication 
                                                 
3 The term nonverbal communication subsumes a variety of communication channels that serve to convey symbolic infor-
mation other than explicit language, including kinesics (visual body movements such as gestures, facial expression, pos-
ture gaze), paralanguage (vocal cues other than the words themselves, such as pitch, loudness, tone), physical appearance 
(manipulable features such as clothing, hairstyle etc.), haptics (the use of touch, frequency, intensity and type of contact), 
proxemics (the use of interpersonal distance and spacing relationships), chronemics (use of time in messages, such as 
punctuality or waiting time) and artefacts, that is, manipulable objects of the environment that may convey messages from 
their designers or users (Burgoon & Hobbler 2002).  Depending on the particular research method, communication re-
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“qualifies” verbal communication by providing a number of additional cues which may rein-
force and augment, or disprove and contradict the meaning communicated by language, and 
can have a “persuasive impact” on observers by influencing source credibility (Burgoon et al. 
1990). For example, it has been found that prolonged eye-contact, a relaxed body posture, flu-
ent speech, and a calm voice increase message credibility and the perceived trustworthiness of 
a sender (ibid.). They are therefore conducive to a build-up of favorable expectations of trust-
worthiness.  
But nonverbal communication can also serve as a symbolic cue in its own right. The most im-
portant function in this regard is the expression of emotions and affective states, which is, to a 
substantial degree, “hard-wired” and automatically occurring (DePaulo 1992). Likewise, the 
recognition of faces and the processing of emotional displays is highly automatic (Todorov et 
al. 2009), constituting an important evolutionary adaptation for “threat detection” (Adolphs 
2003). Generally speaking, displays of anger and sadness influence trustworthiness judgments 
negatively, while displays of happiness (i.e. smiling) increase perceived trustworthiness (Win-
ston et al. 2002, Eckel & Wilson 2003). At the same time, the display of emotions is highly 
culturally regulated, and “each culture has deeply ingrained anticipations how, when, where 
and with what consequences emotions are displayed in public and private” (Burgoon 1993). 
Ekman (1972) used the notion of display rules to denote “cultural norms governing the man-
agement of emotional expressions [that] indicate which emotions should be conveyed, de-
pending on the situation, the person who is communicating the emotion, and the person to 
whom the emotion is being communicated” (DePauolo 1992: 209). In other words, the frames 
and scripts stored in memory also contain information about emotional display and appropri-
ate responses, and a nonverbal signal may well serve as a significant cue for the activation of 
trust-related schemata.  
Other than that, many aspects of nonverbal communication can be, at least indirectly, related 
to judgments of trustworthiness as well. It is, for example, well established that a host of non-
verbal cues (both static appearance and dynamic factors, such as expressivity, gaze, immedia-
cy and involvement, and paralanguage) influence judgments of attractiveness (the “visual 
primacy effect” and the “what-is-beautiful-is-good” heuristic, see Eagly et al. 1991, Feingold 
1992, Langlois et al. 2000). At the same time, judgments of attractiveness are directly related 
to judgments of trustworthiness (Wilson & Eckel 2006). Williams (2007) argues that trustor 
and trustee use a number of behavioral strategies to regulate self-presentation and perceived 
trustworthiness, claiming that nonverbal communication is a primary means for actively 
achieving “threat reduction.” Similarly, Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) hold that nonverbal 
                                                                                                                                                         
searchers estimate the impact of nonverbal communication on the total “meaning” produced in communication to be be-
tween sixty and ninety percent (ibid.). 
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cues may be an important class of signals indicating “trust-warranting properties” because 
they are hard to imitate. Overall, nonverbal communication must be regarded as an important 
part of trust-related communication. When assessing the trust-related qualities of a trustee, 
nonverbal cues are often the most immediately available, and therefore can be used heuristi-
cally when more individuating information does not exist (Burgoon & Hobbler 2002). 
But meaning is not only conveyed through language and nonverbal communication. The 
choice of a trusting act itself can be a significant symbol to communicate one’s interpretation 
of a trust problem. In the economic models to trust development, this idea was expressed in 
the idea of “psychological forward induction”—the trustor uses his action to induce an update 
in the second-order beliefs of the trustee, who by the very fact of observing a trusting choice, 
can infer something about the beliefs of the trustor. Knowing this, the trustor can use his trust-
ing act strategically as a signal to communicate his definition of the situation; for example, to 
induce “guilt” in the trustee and to secure a trustworthy response. In chapter 2.2.3, the very 
same idea was discussed in terms of the “moral obligations” that accompany the choice of a 
trusting act. Trust researchers have regularly expressed the power of the trusting act to define 
the situation and induce trustworthiness, even when rational grounds for favorable expecta-
tions do not exist. According to Gambetta, actors are able to learn “that it can be rewarding to 
behave as if we trusted even in unpromising situations” (1988a: 228), and Hardin similarly 
claims that “as-if trust can be willed repeatedly so that one may slowly develop optimistic 
trust” (1993: 515). The notion of conditional trust in which actors engage in only a “pretense” 
of suspension (Jones & George 1998) precisely points to this power of trust to create the be-
havior on which it ostensibly rests. In fact, most models of trust development implicitly in-
clude the assumption that trust starts from a very narrow basis in which actors, even “irration-
ally” and against their expectations, “just do it” (Möllering 2006: 115f.) and opt for the trust-
ing act in order to test whether a trust relation is feasible.  
A similar argument can be made with respect to the actions of the trustee, which are important 
signals to the trustor influencing the constitution (and reproduction) of the trust relation as a 
social system. For one, different forms of commitment and “hostage posting” can help to de-
fine the trust problem and influence perceived trustworthiness (see chapter 3.3.4 already). 
Principal-agent theory has proven a valuable tool in carving out the conditions that signals 
must meet in order to be reliable and to create a separating equilibrium in which there is no 
“mimicry,” so that trustworthy trustees can use commitment to credibly signal trustworthiness 
(Raub 2004, Bracht & Feltovich 2008). As Raub puts it, “hostages that serve signaling pur-
poses contribute to the ‘definition of the situation’ and to ‘framing’” (2004: 344). In other 
words, the trustee invests resources into a signal that can credibly communicate his trustwor-
thiness and benign intentions. In this way, his commitments become a significant symbol for 
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the trustor once he adjusts his interpretation of the trust problem accordingly, allowing him to 
confidently choose a trusting act. 
Apart from that, the trustworthy response of the trustee (or the failure of trust) is a significant 
symbol in its own right, which strongly affects the future of the trust relation. When looking at 
developmental models in chapter 3.1.4, we discussed the idea that trust gradually evolves over 
time with successful ongoing social exchanges. Apart from “realizing” the content of the trust 
relation, a trustworthy response also confirms the appropriateness of the trust-related 
knowledge which was used to solve the trust problem. The trustor can infer that his definition 
of the situation was correct. For example, if a trustee was judged to be trustworthy based on 
an assessment of his benevolence and integrity, a trustworthy response will confirm the judg-
ment of these characteristics. Likewise, if trust was afforded based on knowledge of the nor-
mative-institutional environment (say, a social role), a trustworthy response confirms the ap-
plicability and appropriateness of the script in the particular context. Most generally speaking, 
the trustee’s response initiates learning and reinforcement of existing mental models, and this 
increases the associative strength between the perceived situational stimuli and the applied 
trust-related mental schemata.
4
  
A failure of trust has a comparable symbolic consequence. Most trust researchers agree that a 
breach of trust is a disruptive event, substantially redefining the perspective of the trustor and 
impacting the future reproduction of a trust relation. What is more, researchers commonly 
claim that trust is “intrinsically fragile” (Gambetta 1988a) and is easier to destroy than to cre-
ate (Barber 1983, Baier 1986, Slovic 1993, Meyerson et al. 1996, Robinson 1996). According 
to Slovic (1993), a variety of cognitive factors contribute to this asymmetry between trust-
building and trust-destroying events. First, a failure of trust is more visible than a trustworthy 
response. This is because the violation of trustworthiness expectations triggers immediate 
arousal, an effect of the hot emotional charge that trust-related expectations possess. Second, 
failures of trust do have more weight in judgment than trustworthy responses. Slovic empiri-
cally demonstrates this asymmetry by presenting hypothetical (positive and negative) news to 
subjects. In support of the claim, he finds that negative news have more impact on judgments 
of trustworthiness than positive news. Similarly, Burt and Knez (1995) find that third-party 
information amplifies distrust to a greater extent than trust. Overall, these findings support the 
view that a breach of trust has a strong symbolic meaning to the trustor, and this breach nega-
tively impacts on future trust. 
                                                 
4 Within the theoretical framework of the MFS, the confirmation of the trustor’s situational definition by a trustworthy re-
sponse can be mirrored in a change in the (chronic and nonchronic) accessibility parameters of trust-related frames and 
scripts, in the links between both situational objects and frame, as well as in the associations between frames and scripts 
and scripts and actions (“encoding”). Presumably, if trust develops over time and actors gradually build up specific, trust-
related knowledge structures, then all parameters are affected at the same time. 
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Lewicki and Bunker (1995a, 1996) focus on the question of the fragility of trust and develop a 
more sophisticated argument, holding that a violation of trust has different effects depending 
on the stage of trust development. Thus, the attributions that trustors will make about the fail-
ure of trust vary with the “basis” of trust—the fragility of trust decreases with relationship de-
velopment, because with identification-based trust, violations may “easily repaired through 
the strong bonds that the parties have built with each other” (ibid. 168, see also Rempel et al. 
1985, 2001).  
More recently, scholars have focused on the conditions that facilitate or prevent trust repair 
(Dirks et al. 2009, Kramer & Lewicki 2010), the attributional processes by which a failure of 
trust obtains the symbolic meaning of a serious “transgression” (Tomlinson & Mayer 2009), 
and have started to spell out the precise types of violations and the interaction rituals neces-
sary to restore them (Ren & Gray 2009). We will have a closer look at such interactional as-
pects further below—at this point, it is important to note that the trustworthy response itself is 
high in symbolic meaning, and will be evaluated by the trustor from exactly that interpretive 
perspective which was the starting ground for his choice of a trusting act. 
Overall, it is apparent that the communication of symbolical content is central to the solution 
of trust problems. It is the power of communication to transfer meaning and enable mutual 
perspective-taking via significant symbols that makes it a most decisive part in the develop-
ment of trust. A trust relation can be successfully established when trustor and trustee empath-
ically converge in their situational definitions of the trust problem, and it can be maintained 
when observable actions match these interpretations. Communication is inseparably tied to 
this process of social framing. 
5.1.3. Relational Communication 
If social systems are sequences of communicative acts, then, ultimately, communication must 
be regarded as the “carrier” of trust per se. Only a congruence of perspectives and a conver-
gence of meaning in both the trustor and trustee can lead to a successful constitution of a trust 
relation. Any communication can become a criterion for the continuation or termination of the 
trust relation, and every action can potentially create, sustain, or bring into doubt a corre-
sponding trust frame. Luhmann consequently argues that, 
“In addition to its immediate significance as regards situation and purpose, every socially comprehensible action also 
involves the actor’s presenting himself in terms of trustworthiness. Whether or not the actor has this implication in 
mind—whether he is aiming at it, or consciously disclaiming it—the question of trust hovers around every interac-
tion, and the way in which the self is presented is the means by which decisions about it are attained” (Luhmann 
1979: 39). 
Humans are experienced as “a complex of symbols” (ibid.), continuously and often uncon-
sciously expressing meaning, which others use as indicators for the judgment of trust-related 
characteristics and an assessment of trustworthiness expectations. What is more, communica-
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tion creates and changes the attributions that actors hold toward each other and toward the re-
lation between them. It does not only convey “referential” meaning, but also “relational” 
meaning, which enables individuals to interpret and define their relations (Watzlawick et al. 
1967, Millar & Rogers 1976). In short, during interaction, actors not only reciprocally define 
“situations,” but also define the status of their interpersonal relationships. Any aspect of 
communication that affects the current and future status (i.e. development, stabilization, or 
change) of a relation is relational communication (Millar & Rogers 1976, Burgoon & Hale 
1984, 1987, Dillard et al. 1999). It is often implicit and embodied in the nonverbal signals that 
actors emit, but it can also be overt, deliberate, and intentional.  
With relational communication, individuals impart to one another how they have defined the 
relationship and how they view themselves and the other within the relationship. In other 
words, they symbolize their relational perceptions, that is, those cognitions that refer to the 
status and quality of the interpersonal relationship. The choice of a trusting act and trustwor-
thy response are examples of relational communications that directly affect the definition of 
the trust problem, but “mediate” verbal or nonverbal communication is of equal significance. 
Relational communication is critical to the development of interpersonal trust, because the 
majority of the cues which enable a trustor to make a “leap of faith” are contained within the 
relational signals emitted during interaction (Holmes 1991, Lindenberg 2000, 2003, Six 2005: 
21f.).  
Relational communication is effective on different “generic themes” which define the content 
of relational perceptions. These themes include, among others, dominance, affection, emo-
tional arousal, formality, intimacy, involvement, composure (self-control), similarity, inclu-
sion, and depth (Burgoon & Hale 1984, 1987). Generalizing these themes, Barry and Crant 
(2000) discuss four distinct dimensions on which relational perception occurs, and on which 
relational communication can consequently be effective: (1) dependence, that is, the extent to 
which dyad members depend on each other in relative comparison, (2) commitment, that is, 
the psychological attachment to the other and the intention to maintain the relationship, (3) 
transferability, that is, the existence of alternatives and “exit” options, mitigating the potential 
for exploitation, and (4) “confidence,” that is, the perception that one will not be betrayed by 
the other in the future (ibid.).
5
 In contrast, Dillard et al. (1999: 58) argue that the “basic sub-
stance” of all relational judgments, which also reflects “the fundamental phenomenological 
content of interpersonal relationships,” can be reduced to two factors: (1) dominance, that is, 
the degree to which an actor attempts to regulate the behavior of the other, and (2) affiliation, 
that is, the extent to which on individual regards another positively. According to these au-
                                                 
5 The quotation marks indicate that “confidence” in Barry and Crant’s view is different from Luhmann’s conception, and 
differs in its meaning from the way it was defined earlier. 
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thors, social relationships are invariably defined in terms of these two dimensions, because 
“they are a product of our evolutionary heritage” (Dillard et al. 1996: 706, see also Bugental 
2000). At this point, it is not necessary to decide on the dimensionality of relational communi-
cations in general. The important point to take here is that individuals “frame” their relation-
ships with the help of an overarching “model” of their relation, which builds on the relational 
perceptions they have, and changes with the relational communications that occur. 
Dillard et al. (1999) use the concept of relational frames to indicate those “mental structures 
of organized knowledge about social relationships ... [which] simplify the problem of inter-
preting social reality by directing attention to particular behaviors of the other interactant, re-
solving ambiguities, and guiding inferences” (Dillard et al. 1996: 706). They suggest that rela-
tional frames are generic, mutually exclusive, and compete for relative salience during inter-
action. Likewise, Lindenberg (2000, 2003) posits that trust crucially depends on the salience 
of a generalized “normative frame” or “solidarity frame” in which hedonic and gain-related 
goals are “pushed into the background” and opportunistic behavior is “suspended.” Important-
ly, he proposes that relational signals and relational communications are the principle motor 
behind the stable activation of a relational frame, and behind the changes in frame-salience 
that occur during interaction.  
5.1.4. Framing Relationships 
According to Clark and Mills (1979, 1993, 1994), relations can be framed either as “commu-
nal,” or as an “exchange.” These relationship orientations fundamentally differ with respect 
to the basic rules of interaction assumed to govern the social exchange. While exchange rela-
tionships follow the principle of “giving or taking one thing in return for another,” and there-
fore invoke a norm of weak reciprocity and allow for the rational consideration of costs and 
benefits, communal relationships are characterized by a distinct, unconditional concern for the 
welfare of the other, and follow a norm of mutual responsiveness. Actors then voluntarily 
provide benefits to one another without mentally accounting for the investments made. 
Braithwaite (1998) directly adopts and extends this framework to argue that the relationship 
orientations proposed by Clark and Mill represent different “trust norms” which can serve as a 
basis for trust by providing different interactional rules, norms, and routines—different “rela-
tional frames,” so to say. Likewise, Sheppard and Sherman (1998) argue that a number of dif-
ferent “relational forms,” which arise from the basic structure of interdependence, are used to 
frame trust relations, each being associated with a different form of risk the and different 
means to mitigate them. 
Note that we have already uncovered a similar distinction between relatively stable relation-
ship orientations as a basis of trust when we looked at models of trust development, which 
Lewicki and Bunker (1995) have accurately described as “frame changes” (see chapter 3.1.4). 
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According to the developmental models, each stage is accompanied by an enrichment of the 
informational basis on which trust rests, by increased emotional investments, and by a shift to 
more affect-based forms of trust. Only the last stage of identification-based trust is marked by 
an attributional shift concerning the other’s motivation from external, instrumental (or “ex-
change”) motives to intrinsic (or “communal”) motives (Rempel et al. 1985), and a shift from 
a purely cognitive to a primarily affective basis of trust. The common ground that unites the 
theoretical perspectives just reviewed is the idea that a relatively stable pattern of relating to 
the other (the “relational frame” or “relationship orientation”) develops for the involved par-
ties, and is situationally activated to define the trust relation and a particular trust problem. We 
have introduced the concept of a relational schema to denote precisely those aspects of stored 
schematic knowledge which “function as cognitive maps to help [individuals] navigate their 
social world. These cognitive structures are hypothesized to include images of self and other, 
along with a script for an expected pattern of interaction” (Baldwin 1992: 462). Thus, the pro-
posed “relationship orientations” and the “relational frames” are synonyms of our concept of a 
relational schema.  
Relational schemata are hierarchically structured (Baldwin 1992, Reis et al. 2000): at the 
highest level, they describe people and relationships in general. The next level includes exem-
plars of particular others. The lowest level contains role and situation-specific representations 
(e.g. “husband-as-father”). Relational schemata are an important class of trust-related 
knowledge, because most interactions are socially embedded. That is, we often base our 
choice of a trusting act on the relational schemata applicable to the situations we routinely en-
counter in everyday life. In a broad sense, even social roles constitute a class of relational 
schemata, as they structure patterns of relating to other, potentially unfamiliar actors. Like-
wise, generalized expectations of trustworthiness are presumably embedded in some (higher-
level) relational schema—that is, we do not only encode “average” expectations of trustwor-
thiness, but, along with that, broader interactional routines and patterns of relating towards 
other, potentially unfamiliar persons; we thus maintain relational schemata even for “typical” 
interaction partners as well. 
Furthermore, relational schemata “do not fully specify behavior in any interaction or situation, 
but they comprise a set of rules that strongly constrain the possibilities and that organize re-
sponses to violations of rules” (Fiske 1991: 21). According to Lindenberg (2003), four im-
portant aspects are contained within relational schemata: (1) a set of rules about one’s own 
and the other’s behavior, (2) expectations about the other’s behavior based on these rules, (3) 
the “surmised” expectations of the interaction partner, and (4) a co-orientation of expecta-
tions, meaning that each interaction partner assumes that the same schema is used by the oth-
er. In short, “the mental model of a relationship is thus more than just a social norm about 
how to behave. It minimally also includes descriptive and normative expectations and co-
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orientation. It is especially this interlocking of expectations that makes mental models so im-
portant for interaction” (Lindenberg 2003: 40). By providing a common frame of reference, 
relational schemata govern the process of mutual perspective-taking in interpersonal trust rela-
tions. In the process, relational communications change the relational perceptions contained 
within these mental models; this enables the actors to compare the perspective they have 
adopted towards the relationship with that of the interaction partner.  
We began this chapter with the claim that the context of the trust relation is not static, but 
highly dynamic. As we have seen, it is in fact reproduced in a continuous process of commu-
nication by which the actors achieve a convergence on a shared situational definition of the 
trust problem. The structural coupling of successful elementary units of communication leads 
to the emergence of the trust relation in a sequential process of social framing. In short, the 
actors endogenously shape the context of the trust relation and “maintain” or “destroy” it dy-
namically with each communicative act. Relational communication is of particular importance 
for the successful establishment and maintenance of a trust relation, because it signals the per-
spectives which the trustor or trustee adopt towards the trust relation. This information is 
stored and organized in the form of relational schemata. They delineate the type of schematic 
knowledge structure by which actors frame relationships in general, and trust relations in par-
ticular, and are therefore prime vehicles by which actors can generate a “favorable” definition 
of the situation in a trust problem. 
5.2. Trust and Identity 
5.2.1. The Concept of Identity  
As pointed out by Baldwin, relational schemata include “images of self and other, along with 
a script for an expected pattern of interaction” (Baldwin 1992: 462). This points to an im-
portant aspect of the framing process which has implications for the development of trust—
interpretation does not only concern the meaningful definition of external situational elements 
(other actors, the meaning of their actions, the status of the relationship, the interpretation of 
structural, normative and cultural constraints, and so forth), but also concerns the actor’s self-
concept within that situation. In other words, during social framing, actors reciprocally define 
both their identities and their social identities. 
The concept of identity, or self, is used in considerably variable ways within psychological 
research, and has been of major scholarly interest for decades (see Markus & Wurf 1987, 
Baldwin 1992, Turner et al. 1994, Mischel & Shoda 1995, Brewer & Gardner 1996, Stryker & 
217 
 
Burke 2000, Andersen & Chen 2002, Simon 2004).
6
 Despite existing conceptual differences 
which mainly derive from the particular focus of research, i.e. analysis of internal cognitive 
processes versus exploration of the influence of social-structural conditions, there is consider-
able agreement on the major properties and characteristics of the identity concept. Most re-
searchers trace the origin of identity theories back to the early works of James (1890), Cooley 
(1902) and Mead (1934). James drew a first distinction between the pure ego, or “I,” and the 
empirical self, or “Me,” which he further divided into the material, the social, and spiritual 
self. According to James, a person “has as many different social selves as there are distinct 
groups of persons about whose opinion he cares” (1890: 282), and these are distinct from his 
core identity that constitutes the “I.” Cooley provided the important insight that identity is 
primarily shaped and experienced in interaction with others, using the metaphor of a “looking-
glass self.” Mead further refined the analytical dimensions of identity, emphasized the dynam-
ic character of identity as a product of symbolic interactions mediated by language, and high-
lighted the influences of social structure and society in shaping identity—in short, “society 
shapes self shapes social behavior.”  
These early contributions highlight several fundamentals which resonate in contemporary 
identity research: (1) identity has a personal and a social dimension, (2) it is dynamic, (3) so-
cially constructed and socially structured; and (4) actors typically have access to multiple 
identities, which are (5) interrelated to varying degrees (Simon 2004: 25, 46). Adopting a 
structuralist-interactionist perspective, Stryker (1980) proposes that identities are organized 
along a “hierarchy” that reflects the institutional structure of the society, and, more concretely, 
the structure of the individual’s life-world. Thus, multiple identities are not an arbitrary prod-
uct or a matter of individual choice, but stem from the social embeddedness of actors in net-
works of relationships. In essence, the concept of identity “serves to bridge social structure 
(society) and social person (self),” as it “mediates between structural forces and the social per-
son’s responses” (Simon 2004: 25f.).  
On the most general level, identity can be defined as a set of “cognitive generalizations about 
the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of the self-
related information contained in the individual’s social experiences” (Markus 1977: 64). Gen-
erally speaking, we can conceive of an individual’s identity as a set of meanings applied to the 
self in a social situation. Like other forms of typical knowledge, it functions as “interpretive 
structure that mediates most significant intrapersonal processes (information processing, af-
fect, motivation) and a variety of interpersonal processes including social perception, choice 
                                                 
6 Due to a difference in focus between North American and European identity research paradigms, the terms “self” and “iden-
tity” have been concurrently used to denote similar concepts and ideas—while the North American psychological tradition 
prefers the term “self,” European identity researchers commonly use the term “identity” (Simon 2004: 26). We will use 
both terms synonymously and interchangeably. 
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of situation, partner, and interaction strategy as well as reaction to feedback” (Markus & Wurf 
1987: 299, emphasis in original). Identity is in fact akin to a mental schema, and the proper-
ties, conditions, and constraints of its activation and use are none other than those which were 
defined in chapter 4 when we analyzed adaptive rationality from the individual framing per-
spective. For example, different aspects of identity can be rendered accessible and activated in 
an automatic or controlled fashion, as a function of cues in the immediate situation (Andersen 
& Chen 2002). 
Since identity is characterized by a high degree of multiplicity and malleability, it is difficult 
to refer to the identity of an individual in the sense of a “monolithic” and unchangeable trait. 
Instead, researchers usually differentiate between chronically accessible core aspects of the 
self, which are relatively unresponsive to changes, and other aspects, the accessibility of 
which depends on motivational and social context variables. Thus, the actual and temporary 
working self is composed of stable core aspects and more a flexible layer of self-aspects tied 
to the immediate circumstances and the current content of working memory (Markus & Wurf 
1987, Mischel & Shoda 1995).
7
 This perspective suggests a process-oriented view on identity, 
emphasizing its dynamic formation in symbolic interaction with others (e.g. Stryker & Stat-
ham 1985).  
According to Mischel and Shoda (1995), the “structure of personality” cannot be found in 
some invariant or stable core identity, but in a stable organizing pattern of relationships be-
tween the “cognitive-affective units” that generate identities. These units are (1) encodings, 
that is, stored categories for the self, people, events, and situations (in other words: stored 
schematic knowledge), (2) expectations and beliefs, (3) affective responses, including physio-
logical reactions, (4) goals and values, and (5) competencies and self-regulatory plans. Indi-
viduals differ in the way this cognitive-affective system is organized. In essence, “the basic 
aspects of personality invariance become visible in the relations between the psychological 
features of the social world and the individual’s distinctive patterns of cognition, affect, and 
behavior” (ibid. 263), while the “personality state,” that is, “the pattern of activation among 
cognitions and affect at a given time in this system” (ibid. 257), changes with the particular 
situation. Even more thought-provokingly, Turner et al. (1994) suggest that “the concept of 
self as a separate mental structure does not seem necessary, because we can assume that any 
and all cognitive resources—long-term knowledge, implicit theories, cultural beliefs, social 
representations, and so forth—are recruited, used, and deployed when necessary to create the 
                                                 
7 “The idea is that not all self-representations or identities that are part of the complete self-concept will be accessible at any 
one time. The working self-concept of the moment is best viewed as continually active, shifting array of accessible self-
knowledge. There is not a fixed static self, but only a current self-concept constructed from one’s social experiences. Core 
aspects of self (self-schemata) may be relatively unresponsive to changes in one’s social circumstances and, because of 
their importance, chronically accessible. Many other self-representations, however, will vary in accessibility depending on 
the individual’s motivational state or on the prevailing social conditions” (Mischel & Shoda 1995: 306). 
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needed self-category. Rather than a distinction between the activated self and the stored, inac-
tive self, it is possible to think of the self as the product of the cognitive system at work, as a 
functional property of the cognitive system as a whole” (Turner et al. 1994: 459, emphasis in 
original). 
Concerning the categories of self-related knowledge, there is a major distinction between the 
aspects of personal identity and of social identity (Brewer & Gardner 1996). Personal identity 
comprises all self-related schemata that are exclusively related to the individual. It is the “I” in 
Mead’s sense, marking the differentiated and individuating aspects of identity by which indi-
viduals adopt their sense of idiosyncrasy. It refers to “self-categories that define the individual 
as a unique person in terms of his or her individual differences” (Turner et al. 1994: 454).8 
Social identity, on the other hand, refers to those aspects of identity that reflect the self in rela-
tion to others, social groups, and broad social categories (the “Me” in Mead’s sense). It can be 
further divided into relational identity and collective identity. While relational identity mirrors 
the knowledge that pertains to the self in personal relationships with significant others (An-
dersen & Chen 2002, Chen et al. 2006), collective identity corresponds to “internalizations of 
norms and characteristics of important reference groups and consists of cognitions about the 
self that are consistent with that group identification” (Brewer & Gardner 1996: 84). The dis-
tinguishing characteristic between these different types of social identity is whether it is an 
individual-level self-concept (“who am I?,” personal and relational identity) or a group-level 
self-concept (“who are we?,” collective identity) that governs cognition (Thoits & Virshup 
1997).  
According to Chen et al. (2006), relational identity reflects who one is in relation to signifi-
cant others. A relational identity “is (a) self-knowledge that is linked in memory to knowledge 
about significant others, (b) exists at multiple levels of specificity, (c) is capable of being con-
textually or chronically activated, and (d) is composed of self-conceptions and a constellation 
of other self-aspects that characterize the self when relating to significant others” (ibid. 153). 
Importantly, relational identities also contain “affective material, goals and motives, self-
regulatory strategies and behavioral tendencies” (ibid. 154), and can thus trigger emotions and 
behavioral goals that an individual experiences when relating to a significant other. Relational 
identities also include social role relationships (employee-employer, worker-coworker, doc-
tor-patient etc.), familial relationships (parent-child, husband-wife), and close personal rela-
tionships (friendships and sexual partnerships), and, more generally speaking, all types of role 
identities. Clearly, they are one major component of a relational schema. 
                                                 
8 We will subsume under this category those self-references that an individual adopts in terms of an “overarching” self-
concept towards the totality of his or her identities (the “Mind” in Mead’s sense). 
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In contrast, collective identity entails a more “depersonalized” sense of the self, where indi-
viduating differences between individuals step back in favor of a common shared group-
identity (“we-identity”) that fosters in-group/out-group differentiations; it does not necessarily 
require personal relationships. This is marked by a “shift towards the perception of self as an 
interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a 
unique person” (Turner et al. 1987: 50). The two main foci of collective identity research are 
group memberships (“we, the chess club”) and broader social category memberships (“we, the 
working class”). Collective identification does not require direct contact or exchange with 
others who share category membership. Rather, the identification of a shared position with 
others in the social world is primarily “psychological” in nature (Ashmore et al. 2004).  
5.2.2. Categorization Processes 
Several streams of identity research have been particularly concerned with the premises and 
consequences of social identification, as exemplified in the theoretical paradigms of “social 
identity theory” (SIT, Tajfel & Turner 1979) and “self-categorization theory” (SCT, Turner et 
al. 1987). At the heart of both theories is the process of categorization—the application of rel-
evant categorical “prototypes” to streamline social perception. Prototypes describe a “fuzzy 
set of attributes (perceptions, attitudes, feelings and behaviors) that are related to one another 
in a meaningful way” (Hogg 2006: 118) and capture similarities and differences between rele-
vant category members and outsiders. In other words, prototypes are mental schemata of so-
cial groups and social categories. Consequently, the principles of adaptive rationality which 
govern activation and use (interplay of opportunity, motivation, accessibility, effort-accuracy 
tradeoffs, etc.) apply to these structures of knowledge as well—in fact, social cognition has 
been a major area for the development of dual-process models of cognition and person per-
ception (see Chaiken & Trope 1999, Macrae & Bodenhausen 2000). 
If a collective group identity is salient, it functions psychologically “to increase the influence 
of one’s membership in that group on perception and behavior, and/or the influence of another 
person’s identity as a group member on one’s impression of and hence behavior towards the 
person” (Turner et al. 1987: 118). Importantly, the adoption of a social identity fosters deper-
sonalization; that is, viewing oneself (or others) as having the attributes of a relevant catego-
ry, rather than looking for more individuating information. The salience of a social identity is 
accompanied by a perceptual shift from “me” to “us;” from “him” or “her” to “them.” Deper-
sonalization can occur with respect to in-group members, out-group members (in which case 
it is known as “stereotyping,” see Bargh et al. 1996, Wheeler & Petty 2001), and oneself. It 
involves prototypical, rather than individuating, attributes being used for judging and evaluat-
ing the target. The shift from individual to social (relational and collective) identity is often 
regarded as a “transformation” which has severe affective, cognitive, and motivational conse-
quences. For one, social identification can trigger affective responses and emotional involve-
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ment to the social category, commonly experienced as a sense of belonging, closeness, inter-
dependence, and attachment (Ashmore et al. 2004). What is more, goals shift from a personal 
to a collective level (Brewer & Gardner 1996, De Cremer & van Vugt 1999), and self-interest 
is not defined at the individual level anymore: “Inclusion with a common social boundary acts 
to reduce social distance among group members, making it less likely that they will make 
sharp distinctions between their own and other’s welfare” (Brewer & Kramer 1986). 
The impulse for the development of SIT and SCT was the empirical observation that even 
minimal and arbitrary group boundaries can be sufficient to induce in-group/out-group differ-
entiations, and that these have a range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral consequences 
(Tajfel 1982). According to SIT, (1) humans have a basic need to maintain a positive identity 
(“self-enhancement”), and this need (2) translates into an implicit drive to create, maintain, 
and enhance the distinctiveness of groups, whenever the basis of identification changes from a 
personal to a collective identity—for example, a group membership. In short, when categoriz-
ing themselves as group members, the need for positive social identity motivates group mem-
bers to differentiate their in-group from relevant out-groups. Research in the SIT paradigm 
has traditionally focused on categories such as gender, race, nationality, and class, and this 
framework was primarily used for the explanation of intergroup discriminations and conflict.  
In contrast, SCT presents a more general theoretical framework, specifying the antecedents 
and consequences of personal and social identities to explain (inter)individual and (in-
ter)group behavior, as well as the transition from one form of behavior to the other. SCT elab-
orates on the details of the categorization process as the cognitive basis of group behavior. 
According to SCT, identity starts with the process of self-categorization, that is, “cognitive 
groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same ... in contrast to some other class of 
stimuli” (Turner et al. 1987: 44). Categorization accentuates perceived similarities between 
stimuli belonging to the same category and differences between stimuli belonging to different 
categories (i.e. depersonalization). The activation of relevant (self-)schemata during categori-
zation is governed by “relative salience,” which is a “function of an interaction between the 
‘readiness’ of a perceiver to use a particular self-category (its relative accessibility) and the 
‘fit’ between category specifications and the stimulus reality to be presented” (Turner et al. 
1994: 454).
9
 In the terminology of the model of frame-selection, the activation of relevant 
self-schemata is guided by the match and respective activation weights—we would have to 
add, however, that the mode of information processing plays a crucial role as well. In fact, the 
                                                 
9 “Fit has two aspects: comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit is defined by the principle of meta-contrast … Stat-
ed in this form, the principle defines fit in terms of the emergence of a focal category against a contrasting background. 
Normative fit refers to the content aspect of the match between category specifications and the instances being represent-
ed. The interaction between perceiver readiness and fit is assumed to be a general process at work in categorization, not 
merely one that applies to social and self-categorization” (Turner 1994: 454, emphasis added). This statement of a “logic 
of appropriateness” was also captured in the MFS by the activation weights and the mode-selection threshold. 
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idea that a large part of social cognition, especially in the form of “stereotyping,” is highly 
automatic, has attracted considerable attention (see Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Evans 2008). 
All in all, we can resketch the core tenets of SIT and SCT in terms of individual framing pro-
cesses—the activation of relevant identity schemata is guided both by accessibility and situa-
tional cues indicating the “appropriateness” of a particular frame and script, and the applica-
tion of an associated (social) identity can occur both in an automatic and controlled fashion.  
The social facets of identity—relational and collective—are of particular interest for trust re-
search. Generally speaking, if we conceive of an individual’s identity as the set of meanings 
applied to the self in a social situation, then the question of which identity a trustor assumes in 
that situation will have critical consequences for the avenues of trust development. More con-
cretely, the affective, cognitive and behavioral consequences of social categorizations can in-
fluence the way trustors deal with a trust problem. Unsurprisingly, a number of scholars have 
proposed that social identities (both relational and collective) can be a basis for trust devel-
opment (Brewer 1986, Meyerson et al. 1996, Jones & George 1998, McKnight et al. 1998, 
Burke & Stets 1999, Messick & Kramer 2001, Williams 2001, Tanis & Postmes 2005, Brewer 
2008). 
For example, Brewer (1986, 2008) argues that a salient collective identity can be a sufficient 
solution to a trust problem, leading to a form of “depersonalized trust” based on category 
membership. First, a salient social categorization can be used as a heuristic cue for guiding the 
activation of relevant cooperative scripts, for example, the reciprocity norm. Second, trustors 
may project their own attitudes and beliefs onto the group ("false consensus effect", Ross et 
al. 1977). Thus “assuming that most individuals have generally positive views of the self 
(high self-esteem), attributing one’s own characteristics to others in the in-group will be bi-
ased in the direction of positive traits and behaviors, producing a general positivity in thinking 
about in-groups that is not extended to out-groups” (Brewer 2008: 222). Lastly, the identifica-
tion with a social group—the activation of a collective identity—may transform individual 
goals so that, when social identification is strong, goal transformations provide a basis for in-
ferences about the other’s favorable trustworthiness. Similarly, Messick and Kramer argue 
that “when group membership is made salient, a bond may be induced that facilitates trust and 
mutual aid. Since common group membership characterizes both parties, it induces, in effect, 
reciprocity” (2001: 101). They emphasize that this type of “category-based trust” (Kramer 
1999) does not rely on dyadic embeddedness or on a history of interaction, and can be extend-
ed to strangers in situations where a common identity is evoked and provides information 
about trustworthiness, because the recognition of a shared identity provides a basis for devel-
oping expectations about trustee characteristics.  
Williams (2001) extends this argument by looking at the impact of social identification on 
trust in intergroup relations, asking how dissimilar group memberships affect trust between 
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in-group and out-group members. According to Williams, the decisive factor influencing how 
a salient collective identity influences perceived trustworthiness of out-group members is the 
structural interdependence between the dissimilar groups, which may be cooperative, com-
petitive, or neutral. A competitive interdependence “refers to the perception that an out-group 
represents a threat to the goals of one’s in-group or to one’s personal goals” (ibid. 392). Thus, 
it “may lead to negative category-based perceptions of out-group members’ trustworthiness” 
(ibid.), because both benevolence and integrity of out-group members cannot be confidently 
assumed. The opposite is true for cooperative interdependence. In addition to this cognitive 
side, which primarily affects expectations of trustworthiness, she posits that social identifica-
tion in the presence of dissimilar groups triggers affective responses which reinforce the cog-
nitive consequences of category-based social cognition. 
A large body of empirical research supports the general hypothesis of “in-group favoritism” 
that social identity theory has provided (see Brewer 1979, Messick & Mackie 1989, Brown 
2000). With respect to the impact of salient collective identity on trust, empirical data show 
that various measures of trust and risk-taking are significantly higher when trustees are in-
group members, rather than out-group members (Brewer & Kramer 1986, Buchan et al. 2002, 
Tanis & Postmes 2005, cf. Güth et al. 2008). What is more, the low levels of observed trust 
towards out-group members can be traced back to the generation of unfavorable expectations 
of trustworthiness and reciprocation (Tanis and Postmes 2005). An important caveat to this 
general conclusion was provided by Buchan, Johnson, and Croson (2006). They relativize the 
general findings by showing that in-group biases in trust depend on the broader cultural con-
text in which interactions take place. In essence, in-group effects are particularly pronounced 
in individualist cultures, whereas they do not extend to collectivist cultures (see Triandis 
1989, 1995). This demonstrates a mediating influence of the cultural “trust settings” (Giddens 
1990) and the “culture of trust” prevalent in a society (see chapter 3.2.4). 
Burke and Stets (1999) and Tyler (2001) suggest another way by which identity becomes rel-
evant to trust: actors use their associations with groups and organizations to judge their own 
social status, and through that, their self-esteem and self-worth. Every interaction thus is also 
a touchstone of “self-verification;”10 it can lead to the confirmation or negation of one’s own 
personal and social identity. According to Burke and Stets, self-verification is a causal ante-
cedent to trust. They argue that “insofar as a person’s identity is verified repeatedly in interac-
tion with others ... that person will gain knowledge of the other’s character and will come to 
trust those specific others” (1999: 351). Moreover, trust through self-verification leads to 
commitment, emotional attachment, and the development of a shared group orientation. Any 
                                                 
10 “In self-verification, individuals seek to confirm their self-views, often by looking at the responses and views of others… 
Self-verification involves the cognitive process of matching the self-relevant meanings in a situation to the meanings that 
define the internal identity standard and guide behavior in a situation” (Burke & Stets 1999: 349). 
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“mismatch” between the meanings carried in the current “identity standard” and perceptions 
of corresponding self-relevant meanings in a situation causes an “error signal” which trans-
lates into negative subjective experiences (conversely, a reduction of the error signal results in 
positive feelings). That is, a discrepancy between self-views and the socially expected identity 
standards triggers negative internal responses. This is particularly pronounced when other ac-
tors deliberately communicate that a socially expected identity standard has been violated—
actions that indicate a transgression are normally experienced as a deprivation of social ap-
proval.  
According to Elster (2005), a violation of moral norms results in feelings of guilt in the actor, 
and of anger and indignation in observers, while the violation of social norms triggers shame 
in the actor and contempt in the observer.
11
 Note that a breach of trust often taps on both a 
moral (obligation, benevolence) and a social (reciprocity) norm. Presumably, decisions about 
trust and trustworthy responses are therefore particularly informative to evaluate both one’s 
own and the other’s identity. Trustors use available cues both to assess and learn about the 
trustee’s identity, and to evaluate their own identity in the light of observable responses to 
their trust. Likewise, trustees learn about the identity of the trustor and use his actions (trust or 
distrust) to evaluate their own identity. Just as any other social interaction, trust problems of-
fer an opportunity for the “looking-glass selves” to adjust self-conceptions and conceptions of 
the social identity of the interaction partner. 
5.2.3. Signaling Identities 
Taking things together, the previous sections suggest that the communication processes in-
volved in the social framing of a trust problem do also supply cues to the identities of the in-
teraction partners. Actors can use these cues to make inferences about the motivation and 
preferences of the other. The choice of a trusting act rests on a mutual understanding and a 
temporary acceptance of the identities presented by trustor and trustee. Only if they are per-
ceived as situationally valid can they become a basis for a subsequent interaction and the 
emergence of a trust relation, and the prolonged continuation of the interaction so initiated 
(the structural coupling) depends on a sustained acknowledgment of a given self-definition, or 
its change into another (Henslin 1968, Endress 2002: 55). In other words, the interpretation 
and acceptance of the identities of trustor and trustee are important events in the process of 
trust development. The perception of identities is prestructured by the stock of available inter-
pretive schemes in the form of prototypes or stereotypes, and it can be influenced by the “self-
                                                 
11 “Moral norms include the norm to keep promises, the norm to tell the truth, the norm to help others in distress; and so on. 
Social norms include norms of etiquette, norms of revenge, norms of reciprocity, norms of fairness, norms of equality, and 
so on. Some norms, about which more later, have features in common with both moral and social norms” (Elster 2005: 
202). 
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presentation” of the actors and their management of the “personal front” (Goffman 1967, see 
next section). 
Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) advance this argument and propose that the signaling of iden-
tities is a core process in the development of trust. Their work aims towards a formalization of 
this perspective in the framework of principal-agent theory. To the primary problem of trust, 
which equates to the choice of a trusting act and thus represents a decision-making problem, 
they add the secondary problem of trust, which must be solved even before the primary choice 
problem can be considered. The secondary problem of trust is wholly concerned with the 
credibility of observable signs of trustworthiness (“manifesta”) with respect to their power to 
indicate the nonobservable trust-warranting properties (“t-krypta”) of the trustor.12 Since op-
portunists can use strategic mimicry to simulate t-krypta, the secondary trust problem can be 
interpreted as a special case of a signaling game. A signal is “an action by a player (the ‘sig-
naler’) whose purpose is to raise the probability that another player (the ‘receiver’) assigns to 
a certain state of affairs or ‘event’” (ibid. 150). Bacharach and Gambetta (henceforth BG) 
strive to delineate the conditions that need to prevail in order to generate separating equilibria 
in which manifesta can reliably signal trustworthy types. Generally speaking, separating equi-
libria exist whenever the costs of using the signal differ between mimics and nonmimics in 
such a way that it is not profitable for mimics to use them, while it is profitable for trustwor-
thy types. 
A normal signaling game would produce an inference structure of the form m  v  t, that 
is, an inference from manifesta m over types v to trust-warranting properties t. BG add a layer 
of “identity signaling”,13 so that (g  i)  v  t, whereby identity signals g allow for an in-
ference of the social identity i, from there to the type v and, in this way, an inference about the 
trust-warranting properties t. Identity itself is a krypton, however. It is not directly observable, 
but can only be signaled. Thus, the trustor principally faces the problem of credibility again, 
as well as the possibility that identity signals will be strategically exploited to signal a certain 
type of identity. However, identity signals often have unique authenticating characteristics 
(“signatures”) that can hardly be imitated. If a trustee has honored trust in a previous interac-
tion, then the display of his signature can be sufficient to induce favorable expectations of 
trustworthiness.  
                                                 
12 “One observes, for instance, physiognomic features—the set of the eyes, a firm chin—and behavioral features—a steady 
look, relaxed shoulder—and treats them as evidence of an internal disposition. Trust-warranting properties—honesty, be-
nevolence, love of children, low time preference, sect membership—may come variably close to being observable. But, 
except in limiting cases, they are unobservable, and signs mediate the knowledge of them” (Bacharach & Gambetta 2001: 
154). 
13 “Identity signaling is a strategy for signaling a krypton that works by giving evidence of another krypton, that of being a 
reputation-bearer” (Bacharach & Gambetta 2001: 163). 
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Signatures are “heteronymous” in that one signature differs from all other signatures allocated 
by the random action of nature—for example, the face. According to BG, the effectiveness of 
face-to-face interactions in producing trust is due to the fact that they allow for a cost-free 
presentation of signatures (facial displays whose recognition is highly automatic) which, on 
top of that, are also protected against mimicry. But there are more options of producing credi-
ble t-manifesta and signatures. For example, trustees who possess t-krypta produce “cues” 
which are often highly automatic. By definition, these are cost-free to display for those who 
are trustworthy (honest look, emotional display, voice etc.), and can be used as a credible sig-
nal of trustworthiness. Moreover, a “group signature” may allow for identity signaling via 
some signal of a social identity if the group can establish a reputation or trustworthiness and 
protect t-manifesta against exploitation (“categorical identity signaling”). Thus, if a trustee 
signals that he has social identity g, and if the trustor has learned that this category has t-
krypta, then the display of this categorical social identity can be sufficient to induce trust.
14
  
As Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) point out, identity signals are a most relevant aspect of 
defining a trust problem; they regularly provide credible information about the other’s identi-
ty, and thus about the trust-warranting qualities of a potential trustee. The authors formulate 
their argument from a perspective of strategic interaction, and ask which kind of signals can 
be reliable and credible given that actors are rational. Starting from this assumption of “ra-
tional opportunism,” they posit that signals are often strategically feigned to initiate and ex-
ploit a trust relation, in that opportunistic actors mimic trustworthy types. However, as BG 
note, the signaling perspective of the primary and secondary trust problem is tied to very 
stringent assumptions which derive from the rational-choice perspective underlying the prin-
cipal-agent framework. In short, in order to make inferences of the kind, type, and logic pro-
posed in their model, the fully rational actors would have to know the costs and utility associ-
ated with all outcomes, the signal costs and utility for all types, and the probability distribu-
tions of the types in the population (ibid. 161). Their model is an example for the strategic in-
terpretation of signals by rational agents under the assumption of full information and ration-
ality. In other words, the object of their analysis is the inference of trustworthiness based on 
identity signals and the choice of a trusting act in an “ideal-type” rational mode of information 
processing.  
In contrast, the framing perspective of adaptive rationality developed in chapter 4 demon-
strates that bounded rationality may lead to automatic trust as well—to an automatic activa-
tion of a corresponding trust frame and script by significant symbols and communicative acts 
which suppresses strategic considerations and which, in the ideal-type case, leads to an un-
                                                 
14 Thus, BG are primarily concerned with categorizations of others, or “stereotyping,” and not with the impact of self-
definitions on trust development. Identity signaling is explored from the perspective of the trustee and conceptualized as 
the trustee’s problem of communicating a trustworthy impression. 
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conditional choice of a trusting act. This means that the secondary problem of trust (which is 
none other than the problem of interpretation and the definition of the situation), assuming 
adaptive rationality, can be solved in ways differing from the rational-choice principal-agent 
perspective. Adaptive rationality applies to sender and the receiver alike, to both the trustor 
and the trustee. Thus, not only can the interpretation of signals be highly automatic, but also 
their emission and communication. More concretely, the signaling and interpretation of identi-
ties can be controlled or automatic.  
Senders will often routinely activate and enact those parts of their social identity which have 
been identified as relevant in a particular situation, given that a corresponding identity schema 
exists and is (chronically) accessible (Macrae & Bodenhausen 2000, Andersen & Chen 2002). 
Likewise, receivers highly routinely categorize the presented social stimuli and cues into 
available relational or collective categories. In this line, Andersen and Chen (2002) argue that 
relational identities, by the principle of transference, may even be activated in contexts where 
the particular significant other is not present and where the situational cues are only proximal-
ly identic. Likewise, Huang and Murnighan (2010) consider the possibility that relational 
identities can be activated unconsciously and thereby influence the choice of a trusting act. In 
short, symbolic interaction and the signaling of identities often occur in an implicit, unintend-
ed and automatic fashion, guided by the principles of adaptive rationality.  
All in all, the constitution of a trust relation is dependent upon a shared definition of the situa-
tion in which trustor and trustee converge on an (implicit or explicit) understanding of the 
trust problem—a state reached with the help of symbolic interaction and communication dur-
ing the process of social framing. This does not only refer to the shared understanding of the 
rules, roles, or routines governing the transaction (i.e., the sources of trust-related knowledge 
and the “framing” of the relationship), it extends to the proper understanding of the other’s 
identity. Henslin correctly summarizes this idea in saying that, “where an actor has offered a 
definition of himself and the audience is willing to interact with the actor on the basis of that 
definition, we are saying trust exists” (Henslin 1968: 140).  
5.3. Active Trust Production 
5.3.1. Active Trust 
The discussion of the secondary trust problem shows an opportunity to create trust actively. If 
trust is the product of an open and reflexive communication process, are there then possibili-
ties for actors to facilitate its emergence during interaction? Can trust be actively influenced 
and produced by communicating, choosing, and presenting relevant identities to others, and 
by managing the impressions generated during interaction? Giddens argues that trust “has to 
be worked at—the trust of the other has to be won” (Giddens 1991: 96). He introduces the no-
228 
 
tion of active trust (Giddens 1994) to capture the idea that trust is continuously and reflexively 
reproduced by the actors involved in an ongoing process of social framing. Importantly, the 
concept of active trust reflects the openness and contingency inherent in trust-related interac-
tions by recognizing the freedom and autonomy of the other, but emphasizes at the same time 
the power of individual action to influence the other’s perspective and to deliberately define 
the trust problem in a desired way.  
The notion of active trust points to a creative element in trust problems, which manifests in 
the intentional actions and communications that trustor and trustee engage in when interpret-
ing and defining the situation. That is, rather than assuming merely passive trustors and trus-
tees who only draw on their trust-related knowledge to make sense of their perceptions, the 
parties are directly and actively involved in the construction of a “favorable” perspective to-
wards the trust problem within and beyond the contexts they find themselves in. That is, trust 
is also an “idiosyncratic accomplishment” (Möllering 2006a: 356) that is actively achieved 
and influenced by the actors in more or less institutionalized contexts.  
According to Möllering (2005a), the active character of trust becomes most visible in a situa-
tion of unfamiliarity, in which neither rational grounds (based on the payoff structure) nor in-
stitutional grounds (based on taken-for-granted expectations) for trust are present. In this case, 
actors nevertheless engage in “reflexive familiarization” to actively create the conditions that 
allow for the trust problem to be solved. This requires the, “to continuously and intensively 
communicate in order to maintain reflexively the constitution of their social world, including 
the trust games played in social interaction” (ibid. 28). In fact, the process approach to trust, 
as suggested by the social framing perspective, is very broad and not limited to such unfamil-
iar situations only—it extends to all situations (of dyadic, network, and institutional embed-
dedness), because the validity and stability of social structures, their taken-for-grantedness, 
and the regulative power of social institutions is itself a product of reflexive and continuous 
communications. In addition to symbolically negotiating the trust relation, actors more or less 
consciously contribute as well to the emergence and maintenance of the institutional and cul-
tural contexts which enable them to trust. 
Lewicki et al. (1998), in detailing the dynamics of trust and distrust in relationships, point to 
an important implication of the active-trust perspective: a state of trust is always a temporary 
balance and a fragile “quasi-stationary equilibrium” that is never stable: “balance and con-
sistency depictions may be more accurately represented as single-frame snapshots of a dy-
namic time-series process, as relationships are transformed through new information that be-
comes available and is processed and interpreted” (1998: 444). The idea of active trust consti-
tution also reverberates in Zucker’s (1986) ideal-type of “process-based” trust. This aspect 
most directly demonstrates how trust materializes in reflexive social interactions which over 
time reproduce (and reinforce) the conditions that generate it, but which can change and dete-
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riorate at any point. Likewise, Lewis and Weigert (1985a) identify a “feedback process” of 
trust building, so that “trust appears to be an antecedent to, a consequent of, and an emergent 
from the processes of social exchange” (ibid. 466)—in other words, a product of reflexive 
constitution in which the actions of the parties involved shape the final outcome, that is, the 
constitution of a trust relation.
15
 
The notion of active trust also emphasizes the importance of mutual perspective-taking and 
empathy involved in bringing about a trust relation—to the extent that actors “use or develop 
similar interpretive schemes to define the social situation, the parties will tend to agree on 
their perceptions of the level of trust present in the social situation, so adjustment to each oth-
er takes place” (Jones & George 1998: 535, emphasis added). This adjustment process is in-
fluenced by the relational communications and the identity signals the trustor and trustee emit. 
Overall, when thinking about trust from a social framing perspective, the achievement of fa-
vorable conditions conducive to trust has to be regarded as a mutual achievement of the par-
ties involved, and the openness and autonomy inherent in communication leaves space for a 
creative element and for the opportunity to actively shape the definition of the situation for the 
actors. This opportunity relates to both the trustor and the trustee, each of whom both actively 
and deliberately influences the perspective of the other. 
5.3.2. Impression Management  
A paradigm that has been particularly concerned with the behaviors and strategies that actors 
use to change how they are perceived by others is “impression management” research 
(Schlenker 1980, Jones & Pittman 1982, Leary & Kowalski 1990, DePaulo 1992). Generally 
speaking, impression management refers to the process by which individuals attempt to con-
trol the impressions others form of them; a term closely related is self-presentation, which is 
often used synonymously.
16
 Impression management addresses both the motivations and the 
concrete strategies used by actors to convey a certain impression of them to others. Many, if 
not all, impression management accounts draw heavily from the work of Goffman (1959, 
1967), who developed the concept of dramaturgic action to denote the fact that social interac-
tions often resemble the “performance” of actors who, as in the theater, have to give a credible 
expression of the “character” they embody to the audience on the “front stage” of social life. 
                                                 
15 Lewis & Weigert (1985a) use this argument to propose an “irreducible” element in trust, emerging as a property of the 
interactions and social exchanges between individuals, so that it “is not derived from, nor reducible to the psychological 
states of atomistic individuals” (ibid. 456, emphasis added). However, the social framing perspective developed in this 
work offers a conception of individual-level decision-making processes which explain the emergence of trust relations, 
and especially their unconditional character, in a reductive sense of methodological individualism. Even when reflexive 
constitution is an open and volatile process, the causal antecedents of trust have to be traced back into the psychological—
and information-processing—states of individual actors. 
16 As Leary and Kowalski (1990) point out, the term self-presentation is, in a strict sense, narrower because impression man-
agement may include the management of entities other than the self, and impressions may be managed by means other 
than self-presentation, for example, by third parties. We will use both terms synonymously here. 
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Actors thus try to convey a certain impression of their character and their intentions with the 
dramaturgical means of self-representation. Goffman gave particular attention to the actor’s 
performance of social roles, and the way in which individuals establish a sense of situational 
normality using interaction rituals to negotiate and maintain the interaction order, that is, the 
background expectations and the “rules of the game” defining the situation.  
What does motivate actors in the first place to manage the impressions they have on others? 
According to Schlenker (1980), the individual motivation to engage in impression manage-
ment is subject to expectancy-value tradeoffs: every image that a person might claim has po-
tential benefits and costs, that is, social and material outcomes which differ with respect to 
their utility and the subjective probabilities pertaining to their successful enactment. Leary and 
Kowalski (1990) propose that relevant goals, their value to the individual, and perceptions of 
discrepancy between the “actual” and the “desired” self are the primary determinants of im-
pression motivation. Of course, the social context is a primary source of such motivations, es-
pecially when social roles are identified as relevant in a particular context and social identifi-
cation allows for appropriate self-categorizations in terms of a particular social identity 
(Goffman 1959). Thus, actors engage in impression management following a logic of appro-
priateness, and often “tailor their public images to the perceived values and preferences of 
significant others” (Leary & Kowalksi 1990: 41).  
This does not mean, however, that interactions are always subject to fraud and deception. 
Even if impression management is tactical (that is, occurring in a deliberately controlled fash-
ion), there is a strong intrinsic motivation to convey accurate self-images to others. For one, 
actors value certain aspects of their personality and consistently try to present the positive 
sides of their character in public (Schlenker 1980, Jones & Pittman 1982). Second, the actual 
self-concepts constrain the range of potential impressions that actors may try to generate by 
providing information about the probability that they can successfully instill a false impres-
sion and “pull it off,” when they claim images that are inconsistent with how they see them-
selves (Schlenker 1980). As Goffman notes, “an individual who implicitly or explicitly signi-
fies that he has certain social characteristics, ought in fact to be what he claims he is” (1959: 
13). Lastly, social norms (e.g. not to lie) and moral norms (e.g. to refrain from deceit) normal-
ly deter actors from making claims about themselves that are inconsistent with their self-
concepts (Leary & Kowalski 1990). Thus, even when impression management can be tactical, 
people normally select from their totality of actual social identities those that are most likely 
to be met with social approval and facilitate current goal-attainment—but rarely, actors build 
impressions on a completely false identity. On the other hand, there is, of course, always room 
for mimicry and deception, and for the use of impression management in a deceitful way. The 
deliberate communication of a false identity can be a means of achieving a desired end, and 
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the “selective” presentation of the self can be used to conceal inconvenient facets of personali-
ty and character. 
At the same time, self-presentation can be “overlearned, habitual, and unconscious,” so that 
“people sometimes engage in impression-relevant behavior with little attention” (Leary & 
Kowalski 1990: 37). From the perspective of adaptive rationality and frame selection, it is ap-
parent that a display of a (social) identity can be highly automatic if the conditions of situa-
tional appropriateness, internal availability, and accessibility of a corresponding frame are 
met. Thus, a tactical element need not always be present in impression management, although 
most theoretical approaches explicitly address the deliberate aspect of intentional performanc-
es to convey a certain picture of one’s personality and identity. 
The construction of impressions addresses all kinds of “ideas” others can have about an actor. 
This does not only include personal attributes and characteristics, but also attitudes, moods 
and emotions, roles, status, physiological states, interests, beliefs, and so on. It can be 
achieved not only in overt action and verbal communication, but also in stylistic and nonver-
bal behaviors and in physical appearance (Jones & Pittman 1982, DePaulo 1992). Social cog-
nitive research has provided a good amount of evidence that the formation of impressions—in 
the sense of adaptive rationality—often occurs rapidly and automatically, and that first im-
pressions may have a long-lasting effect on subsequent judgments (Macrae & Bodenhausen 
2000, Bierhoff & Vornefeld 2004). In the following, we will concentrate on those behaviors 
which are specifically relevant to solving a trust problem. As Luhmann argues, every action 
potentially creates or destroys trust, and every communication is potential evidence for the 
trust-related qualities of the individual, and a reason for adjusting trustworthiness expecta-
tions. Thus, impression management is relevant in most social interactions, and particularly so 
in trust relations. 
5.3.3. Trust Management Strategies 
The discussion of active trust in the preceding section suggests that impression management is 
an ever-present facet of the communication processes related to the constitution of a trust rela-
tion. Since at least two parties—a trustor and a trustee—are involved in its active constitution, 
we can address the idea of trust-related impression management from either perspective, and 
ask about the particular actions of trustor and trustee that facilitate the reflexive constitution of 
“active” trust.  
For example, Kramer (2006), focusing on trustors, contrasts two “broad strategies” they can 
take for coping with social uncertainty in a trust problem. On the one hand, trustors can aim 
for better discrimination, and selectively engage in transactions only with those who will re-
ciprocate trust. On the other hand, they can engage in behaviors that are “aimed at eliciting 
trustworthy behavior from others, regardless of their prior intentions or motives” (Kramer 
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2006: 72, emphasis in original). While the first strategy questions the efficacy of discrimina-
tion as a strategy for improving the outcomes of a trust problem (Kramer takes explicit notice 
of the signaling perspective developed by Bacharach and Gambetta), the second approach 
points to an opportunity for the trustor to actively produce trust. Trustors, according to Kra-
mer, can foster its development in that they (1) encourage trustworthy behavior, (2) reward 
trustworthy behavior, and (3) signal their unwillingness to be exploited. Collectively, these 
actions aim at reducing the social uncertainty of the trustee (!) with respect to the personality 
of the trustor, by solving “his” interpretive problem and defining the situation for the trustee. 
As Kramer claims, this process is “an important route to trust-building” (ibid. 72). Kramer’s 
approach is, however, relatively exceptional: most trust theorists focus on the role of the trus-
tee in bringing about a trustworthy impression and motivating a trustor to choose a trusting 
act.  
In this line, Beckert (2006) argues that “performative acts” of the trustee which precede the 
trustor’s choice are a primary means of producing the willingness to trust in the situation. The 
trustee’s actions aim at producing an image of trustworthiness and represent an “investment” 
which he will take so long as the utility derived from realizing the content of the trust relation 
(i.e. instant gratification, future reciprocal obligations etc.) is higher than the costs incurred. 
Beckert develops this perspective in direct reference to Goffman (1959) and Bacharach and 
Gambetta (2001), holding that the performative acts of the trustee aim at resolving the sec-
ondary trust problem: “The trust-taker has to succeed in convincing the trust-giver of a defini-
tion of the situation that interprets it as cooperative; that is, he has to convince him of his 
trustworthiness. This ‘enticement’ of trust depends essentially on the trust-taker’s performa-
tive self-presentation” (ibid. 324). Applying Goffman’s concept of dramaturgic action, he ar-
gues that self-presentations “not only have the function of producing the impression of trust-
worthiness, but they also offer a common definition of the situation that prejudices the trust-
giver’s action” (ibid.). This argument resembles an earlier one made by Luhmann, who argues 
that selective self-representations provide the criteria on which to build trust, so that “the 
foundations of trust in a society are adjusted according to the prospects and conditions of self-
presentation and the tactical problems and dangers involved in it” (1979: 40). Thus, a trust-
worthy trustee (in contrast to an untrustworthy one) “will handle his freedom ... in keeping 
with his personality—or rather, in keeping with the personality which he has presented and 
made socially visible” (ibid. 39). 
Beckert identifies four “performative strategies” of self-presentation which are conducive to 
achieving the desired image of trustworthiness. First, trustees can try to increase the commit-
ment of the trustor to the trust relation by creating normative or cognitive barriers to with-
drawal. For example, by showing commitment, they may try to induce a reciprocal obligation 
to place trust in them. Thus, the trustee’s advance investment “exercises a subliminal compul-
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sion” (2006: 327) to comply with the norm of not disappointing the trustee. Second, trustees 
can signal a congruence of qualities and characteristics of the trustor, and exploit the fact that 
similarities in status, group memberships, behavior, and lifestyle translate into higher per-
ceived trustworthiness (Zucker 1986: 70ff., Elsbach 2004); for example, by taking “strategic 
membership” in similar groups or by communicating similar life-style, clothing, speech, or 
national or ethnic affiliation. Lastly, trustees can aim at managing the impression of their own 
characteristics, that is, influence the trustor’s assessment of trust-related characteristics such 
as competence, integrity, benevolence, and predictability. This point was also made by Whit-
ener et al. (1998), who suggest that impressions of trustworthiness can be influenced positive-
ly by behavioral consistency, by displaying integrity, sharing control, accurate, open commu-
nication, and demonstrating concern. In conclusion, performative strategies of self-
presentation aim at producing the “appearance” (Beckert 2006: 328) of trustworthiness; the 
willingness to trust is developed actively in the situation itself. 
Elsbach (2004), in summarizing crossdisciplinary work on factors enhancing perceived trust-
worthiness, concludes that trustees can use three types of “tactics” to manage their “trustwor-
thiness images”: self-presentation behaviors, choice of language and physical appearance. Ac-
cording to Elsbach, the general purpose of all three impression management tactics is to trig-
ger some stereotypical categorization which is associated with a favorable generalized expec-
tation of trustworthiness. For example, by displaying similarities to the trustor, a trustee can 
be treated as in in-group member. By displaying membership of a reputable group, that is, by 
categorical identity signaling, trustees can manage to be associated with a stereotypically 
trustworthy group. The aspects of language and appearance, according to Elsbach, work in the 
same direction: both can serve to underline the image of a stereotypically trustworthy group a 
trustee wants to claim membership of. In essence, Elsbach implies that the common denomi-
nator of all trust-related impression management is its potential to trigger stereotypically 
trustworthy categorizations. 
However, the direct effects of performance—the “concrete” aspects of communication, such 
as language characteristics, physical appearance, and nonverbal behavior, seem to go much 
beyond their influence in amplifying only the desired categorical group membership and in 
framing a particular social identity. For example, Burgoon et al. (1990) summarize work on 
the influence of nonverbal behavior on source credibility and persuasion, holding that “non-
verbal behaviors carry significant import in impression management judgments” (ibid. 142). 
Their work provides a detailed insight on how distal vocalic (fluency, quality, pitch, tempo, 
amplitude), kinesic (eye contact, gaze, the way the body is leaning, smiling, facial pleasant-
ness, expressiveness), and proxemic features (body tension, distance, movement) translate in-
to proximal percepts of immediacy, dominance, and arousal in the perceiver. These are re-
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garded as influencing attributes of competence, sociability and integrity, and therefore can be 
directly related to perceptions of trustworthiness and subsequent persuasion success.  
Williams (2007) argues that the most important aspect of trust-related impression manage-
ment is threat reduction. She claims that “emotional threat regulation”—a process for “manag-
ing the harm that others associate with cooperating” (ibid. 596) that involves efforts to influ-
ence the emotional responses of others—is a primary means of reducing perceived risks and 
of inducing trust. She defines threat-reducing behavior as “a set of intentional interpersonal 
actions intended to minimize or eliminate counterparts’ perceptions that one’s actions are like-
ly to have a negative impact on their goals, concerns, or well-being” (ibid.)—in effect, these 
actions represent a cognitive and affective investment into signaling trustworthiness. The po-
tential strategies to achieve threat reduction are (1) altering the situation to remove some or all 
of the threat-provoking elements, (2) altering attention, that is, distracting the trustor away 
from the threat-provoking situation, (3) altering the meaning of the situation, that is, “refram-
ing” the facts and critical elements by formulating a plausible narrative that will have a differ-
ent emotional impact and (4) modulating emotional responses by interrupting a current expe-
rience of threat (i.e. physical exercise, alcohol and drugs, relaxing activities). Overall, during 
threat regulation, the trustee expresses concern, benevolence, support, social competence, and 
responsibility for the welfare of the trustor. A major consequence of successful threat reduc-
tion is the emergence of positive affect and attachment in the trustor and an increase in expec-
tations of trustworthiness. Since threat regulation attempts have a “cost” in terms of interper-
sonal effort (perspective taking, empathy, understanding, planning) and emotion work, and 
they represent a credible signal of trustworthiness.  
Misztal (2001) and Möllering (2006a,b) directly draw from Goffman in connecting dramatur-
gic action to the development of trust by focusing on the interactive achievement of situation-
al normality. This achievement depends on the dramaturgic performances of the actors in-
volved and how they manage the impressions they generate to indicate that things are “nor-
mal.” Generally speaking, by preserving the routine of social life, the actors reinforce the feel-
ing of normality in themselves and others, “which conceals the unpredictability of the reality, 
thus increasing the perception of general security and trustworthiness” (Misztal 2001: 315). 
Trust, in this sense, is an “unintended outcome of routine social life” (ibid. 323), and a prod-
uct of actors who are primarily occupied with enacting a normal social reality in everyday in-
teraction (see chapters 2.3.1 already). Beckert adds to this argument by stating that the opera-
tion of institutional mechanisms “cannot be understood independently of the performative 
production of the willingness to trust” (2006: 329), and without regard for the reflexive nature 
of the institutional structures themselves, the creation of which is “accomplished in the situa-
tion” (ibid.); thus, both situational normality and structural assurance beliefs rest on the en-
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actment of corresponding expectations, and on the performances that trustor and trustee take 
to reassure each other in their mutual intentions.  
The following figure summarizes the arguments put forth in the last section, displaying the 
active social constitution of a trust relation with the help of relational communication, sym-
bolic interaction and identity signaling in a genetic sequence of social framing and communi-
cative acts (figure 19): 
Figure 19: Primary and secondary trust problems and the emergence of a trust relation 
 
Overall, the discussion of active trust development, impression management, and the particu-
lar trust management strategies that are applicable completes the picture of the social framing 
perspective put forward thus far by drawing our attention to the concrete performances of the 
actors involved to create the conditions necessary for a build-up of trust and for the generation 
of favorable expectations. Impression management research details our understanding of the 
content of relational communication, and highlights the fact that trust and trustworthiness are 
active achievements of the actors involved, reached in communication and symbolic interac-
tion during the process of social framing. Both trustor and trustee can proactively take 
measures to induce a desired response (a trusting act, a trustworthy response) by showing 
commitment, by reducing perceived threats, or by working on self-presentation of trust-related 
characteristics. Even the performative creation of situational normality and structural assur-
ance can be addressed under the headnote of active trust creation, highlighting their dynamic 
and situational character as well as the fragility of these concepts. In sum, the discussion 
shows that trust has to be understood as an ongoing process of reflexive structuration, in 
which both trustor and trustee—sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly—reach a shared 
definition of the situation which enables favorable conditions and a confident choice of a 
trusting act. This pinpoints the last step in the “logic of explanation” of the emergence of a 
trust relation. Mutual social framing constitutes the building block on which the micro-macro 
transition and aggregation of trusting choice and trustworthy response into the collective out-
come of the “emergent” trust relation occur. 
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6. Developing an Empirical Test  
In the following, the perspective of trust and adaptive rationality which was developed in the 
previous chapters of this book will be put to an empirical test. This test is has a twofold aim: 
for one, it is designed to gauge the adequacy of an adaptive rationality perspective in trust re-
search from a general standpoint. The “framing” perspective of trust, as developed in this 
work, is novel in that it merges psychological ideas of flexible information processing, “situ-
ated cognition”, and a contingent use of different trusting strategies in trust problems with so-
ciological ideas of a cultural definition of the situation and adaptive rationality. Going beyond 
previous research, it specifies the causal mechanisms behind these concepts. Adaptive ration-
ality must be regarded as a central dimension of the trust concept, and this demands a focus on 
the questions of mode-selection, the interplay between the processing-mode determinants, and 
their causal link to the choice of a trusting act. The following study is designed join these el-
ements in the spotlight of empirical scrutiny.  
Second, the test aims for a practical evaluation of the model of frame selection. The model of 
frame-selection has been used in a number of theoretical and empirical applications in socio-
logical research. For example, the model could be fruitfully applied to model survey response 
behavior and social desirability (Stocké 2006, 2007b), to explain marital divorce (Esser 
1993a, 2002, Hunkler & Kneip 2008), educational aspirations and educational decisions 
(Stocké 2007a), voter behavior (Kroneberg 2006b), environmental concern and behavior (Best 
& Kneip 2011), donor behavior (Mayerl 2010), crime causation and criminal behavior 
(Kroneberg et al. 2010a), the rescue of Jews in World War II (Kroneberg et al. 2010b) and 
ethnic differences in fertility (Nauck 2010). Taken together, these studies support the major 
implications of the model of adaptive rationality, even with respect to more “ambitious” inter-
action hypotheses which are implied by the mode-selection threshold. However, these studies 
have not been able to confirm the predicted effects with sufficient statistical certainty. The 
study designs used up to this point (quasi-experimental, ex-post-facto- or survey-based) were 
limited in their power to draw valid causal conclusions (Opp 2010).  
Therefore, this study adopts the method of controlled laboratory experiments for the first 
time. A number of arguments can be brought forth in favor of an experimental approach (see 
Levitt & List 2007, Falk & Heckman 2009), in particular so when theory is used to model 
choice behavior. In contrast to field studies, laboratory experiments enable a controlled varia-
tion of the decision-making environment. The researcher can manipulate or fix a number of 
factors which cannot be controlled in a natural setting. For example, he defines the material 
payoffs and incentive structure, the nature of interactions, the order of interaction and repeti-
tion, and the information that the subjects possess when they make a choice. Likewise, institu-
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tions, which are normally an endogenous product of social action, can be designed and exoge-
nously manipulated at relatively low cost in an experiment (for example communication, 
reputation mechanism, contracts and punishment etc.). This amount of control allows for a 
precise test of hypotheses derived from a theoretical model, and it focuses research on the 
causal factors of interest; in our case, on the determinants of mode-selection. The general 
course of action is to operationalize and manipulate the parameters of the mode-selection 
threshold, while controlling or holding constant all remaining determinants. This provides a 
causal test of hypotheses addressing the emergence of conditional and unconditional trust. 
The experiment demands a proper operationalization of the theoretical constructs and the de-
velopment of an adequate study design. In using an experimental approach to tackle the ques-
tion of trust and adaptive rationality, one distinct advantage is that trust research is already 
equipped with a number of well-established designs which can be fruitfully adapted to the 
current research question. In the experimental approach to trust, the “investment game” (Berg 
et al. 1995) is one of the most prominent means to establish a behavioral indicator of trust. It 
will be extended here with two treatment conditions. Apart from a behavioral measure of 
trust, the decision times of the participants will be recorded in the choice stage of the experi-
ment as well. Social psychological researchers often use such latency measures to draw infer-
ences about the adopted processing mode. Survey-based measures of trust will be used to op-
erationalize the chronic accessibility of trust related frames and scripts, which constitutes an-
other determinant and parameter of the mode-selection threshold. However, these will be used 
as independent variables in the analysis. 
The experiment focuses on the manipulation of two parameters of the mode-selection thresh-
old: (1) a context treatment varies the presence (or absence) of situational cues indicating the 
appropriateness of trust-related knowledge and (2) and an incentive treatment varies the initial 
endowments of the participants to influence the parameter of extrinsic cognitive motivation. 
Both treatments elicit a direct effect on the parameters of the mode-selection threshold, and 
therefore influence the choice of a trusting act and corresponding trusting strategies (see fig-
ure 20): 
Figure 20: Experimental treatments and the mode-selection threshold 
 
The experiment is conducted as a 2x2 between subjects factorial design. Testing the model 
requires the specification of a set of auxiliary bridge-hypotheses which establish a link be-
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tween processing modes, trusting strategies, the experimental treatments, and the observable 
indicators. While unconditional trusting strategies are expected to result in high levels of trust, 
conditional trusting strategies support any level between full trust and distrust. With respect to 
decision times, the automatic mode is expected to be fast, while the rational mode is expected 
to be comparatively slow. Accordingly, conditional and unconditional trusting strategies are 
also expected to differ with respect to the recorded decision times.  
Although a number of very general propositions have been already put forward in chapter 4, 
the development of the empirical test requires the derivation of hypotheses which make more 
precise predictions about the expected statistical effects. As will be shown, the model of adap-
tive rationality, in conjunction with the set of auxiliary hypotheses, can be used to derive a 
closed set of admissible interaction patterns that can be expected from a statistical model in 
the present experiment. These patterns are a specific feature and consequence of the adaptive 
rationality perspective, in that the mode-selection determinants interact at every stage of 
frame-, script-, and action selection. From a methodological standpoint, the empirical content 
of such a model is higher than that of a model which can predict main effects only. The inter-
action patterns also suggest that any empirical analysis of the trust phenomenon needs to be 
attentive to the potential heterogeneity in response to the treatments which can be introduced 
through the interplay of chronic accessibility, situational cues, cognitive motivation and all 
other mode-selection determinants. The empirical predictions derived in this way pertain to 
both independent variables, that is, to the choice of a trusting act and the corresponding deci-
sion times. 
The subsequent analysis of trustor behavior rests on the specification of five empirical models 
which are then tested. The models are applied to both dependent variables in sequence. With 
respect to the choice of a trusting act, one of the most important results is a confirmed interac-
tion between incentives, the framing of the context, and chronic script accessibility. Previous 
studies of incentive- and stake size effects have not controlled for the element of chronic ac-
cessibility, which is an important mediator of cognitive motivation in the model of adaptive 
rationality. In line with the predictions generated here, it can be shown that incentive effects 
do highly depend on the internalization of trust-related scripts (the norm of reciprocity), which 
counterbalances the negative effects of incentives and high stakes on trust. In other words, 
trustors who have strongly internalized a trust-related script may be more prone to select un-
conditional trusting strategies in the face of high stakes than low-accessibility trustors. Simi-
larly, the context is found to influence the choice of a trusting act. If situational cues suggest 
the validity of trust-related frames and scripts, trustors make use of this information during the 
choice of a trusting act. Again, the effect of this treatment is found to depend on the accessi-
bility of trust-related knowledge. 
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In addition, the analysis of decision times reveals a coherent picture. The estimated interaction 
pattern matches with the analysis of the choice of a trusting act. For example, high chronic 
accessibility is found to trigger higher levels of trust, but it also leads to a relative decreases in 
decision time. This suggests a prevalence of unconditional trusting strategies for trustors who 
have internalized trust-related norms. Moreover, the incentive treatment is found to increase 
overall decision times, indicating a shift to conditional trusting strategies, but this effect is 
again mediated by chronic script accessibility. As a result, decision times still are relatively 
shorter for high accessibility subjects. At the same time, decision times in the context of the 
trust problem are also strongly dependent on “context free” processing preferences, as meas-
ured and controlled for in the form of “faith in intuition” and “need for cognition” scales (Ep-
stein et al. 1996). This is a remarkable finding in itself, as it helps to clarify the tension be-
tween intuitive and rational approaches to trust which are an ever-present facet of theorizing. 
The current data support a perspective of trust in which individual differences in processing 
preferences crucially shape the mode-selection threshold, the resulting trusting strategies, and 
the resulting type of trust. 
Taking things together, the two behavioral indicators of conditional and unconditional trusting 
strategies (that is, observed levels of trust and corresponding decision times) can be explained 
with the help of one general theoretical model. The discovery of matching patterns and their 
similarity over the domain of two different dependent variables suggests the adequacy and 
validity of the adaptive rationality perspective of trust. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
the study limitations, potential caveats and highlights questions open to future research.  
6.1. Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables 
6.1.1. The Measurement of Trust 
The operationalization and empirical measurement of trust is intricately connected to its theo-
retical conceptualization. Overall, researchers use three different strategies to quantify and 
measure trust: (1) a measurement of trust-related attitudes with the help of survey items, (2) 
an experimental measurement of the behavioral consequences of trust and (3) an assessment 
with the help of qualitative interviews. A broad conceptualization of trust in the spirit of adap-
tive rationality suggests that a combined use of different measures is necessary to make pre-
cise statements about the types and nuances of trust we encounter. In short, both survey-items 
and behavioral measures need to be combined if we want to answer how and when conditional 
and unconditional trusting strategies prevail, and, ideally, such an analysis would be accom-
panied by qualitative data supplying additional information on the trust development process. 
In the psychological literature on trust, a number of scales for the measurement of trust have 
been constructed and validated (Rotter 1967, Johnson-George & Swap 1982, Yamagishi & 
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Yamagishi 1994, Couch et al. 1996, Couch & Jones 1997, Glaeser et al. 2000, Fehr et al. 
2002b, Kassebaum 2004). These scales are used to assess various aspects of “attitudinal” and 
“dispositional” trust, such as generalized trust, job- and partner-specific trust, or trust in insti-
tutions, social networks, professions and companies. In addition, new techniques to measure 
implicit components of attitudes (“implicit association test”, IAT) have been used to detect 
implicit aspects of trust-related attitudes. However, as this technique has been developed only 
very recently, its use is not widespread (Burns et al. 2006, Conner et al. 2007). Most attitudi-
nal and dispositional measures come in the form of a set of survey-items, usually to be rated 
along a Likert-type response scale. The number of items used per scale varies considerably 
between the instruments. For example, the GSS (General Social Survey) uses only one item to 
measure generalized trust (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trust-
ed or that you can´t be too careful in dealing with people?”, see Glaeser et al. 2000), while the 
“Interpersonal Trust Inventory” developed by Kassebaum (2004) involves as much as 55 
items. As reported in chapter 3.1, survey-based measures of trust have been empirically con-
nected to a wide range of trust-related phenomena. 
Experimental measures of trust in the form of the trust game (TG, Camerer & Weigelt 1988, 
Dasgupta 1988, Kreps 1990) and the investment game (IG, Berg et al. 1995) establish a be-
havioral measure of trust. The monetary transfers of the players acting as first-movers are in-
terpreted as an indicator of trust. This course of action is standard in trust research (James 
2002b, Hardin 2003), but has recently lead to methodological critique and a consequent re-
finement of measurement instruments. Importantly, other motivations (such as social prefer-
ences, risk and inequality aversion) can easily be confounded with trust. That is why special 
designs have been devised to separate trust from other influences. For example, Cox (2004) 
uses a “triadic” design in which first- and second-movers first make decisions without a direct 
counterpart player. This provides a measure that is clean of social preferences, which then can 
later be controlled for. The approach resembles that of Ashraf et al. (2006), who isolate social 
preferences with an additional dictator-game measurement. Eckel and Wilson (2004) control 
for non-social risk aversion with the help of an instrument developed by Holt and Laury 
(2002). Yamagishi et al. (2005) separate cooperation from trust in a prisoner´s dilemma with 
variable payoffs, in which the subjects can transform the payoff matrix to their liking (thus, 
cooperation can occur at low and high levels of payoff interdependence; trust does not mani-
fest in cooperation per se, but in the pattern of payoff adjustments that occur over time). 
Overall, researchers have devised a variety of methods to quantify trust in experiments and 
control for potential confounding factors that need to be respected. 
Concerning the relation between survey- and behavioral measures of trust, Glaeser et al. 
(2000) did not find any significant correlations, and concluded that survey-items do not assess 
any attitudes relevant to action at all. Their seminal study provoked a huge body of follow-ups 
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with mixed results: Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010), for example, do find correlations of sur-
vey-measures and decisions in investment games, but do not find any influence of risk prefer-
ences. Sapienza et al. (2008) and Capra et al. (2008), who both control for social preferences 
in their studies, do unambiguously find such correlations, while Lazzarini et al.  (2003) repro-
duce the result of the initial study and report none. Capra et al. (2008) can also show, by using 
a within subject design, that binary and continuous trusting decisions are related. This result is 
important insofar as it relativizes objections of either game variant as being “inappropriate” to 
a measurement of trust. In addition, Baren et al. (2010) show that investment game behavior 
and behavior “in the field” are considerably correlated, providing evidence of external validity 
of the experimental measures adopted in trust research. Fehr (2008) reports that social prefer-
ences are a good predictor for survey-items of trust and concludes that surveys are composed 
of an expectation-based and a preference-based component of trust attitudes, while experi-
ments provide a preference clean measure. Thus, a combined use of experimental- and survey-
based measures is most advisable in research. 
An important implication of the model developed in this work is that survey-based attitudinal 
measures of trust may not exclusively and unconditionally guide the choice of a trusting act. 
We have encountered a related argument when looking at the psychological development of 
trust in chapter 3.1 already: it is the “situational strength” of the context which puts a trustor´s 
general “propensity to trust” in relation to his final intentions (see Gill et al. 2005). Thus, 
when we ask about the impact of trust-related attitudes and how they can serve as a trust 
frame, it is important to respect the other determinants of information processing, and particu-
larly, the situational context (cues) and the incentive structure of the trust game (motivation) 
as well. As will be shown, the model predicts particular interaction effects between attitudinal 
measures and objective-structural conditions, and the mixed results cited above appear to be 
indicative of a neglect of relevant variables and incomplete model specifications. 
In the present work, survey-based measures will be used as an indicator of the chronic acces-
sibility of trust-related frames and scripts, and thus serve as an independent variable in the 
statistical models. In particular, the chronic accessibility of a generalized trust frame ai will be 
measured with the help of a short-version of the “Interpersonal Trust Inventory” (Kassebaum 
2004, based on items of Rotter´s ITS). Thus, it is hypothesized that a generalized attitude 
about unspecific others can serve as an interpretive lens to frame a particular trust relation in 
the experiment. Furthermore, the chronic accessibility of a trust-related script aj will be as-
sessed with the help of the “Norm of Reciprocity”-scale (Perugini et al. 2003), which 
measures how strongly the subjects have internalized the norm of reciprocity (see section 
6.1.4. below). 
Concerning the measurement of trust and its behavioral consequences, the sequential-game 
variants of the trust game and the investment game are appropriate for the experimental analy-
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sis of the trust phenomenon because they realize most directly the objective-structural condi-
tions as discussed in chapter 2. The investment game subtly differs from the trust game in that 
decisions about trust are not binary, but continuous. More concretely, when playing an in-
vestment game, two players receive some initial endowment E. The first-mover (in the role of 
a trustor) can then decide to transfer any amount X between zero and E from his initial en-
dowment to the second-mover (the trustee). This transfer is regarded as an indicator of trust 
(see Johnson & Mislin 2011). Importantly, before the trustee receives the transfer, X is multi-
plied by some factor λ, which represents the surplus and potential gain inherent in the success-
ful establishment of a trust relation and its trustworthy response.
1
 After receiving the amount 
λ*X, the second-mover (in the role of the trustee) can decide to return any amount Y of his 
total wealth X + λ*X to the trustor. This transfer is regarded as an indicator of trustworthiness. 
A benevolent trustworthy response requires that the trustee reciprocates with a transfer of at 
least X, to restore the trustor´s initial wealth. Thus, after both decisions have been made, the 
trustor A receives a final payoff of:  
U(A) = E – X + Y 
Likewise, the trustee B, given λ = 2, receives: 
U(B) = X + 2*X – Y 
If Y ≥ X, then trust “has paid off” for the trustor and he can in fact realize a utility increase 
relative to the status quo of distrust, which yields safe payoffs E. Otherwise, the trustor expe-
riences a loss and would have been better off to distrust, send a zero amount X and keep E.  
For empirical testing and data analysis, we will treat the relative transfer of a trustor in the in-
vestment game as a proxy indicator of trust. It is the central dependent variable of the analy-
sis. In order to make results comparable across high- and low initial endowment conditions, 
we will analyze the transfers relative to the initial endowment. Thus, instead of analyzing the 
absolute transfer X, the analysis focuses on X/E, the relative amount sent (reltrust). The vari-
able reltrust, the relative transfer X/E of an experimental subject playing an investment game 
in the role of the first-mover, serves as an indicator of trust; it is the central dependent variable 
of the analysis.  
                                                 
1 The “classical” investment game, as presented by Berg et al. (1995), is played with λ=3. Lenton and Mosley (2011) examine 
the effect of λ with respect to trust. They hypothesize and empirically find that a large λ positively influence trusting be-
havior, and that players act more conservative and risk-averse with λ = 2, see section 6.2.1.  In the current experiment, an 
efficiency gain of λ = 2 will be used. 
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6.1.2. Linking Transfer Decisions and Processing Modes 
The model of trust and adaptive rationality developed in this work predicts an (un-)conditional 
choice of a trusting act as consequence of processing mode selection. One hypothesis that di-
rectly relates the prevalent processing mode to observable behavioral outcomes was H8, stat-
ing that decision times in the automatic mode should be relatively faster than those in the ra-
tional mode. But how can, from the value of the continuous transfers made in the investment 
game, a conditional or unconditional trusting strategy be classified? 
In fact, an empirical classification of trusting choices into conditional and unconditional strat-
egies without the help of fMRI-data proves to be difficult. Arguably, it would be desirable to 
have a look at “what is going on” in the neural circuitry of the brain while the experiment is 
run, and thus to have access to data that can be related to modules of the cognitive system 
known for their role in automatic- versus rational processing. However, such data cannot be 
collected in the current experiment. Instead, the following bridge hypothesis will connect 
transfer decisions to processing modes. It will be useful to derive concrete statistical predic-
tions with respect to the sign and direction of main- and interaction effects of the model varia-
bles when analyzing the transfer decisions as indicators of trust (see section 7.3). In particular, 
in the ideal-type case, it is assumed that 
B1 (unconditional trust): Unconditional trust leads to a complete transfer of resources, X=E. 
B2 (conditional trust): Conditional trust supports any transfer between zero and the initial 
endowment, XƐ[0, E]. 
B3 (distrust): Distrust leads to a transfer of zero, X=0. 
Put differently, unconditional trust and a concurrent activation of the automatic mode will 
lead to higher transfer decisions relative to conditional trusting strategies or distrust, which are 
triggered by the concurrent activation of the rational mode. There are several arguments that 
support this assumption. For one, unconditional trust in the automatic mode suppresses the 
experience of risk and ambiguity in the trust problem. The trustor does subjectively neither 
question the trustworthiness of the trustee nor consciously process or perceive it. But if there 
is no perception of risk and vulnerability, if a relevant trust frame can be smoothly activated, a 
relevant script automatically be used (prompting to a trustful course of action), then there is 
also no reason to withhold trust, to take precautions and start trust incrementally at a low lev-
el. If trustworthiness is taken-for-granted, trustors can confidently expect a benevolent recip-
rocation, and therefore will unconditionally commit to the trust relation. 
In contrast, conditional trusting strategies support precautionary suspicion (“as-if” trust and a 
“pretense” of suspension). Trustworthiness is not taken-for-granted, the trustor has access to 
his expectation of trustworthiness, and he also perceives vulnerability, the potential gains and 
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losses involved in the trust problem, while trying to assess the appropriateness of his initial 
categorization and judgment of trustworthiness. Of course, the trustor may still arrive at a 
conclusion in which full trust and a high transfer are confidently selected. This decision re-
sults from attributions of trustee characteristics, a consultation of “encapsulated interest”, and 
all categories of trust-related knowledge which cater to a build-up of favorable expectations. 
But the trustor may as well decide to risk only a relatively small amount, and in fact, any non-
zero amount, depending on his expectation of trustworthiness (as, for example, a guilt-
aversion model would suggest). This “as-if” trust is conditional and often only mimics real 
suspension to initiate and test a trust relation. Generally speaking, interventions of the rational 
cognitive system, on average, should result in lower levels of trust, and hence, in lower trans-
fers as compared to unconditional trust. An empirical demonstration of this effect was provid-
ed by Kugler et al. (2009): after experimentally inducing “consequential thinking” among par-
ticipants in a trust game, the observed levels of trust significantly decreased. 
The argument can also be recast in more technical terms: given that information is rationally 
processed, transfer decisions in the investment game should, on average, approach the Nash-
equilibrium. It is for the trustee never to return a positive amount, and for the trustor never to 
trust and send any positive amount (Berg et al. 1995, Holm & Nystedt 2008). This argument 
pertains, of course, to situations that involve neither dyadic, nor network or institutional em-
beddedness. It will be necessary to create an experimental environment in which the subjects 
do not have a history of repeated interactions, in which there are no reputational mechanisms 
at work, and in which there exist no explicit institutional mechanisms comforting structural 
assurance to protect the trustor and sanction a failure of trust. Then, a fully rational actor will 
never transfer any amount to the trustee. Given that conditional trust and distrust depend on 
an activation of the rational mode of information processing, transfer decisions should ap-
proach the Nash equilibrium and be lower than with unconditional trust.  
6.1.3. Recording Decision Times 
In the current experiment, millisecond time intervals will be automatically recorded at each 
stage of the experiment (such as reading instructions, answering control questions, making a 
choice) that provide additional information about the observed choice of a trusting act and un-
derlying processing modes. Generally speaking, decision times (DT) are used both as a de-
pendent or independent variable, and, depending on the research question, they have been 
used and analyzed as such in cognitive and social psychological research for a long time (see 
Smith 1968, Luce 1986, Fazio 1990b, Ratcliff et al. 1999, Van Zandt 2000, Mayerl & Urban 
245 
 
2008).
2
 In the current work, DT will be used as an indicator of the processing mode and the 
degree of elaboration which a subject adopts during the choice of a trusting act. Using deci-
sion time as an indicator of the processing mode is a common procedure adopted by cognitive 
psychologists, and it has gained increasing popularity in the advent of analyzing and testing 
dual-process models. Following the general notion of the dual-processing paradigm, the au-
tomatic mode is expected to be “fast and effortless”, whereas the activation of the rational 
mode, paired with an increased degree of cognitive elaboration, is expected to be “slow and 
serial”.  
This implies measurable differences in the actual time it takes a trustor to decide about the 
choice of a trusting act. Whereas a short time interval should on average be indicative of the 
prevalence of the automatic mode and unconditional trust, the opposite holds true for a condi-
tional choice of a trusting act in the rational mode. As stated in propositions 8.1 and 8.2, pro-
cessing modes should be directly connected to measures of decision time in the present exper-
imental set-up. Therefore, the time it takes a subject from being presented the on-screen deci-
sion-making “stimulus” (i.e. the subject is prompted to enter his decision) to confirming the 
necessary input and making a choice (by clicking a button) will be automatically recorded by 
the experimental software. As it is, the statistical analysis of DT can provide additional in-
sights about the cognitive processes involved and help us to validate and substantiate the con-
clusions from an analysis of the relative transfer decision.  
One of the main impediments to analyzing decision times is that the “signal-to-noise” ratio is 
very high (Fazio 1990b). Multiple factors can introduce unwanted variation in decision time 
data. This noise is not of substantial interest and obscures statistical effects. For example, sub-
jects respond at different rates (that is, they have a different “baseline-speed”), their attention 
varies from trial to trial, they get confused about a task or question, or they simply forget to 
confirm an input. Moreover, DT data are typically highly skewed and non-normally distribut-
ed; this is partly a result of the presence of extreme outliers from a small but inevitable pro-
portion of respondents who take an extraordinarily long time to complete a task, and partly of 
the data-generating process itself. Psychologists have long quarreled about the proper way to 
describe the data-generating process of DT data and how to relate the resulting distributions to 
cognitive parameters, and albeit a number of different candidates are discussed (i.e. Poisson, 
ex-Gaussian, Gamma, Wald, Weibull, or Inverse Normal; see Luce 1986, Ratcliff 1993, van 
Zandt & Ratcliff 1995, Van Zandt 2000), the matter is not settled and researchers use a num-
ber of different distributional models and methods to analyze the data. Overall, DT data “can 
be extraordinarily messy” (Fazio 1990b: 75), asking for close attention to measurement and 
                                                 
2 Another common term used in psychological research to denote the measure of a time interval between a stimulus onset and 
a recorded individual response is response latency. We will here use the term decision time to indicate the conceptual link 
of this measure to the actual decision, that is, to the choice of a trusting act. Both terms will be used interchangeably here. 
246 
 
data analysis issues. If not taken care of, these issues can distort summary statistics and bias 
coefficient estimates. A number of statistical procedures have been proposed to deal with de-
cision time data in order to rectify issues arising from (1) the presence of outliers, (2) skewed 
distributions, and (3) irrelevant noise in the data. It has become a routine procedure to prepare 
“raw” decision time data into corrected latency measures in an attempt to address these con-
cerns, and to analyze the data using a number of methods which can account for its distribu-
tional characteristics.  
(1) In order to deal with outliers, decision time data are generally screened for extreme values 
that can exert a biasing influence on the analysis. Outliers can be identified based on substan-
tial information, that is, when interviewers or experimenters provide information about invalid 
individual measurements. They can also be identified based on statistical information of the 
sample, for example, in relation to the standard deviation or some other absolute criterion. 
Both can be used to define cut-off points and maximum (and/or) minimum acceptable thresh-
olds to identify outliers. A frequent choice is to define a threshold of 2 standard deviations 
above the arithmetic mean to identify outliers (Bassili & Fletcher 1991, Bassili & Scott 1996). 
A drawback from such a procedure is that there is no reliable rule as to how establish the cut-
offs; their empirical determination highly depends on the sample. 
While the identification of outliers is routine, the question of how one deals with them, and 
whether they should be discarded and assigned as missing or not, is a matter of considerably 
less agreement among researchers. While some have proposed to impute arithmetic mean val-
ues (Stocké 2002) or to replace them with a fixed, pre-defined maximum value (Devine et al. 
2002), these techniques necessarily introduces bias into the data, even when they ensure that 
the number of observations stays constant (Mayerl & Urban 2008: 60). Moreover, using cut-
offs can have both advantageous and adverse effects on the power of statistical tests, depend-
ing on how precisely the experimental treatments shift the mean and the shape of DT distribu-
tions (Ratcliff 1993). Their removal can introduce asymmetric biases into statistics such as the 
sample mean, median and standard deviation (Ulrich & Miller 1994). In the current analysis, 
the number of outliers above two times the DT standard deviation from the mean is relatively 
low (N=9), all models will be re-calculated with and without keeping them in the data set to 
account for their influence. 
(2) Since DT are highly positively skewed, normal OLS models cannot be applied to the raw 
data, and non-robust measures of central tendency, such as the mean and standard deviation, 
can be distorted and inflated (Mulligan et al. 2003). A common technique to circumvent this 
problem is to use data transformations, such as a logarithmic, reciprocal or square root to 
normalize the data. Each method has a unique normalizing effect on the shape of the distribu-
tion and how the “long” DT in the right tail of the distribution are pulled towards the center 
(for example, logarithmic transformations “normalize” the data stronger, but attenuate the ef-
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fect of outliers to a lesser extent than inverse transformations, see Ratcliff 1993). However, a 
transformation of data necessarily gives rise to interpretation issues. While the ordinal rela-
tions of the observations remain intact, the interval and ratio-based relation among the data 
points is substantially changed in a non-linear fashion, which may distort or even eliminate 
significant effects. 
While the analysis of central tendencies and OLS/ANOVA after a normalization of the data is 
still a frequent and popular technique, researchers have increasingly used other methods that 
can accommodate for the overall shape of the distribution (see van Zandt 2000 for a review). 
The general concern is that the (cumulative) density functions which describe DT markedly 
differ to that of the normal distribution, and statistical models have to be adjusted to respect 
this difference. More fundamentally, in cognitive psychology, the distributional forms and 
their parameters, such as shift, scale and shape, have been directly related to the underlying 
cognitive processes and architecture in order to derive and justify a certain distribution of DT 
(Hohle 1965, Townsend & Ashby 1983, Rouder et al. 2003, Matzke & Wagenmakers 2009). 
An overview and discussion of alternative cumulative density functions which are regularly 
used to model DT (e.g. Ex-Gaussian, Gamma, Weibull, Lognormal, among others) can be 
found in van Zandt and Ratcliff (1995), and van Zandt (2000). This enables the examination 
of treatment effects not only with respect to mean differences, but also with respect to the dis-
tribution parameters. A common practice is to fit a certain distribution over the data and inter-
pret changes in the distributions´ parameters as an indicator of treatment effects on cognitive 
processes (Ratcliff 1978, Matzke & Wagenmakers 2009). In principal, using other distribu-
tional forms also enables the fit of a linear model once a proper distribution is specified and 
accounted for in the statistical model. 
A number of authors have used survival models and event history analysis to analyze DT. The 
observed latency measure is then treated as the outcome of a survival process in which the 
hazard rate defines the instantaneous propensity to “end” the survival with a response, or a 
choice, respectively (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 1997, Johnson 2003, Mulligan et al. 2003). 
Thinking responses and decision times in terms of hazard rates is a common alternative to in-
vestigating distributional forms, because they are less prone to “statistical mimicking” (Luce 
1986, Van Zandt  & Ratcliff 1995).
3
 As Mulligan argues, “the hazard rate fits naturally with 
how we tend to think about response latency” (2003: 296), and a number of models can be 
fitted, including for example, non-parametric Cox models (which do not assume a certain dis-
                                                 
3 The problem of statistical mimicking describes the fact that distributions with several free parameters are highly flexible, 
and an empirical DT sample can often be explained by different distributions with equally good fit. If the aim of the re-
searcher is to test underlying cognitive models, and if the predicted distributions, although different, are virtually identical, 
then DT data cannot be used to discriminate between them. 
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tributional form), and parametric models in which a specific distribution is specified (such as 
the Weibull, Exponential, or Lognormal).  
To decide about a specific distribution, researchers resort to both theoretical and pragmatic 
arguments (Dolan et al. 2002). As pointed out above, theoretical models may suggest and 
generate a specific distribution. Other than that, and from a pragmatic point of view, it is de-
sirable that the distribution provides an adequate description of the empirical shape of the 
sample. This can also motivate and justify a particular model. In the present analysis, a com-
bination of methods will be adopted to model and analyze DT to provide a check of robust-
ness for the estimated of the effects; these methods will be introduced and discussed in more 
detail in the chapter on decision time analysis below. 
(3) A number of additional factors can increase variability in decision times. Principally, they 
are regarded as adding “noise” to the data which does not mirror substantial effects of interest, 
such as subject heterogeneity and measurement error. While the use of computerized software 
helps to exclude the latter, there is substantial variation in the former aspect in terms of sub-
ject heterogeneity. Most importantly, individuals differ in the general speed of responding to 
an item or task. This difference can be profound and inflate variance in DT data. If individual 
differences in response latencies are not accounted for when analyzing aggregated data, then 
treatment effects and between-subject variation are easily confused. Therefore, using within-
subjects designs to account and control for an individual baseline speed (BS) has become a 
routine procedure. A common technique to account for this is to use “filler latencies” (Fazio 
1990b) and adjust DT measures for the individual baseline-speed of the respondent. Filler la-
tencies are measured on items or tasks which are independent of the target latency. If several 
measures are used, the baseline speed is constructed by calculating the arithmetic mean of the 
filler latencies. However, an open question is the precise nature of the filler items (or tasks), 
that is, their difficulty in comparison to the target task, and their theoretical and thematic 
closeness (Mayerl & Urban 2008: 64).  Baseline speeds can be used in different ways to get a 
“clean” measure of DT, denoted as DT*. Fazio (1990b) proposes to use either of the follow-
ing: 
(a) Difference Score: DT* = DT – BS 
(b) Ratio Index: DT* = DT / (DT+BS) 
(c) Z-Score Index: DT* = (DT – BS) / SDBS 
In the above formulas, DT is the decision time, BS is the baseline speed, and SDBS is the 
standard deviation of BS. Thus, difference scores report the observed absolute difference be-
tween the DT under scrutiny and the respondent´s baseline speed; it can be negative if a re-
sponse is faster than the individual baseline. Ratio index scores normalize the observed DT to 
a range of [0,1], where a value of 0.5 indicates that the DT corresponds to the BS. Important-
249 
 
ly, ratio index measures accommodate for the fact that absolute differences can stay the same 
even if the relative magnitude of DT and BS can dramatically differ. Thus, while two observa-
tions (DT1=400 BS1=200, DT2=800, BS2=1000) may have the same difference score (here: 
200), the ratio index will be different (RI1=0.67, RI2=0.44). That is, in the ratio index, abso-
lute differences between DT and BS are treated as relatively less important with increasing 
magnitude of the decision time. Lastly, Z-Scores additionally respect the standard deviation of 
the BS, which necessitates that a number of equal “filler latency” measures have been record-
ed for each observation. Note that the computation of the scores, as proposed by Fazio, neces-
sitates that a BS can be measured on tasks that are principally identical to the target one, so 
that the BS and the transformed DT* have a meaningful interpretation. 
Mayerl and Urban (2008: 71f.) propose a method to control for an individual BS by estimat-
ing the so-called residual index. It is derived from a linear regression in which the recorded 
DT is explained as: E(DT) = a + b*BS + U, that is, as a linear combination of the individual 
BS, a total sample (task-specific) constant, and residual time U. Note that the residual U can 
be computed as DT* = U = Y -Yhat = E(DT) – a – b*BS. In other words, by computing the 
residuals of a linear regression in which DT is regressed on BS, all the variation in DT that is 
not linearly related to the baseline speed is captured in the residual index U. Positive values 
indicate that a subject has a longer DT than expected from his baseline, negative values indi-
cate that the response was faster than expected from the baseline. Principally, this procedure is 
not different to including the baseline speed as a control variable in multiple regressions. 
Mayerl and Urban (ibid. 77f.) show that the residual index DT*, in contrast to Fazio´s DT*, is 
not correlated to the baseline speeds after the transformation, while the traditional DT* are 
still highly correlated to the individual BS.  
In the current experiment, latencies will be recorded at each separate stage of the experiment 
(reading instructions, answering control questions, making a choice). Therefore, there is a 
stock of tasks which can serve as a filler latency to compute a baseline speed. The time that 
subjects take to actually decide about the choice of a trusting act will be recorded in millisec-
onds in the variable time, which is the “raw” measure of decision time without baseline speed 
correction and serves as a second dependent variable in the following analysis. A further note 
on the technical details of the analysis will be given below; a number of different methods 
will be used to assess the overall validity and robustness of the results. For example, the log-
transformed decision times (logtime) can be analyzed with robust regression techniques. In 
that case, it is highly advisable to correct for the respondent´s baseline-speed to get a compa-
rable measure of DT between subjects. A baseline-speed control variable will be computed 
and introduced. The data will also be analyzed by fitting non-parametric models which make 
use of the untransformed DT measures to address distributional concerns and accommodate 
for the non-normal shape of the DT distribution. 
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6.1.4. Chronic Accessibility of Frames and Scripts 
The mode-selection threshold for the unconditional choice of a trusting act was defined as mi 
* aj > 1 – C / (p * (Urc+Cw)). A particular important determinant of mode-selection is the 
chronic accessibility of trust-related frames and scripts which can be applied in the context of 
the investment game. The activation weight crucially depends on how strongly these mental 
models are ingrained in the associative memory system and how readily an individual will use 
them in a situation (see chapter 4 already). During the experiment, the parameters of the 
threshold will be controlled or manipulated with an experimental treatment. To tap on the 
chronic accessibility of a trust frame and a trust-related script, we will use individual survey 
ratings and their extremity as a proxy indicator. The rationale for this operationalization stems 
from a number of results from social- and cognitive psychology research on attitudes, which 
can be fruitfully combined with the propositions of attitudinal trust research. 
Generally speaking, the “strength” of an attitude determines its influence on information pro-
cessing and behavior, its persistence and resistance to change and persuasion (Krosnick & 
Petty 1995). Specifically, strong attitudes (1) come to mind faster, (2) persist over time, (3) 
resist counter-persuasive attempts and (4) guide behavior more than weak attitudes (Petty & 
Cacioppo 1986, Fazio 1995). However, the concept of attitude strength is itself a fuzzy term, 
subject to an ongoing debate regarding its dimensionality, antecedents and determinants (see 
Visser et al. 2006 for a review). Attitude strength is regarded as a multi-dimensional concept, 
measured on roughly a dozen attributes, such as certainty, importance, knowledge, intensity, 
interest, elaboration, ambivalence, extremity, direct experience, structural consistency and ac-
cessibility (Krosnick et al. 1993). Research focuses around the question whether these attrib-
utes can be reduced to a single common underlying factor, or whether they represent several 
unique, or even completely independent dimensions that cannot be combined. 
A finding most relevant to our endeavor is that attitude extremity and attitude accessibility are 
consistently found to share a common underlying factor, regularly distinct from other dimen-
sions such as importance, knowledge and elaboration (Erber et al. 1995, Pomerantz et al. 
1995, Bassili 1996, Visser et al. 2006).
4
 Researchers have uncovered positive correlations be-
tween attitude accessibility and extremity (Fazio & Williams 1986, Judd et al. 1991), as well 
as between attitude accessibility and other strength-related attributes listed above, such as im-
portance (Bizer & Krosnick 2001) and involvement (Lavine et al. 2000).
5
 Thus, attitudes that 
are extreme, in the sense of a high agreement or rejection, are also highly accessible; extremi-
                                                 
4 Extremity is defined as the distance of a rating from the scale midpoint. In the case of a Likert-type scale, the midpoint is the 
center between the two extremes of the scale in which the respondent rates an item with a “fully agree” or a “fully disa-
gree” statement, respectively. 
5 In fact, almost all pairwise comparisons of the strength-related attributes listed above show such positive correlations 
(Krosnick & Abelson 1992) 
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ty may even be a causal antecedent to accessibility (Fazio & Williams 1986, Fazio 1995). In 
this line, some researchers have used composite indexes combining extremity and accessibil-
ity measures into a one-dimensional indicator to investigate attitude properties and processes 
(Bassili & Roy 1998). 
From an intuitive standpoint, the positive correlations between attitude extremity and accessi-
bility make sense: an attitude that we strongly support or reject is most likely one that we can 
also readily express. That is, “attitudes associated with univalent and extreme underlying 
structures should occasion relatively little decision conflict and thus should be highly accessi-
ble” (Lavine et al. 2000: 81). Importantly, attitude extremity is conceptually rich, as it cap-
tures (1) the intensity of feeling an individual experiences with regard to the attitude object, 
(2) the degree to which an individual holds a qualified position, (3) extent to which a certain 
attitude or position is regarded as “defendable” and (4) the extent to which an individual 
would actually defend it (Abelson 1995).  
The above findings establish a link between the extremity of an attitude and the latent con-
struct of chronic accessibility. A high rating on a scale gauging generalized trust or the norm 
of reciprocity, for example, is indicative of high chronic accessibility of a corresponding trust-
related frame or script. Simply put, if we do not support the corresponding “trustful” attitude, 
then the relevant frame or script should also not be chronically accessible to us, and vice ver-
sa. Survey-based scales for the measurement of trust in effect assume that dispositions to 
trust, as a relatively stable and persistent trait, can be measured in the same ways as an atti-
tude. Of course, an extreme rejection of the survey items also indicates “accessibility” of 
some sort. But with respect to the theoretical concerns (the accessibility of frames and scripts 
that support trust and serve as a trust frame) these ratings portray the absence of a correspond-
ing mental model and low chronic accessibility of the trust-related frame or script. In other 
words, the scale-rating is a proxy indicator of chronic accessibility. 
At first glance, this course of action might appear exceptional, given that the most frequently 
used measure of attitude accessibility is response latency (Fazio 1986, 1990a, 1995). The 
method we adopt here favors a “meta-judgmental” measure over an “operative” measure (see 
Bassili 1996). The reasons for this approach are of practical and theoretical nature. First, there 
is a very practical reason that limits access to latency data: in the course of the experiment, 
response latencies could not be collected for survey items. The experimental software that was 
used to conduct the computer-based experiment (z-Tree, see Fischbacher 2007) does not sup-
port a measurement of response latencies in the survey-module of the program, even when 
latencies can be recorded for decision times in the choice-stage.  
But there are further arguments that put into question the adequacy of latency measures as an 
indicator of chronic accessibility, suggesting that the approach taken here is more appropriate. 
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First, on a theoretical level, a resort to the actual scale rating and the underlying substance and 
meaning of the attitude to the respondent allow for an integration of, and connection to, re-
search focusing on dispositional trust and the influence of inter-individually stable traits. In 
this area of research, a number of results confirm that the chronic accessibility of trust-related 
knowledge, in the form of behavioral tendencies and stable dispositions, exerts an influence 
on a variety of trust-related outcomes (see chapter 3.1 already). Traditionally, these concepts 
have been measured using scale-ratings. As it is, attitude extremity is the only dimension of 
attitude strength that is actually related to the content of the attitude and has a “substantial” 
meaning to it (Visser et al. 2006: 55). In contrast, pure response latencies are devoid of con-
tent. They do not tell us unambiguously about trust and the nature of the attitude. If we were 
to use response latencies without looking at the substantial rating, we would run the risk of 
attributing high accessibility to both high-trust and low-trust types: both harbor extreme atti-
tudes and will rate the respective scales on their extremes. From the perspective of trust re-
search, the use of actual ratings to assess the chronic accessibility of trust-related knowledge 
reflects the substantial content of the trust-related attitude, something that latencies cannot 
capture.  
Second, the model of frame-selection suggests that response latencies tell us only indirectly 
about chronic accessibility, if they do at all. Put sharply, whenever we measure response la-
tencies, a processing mode has already been determined, and both chronic and temporary ac-
cessibility have played out their parts in mode-selection. Traditionally, researchers infer ac-
cessibility from response latencies, in that a fast judgment points to automatic processing via a 
high accessibility of relevant knowledge. This is why response latencies are also regularly 
used to directly infer the processing mode (Mayerl & Urban 2008). However, we can never 
determine whether our measurement taps on a temporary or chronic aspect of accessibility. 
Accessibility, when measured in response latencies, will represent a fusion of temporary and 
chronic aspects and mode-selections – they can be influenced, for example, by recent priming 
and the context. Latency therefore does not capture what the model of frame selection sub-
stantially refers to with its concept of chronic accessibility. In fact, the aspect of temporary 
accessibility is captured in the parameter aj|i and the conditional spreading of activation from a 
frame to the relevant scripts. What is more, the model suggests that other factors are important 
during mode-selection as well in that high accessibility alone is not sufficient to guarantee an 
automatic response under all circumstances (for example, if the motivation for rational elabo-
ration is high). Therefore, using response latencies to tap on chronic accessibility is problem-
atic because many other factors (temporary accessibility, motivation, opportunity, context and 
cues) do influence the processing mode, and therefore latency, as well. 
In the present experiment, the chronic accessibility of a trust frame will be operationalized 
using the individual score of the items of a short version of the “Interpersonal Trust Invento-
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ry” (ITI, Kassebaum 2004). This scale measures generalized interpersonal trust towards un-
specified others by asking respondents to judge the validity of statements such as “Generally 
speaking, most people can be trusted” or “You can´t be too careful in dealing with others” 
(present author´s translation). Since the experiment is conducted anonymously and excludes 
social embeddedness (no repetition, reputation, punishment) participants cannot make use of 
other specific categories of trust-related knowledge. Only generalized trust and the relational 
schema connected to it represent a relevant trust frame in the present experiment. In short, it is 
expected that participants who score high on the ITI scale can chronically access the trust 
frame Fi of a generalized-trust relational schema. The resulting normalized score, ranging be-
tween [0,1], will be an independent variable (trustscale) of the analysis. 
To operationalize the chronic accessibility of a trust-related script, we will use the “norm of 
reciprocity”-scale (Perugini et al. 2003). Reciprocity norms are a primary social mechanism 
for the control and protection of trust. Importantly, the reciprocity norm has a direct relevance 
for action, because it suggests that a trustworthy response can be favorably expected, thereby 
motivating the choice of a trusting act (this recasts A2: ak|j=1). We assume that a trust-related 
frame, if adopted, points towards reciprocity norms as a part of the “rules of the game”. If a 
frame of generalized trust is adopted, the reciprocity norm should be temporarily accessible 
(this recasts A1: aj|i=1). The resulting normalized score of the “norm of reciprocity scale”, 
ranging between [0,1], will be another independent variable (recscale) of the analysis. 
A documentation of all items used, factor analyses and reliability measures can be found in 
Appendix B. The individual scale ratings will be constructed by summing up and averaging 
the scores of the 7-point Likert-type items which could be answered ranging from “I fully dis-
agree” to “I fully agree”, leaving open a non-response option (“I don’t know”) at every item. 
These measures serve as important independent variables of the statistical analysis. They will 
be coded such that higher values indicate a higher degree of agreement towards the state-
ments, and thus, higher chronic accessibility. 
6.1.5. Intuition and the “Need for Cognition” 
Throughout this work, a recurrent theme in the discussion of the trust concept was the idea 
that trust can be based on different cognitive “routes” and processing modes. It ranges from a 
rational decision based on the controlled and elaborate “bottom-up” integration of relevant 
information to a “top-down” use of cognitive short-cuts as a basis for a leap of faith. As we 
know, the automatic mode is characterized as “fast, effortless, associative, implicit, slow-
learning and emotional” (Kahnemann 2003: 698). Answers provided by the automatic route 
and the associative cognitive system just “pop” into the head and do not provide much justifi-
cation other than intuition. They become part of the stimulus information, rather than being 
seen as part of the perceiver´s own evaluation or interpretation (Smith & DeCoster 2000). 
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At the same time, researchers have compiled a large body of empirical evidence revealing that 
individuals differ in their disposition to actually follow their intuition and to rely on automatic 
versus rational processing in a variety of tasks and judgment domains (see Cacioppo et al. 
1996, Epstein et al. 1996). These findings suggest that there exist stable differences in the 
chronic tendency to activate a certain processing mode; individuals have a “preference” for 
processing, that is to say. It manifests as a stable, intrinsic readiness to engage in effortful and 
elaborated thinking, and it results in a corresponding “thinking style.” 
The most frequent scale-based measure to assess such individual differences is the “Need for 
Cognition”-scale (NFC), initially developed by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). This instrument 
captures the “tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (ibid. 116), and re-
flects the aspect of cognitive motivation that individuals have towards elaborate processing. 
According to Cacioppo et al. (1996), individuals high in NFC act as highly motivated “cog-
nizers,” in contrast to the “cognitive misers” at the low end of the scale. Differences in the 
need for cognition derive from past experience and behavioral histories, and they influence 
the acquisition and processing of information relevant to judgment and choice. Respondents 
high in NFC enjoy thinking, get intrinsic rewards from effortful mental exercises and prefer to 
confront demanding cognitive tasks instead of easy ones. In contrast, low NFC individuals 
dislike expending mental effort and try to avoid situations that demand it.  
Accordingly, need for cognition consistently influences a variety of judgments, tasks and de-
cisions. Individuals high in NFC are more readily influenced by the quality of persuasive ar-
guments, show better recall and performance on a variety of cognitive tasks, actively search 
for more information, and are more likely to base judgments on empirical information and ra-
tional considerations (see Cacioppo et al. 1996 for an extensive review). Low NFC individuals 
are more prone to use automatic associations and stereotypes in judgment (Florack et al. 
2001), and they more readily use situational cues as a quick-step to interpretation and choice 
(Smith & Levin 1996, Shiloh et al. 2002). In contrast, high NFC individuals are more resistant 
to attempts to change reference points through peripheral cues, and overall they are less sus-
ceptible to framing effects (Smith & Levin 1996). 
In a critical examination of Cacioppo and Petty´s instrument, Epstein et al. (1996) argue that a 
low motivation to process information systemically (“being a cognitive miser”) need not nec-
essarily translate into a high motivation to process intuitively, and vice versa. That is, prefer-
ences for intuition and deliberation may be independent. They develop a second scale, “Faith 
in Intuition” (FI), to complement the NFC instrument, and measure both rational and experi-
ential processing preferences with the two resulting unipolar scales (the “Rational-
Experiential Inventory”, REI). FI captures the “engagement and confidence in one´s intuitive 
abilities” (ibid.  392) and mirrors the extent to which individuals chronically rely on intuitive 
judgments. Their study shows that the two constructs are relatively independent, but describe 
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interindividual differences which are correlated to a number of personality constructs (see also 
Keller et al. 2000, Betsch 2004). Shiloh et al. (2002) can show that specific combinations of 
FI/NFC and the resulting cognitive types react differently to framing treatments. They also 
differ in the extent to which responses in statistical reasoning tasks are based on intuition or 
deliberation. 
The findings presented above have direct implications for trust research. If individual thinking 
styles and the extent to which actors rely on intuitive or rational processing vary systematical-
ly, then the process of trust development potentially varies based on cognitive types. More 
pointedly, some subjects will be more prone than others to select conditional versus uncondi-
tional trusting strategies (over and above the differences captured by the chronic accessibility 
of trust-related frames and scripts and the experimental treatments), simply because they rou-
tinely prefer a more automatic or controlled style of thinking about a trust problem. Therefore, 
it is advisable to explore individual differences in the chronic tendency to rely on intuition and 
deliberation in the experiment. When analyzing the experimental data, it is important to keep 
track of such differences in cognitive style: they represent a source of variation that is not at-
tributable to the experimental treatments or the variation in accessibility alone. If the subjects 
differ in the way they tend to chronically engage a particular processing mode, this will in-
crease within-group heterogeneity and potentially lead to more heterogeneous treatment ef-
fects. 
To explore the impact of processing styles on interpersonal trust, subjects will be asked a 
German version of the “Rational-Experiential Inventory” (REI, Epstein et al. 1996) with its 
subscales “Need for Cognition” and “Faith in Intuition” (see Keller et al. 2000). Appendix B 
lists the full set of items used in both scales, which were assessed using a 7-point Likert-type 
scale which also left an “I don’t know”-option open at every item. The normalized scores of 
both measures (fiscale, nfcscale), ranging between [0, 1], serve as independent variables in 
the following analysis. They will be coded such that higher values indicate a higher degree of 
agreement towards the statements, and thus, indicate that the cognitive style in question is 
agreed and featured by the subject´s self-report. 
6.1.6. Control Variables 
In addition to the independent variables discussed above, a number of control variables will be 
collected to gather additional information about the subjects. Generally speaking, trust re-
searchers have uncovered a variety of factors which influence both attitudinal and behavioral 
measures of trust. A control and analysis of these variables can detail the picture and sharpen 
our knowledge about the effects of the various experimental treatments and measures, their 
differential effects on the mode-selection threshold, and the observable consequences for trust. 
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As it is, the influence of the individual socio-economic background on expectation formation 
and choice in trust problems has been demonstrated in surveys and experiments (Fehr et al. 
2002b, Bohnet & Zeckhauser 2004, Gächter et al. 2004, Güth et al. 2005, Ashraf et al. 2006, 
Schechter 2007, Capra et al. 2008, cf. Gächter & Thöni 2004). Moreover, the socio-economic 
background influences individual social preferences, which are regarded as being culturally 
heterogeneous (Buchan et al. 2002, Cook et al. 2005, Buchan et al. 2006). Researchers have 
found that a large set of individual attributes has a moderating influence on trust, including 
gender (Buchan et al. 2008), age (Garbarino & Slonim 2009), ethnicity (Ben-Ner & Halldors-
son 2010), familial ties (Ermisch & Gambetta 2010) and religiosity (Tan & Vogel 2008). In 
particular, the following additional information about the participants of the experiment will 
be collected: 
(1) Age (age): Several studies have reported age-effects on a range of trust-related measures. 
For example, Naef and Schupp (2009) find weakly significant negative effects on a transfer 
decision in an investment game, and Dohmen et al. (2011) show that older subjects are more 
risk averse than younger subjects. Garbarino and Slonim (2009) demonstrate that age decreas-
es the “sensitivity” to trust for females – reciprocal behavior diminishes as age increases. In 
contrast, Gächter and Thöni (2004) find that older people trust relatively more in that they 
have a more positive opinion about other´s fairness and helpfulness. However, this does not 
translate into empirically different measures of generalized trust, trusting behavior and trust-
worthiness. In contrast, Ermisch et al. (2009) find that age significantly increases trust in a 
trust game. Overall, age effects may be present in the data, but their direction is not clear. To 
explore this issue further, respondent´s age will be recorded. 
(2) Gender (sex): A number of studies have consistently demonstrated that gender differences 
in trust and reciprocity exist (see Garbarino & Slonim 2009 for an overview). In an early 
study, Orbell et al. (1994) showed that females are generally expected to be more cooperative. 
The authors did not find any influence on actual trusting behavior and concluded that general-
ized role expectations are not of practical matter in particular exchange contexts. But since 
then, a number of other studies have demonstrated stable gender differences in trusting and 
reciprocal behavior in experimental trust settings (Croson & Buchan 1999, Chaudhuri & Gan-
gadharan 2002, Cox 2002, Buchan et al. 2008). A consistent pattern that has emerged is that 
females are more reciprocal, while they are also more risk averse and trust less. Hence, to get 
a grip on gender differences, we will collect information on participant´s gender. 
(3) Relationship status (partner) and relationship length (partner_l): These variables will be 
included because the presence or absence of a relationship potentially influences the availabil-
ity of relational schemata and trust-related frames and scripts. Thus, differences in the acces-
sibility of trust-related frames and scripts are expected depending on whether an individual is 
actively engaged in a relationship: being in a relationship potentially increases the accessibil-
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ity of trust related knowledge. But there may also be factors at work which are counter-
productive to trust: Ermisch et al. (2009) find that divorced or separated individuals are more 
trusting than engaged or married counterparts. They speculate that these actors might have a 
greater incentive for interaction with strangers. Similarly, Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) find 
that strong family ties prevent trust towards strangers as measured in a trust game, and conjec-
ture that strong family ties prevent outward exposure and the development of sufficiently 
positive generalized expectations. Thus, being in a relationship may as well decrease levels of 
trust. To explore these effects, both relationship status and length will be recorded. 
6.2. Experimental Design and Method 
6.2.1. Experimental Design 
In the empirical test, an experiment will be used to manipulate the parameters of the mode-
selection threshold. The design involves two treatments which influence the mode-selection 
threshold in the experimental setting of the investment game: (1) a context treatment, which 
varies the presence of situational objects indicating the appropriateness of trust-related 
knowledge and (2) an incentive treatment, which varies the initial endowments of the partici-
pants in order to influence the motivation-component of the mode-selection threshold. The 
two factors will be varied on two levels. Thus, the resulting experiment is conducted as a ran-
domized 2x2 between-subjects factorial design (table 3):  
Table 3: Experimental treatment groups and factor levels 
Treatment / Level 
Context 
Neutral Cooperative 
Incentives 
High (40€) High/Neutral High/Cooperative 
Low (7€) Low/Neutral Low/Cooperative 
In the version of the investment game adopted here, participants will be facing a multiplier 
and efficiency gain of λ=2. As Lenton and Mosley (2011) argue, multiplier effects “incentiv-
ize” trust because the average expected returns increase. For example, if trustees return half 
their gain with an average probability of 0.5, then a multiplier of λ = 4 implies that a transfer 
of 10€ from player A gives player B 40€ and 10€ would be returned on average. In contrast, a 
multiplier of λ=2 implies that a transfer of 10€ from player A gives player B 20€ but only 5€ 
would be returned on average. In the experiment conducted by Lenton and Mosley (2011), 
participants transferred significantly more when efficiency gains were high (λ=4) as compared 
to low efficiency gains (λ=2 or λ=3). Put differently, if the trustee expects a certain return and 
compensation for his trust, then expectations of trustworthiness must become increasingly 
positive the lower is the multiplier λ in order to induce an equal-sized transfer. In fact, several 
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other authors have used an efficiency gain of λ=2 without explicitly taking into account the 
incentivizing effects of its modification or providing an explanation of their motivation to do 
so (Glaeser et al. 2000, Lazzarini et al. 2003, Naef & Schupp 2009).  
In the present experiment, the use of λ=2 has a practical and theoretical motivation: theoreti-
cally, it is expected to create the most risky environment. Higher efficiency gains may invite 
“faulty gambling” and convince even distrusting subjects to take a risk and transfer a small 
amount. In contrast, the λ=2 setting is more risky and therefore should not invite subjects to 
“just go for it”. Trust is more risky because, when holding the expected returns constant, trust 
needs to be built on an overall more positive expectation of trustworthiness. In other words, to 
induce an equal transfer in the trustor, expectations need to be more optimistic under λ=2 than 
under λ>2. Therefore, such a design can better discriminate between subjects that generate 
favorable versus unfavorable expectations – only those trustors with a highly favorable expec-
tation of trustworthiness will be motivated to choose a trusting act. On the practical side, high-
incentive treatments are also very costly. If paired with a high multiplier, the costs of the ex-
periment rise exorbitantly, and λ=2 represents the more economical alternative.  
The two experimental factors, in addition to measures of frame- and script-accessibility, are 
the main independent variables of the statistical analysis. The experimental setting of an 
anonymous one-shot interaction in the investment game between the randomized, randomly 
matched participants serves as the tool to collect the data. In addition to the decisions about 
trust, the individual decision times (that is, the time spent to make a choice) of the participants 
are recorded and analyzed to gain more insights about the processing modes and trusting deci-
sions.  
To maximize observations and available data, the investment game will be implemented in the 
following way: all participants will first make a decision in the role of player A (the trustor), 
then they will be informed about a restart and second round, and then make a decision in the 
role of player B (the trustee), in which the transfer decision X of a randomly selected and 
matched participant will be used to determine their total income when deciding about the re-
ciprocal response Y. This is to keep any potential confound that comes from first making a 
decision as a reciprocator out of the data. However, this course of action has a cost to it: the 
second-mover decisions of player´s B may be influenced and confounded with the preceding 
stages of the game. Therefore, an analysis second-mover decisions will not be conducted. 
6.2.2. Context Treatment 
The context treatment consists of a change in the wording of instructions that are presented to 
the participants during the experiment. The goal of the context treatment is to (1) decrease the 
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perceived social distance between participants,
6
 (2) create a salient social group identity and 
(3) alter the “situational strength” of the environment into which the investment game is em-
bedded towards a heightened appropriateness of relevant trust-related knowledge. In particu-
lar, presenting and priming the participants with cues that point to the appropriateness of a 
shared social identity, communal relationship orientations and the appropriateness of trust-
related norms increases the temporary accessibility of relevant frames and scripts; for exam-
ple, the reciprocity norm. In effect, a successful manipulation increases the “match” of trust-
related knowledge that can be used to favorable define the situation and shifts the mode-
selection threshold towards an activation of the automatic mode. 
The manipulation of the presented context as a means to change the definition of the situation 
of the subjects is a common experimental technique. For example, Burnham et al. (2000) have 
used the labels “opponent” versus “partner” in the instructions of an extensive form trust 
game to explore the effect of the “friend-or-foe”-heuristic (FOF). Using a “partner” wording 
to describe the experiment resulted in a significant increase of trust and trustworthiness in the 
cooperative condition. This effect was initially explained in terms of the activation of the FOF 
(see chapter 4.1 already). In the more general approach adopted here, these effects are ex-
plained as a framing manipulation that affects interpretation and choice and the relational ori-
entation subjects adopt by influencing the temporary accessibility of trust-related knowledge. 
This is encouraged by the presence of corresponding situational cues and a (potential) shift of 
processing modes. A closely related framing-manipulation is the use of instructional labels to 
shift the definition of the situation by changing the “name of the game” (see Ross & Ward 
1996, Kay & Ross 2003, Liberman et al. 2004, Dufwenberg et al. 2011). Naming an experi-
ment a “Wall-Street Game” (exchange relationship-orientation) as opposed to a “Community 
Game” (communal relationship-orientation) significantly influences the cooperation rates ob-
served in subsequent Prisoner´s Dilemma rounds. What is more, even the mere presence of 
corresponding visual cues (symbol of a bank note on-screen, a business suitcase in the room 
etc.) can produce comparable effects (Kay et al. 2004, Vohs et al. 2006). 
In a similar fashion, Hoffman et al. (2008) show that proposer behavior in dictator games var-
ies with social distance – increased anonymity decreases the distribution of offers. They show 
that subtle changes in the wording and formulations indicating closeness, community of shar-
ing and the existence of a social exchange framework trigger greater reciprocity (more gener-
ous proposal) behavior. In other words, contexts that indicate the relevance of social norms or 
promote social identification are readily interpreted by individuals, and this information is 
                                                 
6 Hoffman, McCabe and Smith define social distance as “the degree of reciprocity that people believe is inherent within a 
social interaction. The greater the social distance, or isolation, between a person and others, the weaker is the scope for re-
ciprocal relations” (2008: 429, emphasis added). Thus, social distance is conceptually directly related to reciprocity and 
“communal” relationship orientations in which reciprocity is not only expected, but even normatively demanded.  
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used during the definition of the situation and the choice of action. Likewise, Buchan et al. 
(2002) manipulate the perceived social distance by implementing a minimal-group design in 
the investment game using differently colored instructions and wording, or color-coded 
groups plus personal versus impersonal group-discussions (Buchan et al. 2006) and observe 
comparable (but weaker) effects. From the perspective of social-identity theory, the use of la-
bels that indicate a de-personalized self (“we”, “team”, or “us” as the point of self-reference) 
has also been demonstrated to induce shifts from personal to collective selves and correspond-
ing shifts in motivation and expectations (Brewer & Gardner 1996, Tanis & Postmes 2005, 
see chapter 5.2.2. already). Some scholars have observed weak to none effects of mere label-
ing treatments, but nevertheless find that payoff-interdependence (Eckel & Grossman 2005, 
Güth et al. 2008) or a group-building phase with a joint task (Bauernschuster et al. 2010) fos-
ter in-group cohesion and result in the creation of a common social identity, group-related 
goals and motivations in trust settings. Overall, the manipulation of the social distance be-
tween experimental participants and the context of the experiment does elicit considerable ef-
fects. 
In this experiment, the approaches reviewed above are combined to create a context treatment. 
First, when reading general and specific instructions about the experiment, the participants are 
confronted with word-pairs that either point to a neutral, or a cooperative scenario. In the neu-
tral condition, participants are informed that they will be randomly matched into a “group” 
together with one more “participant.” In the cooperative condition, they are informed that they 
will be matched into a “team” with a randomly selected “partner.” These word-pairs are then 
used throughout the experiment whenever further instructions are presented and a correspond-
ing reference has to be made (the full set of written and on-screen instructions which was used 
can be found in Appendix B). In addition, subjects will be shown a different welcome screen 
when entering their computer booth. In the cooperative condition, the welcome screen will 
show a picture of “shaking hands,” in the neutral condition, the participants will be presented 
a picture of “bank notes” (see Appendix B). These visual primes are used to assist the word-
pair manipulation. 
The cooperative “partner/team”-condition aims at changing the participants´ definition of the 
situation into the direction of a favorable interpretation of the trust problem, relative to the 
neutral condition. Even when there is no direct identity signaling involved, the treatment is 
intended to change the relational perception and relational orientation of the participants. In 
contrast to playing with an anonymous participant in a group (potentially involved in an ex-
change relationship), being a team-member who is working with a “partner” should activate a 
more communal relational orientation, promote the creation of a shared social identity and 
point towards the appropriateness of trust-related communal norms, such as the norm of reci-
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procity. Overall, the goal of the treatment is to increase the match mi of a trust-related frame 
with which to favorably define the trust problem by presenting relevant situational cues.  
Thus, it is hypothesized that the parameter oi increases in the cooperative condition, positively 
influencing the match mi. Using bridge hypotheses B1-B3, a direct empirical hypothesis con-
cerning the level of trust and expected transfers X can be derived. Transfers are expected to 
increase in the cooperative condition. Moreover, additional hypotheses about the expectation 
of trustworthiness, the influence of instrumental variables and the expected decision times can 
be generated using the model propositions P6-P8 (see section 6.3). In particular, in the coop-
erative context, expectations should become more favorable, the influence of instrumental 
variables should decrease and decision times should be relatively faster (hypotheses will be 
fully developed in chapter 6.3). 
6.2.3. Incentive Treatment 
The second treatment manipulates the incentive structure of the trust problem with the aim of 
increasing the motivation to engage in the rational mode. As it is, motivation comprises both 
an individual-intrinsic and a situational-extrinsic dimension. While the need for cognition and 
faith in intuition measures of the REI scale, as discussed in section 6.1.5, capture a stable in-
ter-individual difference in cognitive motivation, the incentive treatment is designed to change 
the extrinsic component thereof. In the mode-selection threshold, motivation is represented by 
the composite term (Urc+ Cf). As suggested by the model of trust and adaptive rationality, an 
increase in motivation increases the right-hand side of the mode-selection threshold, and 
therefore decreases the probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in the automat-
ic mode (H5); we can easily derive corollary hypotheses concerning the effect of monetary 
incentives on the level of trust, expectations and decision times. 
The effect of monetary incentives on judgment and decision-making has been intensively ex-
plored in economic and psychological research. However, these studies have revealed incon-
sistent results (see Camerer & Hogarth 1999, Hertwig & Ortmann 2001). In conducting a 
comprehensive meta-analysis, Camerer and Hogarth conclude that “in many tasks incentives 
do not matter, presumably because there is sufficient intrinsic motivation to perform well, or 
additional effort does not matter because the task is too hard or has a flat payoff frontier” 
(1999: 8). Incentives usually do not matter when the returns to additional cognitive effort are 
very low (a “floor” effect), or when it is very hard to improve performance with additional 
effort (a “ceiling” effect). However, even when there is no significant main effect, incentives 
often alter the variation in the data. Incentive effects are most pronounced in judgment and 
decision, problem-solving or memory/recall tasks. In a related meta-study, Hertwig and Ort-
mann conclude that “although payments do not guarantee optimal decisions, in many cases 
they bring decisions closer to the predictions of normative models” (2001: 395).  
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For example, Wright and Anderson (1989) hypothesized and empirically corroborated that the 
use of heuristics, such as anchoring and adjustment, decreases with performance-contingent 
incentives because they “increase a subject´s motivation, causing the individual to think more 
carefully and completely about the judgment situation and his or her judgment, and therefore 
not display any anchoring effects” (ibid. 69). In other words, incentives increased the motiva-
tion to engage the rational mode. As expected, the anchoring effect was significantly dimin-
ished by the availability of performance-contingent incentives. Likewise, Levin et al. (1988) 
empirically could prove that framing effects were deleted in high-stake conditions, pointing 
towards the prevalence of a more controlled information processing state in which context cue 
validity is scrutinized for “appropriateness” when motivation is high. 
Related results have been obtained in the domain of economic research on risk aversion. The 
general conclusion that can be drawn from a large number of lottery experiments over incen-
tivized outcomes is that risk aversion increases with stake size. Individuals become more risk 
averse when “much is at stake” and the motivation to carefully consider a decision problem is 
high (Holt & Laury 2002, Bruhin et al. 2010). Specifically, these effects seem to emerge from 
a more pessimistic (or: “realistic”) expectation-formation over small-probability outcomes, 
which are normally overestimated (Bruhin et al. 2010). A number of behavioral experiments 
have explored the effect of stake-size on outcomes. In ultimatum games, it is often found that 
minimal acceptable offers are lower with high stakes than with low stakes (Hoffman et al. 
1996, Slonim & Roth 1998, Cameron 1999). None to only weakly significant effects have 
been found in the dictator game (Diekmann 2004, List & Cherry 2008), in public-good games 
(Kocher et al. 2008) and in the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al. 2002a); these experiments 
have not provided clear and unambiguous evidence that incentives shift decisions towards 
equilibrium predictions. However, it is important to note that most of the experiments uncover 
a change in the overall distribution of outcomes, even when mean-comparisons are insignifi-
cant (Camerer & Hogarth 1999). This is important insofar as it suggests a heterogeneous re-
sponse to incentive treatments.
7
  
The hypothesis of an incentive effect can be directly derived from the model of frame-
selection: an increase in motivation increases the probability of a frame- or script-selection in 
the rational mode. As a result, a more elaborated and controlled processing of information will 
prevail during interpretation and choice. However, incentive effects can be counter-balanced 
by high temporary and chronic accessibility. A high match between situational cues and 
                                                 
7 As the model of adaptive rationality suggests, incentive effects cannot be reliably assessed without controlling for the other 
parameters of the mode-selection threshold (accessibility, opportunity, cost etc.) and taking into account the interactive ef-
fects between variables. In particular, a high match potentially suppresses incentive effects and triggers the automatic 
mode; even when extrinsic motivation is very high. Depending on differences in accessibility, the experimental treatments 
are heterogeneous within one experimental condition. By measuring and accounting for the availability and accessibility 
of stored and relevant frames and scripts, this effect will be controlled in the present experiment. 
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stored mental schemata (a high activation weight) can, in the extreme case, completely sup-
press the effect of instrumental incentives. This is one plausible explanation for the incon-
sistent results of the high-stake studies cited above: none of the studies has explicitly taken 
into account interactions between accessibility and motivation. Thus, heterogeneous treatment 
effects within one experimental condition cannot be uncovered. Mean comparisons are ineffi-
cient because sub-groups react differently to one condition. Low accessibility subjects may be 
more prone to responding to incentive treatments than their high accessibility counterparts, 
who may not respond or even display opposite behavior. Presumably, this explains the report-
ed increases in variance of the experimental data. Another caveat of most studies conducted so 
far is a relatively low number of observations. If incentive effects in experiments are of small 
effect size only, then a sufficient number of observations is necessary to reliably detect the 
treatment effects. 
Concerning interpersonal trust, only a handful of experiments have explored the effect of mo-
tivation and stake-size in trust games or investment games. For example, Naef and Schupp 
(2009) do not find any significant reduction of amounts transferred in an investment game. 
Parco et al. (2002) find that increased stake size has a strong effect on trusting behavior in a 9-
move centipede game and conclude that high monetary payments bring subject´s decisions 
closer to the equilibrium predictions of rational-choice models. Malhotra (2004) experimental-
ly shows that a higher difference between the status quo and the “sucker” payoffs (an increase 
in the potential loss that the trustor incurs) negatively affects trust in a trust game. Johannson-
Stenman et al. (2005) show that transfers in the investment game are significantly reduced in 
high-stake conditions, a finding also provided by Holm and Nysted (2008), who present evi-
dence for a significant reduction of transfers in the trust game. They conclude that high stakes 
trigger an approximation to Nash-equilibrium because incentives “may induce the subjects to 
engage in more complex analysis instead of solely relying on their instinctive emotions con-
cerning the choice at hand” (ibid. 532).8 
In line with the experimental procedures developed by Johannson-Stenman (2005) and Holm 
and Nysted (2008), the initial endowment of the trustor and trustee will be varied on two lev-
els. This affects the opportunity cost Cf of making a false decision in the automatic mode, and 
the potential loss that failed trust involves (see Malhotra 2004 for a related argument). If the 
                                                 
8 Their explanation is surprisingly similar to an intuitive version of the model of adaptive rationality: According to Holm and 
Nysted, decisions in the trust game “can be thought of as solved on two different cognitive levels. On the first level [the 
automatic mode] the A-player decides if there is an alternative that has a direct attractiveness or makes the choice at ran-
dom. At the second level [the rational mode], the player realizes the strategic situation, forms expectations about the other 
player and chooses the alternative that maximizes his utility function (which may not be entirely selfish). Those A-players 
reaching the second level may choose to trust or not, since they may be influenced by motivations (and expectations about 
motivations) such as inequality aversion, kindness, altruism reciprocity or efficiency. We believe that most A-players 
make their decision on the first level in the hypothetical treatment and on the second level when monetary motives are pre-
sent” (2008: 532). Unfortunately, they do not further develop these ideas into a theoretical model. 
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trustee is in fact not trustworthy and distrust would have been the better option, the trustor al-
ways loses a higher absolute amount for a given relative level of trust. What is more, the gain 
and utility associated with a correct decision in the rational mode (Urc) also increases because 
either correct decision (trust or distrust) can bring a higher absolute payoff in the high-stake 
condition, irrelevant of the trustee´s actual behavior. That is, both the status quo payoffs and 
the potential gain of a trustworthy response are higher than in the low stakes conditions. 
Therefore, the overall situational-extrinsic cognitive motivation to engage in a more rational 
and elaborate reasoning process should increase in the high-incentive condition. 
In the experiment, the participants will receive either a high (40€) or a low (7€) initial en-
dowment. The initial endowment of 7€ corresponds to the hourly wage of a student-assistant 
at the University of Mannheim (in the fall-semester of 2010). The high-stake condition intro-
duces endowments which are 5.8 times higher than in the baseline condition. Given a duration 
of one hour per experimental session on average, a 40€ status quo payoff represents an hourly 
wage well above average. These high initial endowments aim to increase the likelihood of en-
gaging in a more controlled elaboration of the potential risks involved in the choice of a trust-
ing act via their effect on the motivation-component (Urc+Cf) of the mode-selection threshold. 
Again, we can connect to the expected transfers X and Y using bridge hypotheses B1-B3. The 
transfers in the investment game and the observed levels of trust are expected to decrease in 
the high stake condition. We can derive auxiliary hypotheses concerning expectations of 
trustworthiness, the influence of instrumental variables and the expected decision times of the 
participants using the general model propositions P6-P8 (section 6.3). In particular, expecta-
tions should become more pessimistic; a controlled reasoning process warrants that expecta-
tions should approach the “equilibrium solution”. Furthermore, with high initial endowments, 
the influence of instrumental variables should increase, and decision times should be relative-
ly longer. 
6.2.4. Participants 
The experimental design was implemented using the z-Tree software package (Fischbacher 
2007) for economic experiments. The experiment was conducted between August and No-
vember 2010 at the University of Mannheim. In a first wave, a sample of N=114 first-year 
sociology and political science students was recruited in class at the beginning of the fall se-
mester. In the second wave, another N=184 students were recruited from the university´s ex-
perimental-subject pool and psychology classes. A dummy variable will be added to control 
for subject-pool equivalency (as suggested by Buchan et al. 2002).  
Concerning the use of students as experimental subjects, note that a student sample is not rep-
resentative (Naef & Schupp 2009). According to Levitt and List (2007), students generally act 
different in comparison to non-student groups. Harrison et al. (2007) find that students are 
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more risk averse and have less pronounced social preferences than non-students. Likewise, 
Gächter and Thöni (2004) show that students hold more pessimistic attitudes about trust, us-
ing the GSS survey items on generalized trust.
9
 Bellamare and Kroeger (2007), using a repre-
sentative sample in the Netherlands, show that students on average transfer less in an invest-
ment game, and also hold more pessimistic expectations of trustworthiness. In contrast, Naef 
and Schupp (2009), using a representative sample of German households (SOEP), show that 
students in fact send relatively more in an investment game. Thus, it is difficult to provide a 
definite answer to the question of potential systematic differences between a student sample 
and a representative sample with respect to trust. One advantage of a student sample is that the 
observations are relatively homogeneous on controls such as age or education.  
There is trade-off between internal and external validity in the choice of method and design. 
Being able to conduct an experiment and resort to experimental data, in contrast to a survey 
study, provides high internal validity while compromising on external validity and representa-
tiveness of the data (Falk & Heckman 2009). But the strongest advantage of an experimental 
approach, that is, to test for causal effects and allow causal inference, far outweighs the rela-
tive disadvantages incurred with a limitedly representative dataset. On top of that, the experi-
mental measures adopted in trust research in fact provide a considerable degree of external 
validity (Baran et al. 2010). Lastly, the choice of a student-sample in the experimental design 
is conforming to the current standard procedure of both experimental economic and psycho-
logical research. 
6.2.5. Materials and Procedure 
Upon arrival, the participants were seated in separate booths in the laboratory, where they 
would find a sheet of written general instructions about the procedures and the experiment 
(see Appendix B).  
The instructions explained that they now participated in an experiment and could earn real 
money, the magnitude of which depended on their own decisions and the decisions of other 
participants. Participants were told that they had to perform several tasks, out of which one 
task was selected randomly at the end of the experiment to determine the final payoff. The 
money earned would be paid in cash directly after the experiment had ended. Participants 
were informed that communicating with others was strictly prohibited, and that the instructor 
could always help them if they silently raised their hands. The instructions made clear that at 
                                                 
9
 The three GSS items used are (1) “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?”; (2) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance 
or would they try to be fair”? and (3) “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly 
just looking out for themselves”? On top of that, they ask for the frequency of behavioral manifestations of trust (i.e. lend-
ing a book, money, and leaving the door open) with similar results. 
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no point in time would the participants know the identity of others and vice versa, and that 
their decisions and payoffs remained completely anonymous. 
Furthermore, the written instructions informed them that, at the beginning of the experiment, 
they would be randomly matched into a group (team) with another participant (partner). Thus, 
the context treatment was implemented from the very beginning of the experiment. While 
reading the instructions, participants could see the welcome screen on the computer in front of 
them, which presented the cooperative or neutral visual cues. With a click on the screen, par-
ticipants could start working on the task. 
On-screen instructions then presented the investment game scenario from the perspective of 
player A (the trustor), using the context treatment word-pairs consistently with the written in-
structions. On the next screen, participants were introduced to the decision interface and could 
make one “trial” decision for practice. The participants then had to answer ten control ques-
tions to make sure that they had understood how the payoffs of the game were determined.  
Only when all ten questions were answered correctly could the participants proceed to the ac-
tual decision stage. The next screen asked for their transfer decision, followed by a screen to 
ask for their expectation of trustworthiness, that is, how much they expected to receive back 
from Player B. 
When all participants had made their decision about the transfer in the role of Player A, they 
were informed about a re-start and presented with new on-screen instructions explaining the 
investment game in their new role as player B (the trustee). They were asked another four 
control questions to make sure that the new scenario was understood properly, and then had to 
make their reciprocal decision of trustworthiness, being presented with the transfer decision of 
a randomly selected participant. Lastly, they were asked their second-order expectations 
(“What do you think did player A expect to get back?”).  
Upon completion, several manipulation checks were collected. Subjects were asked three 
questions about the perceived importance of the decisions and whether much money was at 
stake, they were asked to rate the expected cooperativeness of the interaction partner and their 
expectations about the fairness of others, and they were asked a self-report about cognitive 
style. Then, participants had to answer the scales and survey items of generalized trust, the 
reciprocity norm, faith in intuition and need for cognition. All scales were elicited using a 7-
point Likert-type scale (ranging from “fully agree” to “fully disagree”).10 
                                                 
10 Financial and logistic limitations prevented a course of action in which scale measures were collected in advance of the 
actual experiment In fact, asking survey items at the end of an experiment is a most common practice, both in psychologi-
cal and economic experiments (a similar approach in trust experiments was taken by, for example, Buchan et al. 2002, 
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Finally, participants were asked all survey and control-variable items. They were then in-
formed about the randomly selected task which would become payoff-relevant, which was 
either their choice as player A or B. The decisions by both participants were displayed and the 
final payoffs determined. The money was given to the participants in a separate room by call-
ing out each computer-number and paying the participant in the other room. 
6.3. Empirical Hypotheses  
6.3.1. Using the Model to Predict Trust 
In this section, we will derive testable empirical hypotheses to investigate the model of trust 
and adaptive rationality in an experimental setting. The hypotheses can be developed using 
the model propositions P1-P8, bridge hypotheses B1-B3, and the proposed effects of the ex-
perimental treatments. In addition to a number of direct main effects, the model allows to 
formulate more complex hypotheses about the interplay of several parameters and their inter-
actions. In fact, one important benefit and advantage of the threshold model is that permits the 
specification of complex interaction patterns. Remember that the threshold for the uncondi-
tional choice of a trusting act was defined as:  
mi * aj > 1 – C / (p * (Urc+Cw)) 
To see how the threshold can be used to derive hypotheses about main effects and complex 
interaction patterns, the following assumptions (discussed in detail in the previous chapters) 
are collected into a set of bridge hypotheses to begin the analysis: 
(1) aj|i=1 (a script is temporarily accessible given the frame, A1) 
(2) ak|j=1 (an action is satisfactorily regulated given an activated script, A2) 
(3) The automatic mode leads to a complete transfer of resources, X=E (B1) 
(4) The rational mode supports any transfer between zero and the initial endowment, XƐ[0, 
E], but transfers approximate the Nash-equilibrium of distrust X=0 (B2, B3) 
(5) The decision times using the automatic mode are shorter than the decision times using 
the rational mode (P8.1, P8.2) 
(6) li = 1 (the link between objects and chronically accessible frames is established) 
(7) C<p*U (assumption to ensure that the threshold is well-behaved) 
The most important element in this set of assumptions is the link between processing modes 
and transfer decisions, as stated in (3) and (4). As was argued before, the activation of the ra-
tional processing mode should lead, on average, to a decrease of observed levels of trust (see 
                                                                                                                                                         
Malhotra 2004 and Ermisch et al. 2009). While the implementation of a preliminary session in which to collect the survey 
measures before the actual experiment is methodically desirable, it is also more costly. 
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section 6.1.2). Using this set of bridge hypotheses, it is straightforward to derive empirical 
predictions regarding the effect and sign of the experimental treatments and accessibility 
measures that are elicited in the experimental design. 
6.3.2. Main Effects 
A number of general model propositions (P1-P8) can be directly translated into empirical hy-
potheses about statistical main effects. These main effects can be derived ceteris paribus, 
holding other parameters of the mode-selection threshold constant. For example, consider the 
impact of the chronic accessibility of frames and scripts on the definition of the situation and 
the subsequent choice of a trusting act. The model reveals that high accessibility increases the 
left-hand side (LHS) of the threshold, that is, the activation weight. The more readily available 
trust-related knowledge is to a trustor, the more likely it is that interpretation and choice in the 
trust problem occur in the automatic-mode: 
H1 (frame accessibility): The higher is the chronic accessibility ai of a trust frame, the higher 
is the probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in the automatic mode. With re-
spect to transfer decisions in the investment game, this implies a positive main effect of frame 
accessibility. With respect to decision times, this implies a negative main effect. 
H2 (script internalization): The higher is the chronic accessibility aj of a trust-related script, 
the higher is the probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in the automatic 
mode. With respect to transfer decisions in the investment game, this implies a positive main 
effect of script internalization. With respect to decision times, this implies to a negative main 
effect. 
The model of frame selection suggests that accessibility has an effect on the processing mode 
via its influence on the match and the “smoothness” of pattern-recognition. In the absence of 
more individuating information or social embeddedness, other categories of trust-related 
knowledge (such as specific expectations, reputation information etc.) are not appropriate and 
cannot be applied to the experimental situation. However, a relevant trust frame is provided 
by generalized interpersonal trust, an abstract relational schema that participants have or have 
not developed for interaction with anonymous others, and in the script of the reciprocity-
norm. The focus on these two measures of trust-related knowledge has to be understood in 
relation to (and is motivated by) their interplay with the context treatment. The cooperative 
framing condition was designed to increase the appropriateness of a relational schema of gen-
eralized interpersonal trust and the validity of the norm of reciprocity. These knowledge struc-
tures can assist the solution of the trust problem in the anonymous one-shot experimental set-
up, and their importance increases in the cooperative framing condition. 
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The model predicts main effects with respect to the two experimental treatments. Concerning 
the effect of the context treatment on the observed levels of trust, it is expected that the pres-
ence or absence of situational cues pointing towards the validity of a trust-related frame and 
script influence interpretation and choice in the trust problem.  
H3 (context treatment): The cooperative context treatment increases the match mi of a trust 
frame by providing relevant situational cues oi. The higher is the situationally indicated ap-
propriateness of a trust-related frame and script, the higher is the probability of an uncondi-
tional choice of a trusting act in the automatic mode. With respect to transfer decisions in the 
investment game, this implies a positive main effect of the cooperative framing condition. With 
respect to decision times, this implies a negative main effect. 
The cooperative context provides cues that can be used by participants to interpret the situa-
tion more favorably than in the neutral framing condition. The word-pairs used in the coopera-
tive framing condition´s instructions (“partner”/“team”) are designed to decrease perceived 
social distance and signify that a communal relationship orientation and corresponding com-
munal interaction norms (the reciprocity norm) are appropriate, whereas such cues are not 
presented in the neutral framing condition. The visual primes presented to the participants at 
the beginning of the experiment (a picture of hand-shakes, a picture of bank notes) supple-
ment the word priming manipulation. 
Next, the effect of the incentive treatment can be identified by looking at the mode-selection 
threshold. In particular, high initial endowments are expected to increase the cognitive moti-
vation to engage the rational mode and push participants towards a rational processing of the 
trust problem during interpretation and choice. In particular, we can hypothesize that: 
H4a (incentive treatment): High initial endowments increase cognitive motivation U = 
(Urc+Cf) to activate the rational mode. The higher the cognitive motivation U, the higher is 
the probability of a conditional choice of a trusting act in the rational mode. With respect to 
transfer decisions in the investment game, this implies a negative main effect of high initial 
endowments. With respect to decision times, this implies a positive main effect. 
This hypothesis recasts a core postulate of dual-process theories, stating that motivation is a 
central determinant of the processing mode, and applies it to the present experimental set-up. 
Hypothesis H4 also comprises the “low-cost hypothesis” (Diekmann & Preisendörfer 1992, 
Rauhut & Krumpal 2008) of economic rational choice theory: attitude- and norm-conform 
behavior can only be expected in low-cost situations. The more is “at stake” for the actor, the 
higher is the likelihood that a rational processing of information will prevail in the stages of 
interpretation and choice. Then, social norms and attitude-conform behaviors are a mere part 
of instrumental cost-benefit considerations; they are not unconditional. Likewise, H4 implies 
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that unconditional trust can be disturbed whenever trust problems bear important consequenc-
es to the trustor. Consequentially, the use of heuristics such as choice-rules, subjective experi-
ences and so forth should minimally occur in a controlled fashion, if their influence is not 
completely overridden by the intervention of the rational system. 
It is important to note that the proposed main effect of instrumental incentives and high stakes 
conditions is mediated by a number of interactive effects which compensate it. As will be 
shown in section 6.3.3, the model posits that incentive effects can be fully suppressed if, for 
example, actors´ chronic accessibility of relevant frames and scripts is high. In other words, 
even in high-cost situations, actors can be “immune” against instrumental incentives and stick 
to the mental schemata and heuristics suggested by the associative memory-system; even 
when the stakes are very high and cognitive motivation prompts towards a more rational elab-
oration of the selection problem. A corollary hypothesis can be formulated with respect to the 
individual-intrinsic dimension of cognitive motivation, which will be measured using the 
NFC/FI scales.  
H4b (intrinsic motivation): The higher the intrinsic cognitive motivation U, the higher is the 
probability of a conditional choice of a trusting act in the rational mode. With respect to 
transfer decisions in the investment game, this implies a negative main effect of intrinsic moti-
vation. With respect to decision times, this implies a positive main effect. 
One potential source of variance in intrinsic cognitive motivation is the “Faith in Intuition” 
and “Need for Cognition” of the participants, which will be elicited with the corresponding 
scales in the survey-stage of the experiment. As was argued in section 6.1.5, a number of stud-
ies have provided evidence that processing preferences accumulate into different cognitive 
types, based on NFC/FI classifications. Traditionally, NFC is interpreted to measure a stable 
individual-intrinsic aspect of motivation. Thus, it is possible to predict individual-intrinsic dif-
ferences in the way subjects chronically activate a certain processing mode, and control for a 
“preference” for processing, by keeping track of the differences in NFC/FI. In short, it is hy-
pothesized that unconditional trust is more common among low motivation-type individuals 
than among high motivation-type individuals. 
Hypotheses H1-H4 can be tested using the present design. Next, all hypotheses which cannot 
(or can only partially) be tested with the present experimental design will be derived. They are 
stated here for the sake of completeness. With respect to the cost and effort C associated with 
elaborate interpretation and choice in the trust problem, the model implies:  
H5 (effort): The higher is the cost and mental effort C associated with rational processing, the 
higher is the probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act. With respect to transfer 
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decision in the investment game, this implies a positive main effect of cost and mental effort C. 
With respect to the decision times, this implies a negative main effect. 
Since task complexity does not vary between treatments, mental effort will mainly differ on 
its individual-intrinsic dimension. However, a direct measure of mental effort, such as cardio-
vascular response and neural activity (see Fairclough & Mulder 2011) was not scheduled. 
Therefore, H5 will not be analyzed with the experimental data. Considering opportunities p 
for engagement of the rational mode, the model implies: 
H6 (opportunity): The lower is available opportunity p necessary for rational processing, the 
higher is the probability of an unconditional choice of a trusting act in the automatic mode. 
With respect to transfer decision in the investment game, this implies a negative main effect of 
opportunity p. 
That is to say, restrictions on the scarce resource of attention and cognitive capacity, or direct 
time-pressure (all impact opportunity p negatively) prevent the activation of the rational 
mode. Then, the trustor has to rely on heuristic shortcuts to make a decision about trust. For 
example, in the lack of further individuating information, the trustor can resort to cognitive or 
affective feelings, use simplifying choice rules (i.e. a coin toss) or application of heuristic 
schemata (“doctors can always be trusted”) when there is no opportunity. In contrast, the acti-
vation of the rational mode is feasible when opportunity p is sufficient. It opens up the poten-
tial for the development of conditional trust. A hypothesis about the effect of opportunity on 
decision times was omitted here. This is because opportunity, in the form of time-pressure, 
limits itself the amount of available decision time. As with effort C, the effect of opportunity 
will not be analyzed in the current set-up: subjects were given an unlimited amount of time to 
think at every stage of the experiment, and at no point in time capacity was limited with con-
current task-activities.  
6.3.3. Interaction Effects 
To analyze interaction effects between model parameters, it is necessary to vary more than 
one parameter at a time and track the effect of a parameter change on the threshold value, 
while introducing some variation in other parameter values (see Kroneberg 2011b for further 
discussion). In what follows, the focus is on those interaction effects that can be tested and 
quantified using the experimental design. This course of action is exemplary; all other higher-
order interactions can be derived analogously. In particular, the analysis focuses on the effect 
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of the experimental treatments on the threshold value and their impact on the total balance of 
the mode-selection threshold while simultaneously varying chronic accessibility.
11
 
The experimental treatments change two parameters of the threshold. First, the cooperative 
versus neutral context is designed to influence the presence of situational cues oi, as part of the 
match mi = mi(oi). Second, the high versus low incentive treatment is designed to manipulate 
cognitive motivation U = (Urc+Cw). What does the model tell us about the interaction between 
the two parameters, the interaction between each parameter and the chronic accessibility aj of 
a reciprocity script,
 
and the joint interplay of all three variables? Neglecting all constant pa-
rameters for the moment, we can write: 
oi * aj > 1 – S / U 
S is the constant derived from (C/p). Obviously, the threshold depends on all three parameters 
at the same time, and whether a single parameter change “tips over” the threshold balance 
crucially depends on the specification of all other parameter values. That is to say, the model 
predicts two- and three-way interactions between U, oi and aj. In a statistical model, we would 
have to include not only main effects U, oi, and aj, but also interaction terms (U*oi), (U*aj), 
(aj*oi’) and the three-way interaction (U*aj*oi). But what is the predicted sign of these effects? 
As presented in full detail in Appendix C, the model can be used to predict the statistical sign 
of all interaction effects and their direction with respect to the expected transfers in the in-
vestment game using bridge hypotheses B1-B3. The set of valid combinations that remain in-
cludes 17 different outcome patterns. The following table summarizes all the predicted inter-
action patterns, including the sign of the main-effects, second- and third-order interactions 
with respect to the transfer decision in an investment game. These patterns are consistent with 
the model of adaptive rationality, specifying the interaction between script accessibility aj, sit-
uational cues oi and cognitive motivation U (table 4): 
                                                 
11 Since all accessibility parameters are located on the left-hand side of the mode-selection threshold (directly influencing the 
activation weight), their effect and interactions with other threshold parameters are identical. Therefore, the following hy-
potheses, related to the chronic accessibility aj of a script, can be easily restated in terms of chronic frame accessibility. 
The predicted sign and effect of interactions with other parameters is the same. 
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Table 4: Predicted interaction patterns for reltrust 
 Predicted Interaction Patterns (Main- and Interaction Effects) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
aj 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0 
U 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 < 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≤ 0 0 
oi 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 > 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0 
U∙oi 0 ≥ 0 > 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 < 0 = 0 ≤ 0 0 
ai∙U 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 0 
ai∙oi 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 < 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 > 0 ≥ 0 0 
ai∙oi∙U 0 ≤ 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 0 
Note: The table presents predicted interaction patterns between chronic script accessibility aj, situational cues oi and moti-
vation U to predict transfer decisions in the investment game. 
The model admits a number of different interaction patterns between the model parameters. 
Depending on the parameter values and the effect of the treatments on the threshold, the ex-
pected higher-order interactions can be zero, positive or negative. In contrast, the sign of the 
main effects is unambiguous. The three-way interaction can be positive or negative, depend-
ing on the joint effect of the parameters (see Kroneberg 2011b for a detailed discussion). A 
positive three-way interaction results whenever a high value of all parameters determining the 
left-hand side (the activation weight) is necessary to trigger the automatic mode and counter-
balance the negative effect of cognitive motivation U. In this case, a cooperative context and 
high script accessibility aj are necessary to reduce the negative incentive effect pushing to-
wards the rational mode. A negative sign of the three-way interaction indicates that one of the 
two components is already sufficient. That is, when facing high incentives and motivation to 
engage the rational mode, actors choose unconditional trust either when the context is cooper-
ative or when accessibility is high.  
The result of this analysis is confusing at first glance. Depending on the concrete parameter 
values and treatment effects, the predicted interaction patterns are considerably diverse. This 
is not to say, however, that the model admits and predicts statistical interaction effects at ran-
dom and without any restrictions. Even when the falsification of one particular interaction ef-
fect, detached and separated from the joint set of other hypotheses in the interaction pattern, is 
factually not possible (i.e. the model admits both a positive, a negative and a zero three-way 
interaction), the overall interaction patterns which can be predicted provide a set of admissible 
data patterns, against which any empirical deviation can be regarded as negative evidence of 
the theoretical model.  
When analyzing the data, it is important to keep in mind that the data represent an estimated 
aggregate effect from a distribution of individual threshold values, and the statistical results 
mirror the “average” parameter constellations found in the sample. This means that the data 
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may not reveal an overall consistent pattern if the data is too heterogeneous with respect to the 
distribution of individual threshold values (Kroneberg 2011b). Using a relatively heterogene-
ous student population (i.e. a sampling of primarily first-year students) thus could engender a 
relative methodological advantage, because the heterogeneity in threshold-values is presuma-
bly smaller than in a population-representative sample. Let us now take a closer look at the 
resulting interaction effects. In particular, the following two- and three-way interaction hy-
potheses are implied by the model, holding other parameters constant: 
H7a (H2 x H4): The effect of situational cues (cooperative versus neutral framing condition) 
is mediated by the chronic accessibility aj of a trust-related script. Both parameters are neces-
sary for a high activation weight. The higher is the chronic accessibility of the script, the 
stronger is the effect of the context treatment. With respect to transfer decisions in the invest-
ment game, this corresponds to a positive two-way interaction (oi * aj). With respect to deci-
sion times, this corresponds to a negative two-way interaction. 
This formulation of the two-way interaction does not account for the third variable. As can be 
seen from the predicted interaction patterns, the two-way interaction (oi * ai) can well be 
negative or zero once the incentive variable is accounted for. However, when varying the two 
components of the match only, the above formulation is accurate. We can make a similar pre-
diction with respect to the chronic accessibility ai of a trust frame:  
H7b (H1 x H4): The effect of situational cues oi (cooperative versus neutral framing condi-
tion) is mediated by the chronic accessibility ai of the generalized trust frame. Both parame-
ters are necessary for a high match. The higher is the chronic accessibility of the generalized 
trust frame, the stronger is the effect of the context treatment. With respect to transfer deci-
sions in the investment game, this implies a positive two-way interaction (oi * ai). With re-
spect to decision times, this implies a negative two-way interaction. 
Hypotheses H7a and H7b do not take into account cognitive motivation U. The interaction 
patterns presented in table 5 predict positive and negative two-way interactions between cues 
oi and accessibility aj. The hypothesis of a positive interaction between cues and accessibility, 
as stated above, must be qualified when varying more than two interacting components of the 
threshold simultaneously. In sum, the model predicts that the effect of the symbolical cues 
presented in the context depends on the chronic accessibility of appropriate knowledge struc-
tures to “decode” them. Thus, the context treatments are expected to have no effect for those 
subjects who report low chronic accessibility of trust-related frames and scripts and therefore 
cannot make use of the cues presented during interpretation. This hypothesis contrasts to ge-
neric dual-process models (Mayerl 2010). While generic dual-process models predict an in-
creasing effect of situational cues with decreasing accessibility, the model of frame selection 
posits that knowledge must first and foremost be latently accessible to allow for correct inter-
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pretation of the corresponding cues. One plausible explanation for this discrepancy in theoret-
ical predictions is that dual-process accounts have traditionally focused more on the impact of 
temporary accessibility (as demonstrated, for example, in the priming research-paradigm), 
while the model of frame-selection emphasizes the importance of chronic accessibility, that is, 
the “strength” of internalization and the latent activation-potential of knowledge. 
Next, the model predicts an interaction between chronic accessibility aj and cognitive motiva-
tion U. This hypothesis is a particular interesting one because it contrasts to standard econom-
ic models: 
H8 (H1 x H4): The effect of cognitive motivation U (H4) is mediated by chronic script acces-
sibility aj. High chronic accessibility increases the activation weight of the mode-selection 
threshold. The higher is the chronic accessibility aj of a trust-related script (i.e. the reciproci-
ty norm), the weaker is the negative effect of cognitive motivation U. With respect to transfer 
decisions in the investment game, this implies a positive two-way interaction (oi * ai). With 
respect to decision times, this implies a negative two-way interaction. 
In other words, the negative effect of high initial endowments (an increase in cognitive moti-
vation U, pushing subjects towards rational elaboration and conditional trust), can be counter-
balanced and even fully suppressed if subjects have internalized a regulative script which can 
be applied to the current situation. High chronic accessibility promotes high activation 
weights, and therefore an automatic application of stored knowledge without further consider-
ation of instrumental factors. If the automatic mode prevails during mode-selection as a result 
of a high match, then the decision-making process does not follow the principles of economic 
utility maximization anymore. Actors chose actions solely based on the selection rules of the 
automatic mode (selecting frames, scripts and actions with the highest activation weight). The 
“logic of appropriateness” then unfolds in the patterns of spreading activation that the percep-
tion of situational stimuli affords. This also implies that: 
H9 (H3 x H4): The effect of cognitive motivation U (H4) is mediated by the presence of situa-
tional cues oi. A cooperative framing of the trust problem increases the activation weight of 
trust-related frames and scripts. The higher is the appropriateness of trust-related knowledge, 
as indicated by cues oi, the weaker is the negative effect of cognitive motivation U. With re-
spect to transfer decisions in the investment game, this implies a positive two-way interaction 
(oi * ai). With respect to decision times, this implies a negative two-way interaction. 
Principally, this means that the experimental treatments cannot be analyzed independently. 
Since situational cues oi and accessibility parameters ai, aj and aj|i work in the same direction 
with respect to their influence on the activation weight and mode-selection threshold, the pre-
dicted sign of the two-way interaction between cues and motivation is identical to H6. High 
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initial endowments, via their effect on cognitive motivation U, increase the probability of an 
activation of the rational mode and, in consequence, promote conditional trust. However, the-
se incentive effects can be diminished by the presence of situational cues indicating the ap-
propriateness of stored schemata because they influence activation weights. If the initial cate-
gorizations are supported by a detection of relevant external cues, then appropriateness re-
mains unquestioned and information processing occurs at the default automatic mode. Lastly, 
the model predicts a three-way interaction between cues oi, motivation U, and accessibility aj: 
H10 (H1 xH3 x H4): The negative effect of cognitive motivation U (H4) is jointly mediated by 
chronic accessibility aj of a trust-related script and the presence of situational cues oi. This 
implies a three-way interaction, the sign of which depends on the joint effect of aj and oi on 
the threshold. The three-way interaction will be negative if a high value of either parameter is 
sufficient to counterbalance the effect of motivation on the threshold. It will be positive if a 
high value of both parameters is necessary to compensate the negative effect of motivation 
Once the three-way interaction is statistically taken into account, the predicted two-way inter-
actions will change according to the predicted interaction patterns, as presented in table 5 
above. Hypothesis H10 completes the set of empirical predictions that the model affords with 
respect to the observable outcomes in the investment game context and when varying accessi-
bility, situational cues and motivation at the same time. It is important to keep in mind that the 
analysis of interaction effects is a model-inherent requirement and necessity, motivated by the 
model of trust and adaptive rationality. They are not conducted ad libitum. The theoretical 
framework developed here suggests that an analysis of simple main effects will most likely 
not be sufficient to properly describe the data, because interactions between the processing 
mode determinants are an ever present facet of interpretation and choice.  
6.4. Descriptive Statistics 
A total of N=298 participants were recruited and participated in the main experiment between 
August and November 2010. Participants were recruited in class at the beginning of the fall-
semester and randomly selected into the different experimental conditions. The experiment 
was conducted in 24 separate sessions, which lasted about one hour each. The average group 
size was about 12 participants per session, and participants earned an average of 18€ from 
their participation in the experiment (table 5):  
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Table 5: Experimental conditions and number of observations 
Treatment s 
                        Context 
Total 
Neutral Cooperative 
Incentives 
Low    (7€) 76 70  146 
High   (40€) 76 76 152 
Total 152  146 298 
The number of observations across cells and experimental conditions is almost balanced. A 
lower number of observations in the “Low/Cooperative”-condition resulted due to random 
fluctuations. The next table summarizes basic information of the main dependent and inde-
pendent variables used in the empirical analysis (table 6): 
Table 6: Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables  
Label Measure / Operationalization [Min, Max] Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables    
reltrust Relative amount sent in investment game, X/E [0, 1] 0.43 0.31 
time Decision time in seconds [2.95, 207] 17.95 17.84 
logtime Logarithm of decision time [1.08 5.34] 2.64 0.66 
Independent Variables    
end Incentive treatment (0=low, 1=high, dummy) [0, 1] - - 
frame Context treatment (0=neutral, 1=coop., dummy) [0, 1] - - 
trustscale Interpersonal trust (Kassebaum 2004) [0.16, 0.89] 0.57 0.13 
recscale Norm of reciprocity (Perugini et al. 2003) [0.36, 0.91] 0.68 0.09 
fiscale Faith in intuition (Keller et al. 2000) [0.24 ,0.93] 0.65 0.13 
nfcscale Need for cognition (Keller et al. 2000) [0.41, 0.97] 0.77 0.12 
age Respondent age in years [18, 43] 21.89 3.77 
sex Respondent gender (0= male, 1= female, dummy) [0, 1] 0.57 0.49 
partner Relationship status (0=no 1= yes, dummy) [0, 1] 0.48 0.50 
partnerl Relationship length in months [0, 200] 25.05 23.41 
income Income response categories [0, 1875] 535.93 288.87 
semester Respondent semester´s studied  [0, 20] 3.36 3.66 
append Recruitment wave (0=first, 1=second, dummy) [0, 1] - - 
Concerning the composition of the sample, a total of 157 participants (52%) were first-
semester students, another 65 participants (22%) had completed their third semester. The larg-
est groups within the sample comprised sociology (18%) and political science (18%) degrees 
followed by business sciences (13%), economics (8%), psychology (8%) and IT sciences 
(8%). The participants were 21.9 years of age on average (SD=3.77), and a little more than 
half (57%) of the participants were female. About half of all (48%) reported to be currently 
engaged in a relationship. In this group, relationships had been continuing for about 25 
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months (SD=23.4). Participants reported an average monthly gross income of 535€ 
(SD=288€), including a maximum reported income of 1875€. Looking at social background, 
59% of the participants indicated that their father had completed upper secondary school 
(“Abitur”), while 15% each reported their father´s educational background as middle-school 
(“Realschule”) and lower secondary school ("Hauptschule"). These categories are the main 
educational degrees of the German educational system (see Müller et al. 1998). The average 
reported student income significantly differs between high and low social-backgrounds. Stu-
dents whose father had completed upper secondary school report an average income of 573€ 
(SD=289€), which drops to an average 456€ (“Realschule”, SD=218€) and 464€ 
(“Hauptschule”, SD=302€), respectively.  
Across treatments and conditions, trustors transferred an average of 43% of their initial en-
dowment to the trustee. Transfers spanned the whole range from zero to full transfers. That is, 
both complete trust and distrust can be observed in the sample. About 10% (N=29) of the par-
ticipants opted for the safe alternative of distrust and transferred none of their initial endow-
ment. Another 12% (N=35) transferred the full initial endowment. The following graph de-
picts a frequency histogram of the dependent variable reltrust (figure 21): 
Figure 21: Frequency histogram of reltrust 
 
As can be seen from the histogram, the mode of the distribution is at a relative transfer of half 
of the endowment, which about 15% (N=46) of the participants opted for. Overall, about 52% 
(N=157) of the trustors transferred less than half of their endowment, while about 33% 
(N=95) transferred more than half of their endowment. Looking at the distribution of reltrust, 
it is immediately apparent that the variable is not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk normali-
ty test, Z=4.53, p<0.001). With respect to statistical inference, this warrants some caution 
when using parametric tests that rely on normality assumptions, such as estimation of confi-
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dence intervals and t-tests, and it encourages the use of statistical models that can handle 
“heavy tails” at the fringes of the distribution. 
Concerning the distribution of the four continuous independent variables, the following graph 
combines histograms of the measures of (1) chronic accessibility of a trust-related frame (2) 
chronic accessibility of a trust-related script, (3) faith in intuition and (4) need for cognition. A 
kernel density estimate and a normal density plot were added to each graph (figure 22): 
Figure 22: Frequency histogram of (1) trustscale, (2) recscale, (3) nfcscale, (4) fiscale 
 
All scales were normalized to the unit interval. The distributions of the chronic accessibility 
and NFC/FI measures appear to be normal from the graphs. In fact, a Shapiro-Wilk normality 
test cannot reject the null-hypothesis of a normal distribution for trustscale (Z=-0.85, p=0.8) 
and fiscale (Z=0.5, p=0.3). However, it does so for nfcscale (Z=5.1, p<0.001). The distribu-
tion´s mean is .77 with a standard deviation of .12; the distribution is negatively skewed and 
left-tailed. A closer inspection of the underlying NFC-scale items reveals that response fre-
quencies are skewed towards the “high”-end (strong agreement with high intrinsic cognitive 
motivation) of the scale. There are two explanations for this finding: (1) it might be that the 
student sample population generally has a high intrinsic cognitive motivation, or (2) the used 
scale items cannot properly discriminate between low and high NFC-individuals of the sam-
ple. In either case, the result is a loss of discriminative power and information due to a poten-
tial and non-linear “ceiling” effect, which has to be respected. Furthermore, the distribution of 
the norm of reciprocity scale looks well-behaved from the histogram, but the null-hypothesis 
of a normal distribution of recscale can be rejected (Shapiro-Wilk normality test, Z=2.1, 
p=0.02). A skewness/kurtosis test (D´Agostino et al. 1990) reveals that recscale is negatively 
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skewed, while its kurtosis is not different from normal (χ2(2, N=298) = 8.35, p=0.015). How-
ever, note that all four variables will be used as independent variables in the subsequent anal-
ysis; this relaxes most of the distributional concerns with respect to statistical inference.  
In order to get a first impression of the relation between dependent and independent variables, 
the next table displays the conditional means of reltrust, as well as test statistics for two-sided, 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (“WRT”). For each descriptive statistic (as well as 
the estimates from regression models below), statistical significance is specified at the 5%-
level for two-sided tests unless stated otherwise. To create conditional means for the continu-
ous measures of chronic accessibility and FI/NFC, the sample was split along the median of 
the corresponding response variable to create high- and low-score groups (table 7):
12
 
Table 7: Conditional mean of reltrust within subgroups 
Variable Conditional mean of reltrust (standard deviation)  
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Z= p= 
end Low High   
 0.49 (0.32) 0.38 (0.31) 2.85 0.004 
frame Neutral Cooperative   
 0.43 (0.29) 0.43 (0.34) 0.47 0.63 
trustscale Low Trust High Trust   
 0.40 (0.32) 0.46 (0.32) -1.81 0.071 
recscale Low Reciprocity High Reciprocity   
 0.41 (0.30) 0.45 (0.34) -1.11 0.27 
fiscale Low FI High FI   
 0.44 (0.33) 0.42 (0.30) 0.52 0.74 
nfcscale Low NFC High NFC   
 0.41 (0.33) 0.45 (0.31) -1.34 0.17 
sex Male=0 Female=1   
 0.47 (0.36) 0.41 (0.28) 1.09  0.27 
partner No Partner Partner   
 0.43 (0.32) 0.43 (0.31) -0.04 0.97 
Using the information in the table, we can assess simple main effects and conduct a prelimi-
nary examination of hypotheses H1-H4.
13
 For instance, according to hypothesis H1, the prob-
ability of unconditional trust should increase with chronic frame accessibility. Using trust-
                                                 
12 While the experimental treatment variables end and frame, as well as controls sex and partner, are binary by nature, this is 
not the case for trustscale, recscale, nfcscale and fiscale.  It is now widely accepted that dichotomization of continuous 
variables can introduce a number of unwanted side-effects, such as loss of effect size and statistical power or introduction 
of potential artifacts (Cohen 1983, McCallum et al. 2002). For presentational purposes, a mean-split is conducted. The 
continuous measures will be analyzed with regression techniques in the next section. 
13 To prevent accumulation of the family-wise type-1-error, one can adjust α-levels using the Bonferroni procedure. Given 
that N=8 mean comparisons were statistically computed, the appropriate p-value is 0.05/8=0.00625 for a significance level 
of α=.05. A quick look at table 8 reveals that only end has a significant effect on reltrust when using Bonferroni-adjusted 
significance levels; the results do not change for any variable. 
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scale as an indicator to form subgroups across treatments, the conditional mean of reltrust in-
creases from M=0.40 to M=0.46 between low and high chronic frame accessibility. However, 
this difference is not significant (WRT, Z =-1.81, p=0.071). That is, when tested separately 
and across conditions, a comparison of the conditional mean of reltrust does not support H1. 
Likewise, reltrust does not differ between high- and low chronic script accessibility, using 
recscale as the grouping variable (WRT, Z=-1.11, p=0.27). Thus hypothesis H2, postulating a 
main effect of script internalization, cannot be supported by this preliminary test either. But 
while there is no measurable effect in reltrust across high- and low-reciprocity groups, the 
variance in the data slightly increases in high-reciprocity subjects, the increase being margin-
ally significant (Levene´s robust test, F(1, 296) = 3.57, p=0.059). Thus, high-reciprocity sub-
jects may be more heterogeneous in their response to the experimental treatments than low-
reciprocity subjects, a finding which points to a potential interaction between chronic script 
accessibility and other variables, such as the initial endowment and framing-conditions.  
With respect to the experimental treatments, the conditional distribution of reltrust does not 
differ between framing conditions. In both cases, trustors transferred about 43% of their initial 
endowment (WRT, Z=0.47, p=0.63). Thus, the comparison of conditional means does not 
support main effect hypothesis H3, stating that a cooperative context increases unconditional 
trust across all conditions. Again, there is an interesting twist to this result: the variance in the 
data significantly increases in the cooperative framing condition (Levene´s robust test, F(1, 
296) = 5.44, p=0.02). While no main effect can be observed at first glance, the result indicates 
that the observations are heterogeneous in their response to the framing condition. As sug-
gested by the model of trust and adaptive rationality, the effect of the framing-treatment may 
depend on other parameters of the mode-selection threshold. This warrants a consideration of 
potential moderators such as chronic accessibility or cognitive motivation.  
On the other hand, the comparison of conditional means reveals that reltrust is significantly 
lower with high initial endowments. Across framing conditions, the relative transfers decrease 
from an average of M=0.49 to an average of M=0.38 when the “stakes are high” (WRT, 
Z=2.85, p=0.004). This observation is in line with hypothesis H4a, stating that high initial en-
dowments foster conditional trust. Obviously, whether or not the trust problem includes high 
or low “stake sizes” does matter to trustors. This observation suggests that there is strong and 
direct effect of the incentive structure of a trust problem on cognitive motivation. At the same 
time, intrinsic cognitive motivation does not have the same negative effect: in the high-NFC 
group, the conditional mean of reltrust slightly increases from M=0.41 to M=0.45 across all 
conditions, but the hypothesis that the underlying distributions are the same cannot be rejected 
(WRT, Z=-1.34, p=0.17). Thus, with respect to hypothesis H4b, the preliminary analysis does 
not yield a conclusive result. Looking at the “intuitive” counterpart of the NFC-scale, there is 
no noticeable difference between high- and low-FI subjects (WRT, Z=0.52, p=0.74). 
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The following table summarizes average transfer decisions of the trustors separated by exper-
imental conditions. As indicated by the analysis above, the conditional mean of reltrust signif-
icantly differs between high and low endowment conditions when holding frame constant, but 
statistically significant effects cannot be observed between a neutral and cooperative framing 
when holding end constant. Notably, average transfers drop to M=0.37 in the 
high/cooperative-condition, revealing the lowest average level of trust in the sample (table 8): 
Table 8: Conditional mean of reltrust within experimental treatment groups 
Treatment / Level 
                     Context 
Neutral Cooperative 
Incentives 
Low    (7€) 0.47 (0.29) 0.50 (0.35) 
High   (40€) 0.40 (0.31) 0.37 (0.32) 
Note: Table presents means of reltrust conditional on treatment factors. Standard deviations in brackets. 
The data also point towards a common result in experimental trust research: a difference be-
tween male and female participants in the levels of trust. The conditional mean of reltrust 
drops from M=0.47 for males to M=0.41 for females (see table 7). However, this difference is 
not significant across conditions (WRT, Z=1.1, p=0.27). At the same time, the relative trans-
fers of male participants show significantly more variation than the responses of females 
(Levene´s robust test, F(1, 296)=14.91, p<0.001). Overall, some effect of gender seems to be 
present in the data, weakly confirming other results, but the sample presents merely a congru-
ent “tendency” and the tests do not corroborate gender effects with sufficient certainty.  
Concerning the effect of an ongoing partnership on the level of reltrust, the data do not pro-
vide any evidence that there is a difference between single and non-single subjects (WRT, Z=-
0.04, p=0.97). The inclusion of the variable partner was initially based on the hypothesis that 
relationship status affects the chronic accessibility of trust-related frames and scripts. The ef-
fect of relationship status may transpire only indirectly via its influence on the trustscale and 
recscale variables. In fact, there is a marginally significant difference between single 
(M=0.59, SD=0.12) and non-single (M=0.56, SD=0.14) subjects in the measure of trustscale 
(two-sided t-test, t(296)=1.77, p=0.077).
14
 Surprisingly, chronic frame accessibility is lower 
for subjects being currently engaged in a relationship. It is hard to assess the substantial mean-
ing of this result. As speculated by Ermisch et al. (2009), single subjects might have a greater 
incentive for interaction with strangers and therefore develop an overall more positive attitude 
of generalized interpersonal trust. However, this does not translate into an overall main effect 
on reltrust. On the other hand, there is no effect of being in a relationship on chronic script 
accessibility. The conditional means of recscale do not differ between low reciprocity 
                                                 
14 The t-test was used in this instance because trustscale is sufficiently normally distributed. 
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(M=0.69, SD=0.09) and high reciprocity subgroups (M=0.67, SD=0.09; two-sided t-test, 
t(296)=1.25, p=0.21). Overall, the effect of partner is negligible. 
6.5. Analyzing Trust 
6.5.1. Model Specification 
The preceding descriptive analysis of the experimental data is well-suited to assess the basic 
tendencies and major characteristics of the sample. But its informative value is limited in test-
ing the model of trust and adaptive rationality. For one, it is necessary to pay attention to in-
teractive effects between threshold-parameters when analyzing the data. This is difficult to 
accomplish using discrete mean comparisons and one-parameter tests. Most importantly, the 
separate testing of higher-order interactions and main effects using discrete tests drastically 
increases the number of necessary tests to be performed, increasing the overall type-1-error 
probability. A multiple test is advisable. Second, the use of dichotomizations for continuous 
variables is rarely justified. In fact, a common side-effect of transforming continuous varia-
bles into binary dichotomies for statistical inference is a loss of information, statistical power, 
and the potential introduction of artifacts; it is inferior to the use of continuous quantitative 
data which are preferable whenever within reach (Cohen 1983, McCallum 2002).  
Therefore, the following analyses will make use of multiple regression techniques to analyze 
the joint effect of independent variables on reltrust. In order to estimate and test the interac-
tion patterns which were derived in chapter 6.3.3, the mode-selection threshold parameters 
will be fed into a linear regression model that explains the expected value of reltrust, the rela-
tive transfer of the trustor, as a function of experimental treatment conditions, chronic acces-
sibility measures and their interactions, holding constant any other parameters for which a 
measure was elicited. Note that, even with the present data, the analysis can only cover a par-
tial test of the model of trust and adaptive rationality. The most obvious reason for this limita-
tion is that, as the number of varying parameters increases, the interaction patterns (1) become 
increasingly complex and (2) their analysis requires a large sample size in order to provide a 
sufficient amount of observations across cells. In section 6.3.3, interaction patterns have been 
derived for aj, the chronic accessibility of a trust-related script, situational cues oi and cogni-
tive motivation U. Using these parameters, a linear model can be specified as:  
(1) E(reltrust|x) = xβ + e = β0 + β1*end + β2*frame + β3*recscale + β4*end*frame + 
β5*frame*recscale + β6*end*recscale+ β7*end*frame*recscale + trustscale + controls 
+ e  
All independent variables were discussed and introduced above. The variable trustscale is in-
troduced into the model to hold constant its influence on the activation weight while analyzing 
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the remaining parameters. Moreover, the measures of “faith in intuition” and “need for cogni-
tion” will be added to the set of control variables, as discussed in section 6.1.5.  
Using chronic accessibility ai of a trust-related frame instead to specify a second model, the 
predicted interaction patterns do not change, since the effects of ai and aj on the value of the 
mode-selection threshold are identical. Thus a second model can be specified by interchang-
ing trustscale and recscale in all of the above terms: 
(2) E(reltrust|x) = xβ+e = β0 + β1*end + β2*frame + β3*trustscale+ β4*end*frame + 
β5*frame*trustscale+ β6*end*trustscale+ β7*end*frame*trustscale+ recscale + con-
trols + e  
This analysis can also be adapted to analyze the joint effect of the parameters which define the 
match, holding the effect of cognitive motivation constant. In other words, both trustscale and 
recscale will be varied across framing conditions. In this case, a third linear model can be 
specified as: 
(3) E(reltrust|x) = xβ + e = β0 + β1* frame + β2*trustscale + β3*recscale + 
β4*trustscale*frame + β5*frame*recscale + β6*trustscale*recscale+ β7*trustscale 
*frame*recscale + end + controls + e  
Hypotheses for this model have not been analytically derived here, but this can be done simi-
lar to the procedure discussed in Appendix C. Principally, note that all three parameters which 
vary in the third model specification (chronic frame accessibility, chronic script accessibility, 
and situational cues oi) are located on the left-hand side of the mode-selection threshold and 
jointly define the activation weight. While each of the parameters is predicted to have a posi-
tive simple main effect, the joint interaction patterns and the direction of the predicted sign of 
the higher-order interactions once more depend on the question of necessity versus sufficiency 
in “tipping over” the threshold. All three model specifications will be estimated in the next 
section. 
Since the dependent variable (the relative transfer decisions in the investment game) is con-
tinuous, several methods can be applied to estimate the models. A common approach in trust 
research is to analyze the data using OLS on raw scores (e.g. Croson & Buchan 1999, Glaeser 
et al. 2000, Ashraf et al. 2006, Bohnet & Baytelman 2007, among others). But in the context 
of experiments, which often involve a relatively low number of observations, both the pres-
ence of outliers and the (potentially non-normal) distribution of the dependent variable pose 
an imminent threat to the plausibility of OLS and its underlying assumptions. To account for 
distributional concerns and circumvent problems arising from heteroskedasticity, robust error 
variance estimates are usually computed when using OLS estimates. Several authors have also 
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used robust and weighted-least squares regression techniques to alleviate the influence of out-
liers (Ben-Ner & Putterman 2009, Johnson & Mislin 2011).  
However, when using OLS to estimate proportions (i.e. reltrust, the relative amount sent), one 
caveat is that predictions are not guaranteed to fall inside the unit interval. In addition, the ef-
fect of explanatory variables on the predicted mean, unless they are fairly limited in their 
range, cannot truly be linear (Wooldridge 2002: 668). An alternative approach commonly tak-
en in trust research to deal with the presence of “corner solution responses” is to estimate To-
bit models (e.g. Fehr & List 2004, Buchan et al. 2008, Charness et al. 2008, Garbarino & Slo-
nim 2009). The choice of a trusting act, expressed as a relative proportion, is limited to the 
[0,1] interval, and therefore bounded from below and above. Two-limit tobit models can ap-
propriately deal with pileups at the endpoints of this distribution (Wooldridge 2002: 703f.), 
which are readily observed in the present sample as well. However, while Tobit models rest 
on identical assumptions about error distributions as OLS models, they are much more vul-
nerable to violations of those (and additional) assumptions (Maddala 1991). Data from trust 
experiments often involves observations at the fringes of the distribution. But in the case of an 
investment game context, negative values are logically implausible, because the choice of a 
trusting act is naturally bounded at a “zero” of distrust. Likewise, the trustor cannot more than 
“fully” trust, and the upper bound of one is also a natural bound, and not an effect of real cen-
soring or truncation. At least from a logical, as opposed to a statistical standpoint, the justifi-
cation of Tobit models is somewhat limited. This recommends a check with other robust esti-
mation procedures. 
Johnson and Mislin (2011) have recently proposed to use generalized linear models (GLM) to 
estimate decisions in the investment game context. Based on the work of Papke and 
Wooldridge (1996, see also Wooldridge 2002: 748ff.), they model the fractional response y, 
that is, the proportion or relative amount sent (reltrust), as: 
(1) E(y|x)  
   
     
 = g(xβ), or ln(
    
      
  = g-1(xβ) = xβ + e         (logistic link function) 
(2) Var(y|x) = σhat
2 
* g(xβ) / (1-g(xβ))             (robust binomial variance function) 
(3) LL(β) ≡ ∑ yi  *ln(g(xiβ)) + (1-yi) ln(1-g(xiβ))          (quasi log-likelihood function) 
The link function relates the linear predictor xβ to the predicted values using the non-linear 
logistic function, which (1) ensures that the fitted values will be in the unit interval and (2) 
can accommodate for potential non-linearity towards the “corners” of the distribution. The 
results cannot be directly compared to OLS/Tobit regression, because the coefficients express 
the effect of a unit change on the log odds of the dependent variable. But in the present analy-
sis, even when the coefficients are not directly comparable, so are the signs and the interaction 
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patterns that emerge from the estimations, and the GLM approach can provide statistical ro-
bustness-support to the other methods used. 
In the following, when testing a particular model, Tobit, robust and GLM methods will be 
computed to verify the overall robustness of the particular specification under scrutiny. The 
robust procedure is based on a version of weighted least squares regression in which observa-
tions are iteratively re-weighted using calculated Cook´s D and residual values until the model 
converges to a stable estimate in which highly influential data points are downweighted, so as 
to alleviate their biasing influence on the parameter estimates. This is preferred to using sim-
ple OLS models, which are highly sensitive to influential data points, in particular when the 
number of observations is low. Non-parametric bootstrapping (2000 replications) will be used 
to address concerns about the non-normal distribution of reltrust and obtain robust variance 
estimates and confidence intervals. Any omitted alternative result, if not reported, can be 
found in Appendix A.  
Another methodological note is in place at this point. The model specifications derived above 
demand the calculation of higher-order interactions. Concerning their statistical analysis, one 
concern that has been raised in the methodological literature is that interaction terms are often 
highly correlated to the lower-order terms by which they were formed (Cohen & Cohen 1983, 
Cronbach 1987, Aiken & West 1991). As a result, the interactions are closely related to the 
lower-order terms (“spurious multicollinearity”). The issue here is that, as multicollinearity 
increases (1) the predictors may explain an impressive amount of variance of the dependent 
variable whilst none of them is significantly different from zero, (2) the regressions may be 
unstable (“bouncing beta weights”), and (3) computation of the statistical models may be im-
possible. In essence, multicollinearity indicates that the information present in the data is in-
sufficient to correctly allocate the variance of the dependent variable to the predictors, and it 
makes it difficult to distinguish the separate effects of the linear and interaction terms. 
A variety of methods have been proposed in the literature to remedy this state of affairs in in-
teraction analysis. Following the suggestions of Cohen (1978) and Aiken and West (1991), a 
frequently adopted solution is the “mean centering” of the lower-order terms before compu-
ting the interactions. As these authors have demonstrated, mean-centering can reduce the cor-
relations between the linear- and interaction terms, and it often improves diagnostic measures 
of collinearity, such as the variance inflation factors (VIFs). Mean-centering also entails a se-
cond advantage in that the lower-order terms and constant can be interpreted as representing 
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then the conditional effects holding other variables constant at their mean. As it is, the practice 
of mean centering has become a standard and routine in the social sciences.
15
  
However, more recent theoretical and empirical work has questioned whether mean-centering 
can remedy the problem of spurious multicollinearity (Kromrey & Foster-Johnson 1998, 
Echambadi & Hess 2007, Shieh 2011). As analytically demonstrated by Shieh (2011), mean-
centering can also result in the adverse effect of increasing multicollinearity among the pre-
dictors. More generally speaking, mean centering “does not change the computational preci-
sion of parameters, the sampling accuracy of main effects, simple effects, interaction effects, 
nor the R
2” (Echambadi & Hess 2007: 438, a conclusion that they also reach analytically). 
Overall, mean-centering does not substantially change the results of statistical tests of the in-
teraction terms, and it is, if at all, advised by researchers for interpretational purposes (Jaccard 
& Turrisi 2003: 27f.). However, the “scaling argument” for better interpretability of the data 
does not apply in the present case: as it is, uncentered data provide a constant and conditional 
effects that pertain to the effect of a subject with “zero” accessibility; the estimated interac-
tions pertain to the effect of increasing accessibility. Since the continuous measures are scaled 
to [0,1], these differences can be readily interpreted as the contrast between zero and “full” 
accessibility subjects. They are even more informative than the differences from the “average” 
subject of the sample, which a mean-centering procedure would yield. 
An alternative method to deal with issues of multicollinearity that will be adopted here is that 
of residual centering (Lance 1988, Little et al. 2006), or “orthogonalization.” The higher-order 
terms are first regressed on their lower-order constituents, and the empirical residuals of this 
regression are then used to act as the “true” and uncorrelated interaction term in the final 
model, containing only that part of variation which is not linearly related to the lower-order 
terms. As a note of caution, Echambadi et al. (2006) have shown that residual centering, while 
it validly assesses the true interaction effects, can lead to inconsistent estimates of the linear 
main effects. Thus, there is no “all-in-one” solution to address multicollinearity issues when 
analyzing interactions. In the following, we will make use of a combination of methods to as-
sess the overall robustness of the particular models, relying both on residual-centered and un-
centered regression estimates to tackle any potential issue of multicollinearity.
16
  
                                                 
15 Another procedure is to use standardized variables to construct interactions. However, the standardization of main effect 
variables has another considerable impact on estimates because it involves a stochastic scaling adjustment which itself is 
subject to sampling error (the empirical standard deviation estimate). This can lead to wrong standard error and biased co-
efficient estimates. There are also additional issues of interpretation, which need not be discussed here. In general, re-
searchers recommend against the use of this procedure (e.g. Aiken & West 1991: 42f.; Jaccard & Turrisi 2003: 68). 
16 In line with Little et al. (2006), a general empirical result of residual centering is a significant reduction of multicollinearity 
measures, such as the coefficient VIFs. While they were passing traditional benchmarks in a number of unorthogonal 
models (i.e. VIF >10 for the interaction terms), this was not the case in the orthogonal models, where none of the coeffi-
cients exceeded VIF>2.5 with exception of the three-way interaction term (the VIFs for the third-order interaction were 
passing beyond the benchmark of VIF>10 even after orthogonalization in most models).  
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6.5.2. Chronic Frame and Script Accessibility 
To begin the test of the model of adaptive rationality, the three model specifications will be 
analyzed using multiple regression methods in the following. Focusing first on the influence 
of chronic script accessibility, model specification (1) is estimated and presented in table 9. In 
order to provide a direct assessment of robustness to the reader, the results of all three estima-
tion methods are presented. Each model was computed separately with and without control 
variables. Since recscale and trustscale are scaled to the unit interval, the higher-order interac-
tions can assume values larger than one – this is a pure scaling effect and does not carry any 
substantial meaning. 
Table 9: Trust and chronic script accessibility 
Variable 
 
Tobit 
 
Robust 
 
GLM1) 
end  -0.891** -0.936**  -0.736** -0.771**  -3.197** -3.366**  
 
 (-2.31) (-2.39)  (-2.34) (-2.33)  (-2.31) (-2.31)    
frame  0.084 0.007  0.094 0.046  0.401 0.129 
 
 (0.19) (0.02)  (0.23) (0.11)  (0.27) (0.08) 
recscale  0.0741 0.151  0.084 0.155  0.328 0.554 
 
 (0.2) (0.36)  (0.25) (0.41)  (0.25) (0.37) 
end*rec  1.184** 1.253**  0.937** 1.001**  4.168** 4.427**  
 
 (2.05) (2.15)  (1.99) (2.03)  (2.05) (2.07) 
frame*rec  -0.077 0.042  -0.109 -0.035  -0.456 -0.039 
 
 (-0.12) (0.06)  (-0.18) (-0.06)  (-0.21) (-0.02)    
end*frame  1.143* 1.179*  0.926* 0.857+  3.777* 3.841*   
 
 (1.73) (1.84)  (1.65) (1.53)  (1.66) (1.65) 
end*frame*rec  -1.778* -1.820*  -1.437* -1.336+  -5.864* -5.960*   
 
 (-1.83) (-1.93)  (-1.76) (-1.63)  (-1.77) (-1.76)    
trustscale  0.399** 0.310+  0.352** 0.281*  1.345** 1.118+   
  (2.08) (1.46)  (2.31) (1.67)  (2.16) (1.63) 
constant  0.203 0.187  0.219 0.207  -1.072 -1.218 
 
 (-0.71) (-0.54)  (-0.89) (-0.7)  (-1.10) (-0.99)    
Pseudo R2 (ps. LL)  0.051 0.084  0.07 0.11  (-157.8) (-155.18) 
Wald (full model)  20.66*** 36.28***  27.22*** 44.05***  20.04*** 33.76*** 
χ2 Improvement (4df)  8.4*  7.9*  9.12*  7.38+   8.17*  7.23+  
Control variables  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. 1) Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The three methods provide a consistent picture of the interaction pattern emerging from the 
first model specification. Moreover, when computing the residual-centered, orthogonalized 
models to assess the robustness of the interactions and ensure against spurious multicollineari-
ty, the results are identical to those obtained above (see Appendix A). Overall, this provides a 
great deal of confidence that the results tap on a substantial relation among predictors and in-
dependent variables and not on statistical artifacts of some sort. 
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The estimated interaction pattern is matching with predicted interaction pattern number two 
(see section 6.3.3), which admits a negative three-way interaction and a positive two-way in-
teraction of end*frame, as well as end*rec. In other words, when varying chronic script acces-
sibility and the experimental factors, those variables working in opposition to cognitive moti-
vation (high accessibility or a cooperative framing condition) have each been sufficient to re-
duce the negative effect of high initial endowments on unconditional trust. The negative three-
way interaction is reaching marginal conventional statistical significance in all models (for 
example, t=-1.93, p=0.054 in model 2). The joint contribution of the four interaction terms is 
acceptable and improving model fit, as compared to a situation in which they are assumed to 
be zero (Wald tests between χ2 (4) =9.12, p=0.058 in model 3 and χ2 (4) =7.23, p=0.1224 in 
model 6).17 A direct comparison of the estimated coefficients between the Tobit and robust 
regression methods reveals that the Tobit slopes are steeper, potentially reflecting the differ-
ence in how the models deal with the corner solutions present in the data. None of the control 
variables has a noticeable effect on the level of reltrust (see Appendix A), and their introduc-
tion does not substantially change the results. 
Most importantly, the models uncover a negative incentive effect which is counterbalanced by 
high script accessibility. This effect is present in the neutral framing condition. In other words, 
trustors in fact trust less and switch to conditional trusting strategies when the “stakes are 
high,” but this effect can be overrun by high chronic accessibility of a trust-related script. On-
ly those subjects scoring low on the norm of reciprocity scale do in fact respond to the incen-
tive treatment as expected under main hypothesis H4a. With increasing norm internalization, 
the negative effect of instrumental incentives on cognitive motivation diminishes. This lends 
support to hypothesis H8 (and qualifying H4a), stating that the effect of cognitive motivation 
is mediated by chronic script accessibility. The result adds an interesting twist to the experi-
mental-economic investigation of “stake size” effects (Camerer & Hogarth 1999): as suggest-
ed by the model of adaptive rationality, they cannot be appropriately accounted for without 
regard to relevant frames and scripts, because a high internalization (of norms, roles, rules, 
routines etc.) may fully suppress such incentive effects. This is what can be observed in the 
neutral framing condition. The model also uncovers a strong and significant effect of trust-
related frames (trustscale) when estimating model specification (1). 
At the same time, incentive effects are no longer present in the cooperative framing condition, 
as indicated by the negative three-way interaction and the positive two-way interaction of 
                                                 
17 Testing the null-hypothesis of a joint zero effect of the higher-order interactions when the frame accessibility measure 
(trustscale) and controls are excluded improves the test´s results and does not change the predicted interaction pattern. In 
this case, both the Tobit and robust regressions estimates deliver a Wald-test on the joint effect of the interaction terms 
which predicts a non-zero effect with p<0.05 (results omitted). 
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end*frame. Principally, the models lend support to hypothesis H9, according to which the co-
operative framing condition increases the activation weights of trust-related frames and scripts 
and mediates the impact of incentives and motivation on the degree of rationality during in-
terpretation and choice. That is, a switch to conditional trusting strategies in the face of high 
stakes can also be prevented by a cooperative framing of the trust problem, and by a presence 
of situational cues which indicate the validity and appropriateness of a corresponding frame or 
script. This finding is important insofar as it suggests that “context” and “incentive structure” 
do not influence the definition of the situation completely independent of each other, even 
when this assumption is regularly made in experimental economic and social-psychological 
research. What is more, the three-way interaction between chronic accessibility, situational 
cues and incentives supports hypothesis H10, stating higher-order interactions between all pa-
rameters. The estimated interaction pattern also conforms to one of the predicted interaction 
patterns. To further aid the interpretation of the statistical results, the following figure shows 
the predicted levels of reltrust for the neutral and cooperative framing conditions, separated 
by high and low initial endowments (figure 23):
18
  
Figure 23: Predicted level of reltrust across experimental treatments  
 
Focusing on the neutral framing condition, as presented in the graph on the left of figure 23, a 
difference in the predicted level of trust between the low- and high incentive treatment is 
                                                 
18 The graphs have been constructed using the predicted values and standard errors from a Tobit model estimating model 
specification (1) without control variables and using a two-sided type-1-error probability of σ=0.10. 
0
.5
1
.4 .6 .8 1 .4 .6 .8 1
neutral cooperative
low incentives high incentives
re
lt
ru
s
t
recscale
291 
 
clearly visible. Adding confidence intervals around the predicted mean, it is apparent that the 
level of trust significantly drops with high initial endowments for subjects scoring in the bot-
tom range of recscale. This incentive effect disappears with increasing chronic script accessi-
bility, and in the upper range of recscale, it is not present anymore. In contrast, when focusing 
on the cooperative framing condition, as depicted in the right graph of figure 23, no such in-
centive effect is visible in the lower range of recscale, indicating that the cooperative framing 
has been equally sufficient in suppressing incentive effects for low accessibility subjects. In 
fact, the predicted levels of reltrust do not significantly differ between incentive conditions 
over the whole range of chronic script accessibility, as indicated by the confidence bounds.  
At the same time, the models predict a negative slope for recscale in the cooperative framing 
condition when the “stakes are high.” This finding contradicts hypothesis H7, according to 
which the effect of situational cues on the activation weight varies positively with chronic 
frame- and script-accessibility (and vice versa). As stated in H7, context effects should be 
more pronounced for high-accessibility subjects. In the present data, high accessibility sub-
jects do not react to the framing treatment with relatively more trust, whereas low accessibility 
subjects do. Comparing between framing conditions and holding incentives constant, a small 
level effect of neutral versus cooperative framing is visible in the low endowment conditions; 
but the positive relation between reltrust and recscale is reversed with high initial endow-
ments. It is important to keep in mind that the models test the overall interaction pattern 
emerging from the data, and not exclusive separate main- or interaction effects. As it is, inter-
action pattern number 2 predicts recscale*frame to have a coefficient that is smaller or equal 
to zero, which is what we observe in the regression results.  
As reported in the descriptive statistics, the average level of reltrust in the high/cooperative 
condition (M=0.37) is the lowest of all four factorial constellations, and it is particularly low 
when compared to the conditional mean in the low/cooperative condition (M=0.50). Even 
when the differences in trust appear to be insignificant from a comparison of means and their 
confidence intervals, as based on the multiple regression models, a simple test of conditional 
means within the cooperative framing condition finds that reltrust is lower in the high incen-
tive condition (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z=2.297, p=0.022).
19
 Thus, the predicted 
negative slope is probably more than a statistical artifact from the estimations and points to-
wards a more substantial finding that warrants explanation. 
                                                 
19 This result could also be addressed in terms of random sampling error. Concerning this possibility, note that the observed 
mean differences between high- and low endowments in the cooperative framing are large and result in an estimated total 
effect size of d=0.41. Given that the Wilcoxon rank-sum test referred to above was conducted using a two-sided type-1-
error confidence level of α=0.05, it is very unlikely that the rejection of the null-hypothesis was made erroneously, even 
when we cannot exclude this alternative with certainty. 
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The finding that context and incentive structure interact is not surprising. It is a direct implica-
tion of the model of adaptive rationality. The results conform to the predictions made in ge-
neric dual-processing approaches, which suggest a decreasing influence of chronically acces-
sible knowledge with increasing situational strength, and vice versa (Mayerl 2010: 42). More 
generally speaking, the DP models predict accessibility effects of primed constructs (Higgins 
1996). This is what we observe in low-accessibility subjects: in the face of high initial en-
dowments and cooperative cues, but in the lack of an internal regulative script, they respond 
to the trust problem by using the contextual information to adjust their trusting strategy. This 
might be termed a “mere priming-effect” (the analysis of decision times further helps us to 
understand the observed behavior in terms of controlled versus automatic processing, see be-
low). On the other hand, high accessibility subjects are sensible to whether or not a coopera-
tive framing is presented in conjunction with high- or low initial endowments, and from the 
results, one cannot exclude the possibility that they switch to conditional trusting strategies in 
the high/cooperative condition. In fact, a simple test of central tendency reveals a significant 
drop in reltrust for the high accessibility subgroup between endowments in the cooperative 
framing condition (WRT, Z=1.978, p=0.0479), while no such effect can be found for low ac-
cessibility subjects (WRT, Z=1.245, p=0.2133). 
One plausible explanation for this finding is that high accessibility subjects, in contrast to low 
accessibility subjects, experience a “mismatch” in that a cooperative context and high initial 
endowments collide. This does not imply that high endowments produce a separate symbolic 
cue independent of the framing condition for all subjects. If this was the case, then the 
high/neutral condition would not reveal the neutralizing effect of chronic script accessibility, 
and a consistent negative incentive effect across all framing conditions and for all accessibility 
groups would be observed. In contrast, the data indicate that a “mismatch” is contingent upon 
being high in chronic accessibility, so that an attribution of symbolic meaning to the “cue” of 
high endowments, if at all, has been made by trustors in the high accessibility group only. But 
are there any theoretical arguments that support such an assertion? 
To begin with, it is unlikely that the chronic accessibility of frames and scripts does not influ-
ence other parameters of the mode-selection threshold. But this is implied in the current MFS 
formalization by treating the effect of “external” sources of variation, such as the presence of 
situational cues oi, as independent from accessibility, and vice versa.
20
 A consistent finding in 
social-psychological research is that chronically accessible knowledge structures can also in-
                                                 
20 According to Kroneberg (2011: 130), the parameter of situational cures oi is an objective measure of the presence (or non-
presence) of significant situational objects, which indicate the appropriateness of a particular frame in the current situation.  
One important assumption here is that “significance” can be objectively ascribed (given that frames are socially shared 
and “objectified,” including shared definitions of significant cues which indicate their appropriateness). The following ar-
gument opens up the interesting question of whether “significance” can ever be objectively identified  independently of 
perceiver characteristics. 
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voke implicit goal-setting (Bargh et al. 1996, Aarts & Dijksterhuis 2000). One of the earliest 
demonstrations of such automatic motivational effects is the finding of a heightened “perceiv-
er readiness,” that is, of a selective perception of, and attention to, cues which are related to 
the chronically accessible constructs (Higgins et al. 1982, Bargh & Pratto 1986). While the 
model of frame selection models a one-way causal path from cues to activation weights, treat-
ing oi as an “external” source of variation in the threshold, one can argue that oi = oi(ai, aj), 
that is, the subjective presence of significant situational cues which actors perceive is also a 
function of chronic accessibility. In effect, this implies selective perception, attention, and 
perceiver readiness. Note that this cannot be covered in the link li between knowledge and ob-
jects either, as this parameter describes an invariant property of stored knowledge structures, 
related to the strength of the symbolic relation between objects and cues. Thus, it could be 
possible that low-accessibility subjects are not selectively attentive to the cooperative cues of 
the context (even when this subgroup can use the cues in the sense of “temporary accessibil-
ity” and priming), while this is the case for high-accessibility subjects.  
Secondly, if the activation of trust-related frames and scripts does not only rely on the pres-
ence and appropriateness of relevant significant situational cues, but also on the absence of 
distractions, a “mismatch” can arise if the generalized trust-related frames and scripts do not 
unconditionally extend to high-cost situations per se, and if high initial endowments represent 
a nuisance to a “favorable” subjective definition of the situation, once adopted. Note that the 
visual cues and neutral/cooperative wording manipulations were presented before presenting 
the investment game instructions, and therefore before presenting the incentive manipulation. 
This specific design-feature was implemented because the general instructions referred to 
“other” participants already. To keep a consistent terminology throughout the experiment, the 
wording manipulation (Partner/Team versus Participant/Group) was already used from the 
very beginning of the experiment. Assuming that the framing manipulation was successful (as 
indicated by the behavior of low accessibility subjects), and assuming that the activation of a 
trust-related frame by high-accessibility trustors directs selective attention towards confirming 
and disconfirming cues, a “high cost cue” could have presented a threat to their pre-
established subjective definition of the situation. High initial endowments then would acquire 
a symbolic meaning of nuisance for high accessibility subjects, indicating the invalidity of the 
currently adopted frame to them, but not affecting the low accessibility group.  
In fact, alternative specifications of the match (Esser 2001: 269ff., Stocké 2002: 127ff.) have 
been proposed in which the absence of situational nuisances, distractions and interruptions has 
been included as a separate and independent factor determining the match, such that mi = ai * 
oi * e, where ei [0,1] describes the absence of nuisance. If high endowments have presented a 
nuisance (the analysis of decisions times in the next chapter supports this assertion), then we 
need to conclude that the framing manipulation had an unexpected effect for high-
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accessibility subjects, but we can also extract information and draw important conclusions 
from this observation, in that the current experimental data support alternative formulations of 
the match which can accommodate for separate effects of (1) significant situational objects 
and (2) situational nuisances. This issue will be further scrutinized when exploring subgroups 
of the sample and analyzing decision times. 
Focusing now on the effect of chronic frame accessibility and its interactive effects on 
reltrust, the regressions using model specification (2) establish a different result. Principally, 
while a simple main effect of trustscale can be found when analyzing a model without interac-
tions, no interaction pattern can be estimated with sufficient statistical certainty in the full in-
teractive models. None of the coefficients is interpretable, and neither the introduction of con-
trol variables nor the computation of orthogonal models substantially changes this result (table 
10, omitted results reported in Appendix A): 
Table 10: Trust and chronic frame accessibility 
Variable (1) Tobit (2) Tobit (3) Tobit (4) Robust (5) GLM1) 
end -0.124*** 0.143 0.089 -0.095 -0.114 
 
(-2.71) (0.43) (0.26) (-0.34) (-0.10) 
frame -0.001 0.171 0.167 0.026 0.404 
 
(-0.03) (0.43) (0.42) (0.07) (0.32) 
trustscale 0.418** 0.491 0.433 0.232 1.121 
 
(2.17) (1.43) (1.2) (0.76) (0.95) 
end*frame 
 
-0.517 -0.339 -0.123 -1.067 
  
(-1.02) (-0.66) (-0.28) (-0.64) 
end*trustscale 
 
-0.393 -0.301 0.001 -0.392 
  
(-0.71) (-0.54) (0) (-0.21) 
frame*trustscale 
 
-0.249 -0.231 0.001 -0.517 
  
(-0.37) (-0.34) (0) (-0.24) 
end*frame*trust. 
 
0.77 0.483 0.122 1.444 
  
(0.9) (0.56) (0.17) (0.52) 
recscale 0.167 0.167 0.296 0.292 1.066 
 (0.69) (0.68) (1.01) (1.15) (1.04) 
constant 0.145 0.089 0.004 0.0981 -1.675+ 
 
(0.7) (0.33) (0.01) (0.35) (-1.50) 
Pseudo R2 (ps. LL) 0.028 0.032 0.065 0.095 (-156.54) 
Wald (full model) 10.93** 13.75* 22.31* 29.15***     22.4**         
χ2 Improvement (4 df) - 1.54  0.75  0.55 0.81  
Control Variables? No No Yes Yes Yes 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. 1) Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The first column assesses main effects only. It predicts a negative main effect of the endow-
ment treatment (t=-2.71, p=0.007) and a positive main effect of chronic frame accessibility 
(t=-2.17, p=0.03) on the observed level of trust, holding recscale constant. No effect of the 
framing treatment can be found. With respect to main effect hypotheses, this lends support to 
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hypotheses H1 and H4a, but none to H3. That is, (1) unconditional trusting strategies are more 
likely with higher chronic accessibility of a trust-related frame, (2) increasing cognitive moti-
vation via initial endowments pushes behavior towards the distrust equilibrium, indicating a 
prevalence of conditional trusting strategies, but (3) the framing of the trust problem does not 
exhibit any detectable main effect. The coefficient of trustscale is similar to the one obtained 
in the first model specification. Since trustscale is limited to the unit interval, its coefficient 
expresses the difference between a hypothetical zero and a “full” chronic frame accessibility 
subject. The predicted difference in reltrust between zero- and full frame-accessibility is con-
siderable with about a 40 per cent difference.  
The model in the second column assesses the interaction pattern emerging from the interplay 
between initial endowments, framing condition and chronic frame accessibility. While the 
overall explanatory power of the model seems to be weakly better than that of a null-model 
(χ2 (7) =13.75, p=0.085, Tobit regression), the inclusion of the interaction terms adds no ex-
planatory power to the model (χ2 (4) =1.54, p=0.81), and the test cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the interaction terms are jointly zero. Overall, the model and coefficients are not inter-
pretable. This result does not change when including control variables (column 3). Neither 
append, age, sex, partner, fiscale or nfcscale have an effect that is estimated anywhere near 
statistical certainty. We observe similar results when using a robust regression method (col-
umn 4) or when estimating the model specification with the GLM approach (column 5). The 
only marked difference arising from computing the residual-centered and orthogonalized 
models is that a negative main effect of the initial endowment condition is now consistently 
estimated, revealing a significant 11 per cent decrease in reltrust across framing conditions. 
This difference corresponds to the empirical raw mean difference between endowment condi-
tions. All other coefficients remain insignificant (see Appendix A).  
There are several potential explanations to help us understand this result. On the one hand, the 
effects captured in trustscale and emanating from the chronic accessibility of a trust-related 
frame may simply be very weak because what we actually observe in the experiment is a 
choice, and not interpretation. Thus, any effect of chronic frame accessibility might have al-
ready played out its part before actions are observed. Then, the variable trustscale would be 
less important to modeling the observed choice of a trusting act. As suggested by the model of 
trust and adaptive rationality, the mode-selection threshold in the stage of action selection is 
tied to more stringent conditions. An important determinant of action selection is chronic 
script accessibility, which comes into play only after the stage of interpretation has been com-
pleted. On top of that, the norm of reciprocity is a highly regulative script. Thus, model speci-
fication (2) might tap on effects which are too weak and too small in effect size to be reliably 
detected by the current data set and a limited number of observations. In fact, trustscale was 
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found to exert a significant influence when estimating model specification (1), where the fo-
cus was on the interplay between script accessibility and experimental treatments. 
On the other hand, trustscale might interact with recscale in determining the match, as sug-
gested by model specification (3). If this is the case, and if script accessibility is equally im-
portant in determining action, then the above model could simply be insufficiently specified 
and important variables are omitted. Furthermore, it may be that the observations are hetero-
geneous in their response to the framing treatment, depending on other unobserved character-
istics. Thus, similar to a neglect of recscale, other variables might influence the interaction 
pattern in a way that prevents the model from capturing the true effect of trustscale. Lastly, 
the measure of generalized trust, as captured in the short version of the “Interpersonal Trust 
Inventory” (Kassebaum 2004), might simply not provide a relevant frame for the experimental 
setting. While a partial answer to this issue can be given when analyzing model specification 
(3), an alternative specification that explores the possibility of subgroup heterogeneity will be 
explored in section 6.7. Suffice it to say at this point that the third possibility, a complete ir-
relevance of trust frames, is not supported by the data. 
Model specification (3) addresses the joint effect of chronic frame and script accessibility and 
situational cues on the activation weight, holding the effects of cognitive motivation constant. 
Since we now introduce interactions between two continuous variables that are scaled to the 
unit interval, the magnitude of coefficients can become much larger, but this again is a mere 
scaling effect. Estimating model specification (3) reveals following results (table 11): 
Table 11: Trust and the activation weight components 
Variable 
 Uncentered 
 
Orthogonal 
 Tobit Robust GLM1) 
 
Tobit Robust GLM1) 
frame  -2.398 -1.471 -6.44 
 
-0.004 -0.01 -0.022 
 
 (-1.26) (-0.95) (-0.97)    
 
(-0.09) (-0.27) (-0.14)    
trustscale  -4.110** -2.723* -11.46+   
 
0.421** 0.382*** 1.441**  
 
 (-2.01) (-1.83) (-1.64)    
 
(-2.15) (-2.59) (-2.27) 
recscale  -2.996* -1.917+ -8.059 
 
0.167 0.126 0.608 
 
 (-1.71) (-1.46) (-1.34)    
 
(-0.67) (-0.6) (-0.71) 
frame*trustscale  5.206+ 3.364 14.55 
 
-0.028 0.023 -0.01 
 
 (-1.61) (-1.31) (-1.32) 
 
(-0.07) -0.07 (-0.01)    
frame*recscale  3.547 2.13 9.427 
 
-0.991** -0.831** -3.316**  
 
 (-1.3) (-0.96) (-0.99) 
 
(-2.06) (-2.00) (-1.97)    
trustscale*recscale  6.545** 4.432** 18.54*   
 
2.987 1.63 5.329 
 
 (-2.19) (-2) (-1.8) 
 
(-0.98) (-0.69) (-0.54) 
frame*trust.*rec.  -7.726* -4.933 -21.47 
 
-1.493 0.74 0.512 
 
 (-1.65) (-1.34) (-1.35)    
 
(-0.30) (-0.18) (-0.03) 
end  -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.470*** 
 
-0.120** -0.126*** -0.461*** 
 
 (-2.60) (-2.98) (-2.92)    
 
(-2.56) (-3.10) (-2.93)    
constant  2.349* 1.628* 4.727 
 
0.142 0.184 -1.272*   
 
 (-1.96) (-1.81) (-1.15) 
 
(-0.69) (-1.06) (-1.83)    
Pseudo R2 (ps. LL)  0.0858 0.111 (-155.39) 
 
0.0429 0.0636 (-158.53) 
Wald (full model)  33.31*** 38.13*** 29.11*** 
 
17.63** 23.15*** 17.49** 
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χ2 Improvement (4 df)  7.87* 7.04+ 6.2  5.2 5.11 4.19 
Control Variables?  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. 1) Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
When estimating the third model specification, differences in the regression results can be ob-
served between the three estimation methods. While the Tobit model suggests a considerable 
interplay between all of the activation-weight determinants, this result is estimated with less 
statistical certainty in the robust and GLM approach, even when the predicted signs of the co-
efficients do not differ and the trustscale*recscale interaction remains significant. The magni-
tude of effects is considerably lower in the robust approach. The Wald tests for a joint non-
zero effect of the interaction terms become less supportive, and they are least optimistic in the 
GLM. What is more, in the case of model specification (3), the computation of the orthogo-
nalized models, as presented on the right of table 11, suggests that the correlations between 
the predictors and IV/DV´s may be spurious, and that the uncentered models may suffer from 
biased coefficients and inflated standard errors. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
the uncentered models are biased because the higher-order interactions between the two con-
tinuous measures have introduced spurious multicollinearity. Overall, this warrants caution 
when judging the models. Interpretation of the coefficients in the uncentered model specifica-
tion (3) will not be further pursued here. 
At the same time, the orthogonal models consistently uncover a significant influence of two 
predictor variables. First, the conditional main effect of trustscale is now estimated similarly 
to model specifications (1) and (2), predicting an average difference of about 40 per cent in 
reltrust across endowment and framing conditions for a hypothetical zero versus full frame 
accessibility actor. Thus, even when model specification (2) did not uncover an interactive 
pattern between treatments and trust-related frames, a conditional main effect can be estab-
lished. Second, a negative interaction between frame and recscale is uncovered. This finding 
supports the “mismatch” hypothesis as stated above. Obviously, high chronic script accessibil-
ity subjects trust relatively less in the cooperative framing condition than their low accessibil-
ity counterparts. Including the omitted control variables does not change the results substan-
tially (see Appendix A). Overall, while the standard approach would suggest a considerable 
amount of interplay between the two activation-weight determinants, this result is not stable 
and should be taken with a grain of salt. The orthogonal approach, on the other hand, does not 
add any new information. It more directly reveals the frame*recscale interaction, which the 
previous model specifications have already suggested, and confirms a conditional main effect 
of trustscale. 
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6.5.3. NFC/FI as Mode-Selection Determinants 
Up to this point, the variables nfcscale and fiscale have been held constant and used as control 
variables when analyzing the influence of chronic accessibility measures and their interplay 
with manipulations of the context and the incentive structure of a trust problem. However, 
both constructs can be justified to exert an influence on the mode-selection threshold in their 
own right. We can think of them as further determinants of the mode-selection threshold, even 
when they have not been incorporated directly into the theoretical conceptualization of the 
model of adaptive rationality so far.  
First, the need for cognition (NFC) of the individual actor can be regarded as an individual-
intrinsic, as opposed to situational-extrinsic, aspect of cognitive motivation. A parameter of 
intrinsic cognitive motivation can be easily included in the mode-selection threshold by ex-
tending the model. Assume that the selection of the rational mode does not only incur certain 
processing costs C, but also affords some intrinsic utility Uint which reflects the actor´s prefer-
ence for adopting a rational processing mode and the corresponding “joy of thinking.” Thus, 
in deriving the mode-selection threshold, an additive component Unfc can be introduced that 
counter-balances the inhibitive effect of cognitive processing costs C. Modeling the states of 
the world of the rational mode, the certain consequences of its activation then include 
(C+Unfc) instead of merely C. 
Second, faith in intuition (FI) can be incorporated with a similar extension of the model. As 
noted by Pacini & Epstein, the FI scale was designed to represent the “intuitive-processing 
counterpart” (1999: 973) of the NFC scale. It contains information about the intrinsic utility 
from relying on intuition and captures the preferences that an actor has towards automatic 
processing. Assume that the selection of the automatic mode includes the additive utility 
component Ufi, indicating the constant intrinsic utility stemming from a preference for intui-
tion. Straightforward (but tedious) algebra yields that the Ufi measure will be located at the 
same position as its NFC counterpart with an opposite sign. Thus, the extended version of the 
mode-selection threshold, including processing preferences, and solved here for the automatic 
selection of a frame, can be formulated as: 
mi > 1 – (C + Ufi – Unfc) / (p * (Urc+Cw)) 
This implies that Ufi, the preference for intuitive processing, affects the mode-selection 
threshold in favor of the automatic mode (it works in the same direction as C), while its coun-
terpart Unfc, the need for cognition, does the opposite (it reduces the inhibitory influences of C 
and Ufi). All three terms are derived as additive, implying that either of them can be sufficient 
to exert a “tip-over” influence on the mode-selection threshold. Moreover, this implies that all 
three parameters exert an influence that is independent of each other (for NFC/FI, this propo-
sition has received empirical support, see Epstein et al. 1996, and Pacini & Epstein 1999).  
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As usual, the effect of the threshold parameters is expected to change in interaction with the 
other parameters of the mode-selection threshold (H10). It is straightforward to derive interac-
tion patterns for the variable Ufi when varying the experimental factors simultaneously. To see 
why this is the case, note that the effect of a change in either C or Ufi on the balance of the 
mode-selection threshold is similar to the effect of a change of one of the left-hand side pa-
rameters such as chronic accessibility or situational cues, that is, increasing accessibility or 
increasing processing costs both pushes the threshold in favor of the automatic mode. In par-
ticular, if we are interested in the interplay of Ufi with the experimental factors, we can direct-
ly replace the optimal thresholds a* (which trigger a “tip-over” for chronic accessibility 
measures) with optimal Ufi*, and analyze a corresponding model in which either Ufi* < Ufi 
(=Uhigh) or Ufi* > Ufi (=Ulow). When comparing the values of the right-hand side to the left-
hand side of the threshold and varying the framing treatment oi on a low or high level (the 
principal setup is similar to the approach presented in Appendix C), the derived interaction 
patterns are equal to those presented in section 6.3.3. In the case of NFC, the sign of effects is 
opposite to that of Ufi. Thus, the predicted interaction patterns are still the same, but their 
signs are exactly opposite to those predicted before. Empirically, two model specifications 
will be analyzed: 
(4) E(reltrust|x) = xβ + e = β0 + β1*end + β2*frame + β3*nfcscale + β4*end*frame + 
β5*frame*nfcscale + β6*end* nfcscale + β7*end*frame* nfcscale + fiscale + controls 
+e   
(5) E(reltrust|x) = xβ + e = β0 + β1*end + β2*frame + β3* fiscale + β4*end*frame + 
β5*frame* fiscale + β6*end* fiscale + β7*end*frame* fiscale + nfcscale  + controls +e  
The control variables then include trustscale and recscale, to hold the other mode-selection 
threshold parameters constant. When empirically testing both model specifications, the results 
are unambiguous and allow for one simple conclusion: none of the variables fiscale or 
nfcscale does interact with the decision to trust in model-specifications that include interac-
tions between the processing preferences and the experimental factors (results omitted, see 
Appendix A). In the case of the framing treatment, the above analysis does not reveal any dif-
ferences between high or low NFC/FI individuals in the susceptibility to framing effects, and 
with respect to the incentive manipulation, there is no indication that the NFC/FI processing 
preferences independently influence the response of the trustors to high or low stakes. 
Computing residual-centered orthogonal models does not reveal any new information or im-
prove the estimates either, even when an endowment effect of end of about minus 11 per cent 
across framing conditions is revealed (this matches with the results from the analysis of acces-
sibility measures in section 6.5.2). Apart from that, none of the model coefficients can be con-
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fidently interpreted, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that processing preferences, as meas-
ured by the REI scales, do not directly affect the choice of a trusting act.  
It is important to note, however, that processing preferences do not provide any “substantial” 
trust-related information to a trustor regarding when defining a trust problem and deciding 
about the choice of a trusting act. They are, so to say, a “context free” preference for automat-
ic versus rational processing. Thus, in the context of a trust problem, the REI scales may be 
more influential in how available information is dealt with and how accessible information is 
used, but they do not determine which information actors will attend to, and “what comes to 
mind”. This issue will be taken up again in section 6.7.3, where models that vary processing 
preferences and chronic accessibility simultaneously will be analyzed. As presented below, 
these models suggest that an analysis of trust must take care of accessibility and processing 
preferences, a finding which is also reasonable from a theoretical standpoint. 
6.5.4. Discussion 
Overall, a number of important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of model specifi-
cations (1)–(5). Firstly, the models estimate an overall negative endowment effect across 
framing conditions with about an 11 per cent drop in reltrust in specifications (3) to (5). This 
corresponds to the empirical mean difference which was found in the descriptive statistics, 
and confirms a general main effect prediction: when much is “at stake,” cognitive motivation 
increases and pushes the trustors towards a rational consideration of the trust problem and into 
conditional trust. However, this finding must be qualified. As suggested by model specifica-
tion (1), trustors exhibit a differential response to an increase in cognitive motivation depend-
ing both on the chronic accessibility of a trust-related script and on the context. The interac-
tion pattern revealed in model specification (1) is consistent with one of the predicted MFS 
interaction patterns. High norm internalization can suppress the effect of instrumental incen-
tives which push actors toward a rational consideration of the trust problem. Thus, even in the 
face of high stakes, trustors can choose an unconditional trusting strategy if relevant scripts 
are chronically accessible, or if the context supports a favorable definition of the situation. 
Moreover, when estimating this model, a conditional main effect of trust-related frames is also 
revealed. In an unexpected twist, high accessibility subjects (in contrast to low accessibility 
subjects) were found to react with a more conditional trusting strategy and lower levels of 
trust when a cooperative context and high initial endowments were combined. It is important 
to discern whether this finding only challenges the assumptions which were made in designing 
the current experiment, or whether it bears a more substantial meaning that needs to be ad-
dressed theoretically in terms of the model of adaptive rationality and modeling of the mode-
selection threshold.  
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On the one hand, it may be the case that the assumptions made in designing the experiment 
were inadequate. In particular, this questions the overall efficiency of the framing treatment 
and casts doubt on whether the incentive treatment had an exclusive effect on cognitive moti-
vation. To begin with, the framing manipulation was designed to present relevant situational 
cues to the subjects and influence the match mi of trust-related frames and scripts. A naïve 
conclusion from analyzing the simple (unconditional) main effect of the treatment variable 
frame is that it simply had no effect. However, it was also found that low (and high!) accessi-
bility subjects readily use the presented cues to adjust their trusting strategies. Thus, it would 
be erroneous to conclude that there is no effect of the presented context, even when the effects 
are conditional. Secondly, it can hardly be argued that the incentive manipulation has emitted 
a negative symbolic cue across all conditions and for all subjects. If this were the case, then 
we should not have observed the balancing function of script accessibility in the neutral fram-
ing condition, and we should not have observed an effective priming of low accessibility sub-
jects in the high/cooperative condition. Both observations contradict the general “stakes-as-a-
symbol” hypothesis. Put sharply, it is only the high accessibility group whose behavior de-
parts from the model´s predictions in the high / cooperative condition. A symbolic effect of 
high initial endowments could have been present for this subgroup in this experimental condi-
tion, but why? 
The explanation favored here is that of a “selective mismatch” and situational nuisance which 
emerges exclusively in high accessibility subjects. The argument invokes selective attention 
and holds that high initial endowments may serve as a salient cue for (selectively attentive!) 
high-accessibility subjects, who do not further only rely on their (successful!) initial definition 
of the situation with a trust-related frame and script, but who are also attentive to whether 
their interpretation and automatic application of stored knowledge is still correct. High stakes 
only “fit the frame” if their presence is encoded as a typical situational element of generalized 
trust frames and scripts. Arguably, this bridge hypothesis cannot be tested with the current 
data, and we need to rely on indirect evidence.
21
 First, model specification (3) revealed a neg-
ative frame*recscale interaction which exactly pin-points this adverse effect. Second, model 
specification (1) showed that the cooperative cues were readily used by low accessibility sub-
jects in the face of high endowments, suggesting a “priming effect” for this group. Overall, 
the data lend some plausibility to the “mismatch” explanation. Further evidence will be pre-
sented when analyzing the decision time data, which show a decision time increase for high 
accessibility subjects in this experimental condition, suggesting a switch to more elaborate 
and conditional trusting strategies. 
                                                 
21 Of course, one could argue that, from a normative standpoint, this is precisely what the norm typically should prescribe: 
unconditional trust irrespective of the “stakes”. But, empirically, the question remains whether the real-life actors (the sub-
jects participating in the experiment) have learned and acquired a norm that includes high-cost situations as a “typical area 
of application” for trust-related norms and scripts. 
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As a theoretical consequence, this encourages a consideration of conceptualizations of a 
match mi in which nuisances are taken care of. A similar argument was also made by Mayerl 
(2009: 235), who adopts am earlier conceptualization put forward by Esser (2001: 270) and 
models the match as mi= ai*oi*ei*, where ei [0,1] represents the absence of nuisance. In fact, 
Kroneberg (2005: 351) also states that the activation weight can be reduced by a factor (1-d), 
where d [0,1] represents the presence of nuisances. According to Kroneberg, this factor should 
be introduced into the analysis “on demand.” In the current work, this seems to be the case. 
Taking a more general stance, the present data suggest that the (non-)emergence of a subjec-
tive nuisance is strongly dependent on characteristics of the actors, for example, the accessi-
bility of stored frames and scripts. This kind of reflexive feedback between stored knowledge 
structures and “on-line” cognition has not been theoretically incorporated and dealt with yet. 
Principally, by modeling oi as oi(ai, aj), one can invoke selective attention and perceiver readi-
ness. This idea merges well with the dynamic and interactive conceptualization of a social 
construction of trust, as put forward in the previous chapters; it directs our attention to the 
possibility that the modeling of adaptive rationality can be complicated by endogenous pro-
cesses such as a reflexive feedback between “active” cognition and stored knowledge struc-
tures. 
Model specifications (2), (4) and (5) have each tested the effect of one continuous measure 
(frame accessibility or either of the two processing preferences) on reltrust, including interac-
tions with the two experimental factors. While neither of the models reveals substantial inter-
active effects of the variable under scrutiny on the level of trust, it is argued here that the con-
clusion of a “failure” of the adaptive rationality model would be premature. If substantial rela-
tions among the threshold variables are not included, the models can be miss-specified and 
result in weak detected effects and poor estimation results. Concerning the effect of pro-
cessing preferences, it is likely that they do not influence the choice of a trusting act inde-
pendent of “what comes to mind”. Therefore, an analysis of subgroups and an estimation of 
models in which processing preferences and accessibility measures vary simultaneously will 
be conducted further below. The same holds true for the finding that no main effect influence 
of trustscale was found. Either, the effect of script accessibility and its interactions with the 
other mode-selection determinants is stronger (this is plausible given that we observe a choice 
and not interpretation) or its effect is masked by heterogeneity which can only be uncovered 
when analyzing subgroups. In fact, a conditional main effect of trustscale could be revealed in 
model specifications (1) and (3).  
Arguably, one severe limitation of the current data set is the low number of observations. Giv-
en that models estimate higher-order interactions, a larger sample size would have been desir-
able. For example, Kroneberg (2011c) uses Monte-Carlo simulations to assess the statistical 
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testability of the MFS interaction hypotheses and concludes that approximately N=2000 ob-
servations constitute the optimal sample size.  
A methodological corollary that can be drawn from the present analysis is that a combination 
of different statistical methods can support interpretation and provide a robustness check of 
results in trust research. Importantly, the Tobit models have, in several cases, detected signifi-
cant effects where the Robust and GLM models have indicated none, and it was found that 
uncentered explanatory variables, when estimating the interaction effects, can potentially in-
troduce multicollinearity to which the Tobit models were reacting most sensitively. This pro-
vokes a general word of caution for trust researchers relying solely on Tobit models to analyze 
investment game data. Secondly, in addition to cross-validate the model specifications with 
different estimation techniques, it is advisable to re-estimate models using orthogonalized in-
teraction variables. Overall, the combination of methods used here entails that the model of 
adaptive rationality can be tested without falling into the pit-trap of spurious multicollinearity 
and miss-specification. In combination with multiple estimation techniques and the use of 
bootstrapping methods to address issues of non-normality, influential data points and robust 
standard errors, this lends considerable credibility to the established results. 
6.6. Analyzing Decision Times 
6.6.1. Model Specification 
The next section will detail the test of the model of adaptive rationality by examining the de-
cision times (DT) of the subjects which were recorded during their participation in the in-
vestment game experiment. Similar to the analysis of the choice of a trusting act, this demands 
the specification of an empirical model to predict and test hypotheses which can be derived 
from the mode-selection threshold. In general, the automatic mode is expected to be fast and 
effortless, whereas the activation of the rational mode, paired with an increased degree of 
cognitive elaboration, is expected to be slow and serial. According to general model proposi-
tion 8.1, the processing modes are directly linked to the decision time of the corresponding 
trusting act, and main effect hypotheses for the treatment and accessibility measures have 
been stated in section 6.3.2 already. The predicted effect of the processing modes on DT is 
opposite to the predicted effects on the relative transfer decision.  
Thus, a negative main effect can be predicted for frame and the accessibility measures 
recscale and trustscale. Both a cooperative framing of the trust problem and a high accessibil-
ity of trust related frames and scripts push the mode-selection threshold towards the automatic 
mode and lead to a relative increase of unconditional trusting strategies. This results in a de-
crease of decision times. In contrast, high initial endowments push trustors towards a con-
trolled elaboration of the trust problem and conditional trust. Therefore, an increase in DT is 
304 
 
expected. As with the choice of a trusting act, the model of adaptive rationality bears more 
complex interaction patterns among the processing mode determinants, and it encourages their 
analysis both theoretically and empirically. With respect to predicted interaction patterns, it is 
easy to show that they are opposite to those stated in chapter 6.3.3. For example, the analysis 
of a continuous measure of accessibility and the two experimental factors yields a set of pre-
dicted patterns in which the coefficients are reversed (table 12).  
Table 12: Predicted interaction patterns for decision times (time) 
 Predicted Interaction Pattern (Main- and Interaction Effects) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
aj 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 0 
U 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 > 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 0 
oi 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 < 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 0 
U∙oi 0 ≤ 0 < 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 > 0 = 0 ≥ 0 0 
ai∙U 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 0 
ai∙oi 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≤ 0 = 0 > 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 = 0 < 0 ≤ 0 0 
ai∙oi∙U 0 ≥ 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 0 
Note: The table presents predicted interaction patterns between chronic script accessibility aj, situational cues oi and moti-
vation U, predicting the observed DT in the investment game. 
Concerning the specification of an empirical model, this corresponds to model specifications 
(1) and (2), as presented in section 6.5.1; specifications (3)–(5) can be straightforwardly 
adapted. But before estimating the models, it is advisable to take a look at the empirical distri-
bution of DT in the sample in order to assess whether and which statistical method can be 
used for their analysis. The following section presents a descriptive approach to the sample 
and ends with a discussion of the methods that will be used. 
6.6.2. Distribution of DT and Non-Parametric Analyses 
Empirically, the observed decision times have a high variance (M=17.95, SD=17.84). The dis-
tribution of time is profoundly non-normal (skewness=5.35, kurtosis= 48.57, Skew-
ness/Kurtosis test for normality χ2(2, N=298) = 59.96, p<0.001) and it includes outliers with 
an extremely long latency. In fact, this is a typical DT data pattern. The next table reports the 
percentiles of time, that is, the absolute DT value below which a certain percent of observa-
tions fall, and it presents the empirical values of all observations which fall outside of a two 
standard deviation interval above the mean (table 13): 
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Table 13: Percentiles of time, calculated from the total sample of N=298 observations 
Percentile Percentile value of time (seconds) 
25% 8.89 
50% 13.2 
75% 20.27 
90% 35.89 
95% 44.38 
> 95% (single observation values listed) 45.64, 47.43, 45.64, 47.34, 48.38  
49.53, 51.61  
 
---- N=9 cases above 2 * SD threshold  (=53.65) ---- 
 
55.51, 58.75, 60.17, 60.34, 75.95, 78.23, 103.84, 105.56, 
207.81 
While most trustors decided about the choice of a trusting act in well below a minute (total 
sample median = 13.2s), some observations clearly fall outside of the average range, the long-
est observation at 207.81 seconds. Scrutinizing the N=9 extreme outliers, there is no clear re-
lation to reltrust: choices include zero and full trust, and reltrust is relatively evenly distribut-
ed, resulting in a mean near the 50 percent mark. However, it is apparent that their inclusion 
can have profound effects on the parameter estimates (statistical models will therefore be re-
calculated in- and excluding outlier observations). 
The following table cross-tabulates the conditional medians of time across experimental con-
ditions. As can be seen from table 14, a shift in median DT is visible for the framing treat-
ment, with overall shorter DT in the cooperative context. Likewise, the manipulation of the 
initial endowments increases median DT in the high incentive condition.  
Table 14: Conditional median of time (s) within experimental treatment groups, N=298 
Treatment / Condition 
                     Context 
Neutral Cooperative 
Incentives 
Low     13.69 11.16 
High   16.63 12.85 
In order to detail the picture of tendencies for different subgroups of the sample, the next table 
reports the observed conditional mean of time across the various groups, as well as Wilcoxon 
rank-sum tests for each comparison (means were computed to allow for the WRT). In the case 
of continuous variables, a median-split was conducted (table 15): 
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Table 15: Conditional mean of time within subgroups, N=298 
Variable Conditional Median of time 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Z= p= 
end Low High   
 11.85 14.35 -1.34 0.169 
frame Neutral Cooperative   
 14.72 11.54 3.1 0.002 
trustscale Low Trust High Trust   
 13.28 13.11 0.12 0.91 
recscale Low Reciprocity High Reciprocity   
 13.61 11.84 1.15 0.25 
fiscale Low FI High FI   
 13.31 12.84 -0.15 0.88 
nfcscale Low NFC High NFC   
 13.98 11.84 1.22 0.22 
The Wilcoxon rank-sum tests uncover a significant decrease in time for the cooperative fram-
ing condition (two sided WRT, Z=3.1, p=0.002)
22
. Descriptive evidence also exists for an ef-
fect of end, recscale and nfcscale, where a small shift in means can be observed, but none of 
the WRT reaches statistical significance. Thus, the alternative hypothesis that there are no dif-
ferences in median time across these variables cannot be confidently rejected.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that an exclusive focus on measures of location in 
the analysis of DT can be insufficient and misleading, as changes in the shape of the distribu-
tion are masked and cannot be uncovered (Heathcote et al. 1991). Moreover, if a distribution 
is highly skewed and includes outliers, then neither the mean nor the median are informative 
because they are potentially biased. As it is, this is the case in the present sample. To provide 
a visual assessment of the distribution of the DT, the next figure presents a non-parametric 
kernel density estimate of time, separated for each experimental condition. Outliers above two 
times the standard deviation from the mean of DT were excluded for presentational purposes 
(figure 24): 
                                                 
22 The result does not change if a Bonferroni adjustment is conducted. The difference in frame stays significant. 
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Figure 24: Kernel density estimates of time, separated by experimental conditions 
 
The kernel density estimates provide a direct assessment of the shape and distribution of time. 
As expected, the distribution is positively skewed, revealing a non-normal data pattern with a 
high peak at a relatively short median DT and an extended tail which results from the pres-
ence of longer decision times. More importantly, the graphs reveal differences between the 
experimental conditions: in the cooperative framing conditions, the density of time markedly 
increases in the lower range. Thus, with cooperative framing, more observations fall in into a 
short DT interval. This indicates a shift towards unconditional trusting strategies and shorter 
decision times. In contrast, high initial endowments result in a “fatter” tail of the distribution 
and lower peak densities; a hint to the presence of long decision times and prevalence of con-
ditional trusting strategies. In combination, the results presented above suggest the presence of 
treatment main effects that are consistent with hypotheses H3 (shorter DT in the cooperative 
context) and H4a (longer DT with high endowments).  
Another way to assess treatment effects is to adopt a duration-model perspective and regard 
the choice of a trusting act as an “event” that ends the “state” of frame- and action selection. It 
terminates the recorded DT interval. One can then compute and graph the conditional proba-
bility for a subject to “survive” (that is, to not terminate the DT measurement with a choice of 
a trusting act at any point in time), separated for each experimental condition. This is also 
known as the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function (see Cleves et al. 
2004: 93f.).
23
 From the graph of the Kaplan-Meier estimates, differences in decision times 
                                                 
23 In continous time, the survivor function S(t) = 1 – F(t), where F(t) is the cumulative density of the distribution. It defines 
the probability of survival, that is, of not observing an event conditional on its non-appearance up to time t. For discrete 
time intervals t1<t2<…tn, the Kaplan Meier estimator is defined as  ̂(t) = ∏
     
  
 
    , where ni is the number of observa-
tions “at risk” at point ti, and di is the number of “deaths” at ti. 
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between the experimental conditions can readily be inferred (see figure 25). Holding one ex-
perimental factor constant, the level of the second factor exerts a notable influence on the es-
timated probability of survival. This effect is present both for the endowment and the framing 
conditions. Moreover, each factor affects the probability of survival in the expected direction. 
High endowments lead to a higher survival probability across framing conditions. This indi-
cates an empirical increase in DT. The effect is more pronounced in the neutral framing con-
dition. On the other hand, a cooperative framing reduces the probability of survival. This indi-
cates a decrease in DT. The predicted survival probabilities are most optimistic in the 
high/neutral condition. In this case, the probability of remaining “at risk” and observing a long 
DT is the highest at any point in time. In contrast, lowest probabilities can be found in the 
low/cooperative condition. Here, trustors have empirically made their decisions faster as in 
any other condition, and the probability of observing long “survivals” is the lowest across 
time. Adding confidence intervals around the Kaplan-Meier predictions (results omitted), a 
statistically significant difference in the predicted probabilities and corresponding survivor 
functions can be revealed between the two extreme conditions. The differences between all 
other subgroup comparisons are insignificant, however. Thus, while the graphical analysis 
indicates coherent treatment effects, their statistical effect size may be very small. 
Figure 25: Kaplan-Meier probability of “failure” for the choice of a trusting act 
 
The preceding analyses have (1) revealed the non-normal character of time, and (2) graphical-
ly, as well as descriptively, uncovered the presence of treatment effects, but (3) no evidence 
could be gathered of an influence of accessibility or processing preference measures. A simple 
reason may be that effects are very weak, or covered in interactive effects between treatment 
conditions on which main effects do not tap. To get a precise statistical estimate and test mod-
el specifications (1) to (5), it is imperative to be clear about the distributional form of DT in 
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the sample. The approach taken here is pragmatic: as the model of frame selection is princi-
pally open to various underlying cognitive architectures, it is not possible to derive a theoreti-
cal argument in favor of one particular response time distribution. Rather, it is advisable to use 
a distribution that can adequately describe the present dataset.  
In a first step, using EasyFit
24
, the raw measures of time were analyzed and fitted to a number 
of frequently used DT distributions (see Dolan et al. 2002, Heathcote et al. 2004), both in- and 
excluding the outliers of the sample. Then, goodness-of-fit measures (i.e. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests) were computed and compared. The following table reports the results of this 
analysis, showing that a number of different distributions which are regularly used in response 
time analysis can in fact be fitted to the data (table 16): 
Table 16: Fitting different distributions to the DT sample 
Distribution 
Goodness of Fit (Kolmogorov Smirnov Test) 
outliers excluded, N=289 outliers included, N=298 
 D= p= D= p= 
Lognormal 0.054 0.359 0.064 0.168 
Gamma 0.067 0.135 0.210 <0.001*** 
Exponential 0.214 <0.001*** 0.245 <0.001*** 
Inv. Gauss (Wald) 0.048 0.501 0.145 <0.001*** 
Weibull 0.113 <0.001*** 0.121 <0.001*** 
Note: Kolmogorov-Smirnov´s D statistics report and test the maximum distance D between the assumed and the empirical 
cumulative distribution function. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Overall, the lognormal distribution delivers a good description of the data; most other distri-
butions fail to adequately describe the sample with the inclusion of outliers (note, though, that 
even the lognormal distribution is close to being rejected with N=298). As can be seen from 
the table, the overall fit of any distribution decreases when outliers are included. This suggests 
a separate consideration of models including and excluding the extreme observations. Based 
on the distributional analysis, the set of model specifications will be estimated using robust 
linear regressions of the logarithm of time (logtime, M=2.64, SD=0.66, a histogram is present-
ed in figure 26) on the predictors. 
                                                 
24 The software is available from Mathwave in academic license at www.mathwave.com. 
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Figure 26: Frequency histogram of logtime (outliers excluded, N=289) 
 
To control for an individual baseline speed, the variable timeavg is constructed as the re-
spondent´s empirical average of two latency measures that were collected in the course of the 
experiment: one measure is the respondent´s decision time for a trial decision which was pre-
sented before asking the control questions. Participants had to make this trial to get acquainted 
with the interface. The second latency measure is the reciprocity decision in the second stage 
of the experiment, where subjects had to reciprocate a matched trusting choice. Here, the deci-
sion interface was nearly identical in design. Therefore this measure can serve as another ap-
proximation of the decision-making context of the choice of the trusting act, and help to pin 
down an individual baseline speed of response. Arguably, other factors may influence both 
measures over and above an individual baseline. However, out of all latency measures collect-
ed, these two measures were the only ones that could be collected in a situation that is compa-
rable to the actual choice situation. An implicit demand of the baseline speed correction pro-
cedure is that filler latencies “match” to the target latency. In principle, one could use other 
latencies as well (for example, the time to answer control questions, read instructions etc.). 
Theoretically, they do not deliver a proper and valid baseline that can be used in the decision-
making context. Empirically, it turns out that these measures are only weakly related to the 
actual DT measure of time. 
6.6.3. Chronic Frame and Script Accessibility 
Using the robust regression approach (see section 6.5.1), specifications (1) and (2) were esti-
mated in order to assess the influence of chronic frame or script accessibility and processing 
preferences on the observed DT. Orthogonalized interaction terms were used in all models to 
estimate the predicted interactions between experimental treatments and the accessibility of 
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the trust-related frames or scripts; included controls were similar to those used in section 6.5 
(see table 17): 
Table 17: Regression of chronic frame and script accessibility on logtime 
Variable 
Model Specification (1) 
Script Accessibility  
Variable 
Model Specification (2) 
Frame Accessibility 
end 0.096 0.094 0.082 end 0.077 0.076 0.067 
 
(-1.33) (-1.22) (-1.12)  (-0.96) (-0.92) (-0.85) 
frame -0.169** -0.163** -0.173**  frame -0.165** -0.163* -0.168**  
 
(-2.37) (-2.03) (-2.27)     (-2.11) (-1.90) (-2.06)    
recscale -0.179 -0.263 -0.288 trustscale 0.080 0.031 -0.006 
 
(-0.46) (-0.61) (-0.71)     (-0.23) (-0.08) (-0.02)    
end*frame -2.101* -2.050+ -1.338 end*frame -0.014 0.218 0.246 
 
(-1.76) (-1.61) (-1.27)     (-0.02) (-0.27) (-0.32) 
end*rec -1.246 -1.151 -1.112 end*trust 0.597 0.669 0.694 
 
(-1.02) (-0.89) (-0.99)     (-0.64) (-0.7) (-0.76) 
frame*rec -1.072 -0.991 -0.448 frame*trust -0.603 -0.417 -0.452 
 
(-0.86) (-0.77) (-0.43)     (-0.70) (-0.47) (-0.52)    
end*frame*rec 3.024* 2.995+ 2.063 end*frame*trust 0.004 -0.329 -0.273 
 
(-1.74) (-1.63) (-1.32)  (0) (-0.25) (-0.22)    
timeavg 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014*** timeavg 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (-4.82) (-4.63) (-4.25)  (-4.4) (-4.15) (-4.01) 
trustscale  -0.006 -0.040 recscale  -0.351 -0.335 
  (-0.02) (-0.12)      (-0.78) (-0.80)    
constant 2.376*** 2.396*** 2.507*** constant 2.245*** 2.450*** 2.551*** 
 
(-8.57) (-4.63) (-5.16)  (-9.51) (-4.76) (-5.25) 
R2  0.156 0.113 0.149 R2 0.137 0.151 0.130 
Wald (full model) 31.92*** 37.17*** 37,42*** Wald (full model) 34.76*** 38.91*** 41.01*** 
χ2 Improve (4 df) 4.01 3.63  2.2  χ2 Improve. (4 df) 1.72  1.2  1.48  
Control variables No Yes Yes Control variables No Yes Yes 
Ouliers included Yes Yes No Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Note: N=289 excluding outliers, N=298 including outliers. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping 
of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
One effect that can be reliably reproduced in all statistical estimates is a significant negative 
effect of the framing condition on DT. The variable frame reduces logtime about a third of its 
standard deviation in magnitude, indicating an overall decrease in DT and a shift to uncondi-
tional trusting strategies in a cooperative context. In contrast, a positive main effect of end, 
while it is weakly evident from the data, cannot be reliably detected. None of the control vari-
ables has a significant effect. Browsing the results, one general conclusion that can be drawn 
is that, even when controlling for the respondent´s baselines speed, the estimates involve a fair 
amount of statistical uncertainty and do not allow definite conclusions about the interaction 
patterns. It is noteworthy, however, that the t-values of the coefficients in model specification 
(1) are not “completely off” and definitely indicate the presence of interactive effects. Yet, 
they cannot be estimated too reliably, and Wald tests of joint significance cannot reject that 
the interactions are zero. An alternative specification in which the outliers were capped to the 
maximum of two standard deviations above the mean (see Ratcliff 1993, results omitted) pro-
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duces results almost identical to column 2. Even when the outlier analysis points to a remain-
ing influence of extreme cases, there is no a priori theoretical justification for their exclusion. 
What is more, the robust regression techniques which were used in the analysis directly ac-
commodate for their leverage.
25
  
Focusing on chronic script accessibility, the empirical signs of the interaction pattern match 
with predicted pattern number two. This result is remarkable because it is in line with the find-
ings of section 6.5.2. That is to say, the model´s predictions for both the decision to trust and 
corresponding decision time are consistent and merge into a coherent picture. However, most 
t-values do not reach traditional thresholds of significance. This presents a potential type-2-
error problem: should we conclude from the estimates of model specification (1) that interac-
tive effects do not exist? It is argued here that the direct correspondence between DT and 
trusting choices and their combination into a consistent pattern over the domain of two de-
pendent variables rather points to a lack of statistical power in the decision time analysis.  
The following graph (see figure 27) visualizes model specification (1).
26
 It presents an explor-
atory perspective on the model without a claim of confirmed effects. As pointed out, the inter-
action pattern from the regression on logtime mirrors the results that were uncovered in sec-
tion 6.5.2. In the graph, a negative effect of recscale can be observed in the high/neutral, the 
low/neutral, and in the low/cooperative conditions. It indicates shorter DT and a shift to un-
conditional trusting strategies with higher script internalization. This is particularly pro-
nounced when the “stakes are high.” Vice versa, this finding indicates a stronger effect of high 
initial endowments for low accessibility subjects, who respond with longer DT and shift to 
conditional trusting strategies. Overall, the data suggest that high chronic script accessibility 
supports unconditional trust and suppresses incentive effects. This is precisely what is predict-
ed by the model of adaptive rationality.  
Moreover, when a cooperative frame and high initial endowments combine, the effect of 
recscale reverses in sign; the slope of recscale is then positive. In this case, high accessibility 
subjects take longer in deciding about the choice of a trusting act. In other words, the DT data 
weakly support the mismatch hypothesis, indicating that high reciprocity subjects have 
switched to conditional trusting strategies in the high/cooperative condition. High endow-
ments may have presented a situational nuisance to them. In fact, when fixing the cooperative 
framing condition, a direct test reveals a weakly significant difference in logtime between en-
                                                 
25 As described in section 7.5.1, the robust estimation technique uses Cook´s D measures to generate case-wise regression 
weights until a stable estimate converges in which individual leverage is minimized. In the estimates of column 1, the 
lowest weights of the sample were in fact attached to the outliers, ranging between [0.36 0.60]. The weighting is consider-
ably less severe for most other cases: 75 per cent of all observations were attached weights higher than 0.9; 50 per cent of 
the sample received weights higher than .96; 25 per cent of all cases were attached weights higher than .99.  
26 Because of insufficient statistical certainty, confidence intervals were not added to the graph and predicted values added. It 
was computed from the first column of table 18 including outliers. 
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dowment conditions for high accessibility subjects (one-sided t-test, Mlow=2.42, Mhigh=2.58, 
t(2, 74)=-1.09, p=0.13). 
Figure 27: Predicted values of logtime, using model specification (1); N=298 
 
Another important result is that the estimate of model specification (2) in which frame acces-
sibility is varied along with the experimental factors (presented in the right columns of table 
17) is estimated to have no effects. This finding also merges with a result of the previous sec-
tion. Chronic frame accessibility (as measured in terms of a generalized attitude by the “Inter-
personal Trust Inventory”, Kassebaum 2004) is not substantially related to the DT of a trust-
ing act in the present experiment. Presumably, this is so because we observe a choice and not 
interpretation, and the reciprocity norm is a highly regulative script that is much more im-
portant in determining both processing modes and final choices than a general trust frame (see 
sections 6.6.5 and 6.8 for further discussion).  
Again, these results must stay rather exploratory in nature. The level of noise in the DT 
measures is very high, and a more robust analysis would have to be built on a much larger 
sample. Even then, the fact that the estimated interaction patterns correspond to and match 
with the findings of section 6.5.2 are encouraging, and indicate that the model of adaptive ra-
tionality has a potential to predict multiple outcome measures consistently. On top of that, 
processing preferences might play an important role and introduce further heterogeneity, 
which is not captured in the current model specifications (but see below).  
6.6.4. NFC/FI and Decision Times 
The next analysis focuses on processing preferences and their interplay with experimental fac-
tors in the determination of logtime. On a general level, tensions between “intuitive” and “ra-
tional” approaches to the explanation of the trust phenomenon are an ever-present facet of 
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theorizing in trust research. Thus, the present experiment can inform trust researchers and 
substantiate this dual notion by answering the question whether, how, and when processing 
preferences influence the choice of a trusting act. Within the model of adaptive rationality, 
both NFC and FI have been introduced as additional determinants of the mode-selection 
threshold. Even when they have not been found to be directly related to the choice of a trust-
ing act, an equally important question is whether trustors differ in how the information that 
“comes to mind” is dealt with. In this regard, processing preferences might play an important 
role (see table 18, all models use the robust regression approach and orthogonalized interac-
tion variables): 
Table 18: Regression of processing preferences on logtime 
Variable Model Specification (4)  Variable Model Specification (5) 
end 0.069 0.070 0.069 end 0.102 0.099 0.088 
 
(-0.84) (-0.79) (-0.84)  (-1.39) (-1.28) (-1.22) 
frame -0.211*** -0.201** -0.198**  frame -0.180** -0.172** -0.178**  
 
(-2.68) (-2.38) (-2.50)     (-2.51) (-2.17) (-2.40)    
fiscale -0.267 -0.252 0.081 nfcscale 0.083 0.051 -0.133 
 
(-0.61) (-0.56) (-0.2)  (-0.25) (-0.14) (-0.39)    
end*frame -2.149** -2.202** -1.398*   end*frame 1.067 1.204 1.131 
 
(-2.42) (-2.28) (-1.65)     (-1.18) (-1.3) (-1.26) 
end*fiscale -1.863** -1.898** -1.145+   end*nfcscale 0.968 1.046 1.145 
 
(-2.21) (-2.16) (-1.51)     (-1.06) (-1.13) (-1.3) 
frame*fiscale -1.371+ -1.409+ -0.857 frame*nfcscale -0.0142 0.059 0.014 
 
(-1.51) (-1.44) (-0.96)     (-0.02) (-0.08) (-0.02) 
end*frame*fi. 3.226** 3.310** 2.192*   end*frame*nfc. -1.468 -1.596 -1.41 
 
(-2.57) (-2.42) (-1.84)  (-1.23) (-1.31) (-1.21)    
timeavg 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014*** timeavg 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 (-5.19) (-4.76) (-4.48)  (-4.49) (-4.27) (-4.14) 
nfcscale  -0.0673 -0.254 fiscale  0.287 0.438 
  (-0.21) (-0.87)      (-0.82) (-1.43) 
constant 2.467*** 2.903*** 2.879*** constant 2.225*** 2.371*** 2.505*** 
 
(-7.79) (-5.16) (-5.47)  (-8.07) (-4.58) (-5.06) 
R2  0.173 0.179 0.136 R2 0.144 0.159 0.136 
Wald (full model) 47.82*** 46.54*** 45.83*** Wald (full model) 36.92*** 39.36*** 39.32*** 
χ2 Improve (4 df) 7.36+  6.7+ 4.4 χ2 Improve. (4 df) 2.46  2.45  2.64  
Control variables No Yes Yes Control variables No Yes Yes 
Ouliers included Yes Yes No Control variables Yes Yes No 
Note: N=289 excluding outliers, N=298 including outliers. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping 
of parameter estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
In short, while there is no reliably detectable effect of NFC on logtime (model specification 
5), the FI model delivers robust and model-consistent effects (model specification 4). This 
suggests that the choice of a trusting act is a matter of “feeling” and “intuition,” more so than 
a matter of rational elaboration and “thinking.” However, judging from the t-values, some ef-
fects of NFC can be suspected as well. At this point, it is important to remember that the NFC 
variable was measured with a potential ceiling effect, the empirical mean being well above the 
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center of the scale, with most subjects ranging high in NFC. This may have reduced statistical 
power and reduced the detected effect size. Even so, ceiling effects in independent variables 
normally inflate standard errors, and result in a overestimation of effects (Austin & Brunner 
2003). In the current analysis, full NFC model will not be interpreted. An analysis of sub-
groups in the next section will show, however, that NFC can be important to some trustors as 
well. 
The interaction pattern that is revealed in model specification (4) testing the FI processing 
preference is almost identical to the pattern obtained from model specification (1), in which 
the effect of recscale on DT was analyzed (a graph of predicted DT is presented in Appendix 
A). Since fiscale has a similar effect on the mode-selection threshold as the other activation 
weight determinants, this is in line with the set of predicted patterns that can be generated for 
model specification (4). One might suspect that the observed effects and interaction patterns 
arise from collinearity, but the empirical correlation between fiscale and recscale is weak and 
insignificant (rho=0.084, t=1.45, p=0.147). Furthermore, adding the control variables in col-
umn 2, which includes both recscale and trustscale, does not change the result. However, a 
test of the joint contribution of the interaction coefficients cannot reliably reject that they are 
different from zero (for example, χ2 (4) =7.36, p=0.12 in column 1). Likewise, the exclusion 
of outliers attenuates the result and the coefficients lose statistical precision. This raises a gen-
eral concern of how to deal with outliers: while the observations are “extreme” in a statistical 
sense, there is no theoretical justification for their exclusion. What is more, the regression 
models used here are robust (down-weighing influential cases), their bias has already been 
taken care of.27 As such, preference should be given to the full models. 
It is important to note that a statistically significant difference in DT arises only in the high / 
cooperative condition, where high FI subjects are found to take longer than low FI subjects 
(two sided t-test, Mlow=2.35 Mhigh=2.64, t(2, 77)=-2.73, p=0.008; all other tests are insignifi-
cant and omitted here). While we would expect a negative main effect of FI on decision times 
in general, the effect is positive in this case. The increase in DT in the high/cooperative condi-
tion is consistent with the proposition of a “mismatch” in this factorial constellation. The cur-
rent findings suggest that highly intuitive subjects have experienced a mismatch independent 
of the degree of accessibility. However, a closer look reveals that there is in fact a difference, 
depending on whether the high FI subjects are simultaneously high in script accessibility, or 
not: while the positive initial endowment-effect on DT is very pronounced in high reciproci-
ty/high FI subjects (two-sided t-test, Mlow=2.28 Mhigh=2.65, t(2, 36)=-2.21, p=0.033), the same 
                                                 
27 As with chronic script accessibility, the lowest regression weights in model specification (4) are attached to the outliers. 
The lowest attached weight is about 0.32 for the observation that exceeds a response time of 200 seconds; outlier weights 
range between [0.32 0.51]. 75 per cent of the sample were attached weights higher than .88; 50 per cent of the sample 
were attached weights higher than .96; and 25 per cent were attached weights higher than .99. 
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effect is weaker in low reciprocity/high FI subjects (two-sided t-test, Mlow=2.43 Mhigh=2.64, 
t(2, 36)=--151, p=0.14).
28
 This finding suggests that processing preferences and chronic ac-
cessibility interact, and it recommends the analysis of models in which both measures vary 
simultaneously. The current model specifications have not taken care of this form of interac-
tion, and the results just presented indicate that certain subgroups of the sample will be more 
sensitive to the treatments than other groups. To this end, section 6.7 will continue with a 
more detailed exploration of sample subgroups.  
6.6.5. Discussion 
The analysis of decision times, as presented in the above sections, supplements the general 
results of the experiment in several important ways. First, the data reveal a consistent pattern 
for the influence of chronic script accessibility and experimental factors on the processing 
modes. The model of trust and adaptive rationality, as put forward in this work, thus receives 
empirical support in a multi-measure framework where predictions are generated not only for 
decisions, but also for corresponding decision times. This also exemplifies how the mode-
selection threshold can be used to predict the emergence of different types of trust and a set of 
interaction patterns which can be tested against the data. Importantly, the predicted types of 
trusting strategies and their occurrence, that is, conditional and unconditional trust, can be 
compared and traced back not only to behavioral measures of trust, but also to empirical cor-
relates of the processing mode, as measured in the form of decision time latencies. 
Furthermore, and in line with the above analyses of the choice of a trusting act, the current 
models indicate that important determinants of trustor behavior cannot be uncovered with an 
analysis of simple main effects. Subgroups of the sample are heterogeneous in their response 
to the experimental treatments, differing on such dimensions as chronic accessibility and pro-
cessing preferences. This finding is important for trust research because these variables have 
only been regarded in their main effect influence so far, if they have been taken care of at all. 
The experiment reveals that chronic accessibility and NFC/FI subgroups respond differently 
to the trust problem and to the experimental treatments. It is therefore imperative to accom-
modate for this form of heterogeneity because it can easily mask important effects. For exam-
ple, a number of studies revolving around the question of “stake size” effects have uncovered 
inconsistent results, often finding no main effects of the manipulation, but displaying changes 
in the variability of the data (see Camerer & Hogarth 1999). The present experiment suggests 
that chronic frame and script accessibility (that is, of situationally relevant knowledge struc-
tures) may be a very important mediator of “stake size” effects. Unfortunately, none of the 
studies conducted in the context of trust and reciprocity have properly operationalized and 
                                                 
28 Note that a Bonferroni correction would not change the results. 
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measured relevant frames and scripts, let alone take care of them in statistical models so far. 
From the adaptive rationality perspective, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence for 
stake size effects is weak: the models tested so far are simply miss-specified. 
In the case of the collected latency measures, it is noteworthy that weak effects and a high 
level of noise uncovered are typical for DT data (e.g. Fazio 1986). In contrast to the experi-
mental conditions, the participating subjects cannot be perfectly “controlled”, and a number of 
reasons can lead to an observed latency that is well above the empirical average. Even when 
subjects take a long time, there is ultimately no justification for an exclusion of these observa-
tions. It is notable that the DT models provide a consistent picture from an adaptive rationality 
perspective. That is, estimated interaction patterns (1) merge on different dependent measures 
and (2) are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model. The data presented in 
this work can be fruitfully used to estimate effect sizes and plan contingent follow-up experi-
ments which directly tackle the drawback of the present study: a relatively low number of ob-
servations. As a direct methodological consequence, and since a full model test demands a 
higher number of cases (Kroneberg 2011c), the models will further be tested partially for sub-
groups in the remainder of the empirical part. Thus, in the light of the previous decision time 
analyses and findings, the next section will present more specific tests and separate hypothe-
ses which can be generated for particular subgroups.  
Overall, the data support a perspective of trust and adaptive rationality in which the question 
of mode-selection assumes a central role in the emergence of different types of trust. The idea 
of a contingent and flexible use of conditional and unconditional trusting strategies and the 
influence of “situated cognition” in a particular trust problem are linked to more fundamental 
determinants of the processing modes, such as chronic accessibility, situational cues, and cog-
nitive motivation. The experimental manipulation of these parameters indicates that the inter-
play between the different mode determinants is profound and considerable, and shaping both 
interpretation and choice in a trust problem. 
6.7. Exploring Subgroups  
6.7.1. Low and High Accessibility 
The findings of the multivariate analysis of reltrust and logtime suggest that there is more var-
iability in the data than can be uncovered by restricting the analysis on simple main effects. In 
fact, the analysis of population subgroups is of immediate concern within the model of trust 
and adaptive rationality because (1) interaction effects between the mode-selection determi-
nants are predicted and (2) concurrent hypotheses can be formulated for specific subgroups 
(for example, high-accessibility versus low-accessibility subjects). The following descriptive 
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analyses contrast extreme subsets of the sample, splitting observations along a number of var-
iables of interest.  
A natural candidate for a more detailed extreme-group analysis is the chronic accessibility of 
trust-related frames and scripts. For example, it is instructive to look at subgroups of the sam-
ple which score high on both measures of chronic accessibility and compare them to the low-
score counterparts. Specific hypotheses can be generated for these two extremes. On the one 
hand, the effect of chronically accessible knowledge on trust should be strongest for the high 
frame / high script accessibility trustors, where unconditional trust, speaking in terms of a 
main effect, is most probable. With respect to empirical measurement, this translates into a 
high predicted reltrust and low predicted logtime measure. In contrast, low frame / low script 
accessibility subjects should be particularly prone to switching to elaborate processing strate-
gies and conditional trust, with opposite and contrasting implications for trust and decision 
times. To conduct the following analysis, the sample was split along the corresponding medi-
an values of frame and script accessibility to identify these subgroups. The high frame / high 
script accessibility group includes N=63 observations, the low frame / low script accessibility 
group consists of N=67 observations. Splitting these groups along the experimental conditions 
further reduces the number of observations per cell. On average, there are N=16 observations 
in each cell of the next table. Therefore, while a coherent picture of tendencies emerges, these 
do provide moderate statistical certainty and may be subject to random sample fluctuation (ta-
ble 19): 
Table 19: Conditional mean of reltrust and logtime for accessibility subgroups 
Treatment   
                     Context 
Neutral Cooperative 
Incentives 
Low    (7€) reltrust 0.56 (0.44) 0.51 (0.46) 
logtime 2.46 (2.84)  2.19 (2.48) 
High   (40€) 
reltrust 0.60 (0.29) 0.39 (0.31) 
logtime 2.75 (2.81) 2.71 (2.52) 
Note: The table presents the means of reltrust and logtime, conditional on experimental treatments, for the high frame / high 
script accessibility group. The numbers in brackets show the corresponding conditional mean value of reltrust and logtime for 
the low frame / low script accessibility subgroup. 
A clear-cut tendency is revealed from the data. In any experimental condition, the relative 
transfer of the high accessibility group exceeds that of the low accessibility group. In addition, 
the recorded decision times are shorter in all factorial constellations but the high / cooperative 
condition. Here, it is in fact the high accessibility group which displays an increase in DT 
relative to the low endowment condition, and longer DT in comparison to the low accessibil-
ity contrasts. Given that the “mismatch” hypothesis holds, these observations are in line with 
the predictions that can be generated from the model of adaptive rationality for the particular 
subgroups. In a broad sense, the uncovered pattern exemplifies the prevalence of uncondition-
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al trusting strategies and more automaticity in high accessibility subjects, who in general do 
not only trust to a higher degree, but also decide faster about the choice of a trusting act. In 
contrast, members of the low-accessibility subgroup, in lack of internalized knowledge struc-
tures, obviously turn to conditional trusting strategies, resulting in longer decision times and a 
decrease in the observed level of trust. In line with previous findings, the high / cooperative 
condition presents a special situation in that DT are longer for high accessibility subjects. This 
supports the “mismatch” interpretation as proposed in sections 6.5 and 6.6.  
6.7.2. Cognitive Types  
Several researchers in cognitive psychology have used the NFC/FI and related measures to 
construct “cognitive types” and explore differential effects of experimental treatments on sub-
groups which systematically differ in their processing preferences (Cacioppo et al. 1996, Shi-
loh et al. 2002, Betsch 2004). Similar to the extreme groups of accessibility, one can use the 
FI/NFC measures to identify “cognitive misers” and “cognitive monsters”, that is, subgroups 
scoring high on one measure and low on the other. In the case of processing preferences, these 
identify the extreme groups. Subjects scoring high (or low) on both measures represent an “in-
termediate” case: even when the two preferences are considered to be independent, it is not 
clear which preference prevails in a given situation, and how the seemingly conflicting im-
pulses from intuitive and rational processing preferences are internally compromised (Shiloh 
et al. 2002). Focusing on single measures, several authors have reported contrasting effects for 
high versus low NFC groups. For example, Smith and Levin (1996) found that low-NFC sub-
jects are affected by the framing of choice problems, whereas high-NFC subjects were more 
resistant in attempts to change their behavior by situational cues. Shiloh et al. (2002) elaborat-
ed on these findings and showed that high FI / high NFC (“complementary thinkers”) and low 
FI / low NFC subjects (“poor thinkers”) are most prone to framing effects. They speculate that 
a clear and dominant thinking style, either intuitive or deliberative, fosters resistance to fram-
ing effects because, in contrast to non-differentiated thinking styles, the actors have “strong 
internal guides” (ibid. 425) and do not experience internal conflicts, in case of which the in-
fluence of contextual cues increases. 
Similar to the procedure of constructing high versus low accessibility contrasts, the sample 
was split along the median of high and low NFC/FI medians to construct four cognitive types. 
The next table reports the differences between the high NFC / low FI (“rational”) and low 
NFC / high FI (“intuitive”) subgroups (table 20): 
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Table 20: Conditional means of reltrust and logtime FI/NFC subgroups 
Treatment    
                     Context 
Neutral Cooperative 
Incentives 
Low    (7€) reltrust 0.55 (0.37) 0.51 (0.46) 
logtime 2.48 (2.57)  2.51 (2.46) 
High   (40€) 
reltrust 0.41 (0.34) 0.34 (0.39) 
logtime 3.01 (2.69) 2.51 (2.83) 
Note: The table presents the means of reltrust and logtime, conditional on experimental treatments, for the high NFC / low FI 
group. The numbers in brackets show the corresponding conditional mean value of reltrust and logtime for the low NFC / 
high FI subgroup. 
A remarkable finding is that the cooperative framing condition consistently increases reltrust 
in the intuitive group across all endowment conditions, while this is not the case for the ra-
tional group. Here, a cooperative framing leads to a decrease in trust. Importantly, this repli-
cates the findings of Shiloh et al. (2002), in that an “intuitive” but not a “rational” thinking 
style encourages the susceptibility to situational framing and increases the influence of pe-
ripheral cues. At the same time, the observed absolute level of reltrust is higher for rational as 
opposed to intuitive subjects in all but the high/cooperative condition. This is remarkable, as 
high faith in intuition should support the selection of the automatic processing mode, and 
therefore cater to unconditional trust. However, it is important to keep in mind that the split 
along FI/NFC does not inform about the chronic accessibility of trust related frames and 
scripts. The data therefore do not differentiate between subjects who have (or have not) avail-
able a set of trust-related frames and scripts, which potentially omits any heterogeneity along 
this dimension. 
In fact, the average level of trust in the intuitive group is highly dependent on the chronic ac-
cessibility of trust-related knowledge, but this is not the case for the rational group. The fol-
lowing graph displays the conditional means of reltrust for the intuitive and rational sub-
groups, conditional on the degree of frame and script accessibility. A total of four accessibility 
groups were constructed by cross-splitting the observations along the medians of the corre-
sponding accessibility measures: (1) low frame / low script accessibility, (2) low frame / high 
script accessibility, (3) high frame / low script accessibility, and (4) high frame / high script 
accessibility. These groups are used in in the following to graph the conditional means of 
reltrust for the intuitive and rational subgroups (see figure 28). Note that the graph´s x-axis 
represents a nominal scale; a complete rank ordering of the subgroups cannot be established. 
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Figure 28: Conditional means of reltrust for rational and intuitive subgroups by frame 
and script accessibility  
 
As can be seen from the graph, the intuitive subgroup, as displayed on the right, draws from 
the chronic accessibility of trust-related frames and scripts when deciding about the choice of 
a trusting act, while a similar tendency is not visible in the high NFC subgroup. The condi-
tional means range between M1=0.29 and M4=0.49 for the “intuitive” trustors and increase 
with combined chronic accessibility. As it is, the observed average level of trust is the highest 
when an intuitive trustor is high in both accessibility measures; it is the lowest of all sub-
groups when trust-related knowledge is not accessible for an intuitive trustor. As can be seen 
from the added confidence intervals, neither of the differences is significant. Again, the results 
carry a considerable amount of statistical uncertainty and must be taken with caution. Howev-
er, the analysis suggests that both accessibility and processing preferences simultaneously in-
teract in determining the processing mode. This recommends an analysis of model specifica-
tions in which all parameters of the mode selection threshold vary at the same time.  
6.7.3. Combining Accessibility and Processing Preferences 
The goal of this this section is to explore the combination of chronic accessibility measures 
and processing preferences in a model in which the two continous variables and the experi-
mental factors vary simultaneously. Put shortly, this full model includes four main effects, six 
two- and four three-way interactions, as well as one four-way interaction to model the mode-
selection threshold. This model can be specified as: 
(6) E(reltrust|x) = xβ + e = β0 + β1*end + β2*frame + β3*recscale + β4*fiscale 
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+ β5*end* recscale+ β6*end*frame+ β7*end*fiscale + β8*frame* recscale+ 
β9*frame*fiscale + β10* recscale*fiscale 
 
+ β11*end*frame*recscale + β12*end*frame*fiscale+ β13*end*recscale *fiscale + 
β14*frame* recscale *fiscale  
 
+ β15*end*frame*recscale *fiscale + controls + e  
Model specification (6) displays the case for the simultaneous variation of a trust-related 
script and FI preferences in conjunction with the two experimental factors. A similar model 
can be specified using chronic accessibility of a trust-related script, by interchanging recscale 
with trustscale, and with respect to NFC preferences by interchanging fiscale with nfcscale. 
Thus, another three model specifications (7) to (9) can be estimated. A formal derivation of 
the predicted interaction patterns can be carried out similarly to the case with three variables. 
As the analysis of the current model specification is highly exploratory in nature, no predic-
tions regarding the sign of the interactions will be made here. The principal motivation behind 
the analysis of the current specifications is to gauge the simultaneous influence of processing 
preferences and chronic accessibility in determining the processing mode. As presented in the 
last section, a descriptive analysis suggests that accessibility and processing preferences are 
not independent: high chronic script accessibility may influence the behavior of “intuitive” 
trustors more than that of “rational” trustors. Thus, when thinking about chronic frame and 
script accessibility, it is important to keep track of variable processing preferences in bringing 
about different types of trust. In the previous sections, they were held constant. 
Model specification (6) was estimated using the familiar combination of analytic methods: 
first, orthogonalized interaction terms were used to ensure against spurious multicollinearity. 
Second, all of the different estimation methods (Tobit, Robust and GLM) and bootstrapping 
procedures were used to obtain robust standard errors and to account for the non-normality of 
reltrust. Third, all models were re-run with and without control variables. The findings do nei-
ther change with uncentered interactions or when including control variables. As can be seen 
from the statistical results (table presented in Appendix A), a number of main effects, two-
way interactions, three-way interactions, and the four-way interaction are estimated to be sig-
nificantly different from zero. The t-values obtained for most coefficients are considerably 
high and suggest that the estimated coefficients are different from zero with certainty. Moreo-
ver, the Wald tests examining the joint influence of the combined interaction terms marginally 
indicate that the full model improves model fit, as compared to a null model.  
This result is even more striking when combining it into a broader picture with model-
specifications (7) to (9). While model (7), which combines FI and chronic frame accessibility, 
provides relatively similar estimates of the interactive effects (results omitted), both NFC 
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models fail to confirm any joint contributive power of the interaction terms over a null-model, 
and do not result in a model that is anywhere near in statistical certainty robustness, as com-
pared to models (6) and (7) (results omitted). This suggests that the present findings should 
not per se be ruled out under the headnote of spurious multicollinearity and be discarded as 
unstable. Nevertheless, the statistical test of all models that include higher-order interactions 
demands a high number of observations. The results are not established as confirmed effects, 
but remain highly explorative, presenting an outlook to the potential of the model and to fu-
ture studies. The combined models reveal interactions between processing preferences, chron-
ic accessibility and situational parameters, but the results will not be further interpreted here. 
Again, it is important to keep in mind that the estimated model uses a total of N=298 observa-
tions. While it is a wide-spread practice to estimate three- and four-way interactions with 
much smaller sample-sizes in many (psychological) studies, the models will be taken only as 
evidencing a potential for the statistical detection of higher-order interactions between mode-
selection determinants. Theoretically, such effects are implied by the model. Statistically, the 
present results can merely be regarded as a solid indication, and future tests would have to be 
built on a much larger sample. 
Overall, the results of this explorative analysis are highly provocative for trust research. Prin-
cipally speaking, they demonstrate that trust-related knowledge and processing preferences 
and situational parameters interact in determining the choice of a trusting act. This result is 
important because it suggests that trust and adaptive rationality are in fact much more closely 
intertwined than previously accepted in theory. One central idea of the current work is that we 
cannot think trust without thinking adaptive rationality. This statement is directly expressed in 
the last model specifications (6)-(9). If processing preferences shape the choice of a trusting 
act along with the accessibility of knowledge, then neither of the mode-selection determinants 
can be disregarded in any theoretical explanation of a choice of a trusting act.  
The model of frame selection which has been put forward in this work can be used as a guide 
in the analysis of trust-related (experimental) data, and the empirical results uncovered in the 
preceding analyses provide considerable support for a perspective of trust and adaptive ration-
ality in which mode-selections and the determinants of the processing modes acquire a central 
position in theorizing, model-building and causal explanation. The findings presented here can 
pave the way for a further empirical scrutiny of the trust and adaptive rationality perspective, 
and aid the development of experiments, guided by a proper theoretical model from which 
specific empirical hypotheses can be generated. Overall, they help to establish a broad per-
spective of trust that takes the aspects of interpretation and adaptive rationality to the core of 
its theory. 
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6.8. Summary of Empirical Results 
The development and implementation of the empirical test in this chapter has pursued two in-
terconnected goals: its purpose was to evaluate the adequacy of a perspective of trust and 
adaptive rationality in general, and to experimentally test the implications of the model of 
frame selection in particular. To this end, the “investment game” setting was enriched with 
two treatments. The trust problem was framed either neutrally or cooperative, and the stakes 
involved were set either to a high or a low level. These treatments allowed for a direct manip-
ulation of two mode-selection determinants. In combination with the statistical control of the 
remaining parameters, this set-up provided for a direct causal test of model implications.  
It was demonstrated how the model of frame selection can inform research in predicting very 
specific statistical effects. This does not only entail simple main effect hypotheses. The model 
of frame selection establishes that the mode-selection determinants interact at all stages of 
frame-, script-, and action-selection, and as a consequence, a number of higher-order interac-
tions between the mode-selection determinants are predicted. This empirical specificity also 
attests to the high informational value and empirical content of the model of adaptive rational-
ity. In combination with a set of bridge hypotheses that connect processing modes to observa-
ble outcomes, a set of admissible interaction patterns was derived against which any devia-
tion in statistical results must be regarded as contradicting evidence.  
Empirically, a number of important findings were collected. First and foremost, the framing of 
a trust problem and its incentive structure influence the choice of a trusting act. Thus, both 
experimental treatments affected the decisions of the trustors, and both exerted an influence 
on the corresponding decision times. While high initial endowments decrease trust and pro-
long decision times, a cooperative context suppresses these incentive effects and leads to a 
relative decrease in decision times. Both results can be interpreted as evidencing a shift in 
processing strategies induced by the treatments. One important mediator of treatment effects 
is chronic script accessibility. Thus, framing and incentive treatment effects could not be es-
tablished with a simple main effects analysis only, because interactions between the mode-
selection threshold parameters have to be accounted for. Most importantly, it could be shown 
that negative incentive effects can be fully suppressed by high chronic script accessibility. In 
other words, trustors who have strongly internalized a social norm may select the automatic 
mode and unconditional trust even when “the stakes are high.” Together, these results provide 
direct empirical evidence of adaptive shifts in rationality, as proposed in the model of frame 
selection. The estimated empirical interaction pattern merges with the theoretical predictions 
that were generated from theoretical model.  
Second, it was found that trust-related frames, as measured in the form of the “Interpersonal 
Trust Inventory” (Kassebaum 2004) are only weakly related to the choice of a trusting act in 
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the investment game. This in line with a number of other experimental results in which 
measures of generalized trust were found to be only weakly related to behavioral trust (see 
sections 3.1.3 and 6.1.1). This result pertains to models where a measure of chronic frame ac-
cessibility varies with the treatment conditions. Several potential explanations can be brought 
forth to understand this result. First, the measured frames may simply be irrelevant to the cur-
rent experimental set-up. Even when the experiment was conducted anonymously, the trustors 
may have activated more specific categorical representations about their counterparts other 
than that of “people in general,” to which most questions of the trust inventory refer (i.e. “stu-
dent”). Likewise, it may be the case that the chronic accessibility of frames plays a role during 
interpretation, but not so during the choice of a trusting act, where the situation has already 
been defined. Lastly, it may be the case that trust-related frames and scripts need to be ad-
dressed in conjunction with processing preferences. If both types of mode-selection determi-
nants are relevant to the adopted processing mode and the subsequent choice of a trusting act, 
then only a model which captures both effects would reveal the true relationships. In fact, the 
exploratory analyses in chapter 6.7 revealed a more complex interrelation between trust-
related frames, scripts, and processing preferences such as “faith in intuition.”  In these mod-
els, trust-related frames were found to be influential in the choice of a trusting act as well. 
Moreover, conditional main effects for trust-related frames were also found when script ac-
cessibility was varied along with the experimental treatments.  
However, the results revealed an unexpected twist in the data: the high accessibility group of 
trustors does not behave as expected in the high/cooperative condition. While theory would 
predict that unconditional trust is most probable in this subgroup/factorial combination, it was 
found that trustors in fact trust less and increase in their decision time. This finding was inter-
preted as a shift to a more rational processing and towards conditional trusting strategies; a 
claim that could be backed up by the analysis of decision times. Notably, this effect was not 
visible in low-accessibility subjects. One plausible explanation for this finding is the emer-
gence of a selective mismatch in the particular subgroup. The situational definitions adopted 
by the trustors in the aftermath of a cooperative framing and the presence of high initial en-
dowments may have created a situational nuisance and disturbed their definition of the situa-
tion. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be further tested with the present data. Future ex-
periments need to investigate the possibility of a reflexive feedback between activated inter-
pretational knowledge structures, resulting selective attention, and the “state-dependent” at-
tribution of meaning to situational objects. 
Another important finding is that the empirically estimated interaction patterns match to the 
predicted patterns over the domain of two different dependent variables. This consistency in 
effects is a particularly powerful hint to the adequacy of the adaptive rationality perspective of 
trust. Concurrently, these findings suggest that an analysis of trust cannot ignore the potential 
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interplay between the processing mode determinants and parameters of the mode-selection 
threshold. A prominent example in this regard would be the question of “stake size” effects, 
the mixed findings of which in previous studies may be interpreted as a result of incomplete 
model specifications and a disregard of the potential interaction between mode-selection de-
terminants. Adaptive rationality implies that strong norm internalizations and a high match 
between situational cues and accessible interpretational knowledge structures can lead to the 
activation of the automatic mode in which “rational” incentives may be completely sup-
pressed, leading actors to adopting a mode of decision making in which they automatically 
follow their initial categorizations, activated frames, and scripts.  
A result that is of interest for trust research is the finding of an influence of processing prefer-
ences on the choice of a trusting act and corresponding decision times. It was found that “faith 
in intuition” strongly qualifies the influence of chronic script accessibility. From a general 
perspective, this is not surprising: intuitive trustors should be particularly sensitive to the 
(non-)accessibility of trust-related knowledge. Precisely this could be observed in the data. 
For trust research, this is a new result that adds to our knowledge about the determinants of 
trust. In line with previous results from other studies, it was also found that trustors with a 
high “Need for Cognition” are less susceptible to framing effects and report longer decision 
times. This is a hint to a prevalence of more rational processing and conditional trust for the 
“rational” cognitive types. Both factors were also theoretically incorporated into the model of 
frame selection in a simple extension of the model. The practical relevance of this step must 
be evaluated in future studies, and it should be tied to the question of whether social groups 
systematically differ with respect to processing preferences (for example, academics versus 
workers), and whether these differences also translate into differential trusting behavior. 
Overall, the data provide support for a perspective of trust and adaptive rationality in which 
contingent mode selections and a flexible degree of information processing lie at the heart of 
the trust phenomenon. Core propositions of the model of frame selection such as the suppres-
sive effect of socialized frames and scripts on “rational” incentives, a flexible, dynamic and 
adaptive degree of rationality in interpretation and choice, and the formulation of the mode-
selection threshold which determines the interplay of its parameters, can fruitfully inform trust 
research about the conditions that must prevail for the emergence of different types of trust. 
At the same time, it is apparent that the study cannot provide the definite and ultimate answers 
to the modeling of adaptive rationality and the trust phenomenon. For example, the emergence 
of a potential “nuisance,” an unexpected twist in the experimental data, brings about the ques-
tion of how the match should exactly be formulated, and whether an inclusion of nuisance pa-
rameters into the match concept is obligatory or should be conducted only “on demand.” The 
idea of “selective attention” which was put forward as a theoretical explanation here provokes 
the critique of being an ad-hoc explanative strategy and immunizing stratagem. Arguably, this 
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explanation cannot be directly tested with the present data, even when the results (i.e. increase 
in decision times connected to a decrease in the level of trust) point into a certain direction. 
Furthermore, in light of the results, there are two different possible causes for a switch to con-
ditional trusting strategies: either, a nuisance has emerged because of a faulty study design 
(i.e. inadequate wording or ineffective priming procedure), or it has emerged because the elic-
ited frames and scripts do in fact not extend to high-cost situations, in which case a nuisance 
would have emerged irrespective of the particular design features. It is impossible to discern 
which of the two (or a combination) has been responsible. In any case, the set of bridge hy-
potheses which were implicitly made in designing the experiment is incomplete. Answering 
these open questions (How important is “nuisance” as a relevant determinant of the mode-
selection threshold? What is their cause? What is the precise domain of trust related frames 
and scripts such as the norm of reciprocity?) must be left to future studies. 
There are further limitations of the present study. First and foremost, a common critique of 
experiments is their external validity, and this concern applies to the present study as well. 
There is a tradeoff between the power of experiments to provide an opportunity for direct test-
ing and causal inference and the applicability of these results to the real world. This discrep-
ancy is seen to arise from the predominant use of a homogeneous student sample, a lack of 
sample size and the creation of artificial situations which result in “unrealistic” data and lack 
practical relevance (Falk & Heckman 2009). However, as Falk and Heckman note, experi-
ments “in the field” carry with them a different set of test conditions (for example, demo-
graphic characteristics, individual preferences, the presence or absence of social institutions 
and other aspects of the environment); and therefore do not automatically produce more in-
formative results. Neither are they per se better suited for a test of theoretical models. In fact, 
experiments allow for a tight control of the conditions and constraints in which behavior takes 
place. This is essential for testing game theoretic models and general behavioral assumptions, 
as for example, the Model of Frame Selection. Therefore, experiments seem to be most pow-
erful for the aim of testing general propositions about behavior in general, and about trust and 
adaptive rationality in particular. The adoption of the experimental method afforded a distinct 
advantage in that a direct manipulation of threshold parameters and a causal test of hypothesis 
was then possible. Since the model of frame selection is a general model, there is no a priori 
reason why the obtained results should be less realistic than any data gathered in the field. 
Another criticism is that subjects may learn about the experiments and adjust their behavior 
according to the expectations of the experimenter (Hawthorne Effect). In the present experi-
ment, the majority of participants were un-experienced first year freshmen (recruited in the 
second week of the curriculum) who had not participated in similar experiments before. The 
experiment itself was conducted as a “one-shot” game without repetition. Overall, learning 
and experience effects are improbable. Concerning experimenter effects, the study was con-
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ducted “double-blind,” that is, the experimenter was not aware of the current treatment condi-
tions. To reduce social desirability, the participants were assured of full anonymity.  
Apart from these very general points, several particular issues arise with respect to the exper-
iment and the study of the trust phenomenon. For example, the current experiment did not 
control for the current emotional or mood state of the participants, even when affective influ-
ences on the choice of a trusting act have been convincingly demonstrated. Likewise, a simple 
investment game design was used in which neither risk aversion (Holt & Laury 2002) nor so-
cial preferences (Cox 2004, Eckel & Wilson 2004, Ashraf et al. 2006) were elicited. But in the 
current experiment, the randomization of subjects into treatment conditions should have 
equalized any systematic influence of current mood states or social preferences. What is more, 
the measures of trust-related frames (that is, “generalized trust”) and scripts (that is, the “norm 
of reciprocity”) which were elicited after the choice stage of the experiment can be regarded 
as a proxy of social preferences. As Fehr (2008) noted, social preferences are a good indicator 
of survey based measures of trust. If this holds, then the survey-based measures of frames and 
scripts have the power to accommodate and control for the influence of social preferences. 
Furthermore, findings about the influence of social preferences and risk aversion are relatively 
mixed. In a pre-test study to the current experiment, neither social preferences nor risk aver-
sion were found to have a significant  influence on the choice of a trusting act (Rompf 2008). 
The current study did not seek to apply alternative measures of trust-related frames and 
scripts, of which a potentially endless number exists. For example, no reference was made to 
individual characteristics of the trustee as a basis of trust and expectation formation. Likewise, 
specific relational schemata, which are one of the most important types of trust-related 
knowledge, were only involved on the most general level of an “anonymous” counterpart who 
could either be a “participant” or a “partner.” Presumably, these two wordings connote a dif-
ferent relational perspective, but they may be insufficient to activate specific relational sche-
ma. Huang and Murnighan (2010) have used a simple priming manipulation to achieve this 
end: the subjects had to list the names of their most favorite friends in a seemingly unrelated 
task. This served as a priming manipulation to increase the activation level and temporary ac-
cessibility of the specific relational schemata. While it is interesting to test these and other 
trust-related knowledge structures, the endeavor of an exhaustive test is not of practical rele-
vance for a general test of the model of adaptive rationality, as long the constructs used here 
function properly in the mode-selection threshold. The data suggest so. 
Furthermore, social norms other than the norm of reciprocity may be relevant to the choice of 
a trusting act and can be relevant as a regulative script. For example, fairness or equity norms 
may motivate trustors and the choice of a trusting act and serve as a basis for institutional 
trust. The present design choice was motivated by the universality of the reciprocity norm and 
the fact that trust and reciprocity are also structurally most intimately related (see Ostrom & 
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Walker 2003). Arguably, other scripts can be relevant, but this does not compromise the testa-
bility of the general theoretical model as long as the scripts elicited here do have practical rel-
evance. Again, the data suggest so. 
Concerning the question of institutional trust and how it serves as a basis for interpersonal 
trust, note that experiment indirectly invoked institutional trust through the framing treatment, 
which contained minimal references to normative institutions (i.e. the word “partner,” point-
ing to a more communal relationship orientation with corresponding interaction norms). 
While no explicit institutions were designed in the experiment (no communication, no repeti-
tion, no reputation mechanisms etc.) institutional trust was highly relevant in the current ex-
periment. In fact, the survey-based measures of generalized trust and the reciprocity norm can 
be interpreted as a direct approximation to a measure of relevant institutional trust. The empir-
ical results indicate that there is a direct relation between these social institutions and trust. 
What is more, institutional trust can in fact become a form of “shallow trust” that is based on a 
rather low level of information processing and deliberation, as indicated by the DT analysis. 
Next, the model test presented here was only partial in that important mode-selection determi-
nants were not manipulated (opportunity p); others were only “held constant” or assumed to 
be fixed (such as the link li between objects and mental models). Arguably, these parameters 
cannot be perfectly controlled for with the present data, and the study results can be criticized 
along these lines: if any of the uncontrolled factors was of practical relevance in the experi-
ment (if the participants subjectively felt time pressure, if the link between objects and mental 
models was a source of considerable systematic variation) and if these effects are not equal-
ized and leveled out by the randomization procedure, then the current results stand on shaky 
grounds because we cannot allocate the variation found in the data to the independent varia-
bles introduced to the model. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the total number of observations was limited with about 
N=300 observations. As it is, the effect sizes stemming from processes of mode-selection and 
adaptive rationality on a behavioral measure of trust and response times were found to be 
small. As a consequence, the statistical models which were estimated in the present work in-
volve a non-negligible amount of statistical uncertainty compared to traditional benchmarks. 
However, more important in current model testing is whether the complete models bear ex-
planatory power and whether the interaction variables jointly contribute to the explanation of 
variance in the data. It is less interesting whether a single isolated effect is significant. As was 
argued in chapter 6.3, the model of trust and adaptive rationality postulates interactions be-
tween the mode-selection determinants at all stages of selection. Therefore, the analysis of 
simple main effects can be misleading. As it is, the joint explanatory power of the interaction 
terms was found to be acceptable in the models analyzing trust and script accessibility, and it 
was acceptable in the analysis of decision times. Overall, this suggests that the uncovered ef-
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fects are more than statistical artifacts and tap on substantial relations among the moderator 
variables. A number of results, as for example the suppression of incentive effects during the 
choice of a trusting act, could be established at a tolerable conventional significance level. 
Yet, as is always the case in any empirical study, a larger sample size would have been desir-
able, but it was limited by economic and logistic concerns. The present study can inform re-
search on the question of design choice and experimentation and pave the way for future re-
search projects to accomplish a more exhaustive and complete test of the model and all its im-
plications. 
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7. Synthesis: A Broad Perspective on Trust  
Trust is a subject of ongoing theoretical debate. The conceptions of trust that researchers put 
forward are diverse, and scholars routinely bemoan the troublesome theoretical plurality and 
fragmentation of trust research. A number of examples have been presented and discussed in 
this work. In short, the question of subjective experience is one of the prime reasons for the 
“confusing potpourri” (Shapiro 1987: 625) of trust definitions in the literature. Scholars focus 
on different phenomenological aspects and different sources of trust-related knowledge in de-
fining the concept. As a consequence, trust definitions become too narrow and “homony-
mous,” preventing theoretical formulations and empirical results from accumulating and be-
coming comparable (McKnight & Chervany 1996). Theories differ with respect to the concep-
tualizations, propositions, and assumptions put forward about the objective structure and sub-
jective experience of trust. Fundamentally, they diverge on the question of how trust can be 
explained theoretically. Is trust a rational choice? Is it “beyond” reason or even something ir-
rational and noncognitive? Is it an action, or a psychological state; and if so, how should this 
state be characterized?  
This state of affairs was the impetus for the present work. As stated in the introductory chap-
ter, a primary goal of the present thesis is to develop a broad and integrative perspective on 
the phenomenon of trust under a common theoretical umbrella. The guiding principle in de-
veloping this interdisciplinary perspective is to look for the commonality, mutuality, and simi-
larities that allow the existing theory to be integrated into a broader picture; to delineate the 
shared theoretical and conceptual grounds on which a unifying theoretical framework for the 
explanation of trust can emerge. Ultimately, a broad perspective must enable scientific pro-
gress beyond descriptive work and the creation of typologies. The final destination is causal 
explanation, and thus a modeling of microlevel individual behavior. From the viewpoint of 
methodological individualism, this is the pivot around which any explanation of the social 
system of a trust relation must revolve. The declared purpose of the present work is to ac-
commodate the conceptual diversity in trust research and to advance our understanding of the 
trust phenomenon by offering a causal reductive explanation of trust on the individual mi-
crolevel, extending it further to a macro-micro-macro explanation of trust in the spirit of 
methodological individualism. Notably, this broad perspective does not devaluate past re-
search or judge one approach to be inferior to another. In contrast, it attempts to reconcile 
conflicting theoretical perspectives by making them understandable as a special case of a 
more general process. 
As proposed here, two elements represent a key “missing link” to the smooth integration of 
the current state of the art: (1) interpretation, that is, the subjective definition of the situation 
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and (2) the actor’s individual adaptive rationality. Both elements have been put into the focus 
of theorizing in this study. I argue that we can advance our understanding of trust by linking it 
to interpretation and adaptive rationality simultaneously. In essence, the concept of trust is 
fuzzy because researchers are unclear about the role of interpretation; they disagree on how 
trustors subjectively handle and deal with the trust problem. The process of a “definition of 
the situation,” although crucial to the understanding of the trust phenomenon, is often men-
tioned in passing only, or it is taken for granted and rarely dealt with explicitly. The conver-
sion from structure to experience, and the cognitive mechanisms involved in doing so, present 
a missing link in trust theory. Furthermore, I argue that adaptive rationality constitutes a fun-
damental dimension of the trust concept. There is a looming tension between cognitive and 
noncognitive, conditional and unconditional, rational and automatic, cognition-based and af-
fect-based conceptions of trust that has been highlighted and emphasized throughout this 
book. This duality is deep-rooted and ever-present in trust research, and it has permeated to 
the very core of the theory, its concepts, and its definitions. But even when many authors im-
plicitly refer to adaptive rationality when specifying the different types of trust, it has not been 
systematically incorporated into current theoretical frameworks, nor given the central status it 
deserves.  
In fact, the neglect of rationality as a fundamental dimension of trust can be indeed regarded 
as a main barrier to the theoretical integration of existing trust research. The common ground 
that allows “rational” and “nonrational” accounts of trust to be united and integrated is the 
idea of a dynamic, flexible, and adaptive degree of rationality involved in interpretation and 
choice. This enables a seamless integration of the various typologies and approaches that have 
been proposed along one common and underlying dimension. Cognition-based versus affect-
based, calculus-based versus identification-based, conditional versus unconditional trust: most 
typologies implicitly rest on specific assumptions concerning the amount of rationality in-
volved in the choice of a trusting act. At the same time, they differentiate trust with respect to 
the categories of trust-related knowledge that are used by the trustor. Unfortunately, the two 
dimensions (category of trust-related knowledge and its “mode of application”) are regularly 
interwoven, entangled, and regarded as fixed; the resulting typologies do not respect any flex-
ibility in information processing when specifying the different types of trust. Essentially, cur-
rent approaches do not treat adaptive rationality as a distinct dimension in its own right. But 
interpretation and choice, the degree of rationality involved, and the category of trust-related 
knowledge used to solve a trust problem are not fixed; they are independent and “orthogonal” 
dimensions of the typological space of trust. 
But the explanation of adaptive rationality demands a focus on the process of interpretation 
and the subjective definition of the situation; it automatically turns our attention to the mecha-
nisms by which the cognitive system regulates and achieves trust in “situated cognition” 
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(Kramer 2006). This entails a dynamic adaptation of information processing states to the cur-
rent needs of the situation and the context-sensitive activation of trust-related knowledge. 
Methodologically, this also necessitates a clear distinction and separation from interpretation 
and choice. Overall, when thinking about trust, the process of the subjective definition of the 
situation is central in specifying the phenomenological foundations, the “mindset” of trust, 
and the associated subjective experiences. In order to understand trust, we must sharpen our 
understanding of the “missing link” of interpretation. Concurrently, it is necessary to advance 
our knowledge and comprehension of adaptive rationality. This cannot be done without focus 
on interpretation and contingent mode-selections. They jointly determine the “route to trust.” 
The present work seeks to close this gap in current trust research.  
7.1. Trust, Framing, and Adaptive Rationality 
To equip trust research with the necessary tools, chapter 4 was wholly devoted to the explora-
tion of adaptive rationality, as developed and promoted in the area of social-cognition re-
search, in particular the dual-processing paradigm. The model of trust and adaptive rationality 
uses a general theory of action that directly builds on these important contributions. Using the 
Model of Frame Selection (MFS), I conceptualize trust as the outcome of the multi-stage pro-
cess of frame, script, and action-selection. This combines separate steps of interpretation 
(frame and script-selection) and choice (action-selection) paired with a flexible degree of ra-
tionality at each stage in one general theoretical framework. A crucial step towards causal 
modeling is the capability of the MFS to bring the determinants of information processing in-
to a functional relation and to spell out the mode-selection threshold which defines the condi-
tions that must prevail for automatic or rational information processing to occur. Guided by 
the natural assessments of opportunity and motivation, and relying on the initial categoriza-
tions of unfolding pattern recognition (the activation weights and “match”), mode-selections 
endogenously determine the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice. In 
other words, it directs the automatic or rational selection of trust-related knowledge at each 
stage of the trust development process. Furthermore, the formulation of explicit selection 
rules within the MFS establishes a long needed causal link between cognition and action, and 
thus between the categories of trust-related knowledge, the processing modes, and the choice 
of a trusting act. 
This reveals how the purported “leap of faith” and suspension in trust can be understood. As it 
is, suspension can occur at different stages of the trust-development process. Ultimately, it 
evolves from the contingent activation of the automatic mode during interpretation and choice 
of a trust problem. If the default mode of automatic information processing is selected and 
remains undisturbed, then trust can emerge without further scrutiny of the trust problem and 
without rising into the awareness of the trustor. The subjective experience associated with this 
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form of suspended, unconditional trust is nevertheless multifaceted: it may resemble the heu-
ristic use of affect and cognitive experiences as a “quick-step,” or be guided by the swift ap-
plication of relational schemata, trust-related rules, roles and routines, and any other source of 
trust-related knowledge. What matters, in the end, is that any potential doubts or the aware-
ness of vulnerability is suspended into subjective certainty at the level of mode-selection. That 
is, suspension is not a conscious and deliberate achievement of the trustor. It either occurs, or 
it does not. If conditions prevail that foster a switch to more elaborated and controlled pro-
cessing of the trust-problem, then trust may ultimately acquire those characteristics which are 
typical of cognition-based trust, feel “bothersome,” and promote a form of conditional trust in 
which only a “pretense” of suspension is at work. Arguably, we cannot predict which category 
of trust-related knowledge will come to bear in a particular solution of the trust problem. But 
importantly, its mode of application and the processing state of the cognitive system during 
interpretation and choice shape the “type” and nuance of trust that emerges in the subjective 
experience of the trustor as a result.  
Consequentially, I have defined trust as an actor’s definition of the situation that involves the 
activation of mental schemata sufficient for the generation of a favorable expectation of 
trustworthiness and the subsequent conditional or unconditional choice of a trusting act. This 
definition is very general and does not take care of the respective content of trust-related 
knowledge, nor demand a certain processing state. The “typological” specification of trust de-
pends on what category of knowledge is being used, and in which mode of information pro-
cessing it is applied. Nonetheless, it should be clear that any attempt of specifying a closed set 
of all-encompassing types of trust is futile. The definition presented here merges psychologi-
cal aspects, that is, trust as a “state of mind” (or state of the cognitive system), with the behav-
ioral aspect of choice and action. The choice of a trusting act can causally be traced back to an 
attempt at rational inference, at assessing trustee characteristics, and rationally weighing the 
expected costs and benefits of action and the activation of specific expectations, as well as to a 
routine execution of trust-related knowledge (relational schemata, rules, roles, routines) and a 
reliance on heuristic shortcuts in interpretation and choice. In the case of unconditional trust, 
suspension and the “leap of faith” take place on the level of mode selection (!), the parameters 
of which display the individual’s history of learning and socialization. Only in conditional 
trust will trustors consciously access their expectation of trustworthiness. In this case, the con-
text determines the relevance of trust-related knowledge and enables, via appropriateness be-
liefs, the formation and generation of expectations. I claim that this model of trust incorpo-
rates and reductively explains conditional and unconditional trust.  
The model offers access to the phenomenon of interpretation and suspension; it also locates 
the formation of trustworthiness expectations in the individual framing process. The broad 
perspective on trust assumes, under ideal conditions, an intimate match between cognition and 
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context. Then, expectations are a direct equivalent of the appropriateness beliefs that pertain 
to the applicability of trust-related knowledge in a trust problem. There is a subtle but im-
portant difference in the conception of expectations, as put forward, for example, in the ra-
tional choice paradigm, and the present formulation as an appropriateness belief. Even when 
the two are practically indistinguishable in the rational mode, the framing model connects the 
formation of expectations to more basic cognitive processes of schema recognition and the 
activation of trust-related frames. Appropriateness beliefs point to social-psychological con-
cepts such as “fit” and “applicability,” that is, to cognitive matches between stored mental 
schemata and situational cues and the spreading activation occurring in response to percep-
tion. As such, they mirror the working of a basic categorization process, and an internal 
achievement of the cognitive system. They are not merely a result of knowledge retrieval, nor 
based on trust-related information alone. Concurrently, the context-dependent activation of 
frames also has the potential to explain the emergence of different social preference functions, 
which are treated as exogenously given in rational choice models. They become relevant only 
if corresponding cultural knowledge is activated and processed in the rational mode. 
The human cognitive system directly builds on perceptual input when regulating the mode of 
information processing. Obviously, when taking into account human cognitive architecture, 
the process of trust may begin even before a conscious and deliberate interpretation of the 
trust problem, and without any effortful, elaborate and controlled decision-making process. 
This is the case when automatic interpretation and choice are furnished by salient and appro-
priate situational cues. If the routine of everyday behavior can be maintained by “matching” 
situational stimuli to preexisting stored interpretive schemes, then the allocation of attention, 
the conscious awareness of trust problems, and doubtful reasoning processes about the choice 
of a trusting act may be fully absent. One can argue with Luhmann that, in this sense, famili-
arity, trust and confidence do in fact gradually merge into each other. 
There is an important theoretical consequence of the broad perspective on trust that I have de-
veloped here. Although it becomes possible to explain various types of trust reductively as a 
consequence of context-dependent framing processes and adaptive rationality, the concept of 
trust itself seems to dissolve and become a redundant category. Many trust researchers are 
concerned that trust research is in danger of becoming irrelevant, because the concept seems 
to refer to all and nothing at the same time. In his work on the trust concept, Möllering, for 
example, demands that trust research needs to claim “some unique element in the concept of 
trust that existing theories are not able to capture” (2006b: 9), and he identifies suspension and 
the “leap of faith” as these unique elements. He concludes that, “trust research needs to find 
out how the leap is made” (ibid. 192). If there is some substance to the conception of trust that 
I have offered, then trustors principally “leap” into trust during automatic mode selections. 
That is, suspension is a result of the very general functioning of the cognitive system, and it is 
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hard to claim anything unique about it. Thinking in terms of adaptive rationality, suspension is 
not even exclusively related to the phenomenon of trust. One unique characteristic of the trust 
phenomenon is the fact that the very general process is then directed towards a situation that 
has the structure of a trust problem, and that it is solved with the help of different categories of 
relevant trust-related knowledge.  
In fact, I argue that there is no need to claim anything unique about trust. While it is true that, 
with the model of trust and adaptive rationality at hand, trust loses much of its “mysterious” 
and “elusive” character, it is rather a strength and advantage of a good theoretical model to 
make things look easy, once the hard work is done. Even though the drawing of disciplinary 
borders is often helpful in identifying a research domain and developing its agenda, social sci-
ence, to me, is set on a route towards an integrative and interdisciplinary unification. There is 
no reason to exclude trust research from this development. As it is, it is one of the most inter-
disciplinary fields in the social sciences. It should come to no surprise that the solutions of-
fered span disciplinary borders. The explanation offered here is very general and universal, 
and its reductive nature brings with it the property that a wide range of phenomena can be 
covered. However, it neither denies the importance of trust to social processes, nor implies 
that trust research is a meaningless endeavor that does not contribute to the social science 
agenda. 
Some researchers doubt that the route towards a general approach can be taken at all. For ex-
ample, Bigley and Pearce fear that “a universal conceptualization of trust and distrust may 
have difficulty in attaining a sufficient level of theoretical and empirical viability for research 
purposes” (1998: 408). That is, when “stretching” trust too far, there is a high risk of “produc-
ing constructions that are either too elaborate for theoretical purposes or relatively meaning-
less in the realm of empirical observation” (ibid.). In contrast, I claim that the model of trust 
and adaptive rationality is neither too theoretically complex, nor empirically empty. While it 
is true that its implications are complex and tedious to spell out, the empirical content of the 
theory is very high. It was derived here as a set of admissible interaction patterns which are 
implied by the model. This sort of hypothesis generation is beyond the proposition of simple 
main effects or the statement of general model propositions. The distinct advantage offered by 
the current model is that it is context-free; the relevant categories of trust-related knowledge, 
the frames and scripts used by trustors, are open to more detailed specification in a particular 
research problem. But the basic mechanism behind trust becomes transparent. 
7.2. The Role of Institutions and Culture 
In the model of trust and adaptive rationality, normative and cultural systems acquire a major 
role in the emergence and evolution of trust. Both provide and add to the stock of trust-related 
frames and scripts in which the social definition and constitution of a trust relation can occur. 
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They come, for example, in the form of social roles, norms, rules, routines, as well as cultural 
codes, moral standards or value systems, in sum, in the prevalent “trust culture” of a society. 
Together, these mental models constitute a major interactional resource on which the context-
sensitive definition of a trust problem can unfold in a particular situation. This evidently im-
plies that trust can neither be studied nor fully understood exclusively on either a purely indi-
vidual or a collective level, because it thoroughly permeates both. Social institutions often 
create the background of familiarity on which trust becomes tangible; they also provide the 
structural “safeguards” and structural assurance that enables trust between individuals.  
Broadly speaking, institutions and culture help to instill “taken-for-grantedness” and establish 
and maintain stable and unproblematic interaction. A major function of institutions is thus to 
provide a reduction in social complexity by providing socially shared information about the 
likely course of action in a social context—they do so, as proposed here, in the form of 
learned mental schemata about typical situations (frame), typical action sequences (scripts), 
typical actions by typical actors (role), and rules of action (norms). In the model of trust and 
adaptive rationality, these concepts are directly incorporated and mirrored in the chronic ac-
cessibility of trust-related frames and scripts, a crucial component of the activation weight 
and match. When institutions instill taken-for-granted expectations, the corresponding inter-
nalized mental schemata are often enacted without question, following a “logic of appropri-
ateness” (March & Olsen 1989). On the individual level, this amounts to postulating a preva-
lence of automatic selections during interpretation and choice. When the context of a trust 
problem indicates that certain institutions are part of the “rules of the game,” trust is enabled 
between actors because the institutions provide the means for a social definition of the situa-
tion and guide the individual framing processes without interruptions or nuisances. Ultimate-
ly, trust and trustworthiness can themselves acquire a taken-for-granted character in a particu-
lar and familiar trust problem. Rule-based forms of trust can trigger suspension without a con-
scious calculation of consequences. In specifying a causal model on the level of individual 
behavior, it is apparent that the mechanism behind unconditional trust is the contingent selec-
tion of the automatic mode, triggered by a high match between stored mental schemata and 
situational cues. I have furthermore argued that one most important class of trust-related 
knowledge can be found in generalized and specific relational schemata, of which humans 
acquire a plentitude in their social life. 
Moreover, the present thesis also extends the framework of trust and adaptive rationality from 
the individual’s to a collective, dynamic and interactive perspective. In the present conception 
of trust, actors normally reach the subjective definition of a trust problem in symbolic interac-
tion with each other, relying on the dynamic process of communication. Essentially, any trust 
relation must be explained as a genetic sequence of meaningful communicative acts in which 
the actors’ subjective definitions of the situation temporarily converge into a shared social 
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definition of the situation. Communication is decisive for the development of trust because it 
defines and influences the environment in which individual framing processes occur. This 
symbolic-interactionist perspective on interpersonal trust implies that trust relations must al-
ways be reciprocally and actively defined. Communication serves as the springboard for in-
terpretation; it is concurrently the major vehicle for producing trust-related cues. In short, the 
context and environment of a trust relation cannot be treated as static. They are dynamic, and 
actively shaped by the involved actors, by their actions and relational communication.  
The broad perspective of trust that I have developed here explains the constitution of a trust 
relation as a result of reflexive social framing (Esser 2001: 496). Social framing describes se-
quences of individual frame and action selections, their aggregation into a new objective so-
cial situation, and a feedback into new individual framing processes. The constitution and 
continuation of a trust relation then depend on structural coupling and the temporary conver-
gence of communicated meaning. A trust relation as a social system is “locally” constituted 
within a particular social environment as result of social framing processes. This is guided by 
the application of shared frames, which are reciprocally activated during communication. But 
social framing processes are bound to the laws and limits of individual adaptive rationality. 
For unconditional trust to emerge, the chains of communication associated with a trustful 
course of action need to unfold without problematic interruptions, and significant symbols 
must be effortlessly decoded, so that a structural coupling of communicative acts smoothly 
accumulate into the choice of a trusting act and its trustworthy response. As mentioned before, 
it is a unique contribution of this work to go beyond a statement of principle relations, and to 
instead spell out the necessary causal conditions in a precise and tractable theoretical model. 
The role of institutions and culture in this sequence cannot be underestimated. The cognitive 
dimension of trust, the trustor’s knowledge of the social world, points to processes of learning, 
socialization, familiarization, generalization, and to the development of practically relevant 
interpretive schemes and their routine application. The ability to trust is based on past experi-
ence, learning, and familiarity with the individual life-world, which render available the dif-
ferent categories of trust-related knowledge: specific information, such as trustee characteris-
tics, knowledge of dyadic and network embeddedness, and knowledge of the cultural-
normative frameworks surrounding the trust relation—such as rules, roles, norms, values, re-
lational schemata, stereotypes, and so forth.  
Another important implication of the social framing perspective on trust is that a trust relation, 
as any social system, must always be regarded as a state of temporary balance and a fragile 
“quasi-stationary equilibrium.” Even when trust sometimes appears as static, balanced and 
consistent, such an impression merely emerges from a snapshot of a dynamic time-dependent 
process. In this regard, the concept of active trust points to the flexibility and creativity in the 
feedback process during the social construction of trust. The actions of the parties involved 
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shape the emergence, continuation or dissolution of a trust relation, and trustor and trustee can 
influence the production of trust-related cues with relational communication, identity signal-
ing and impression management. But even when the reflexive constitution of a trust relation is 
a dynamic, open and volatile process, the causal antecedents to trust reside in the psychologi-
cal—and information-processing—states of individual actors. The opportunities and con-
straints of individual framing and bounded rationality extend to any social situation. Overall, 
when thinking about trust from a social framing perspective, the achievement of favorable 
conditions conducive to trust has to be regarded as a mutual achievement of the parties in-
volved, and the openness and autonomy inherent in communication leaves much space for a 
creative element and for an opportunity to actively shape the definition of the trust problem. 
This opportunity relates to both the trustor and the trustee, each of whom can actively and de-
liberately influence the other’s perspective. At the same time, it is clear that trustor and trustee 
rely on a large set of shared interpretive schemes during interaction. The stock of trust-related 
knowledge which actors use is, to a large extent, socialized and socially shared; the social 
construction of trust therefore always points to the cultural and institutional prerequisites of 
trust.  
Importantly, the dynamic perspective which was added in chapter 5 also demonstrates that 
institutions are not just passively consumed, but actively (re-)produced in an ongoing process 
of symbolic interaction and reflexive structuration. They are both an objective fact of a social-
ly constructed reality and an internalized part of individual identity at the same time (Berger 
& Luckmann 1966). The broad perspective promotes a symbolic-interactionist conception of 
trust. The constitution and social construction of trust involves the development, maintenance 
and application of interpretive schemes to which the actors refer, and which they symbolize 
and externalize during interaction. At the same time, they reproduce the social structure which 
is conducive to a buildup of trust and to which future action can refer. Trust, I argue here, is 
inseparably tied to this reflexive reproduction of structure and action. The social framing per-
spective of trust accommodates the idea that trust can emerge blindly in social interaction, 
based on routine, familiarity, and taken-for-grantedness. The present work contributes to such 
a structuration perspective by adding a microlevel foundation from which this process can be 
understood, and by delineating the role of normative and cultural systems in the cognitive 
processes involved. 
7.3. Avenues for Future Trust Research 
In this closing section, I want to reconnect my work to larger research agendas in the social 
sciences and highlight avenues for future research. The rise of trust as a “hot topic” is un-
doubtedly connected to its central role in a number of rudimentary social processes and its 
importance for many outcomes of human social life. An ever-increasing number of empirical 
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studies confirm that trust is of high social and economic relevance. A need for its theoretical 
explanation and for future research arises on all levels of analysis, from micro to meso and 
macro-analyses. Hence, the following stipulations are necessarily selective and cannot be con-
sidered exhaustive. In connecting to other research agendas, it is also apparent that cross-
fertilization can always occur in both directions. Trust research draws heavily from achieve-
ments and progress made in other disciplines, and its own progress can feed back into a num-
ber of related fields, and help to shape and advance the broad research agenda of social sci-
ence.  
For example, trust has been regularly connected to the question of identity and the individual. 
It directly merges with research about the development, stability, and change in personality. It 
is worth noting that current notions of the “psychology of the individual” have shifted from 
viewing personality as a stable set of traits into a more dynamic perspective that draws heavily 
from the dual-processing perspective of social cognition. This view is inherent in the MFS, 
where identity is recast as dependent on context-sensitive activations of frames, scripts and 
associated schemata of the self. The concept of a relational schema, which contains schematic 
descriptions of both self and other in a particular context, was promoted here as a prime 
source of trust-related knowledge. Concurrently, relational schemata are a prime source for 
the adoption of individual, relational and collective identities. The social framing perspective 
conceptualizes identity as a dynamic and temporary state and puts the social situation and its 
interactive construction into the focus of interest. In connecting identity theory to the concept 
of social framing and adaptive rationality, psychological research is directed towards the 
structural, normative, and cultural antecedents of identity and “identity salience.” Overall, 
connecting the broad perspective to the psychological and social-psychological agenda opens 
up a number of important avenues for future research. 
For one, it is clear that the very general propositions made here about the phenomenon of trust 
can always be adapted to a more detailed specification in real-life social contexts. To answer 
the question of interpersonal trust and to explain the emergence of trust relations in an applied 
context requires our understanding of the “concrete” frames and scripts which become practi-
cally relevant in, for example, romantic and marital relationships, ordinate-subordinate, pa-
tient-physician, and buyer-seller relationships, and so forth. This specification could be ac-
complished with additional qualitative studies to help refine the measurement of trust-related 
frames and scripts. Moreover, a number of existent instruments for specific forms of trust 
could, in principle, be tested for their role as chronic frame or script accessibility indicators in 
the relevant contexts. This would naturally carry the empirical basis of research from experi-
mental settings to the analysis of field data, and thus provide additional insights to the external 
validity of the results gathered in the present work. The qualitative specification of trust-
related knowledge not only pertains to different relational contexts, it extends to intercultural 
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research as well. Thus, the exploration of the intercultural bases and differences in “trust cul-
ture” could be fruitfully guided by the adaptive rationality perspective. In particular, intercul-
tural trust research has opened up an interesting debate about the generalizability of trust 
models (the "etic vs. emic" debate; see Dietz et al. 2010): while many trust researchers claim 
an etic position, assuming that trust concepts, models and measures are generalizable to all 
cultural contexts, some researchers defend an emic position and argue that differences in 
meaning and the antecedents and consequences of trust across cultural domains result in a 
practical non-comparability of trust models, which necessitates separate theoretical explana-
tions. The position taken here is decidedly etic. While the practical specification of frames 
may unveil cultural differences in relevant trust-related knowledge, the adaptive rationality 
perspective specifies general mechanisms that are independent of the “content” of cultural-
specific frames and scripts. The predictions of the MFS model thus could be tested across dif-
ferent cultural settings. Intercultural studies are an important area of future research by which 
the model of adaptive rationality and its propositions can be scrutinized.  
A second important avenue for future research on the microlevel relates to the field of social 
cognition and the emerging field of neuroeconomics. The neuroscience of trust, still in its in-
fancy, has the potential to become a central criterion in the evaluation of an integrative theory 
of trust. Simply put, if it is possible to trace back different “types” of trust to the preferential 
activation of different neuronal systems with the help of neuroscientific methods, then a broad 
theory of trust must be able to predict data on this empirical level as well. One potential 
source of such “hard” data comes from fRMI analyses and the study of oxytocin release in the 
human brain. Neuroscientific studies could support and extend the adaptive rationality per-
spective of trust in providing further insights and shape the solid microlevel foundation. This 
also directly addresses the theoretical advancement and corroboration of the MFS. Specifical-
ly, future studies need to attempt to predict the involved neuronal processes, guided by the 
framework of adaptive rationality and the formulation of the mode-selection threshold. At the 
same time, it should be clear that cognitive research will remain a most influential factor guid-
ing the future advancement of the MFS and its theoretical formulations. A constant dialogue 
and transfer of knowledge between the sociological approach to a general theory of action and 
the field of cognitive research addressing the roots of human cognition will remain one of the 
most important vehicles for an advancement of the broad perspective of trust, and, concurrent-
ly, of the adaptive rationality perspective. 
At the interpersonal and interorganizational level, trust is regarded as a central ingredient in 
explaining cooperation and as a key to understanding the development of collective action at 
large. As it is, trust problems are an important class of social dilemma situations. The question 
of their mastery is one of the most basic questions that can be asked in the social sciences. The 
framework of trust and adaptive rationality can support the analysis of cooperative phenome-
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na in many domains. For example, organizational science, by adopting the frame-perspective 
of trust, could determine the scope and extent to which the internalization of trust-related 
knowledge influences economic outcomes within and between organizations. Is the function 
of trust as a “social lubricant” limited to conditions conducive to automatic mode selections? 
Is it possible to determine qualitatively which norms, roles, and routines are relevant parts of 
the “organizational culture” and the “psychological contracts” that promote trust? Such issues 
could be accompanied by more practical advice on how to encourage the development of un-
conditional trust between the cooperating actors. Of course, this line of research is not limited 
to the study of organizations, but it extends to all forms of cooperation. Ultimately, one can 
expect new insights even in more distant areas, such as research on social closure, where the 
cooperative effort of exclusion and monopolization rests, to a large extent, on trust among the 
participating actors. From a social network perspective, stipulations for future research arise 
on all levels of embeddedness. Trust is a defining element in many network theories. New 
questions emerge once adaptive rationality is taken into account. If trust rests on adaptive ra-
tionality and networks rest on trust, then what can be learned about the stability of social net-
works? What does the structuration perspective of trust and its social construction imply for 
the conceptions of trust used in network theory? Also, how do other structural parameters, 
such as the distribution of power and control, influence, and potentially override, the constitu-
tion of trust within social networks?  
On the macrolevel, trust has been assigned a crucial role in the question of establishing and 
maintaining social order and social change at large. Trust is inseparably tied to the functioning 
and stability of social systems by its integrative function as a “lubricant” of cooperation and 
efficient mechanism for the reduction of social complexity. These broad research agendas be-
long to the core of sociological thinking and have always been at the center of theorizing in 
the social sciences. The broad perspective of trust emphasizes the potential for the emergence 
of stable “systems of trust” and the recursive and self-enforcing structuration of social systems 
on the basis of automatic and routine action, in which the “logic of appropriateness” unfolds 
under the conditions of adaptive rationality. This opens up a huge number of avenues for fu-
ture trust research, both on the theoretical and empirical front. Concerning the question of in-
stitutionalization and agency, it is interesting to explore how and when trust becomes self-
reinforcing. Thus, future studies would need to address the question of how trust can stabilize 
into “systems of trust” (Coleman 1990) and ask about the role of framing and adaptive ration-
ality in this regard. More generally speaking, future research needs to address the “logic of 
aggregation” and explore the dynamic feedback process of the social constitution of larger 
social systems in which trust is critical. Turning to more practical considerations, the adaptive 
rationality perspective has a potential to fundamentally change the way in which we look at, 
for example, the “psychology of markets” and individual market behavior, and similarly, the 
functioning of the political system. The theoretical consequences of postulating a reductive 
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logic of action that can easily depart from rational choice considerations is profound and 
needs to be gauged in future work. This can also lead to more practical conclusions concern-
ing the question of the stability of the political and economic systems, in both of which trust is 
seen to play a central role. An issue that was decidedly excluded from the present work as an 
explanandum in its own right is institutional trust, that is, trust towards objects that are not 
individual actors. The adaptive rationality perspective bears important implications for the 
explanation and emergence of system trust, which back up the functioning of the institutional 
and cultural systems of society. 
Apart from these very general suggestions, there are a number of concrete next steps which 
need to be tackled in advancing the adaptive rationality perspective of trust. In part, they 
emerge as a direct consequence of the limitations of the present work and other previous stud-
ies. To begin with, this study did not vary all factors of the mode-selection threshold. Clearly, 
there is much room for future experiments to manipulate other factors and other factorial 
combinations of the mode-selection threshold parameters (for example, in combination with 
opportunity). This research is necessary in further testing the precise interplay of the mode-
selection determinants. Coincidentally, such studies can provide corroboration and a check on 
the robustness of the results obtained here. Secondly, any experimental study is confronted 
with the potential criticism of being not externally valid. Future studies should carry the basic 
framework adopted here “to the field” and devise experiments in a natural setting in which the 
basic propositions of the MFS perspective can be thoroughly tested. Third, the present study 
has not sought to explore the role of affect during interpretation and choice. If emotions are 
not only a consequence of interpretation, but also influence processing states, then an im-
portant avenue for future studies is to explore empirically and theoretically their role in the 
trust development process. On a theoretical level, the impact of emotions has only been provi-
sionally explored within the MFS framework (see Esser 2005). Fourth, it is clear that the 
frames and scripts used in this experiment to operationalize chronic accessibility parameters 
can, in principle, be substituted by other indicators. For example, fairness norms or distribu-
tional concerns might become relevant in the experimental setting. Future experiments could 
devise alternative measures, the selection of which should be adapted to the concrete design of 
the experimental context. Thus, research needs to simultaneously explore other means of op-
erationalizing the threshold-parameters and manipulating the context of the trust problem ex-
perimentally. Fifth, one particular issue that has emerged in the present experiment is the 
question of “nuisance” and its theoretical inclusion in or exclusion from the activation 
weights. Future experiments could be devoted to exploring the role of disruptions versus sta-
bility in the subjective definition of the situation. This approach could be very fruitfully con-
nected to trust research: a prominent case of a “nuisance” in pre-established trust relations is 
the failure of trust by the trustee. Put shortly, one could not only experimentally create a cer-
tain context, but could dynamically change the definitions of the situation of the participants. 
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For example, depending on “situational strength” and norm-internalization, how stable is trust 
against violations in repeated interactions? How likely are trustors to change their perspec-
tives following a breach of trust? How can trust be re-established? Sixth, I propose to re-
examine previous “stake-size” experiments and studies of incentive effects for their potential 
use under the head-note of adaptive rationality. Thus, any data-set in which a stake-size ma-
nipulation is paired with an indicative measure of a relevant norm and its accessibility can be 
used to test the MFS predictions in retrospective (see for example, Johansson-Stenman et al. 
2005, who collect a one-item generalized trust measure, but do not test interactive effects with 
the incentive treatment, as implied by the MFS). In principle, cognitive motivation could also 
be varied with an alternative manipulation, such as “fear of invalidity” (Sanbonmatsu & Fazio 
1990). However, it should be clear that the use of monetary incentives is the most credible 
course of action from an “economic” point of view. Future experiments could also carry the 
experimental setting to market economies in which a much higher “stake size” can be 
achieved with the research funds (of course, cultural differences in the measurement of rele-
vant frames and scripts have to be respected). Last but not least, future studies need to address 
the pending issue of generating a sufficient number of observations in the data sample. This is 
particularly important with respect to the analysis of decision times, which naturally have a 
large variation. Methodically, one potential route would be a turn to other experimental de-
signs (potentially departing from the topic of trust and the investment game setup) which pro-
vide data on multiple observations “within” individuals. A shift from between-subject to with-
in-subject designs with repeated measurements would allow for an even more stringent analy-
sis of causal effects.  
Summarizing these suggestions for future trust research, and restating the main argument that 
was developed in this book, it is crucial to recognize the importance of interpretation and 
adaptive rationality to our understanding of the trust phenomenon. A perspective that puts 
human bounded rationality to the core of theorizing but goes beyond mere descriptive work 
has the potential to change the way we think about a number of social phenomena in which 
trust plays a decisive role. Conceptually, this means that our “models of man” need to be ad-
justed accordingly. The perspective of adaptive rationality has the potential to provide the ex-
planative core of a macro-micro-macro model in which the causal explanation of social phe-
nomena can be accomplished reductively, that is, by reference to a more general process in 
which rational versus irrational, cognitive versus noncognitive, automatic versus controlled 
“types” of action can be traced back to a common underlying mechanism. This perspective 
points to the interaction between several cognitively relevant parameters that guide the ad-
justment of the degree of rationality involved in interpretation and choice. If this is recog-
nized, then I am confident that future trust research will bring substantive benefits to the broad 
research agenda of sociology, and contribute to the advancement of social science. 
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Appendix A: Omitted Tables and Results 
Chapter 6.5.2, Table 10: Trust and chronic script accessibility, omitted control variables 
 Tobit Robust GLM 
Nfcscale 0.181 0.168 0.744 
 
(1.02) (1.14) (1.2) 
Fiscale -0.0577 -0.0857 -0.217 
 
(-0.29) (-0.52) (-0.33)    
Append -0.0775+ -0.0711+ -0.27 
 
(-1.47) (-1.52) (-1.44)    
age3 -0.0142+ -0.0117+ -0.0435 
 
(-1.48) (-1.57) (-1.29)    
Sex -0.0736+ -0.0719+ -0.311*   
 
(-1.44) (-1.52) (-1.71)    
Partner -0.00701 0.0164 0.0338 
 
(-0.15) (0.41) (0.21) 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Chapter 6.5.2, Table 10: Trust and chronic script accessibility, orthogonal models 
 
Tobit Robust GLM 
end -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.473*** 
 
(-2.60) (-2.99) (-2.98)    
frame 0.002 -0.007 -0.017 
 
(0.05) (-0.17) (-0.10)    
recskala 0.204 0.203 0.805 
 
(0.7) (0.8) (0.76) 
end*recscale 1.253** 1.001** 4.427**  
 
(2.15) (2.03) (2.07) 
frame*recscale 0.0421 -0.0347 -0.0394 
 
(0.06) (-0.06) (-0.02)    
end*frame 1.179* 0.857+ 3.841*   
 
(1.84) (1.53) (1.65) 
end*frame*recscale -1.820* -1.336+ -5.960*   
 
(-1.93) (-1.63) (-1.76)    
trustscale 0.310+ 0.281* 1.118+   
 
(1.46) (1.67) (1.63) 
nfcscale 0.181 0.168 0.744 
 
(1.02) (1.14) (1.2) 
fiscale -0.058 -0.086 -0.217 
 
(-0.29) (-0.52) (-0.33)    
append -0.078+ -0.071+ -0.27 
 
(-1.47) (-1.52) (-1.44)    
age -0.014+ -0.012+ -0.044 
 
(-1.48) (-1.57) (-1.29)    
sex -0.0736+ -0.0719+ -0.311*   
 
(-1.44) (-1.52) (-1.71)    
partner -0.007 0.016 0.034 
374 
 
 
(-0.15) (0.41) (0.21) 
constant 0.166 0.189 -1.333 
 
(0.56) (0.76) (-1.26)    
Pseudo R2 (ps. LL) 0.084 0.1105 (-155.2) 
Wald (full model) 36.28*** 44.05*** 33.76*** 
χ2 Improvement (4df) 7.9* 7.38+ 7.23+ 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Chapter 6.5.2, Table 11: Trust and chronic frame accessibility, omitted control variables 
 
Tobit Robust GLM 
fiscale -0.076 -0.088 -0.26 
 
(-0.37) (-0.50) (-0.38) 
nfcscale 0.202 0.21 0.864 
 
(1.14) (1.42) (1.4) 
append -0.059 -0.058 -0.218 
 
(-1.07) (-1.20) (-1.13) 
age -0.015+ -0.014* -0.047 
 
(-1.52) (-1.73) (-1.33) 
sex -0.076 -0.072+ -0.308* 
 
(-1.39) (-1.50) (-1.67) 
partner -0.006 0.019 0.034 
 
(-0.13) (0.48) (0.22) 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Chapter 6.5.2, Table 11: Trust and chronic frame accessibility, orthogonal models 
 
Tobit Robust GLM 
end -0.117** -0.120*** -0.463*** 
 
(-2.53) (-2.96) (-2.89)    
frame 0.004 0.0003 -0.01 
 
(0.09) (0.01) (-0.06)    
trustscale 0.249 0.256 0.926 
 
(0.98) (1.18) (1.15) 
end*frame -0.339 -0.123 -1.067 
 
(-0.66) (-0.28) (-0.64)    
end*trustscale -0.301 0.001 -0.392 
 
(-0.54) (0) (-0.21)    
frame*trustscale -0.231 0.001 -0.517 
 
(-0.34) (0) (-0.24)    
end*frame*trustscale 0.483 0.122 1.444 
 
(0.56) (0.17) (0.52) 
recscale 0.296 0.292 1.066 
 
(1.01) (1.15) (1.04) 
fiscale -0.076 -0.088 -0.26 
 
(-0.37) (-0.50) (-0.38)    
nfcscale 0.202 0.21 0.864 
 
(1.14) (1.42) (1.4) 
375 
 
append -0.059 -0.058 -0.218 
 
(-1.07) (-1.20) (-1.13)    
age -0.015+ -0.014* -0.047 
 
(-1.52) (-1.73) (-1.33)    
sex -0.076 -0.072+ -0.308*   
 
(-1.39) (-1.50) (-1.67)    
partner -0.006 0.019 0.034 
 
(-0.13) (0.48) (0.22) 
constant 0.123 0.097 -1.506 
 
(0.39) (0.37) (-1.39)    
Pseudo R2 (Ps. LL) 0.0652 0.0945 -156.54 
Wald (full model) 22.31* 29.15*** 22.4** 
χ2 Improvement (4df) 0.75 0.55 0.81 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Chapter 6.5.2, Table 12: Trust and activation weight components, omitted control variables  
 
Tobit Robust GLM 
nfcscale 0.171 0.17 0.743 
 
-0.94 -1.12 -1.16 
fiscale -0.0585 -0.0765 -0.218 
 
(-0.29) (-0.46) (-0.33)    
append -0.0718 -0.0667 -0.251 
 
(-1.35) (-1.40) (-1.32)    
age -0.0140+ -0.0116+ -0.0426 
 
(-1.45) (-1.54) (-1.26)    
sex -0.0842* -0.0813* -0.342*   
 
(-1.65) (-1.70) (-1.87)    
partner -0.00132 0.0209 0.0455 
 
(-0.03) -0.52 -0.28 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Chapter 6.5.2: Table 12: Trust and activation weight components, orthogonal models  
 
Tobit Robust GLM 
frame 0.003 -0.007 -0.012 
 
(0.06) (-0.17) (-0.07)    
trustscale 0.330+ 0.308* 1.198*   
 
(-1.52) (1.84) (1.69) 
recscale 0.304 0.27 1.069 
 
(1.06) (1.09) (1.03) 
frame*trustscale -0.153 -0.06 -0.359 
 
(-0.39) (-0.19) (-0.27)    
frame*recscale -0.917* -0.736* -3.025*   
 
(-1.83) (-1.69) (-1.69)    
trustscale*recscale 2.933 1.818 6.193 
 
(0.95) (0.75) (0.6) 
frame*trust.*rec* -1.362 0.213 0.237 
 
(-0.28) (0.05) (0.01) 
376 
 
end -0.116** -0.118*** -0.460*** 
 
(-2.51) (-2.91) (-2.85)    
nfcscale 0.181 0.175 0.77 
 
(0.99) (1.13) (1.2) 
fiscale -0.054 -0.075 -0.205 
 
(-0.27) (-0.44) (-0.31)    
append -0.070 -0.066 -0.245 
 
(-1.32) (-1.40) (-1.28)    
age -0.014+ -0.012+ -0.044 
 
(-1.49) (-1.58) (-1.32)    
sex -0.082+ -0.079* -0.335*   
 
(-1.60) (-1.66) (-1.82)    
partner -0.008 0.016 0.024 
 
(-0.17) (0.39) (0.15) 
constant 0.0835 0.115 -1.591+   
 
(0.28) (0.46) (-1.54)    
Ps. R2 (ps. LL) 0.076 0.105 (-155.9) 
Wald (full model) 31.34*** 36.68*** 28.05** 
χ2 Improvement (4df) 4.19 3.56 3.18 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Chapter 6.5.3: Regression of reltrust on processing preferences 
Variable 
Orthogonal, using nfcscale 
Variable 
Orthogonal, using fiscale 
Tobit Robust GLM1) Tobit Robust GLM1) 
   
              
  
             
end -0.121*** -0.124*** -0.475*** end -0.117** -0.123*** -0.469*** 
 
(-2.64) (-3.10) (-3.01)     (-2.45) (-3.03) (-2.90)    
frame 0.003 -0.002 -0.021 frame 0.004 -0.003 -0.014 
 
(-0.05) (-0.06) (-0.13)     (-0.08) (-0.07) (-0.08)    
nfcscale 0.122 0.152 0.62 fiscale -0.005 -0.029 -0.093 
 
-0.61 -0.88 -0.9  (-0.02) (-0.14) (-0.12)    
       
end*frame -0.886+ -0.51 -2.75 end*frame 0.359* 0.321* 1.268*   
 
(-1.51) (-1.03) (-1.34)     (-1.69) (-1.87) (-1.86) 
end*nfcscale -0.385 -0.192 -1.189 end*fiscale 0.312 0.283 1.086 
 
(-0.87) (-0.49) (-0.73)     (-1.12) (-1.2) (-1.13) 
frame*nfcscale -0.697 -0.409 -1.926 frame*fi. 0.253 0.244 0.741 
 
(-1.34) (-0.92) (-1.09)     (-0.47) (-0.55) (-0.42) 
end*frame. 1.073+ 0.601 3.279 end*frame -0.192 -0.0253 -0.434 
* nfcscale (-1.45) (-0.97) (-1.28) * fiscale (-0.37) (-0.06) (-0.26)    
        
trustscale 0.268 0.237 0.975+   trustscale 0.225 0.135 0.622 
 
(-1.3) (-1.41) (-1.45)  (-0.42) (-0.3) (-0.36) 
recscale 0.257 0.248 0.938 recscale -0.474 -0.448 -1.475 
 
(-0.85) (-0.97) (-0.91)  (-0.60) (-0.68) (-0.56)    
       
age -0.066 -0.057 -0.234 age -0.068 -0.064 -0.246 
 
(-1.23) (-1.21) (-1.24)     (-1.28) (-1.41) (-1.32)    
sex -0.014+ -0.013* -0.045 sex -0.016* -0.014* -0.05+   
 
(-1.46) (-1.75) (-1.31)     (-1.70) (-1.94) (-1.47)    
partner -0.082+ -0.079+ -0.342*   partner -0.089* -0.085* -0.361**  
 
(-1.48) (-1.60) (-1.84)     (-1.67) (-1.86) (-2.00)    
append -0.016 0.013 0.007 append -0.004 0.018 0.042 
 
(-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.04)  (-0.09) (-0.46) (-0.27) 
constant 0.167 0.136 -1.373 constant 0.17 0.208 -1.106 
 
(-0.53) (-0.51) (-1.28)     (-0.65) (-0.96) (-1.26)    
377 
 
Ps. R2 (ps. LL) 0.07 0.959 (-156.3)  0.067 0.095 (-156.68) 
Wald (full model) 25.56** 31.17*** 25.85**  22.5** 29.7*** 22.14* 
χ2 Improvement (4df) 2.52 1.24 2.03  1.94 1.69 1.54 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. 1) Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
Chapter 6.6.4: Omitted figure displaying predicted logtime, using model specification (4) 
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Chapter 6.7.3: Combining accessibility and processing preferences, model specification (6) 
Variable 
 
Tobit 
 
Robust 
 
GLM1) 
end  -0.100** -0.104** 
 
-0.110** -0.111*** 
 
-0.409**  -0.435*** 
 
 (-2.07) (-2.20)  (-2.57) (-2.71)  (-2.52)    (-2.65)    
frame  -0.00165 0.0157  -0.0123 -0.00306  -0.0116 0.0369 
 
 (-0.03) -0.33  (-0.30) (-0.07)  (-0.07)    -0.22 
recscale  0.567* 0.880***  0.384+ 0.667**  1.955*   3.049**  
 
 -1.79 -2.58  -1.46 -2.38  -1.74 -2.44 
fiscale  0.011 -0.0537  -0.0284 -0.0863  0.0235 -0.14 
 
 -0.05 (-0.23)  (-0.13) (-0.44)  -0.03 (-0.18)    
end*frame  10.28*** 10.90***  7.018** 7.129**  33.01**  36.58*** 
 
 -2.77 -2.9  -2.45 -2.42  -2.56 -2.62 
end*fiscale  8.641** 9.288***  5.224** 6.129**  25.24**  28.25**  
 
 -2.53 -2.62  -2.17 -2.34  -2.11 -2.21 
frame*fiscale  2.076 2.593  2.207 2.909  7.376 9.449 
 
 -0.61 -0.73  -0.71 -0.86  -0.65 -0.75 
end*recscale  9.751*** 10.19***  6.154*** 6.829***  28.94**  31.22**  
  -2.89 -2.94  -2.65 -2.75  -2.49 -2.52 
frame*recscale  1.926 2.104  2.047 2.429  6.962 7.699 
  -0.58 -0.63  -0.69 -0.79  -0.64 -0.67 
recscale*fiscale  1.81 3.051  1.337 2.564  5.118 10.06 
 
 -0.61 -0.94  -0.53 -0.9  -0.51 -0.87 
end* frame*recscale  -15.58*** -16.04***  -10.82** -10.59**  -49.91**  -53.59**  
 
 (-2.78) (-2.84)  (-2.49) (-2.39)  (-2.57)    (-2.56)    
end*frame*fiscale  -14.55*** -15.60***  -9.832** -10.30**  -46.48**  -52.29**  
 
 (-2.59) (-2.72)  (-2.23) (-2.22)  (-2.38)    (-2.45)    
end*recscale*fiscale  -13.51*** -14.30***  -8.253** -9.404**  -39.13**  -43.01**  
 
 (-2.60) (-2.69)  (-2.24) (-2.39)  (-2.18)    (-2.26)    
frame*rec.*fis.  -3.117 -3.472  -3.395 -4.136  -11.39 -12.87 
 
 (-0.61) (-0.65)  (-0.72) (-0.82)  (-0.66)    (-0.69)    
end*frame*rec.*fis.  21.85*** 22.76***  15.00** 15.13**  69.67**  75.91**  
 
 (2.58) -2.64  -2.25 -2.18  -2.37 -2.38 
constant  0.0932 0.0542  0.0542 0.185  -1.414+   -1.806 
 
 -0.34 -0.14  -0.14 -0.61  (-1.48)    (-1.36)    
Pseudo R2 (ps. LL)  0.076 0.126  0.084 0.141  (-156.58) (-152.81) 
Wald (full model)  22.83** 42.84***  28.85** 47.07***  19.4 35.64** 
χ2 Improvement (11df)  15.31+ 15.07  16.56+  14.09   12.63  12.08  
Control variables  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Note: N=298 observations in all models. T-values in brackets. All models use non-parametric bootstrapping of parameter 
estimates with 2000 replications. 1) Effects on log-odds. + p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Ad table 16: Fitting DT distributions across subgroups 
Fitting Across Experimental Conditions (outliers excluded, N=289) 
 
Low/Neutral Low/Cooperative High/Neutral High/Cooperative 
D= p= D= p= D= p= D= p= 
Lognormal 0.084 0.638 0.088 0.638 0.081 0.710 0.059 0.945 
Log-Logistic 0.083 0.646 0.068 0.892 0.078 0.744 0.078 0.715 
Inv. Gauss 0.074 0.791 0.081 0.734 0.085 0.641 0.059 0.944 
Weibull 0.113 0.283 0.135 0.149+ 0.110 0.322 0.081 0.683 
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Appendix B: Items, Scales, and Instructions 
The following tables list the items of those scales which were used in the experiment. They 
also present all associated measures of reliability. All scales were elicited using a 7-point Lik-
ert-type scale ranging from “fully agree” to “fully disagree,” including a “don´t know”-option. 
The reliability measures obtained refer to the full data sample including N=298 observations. 
The scales were constructed by computing the average row mean across all items of the scale, 
normalizing the scale range to [0,1]. Missing values were left out. A list of items translated 
into English is available from the author on request. 
1. Interpersonal Trust Inventory (Kassebaum 2004), short version 
Item Factor Loading 
(1) In der Regel begegne ich fremden Menschen mit großer Vorsicht 0.2564 
(2) Die meisten Menschen würden eine günstige Gelegenheit nutzen, um sich auf 
Kosten anderer zu bereichern 
0.6561 
(3) Ich gehe in der Regel davon aus, dass andere Menschen mir gegenüber nicht 
nur gute Absichten haben 
0.6724 
(4) Institutionen wie Verwaltungen, Behörden, Ämtern usw., kann ich nur sehr 
schwer vertrauen 
0.5265 
(5) Ich habe oft Angst davor, dass fremde Menschen mir und meiner Umwelt 
Schaden zufügen könnten. 
0.5159 
(6) Im Grunde kann man den Mitmenschen vertrauen. 0.4123 
(7) Wenn man seine finanziellen Angelegenheiten nicht weitgehend selbst regelt, 
muss man befürchten, hereingelegt oder hintergangen zu werden. 
0.4511 
(8) Manchmal befürchte ich, dass sogenannte "Experten" Entscheidungen treffen 
könnten, die sich negativ auf mein Wohlergehen auswirken 
0.5126 
(9) Wenn andere eine Aufgabe für mich erledigen, würde ich mich am liebsten 
ständig vergewissern, ob sie es auch in meinem Sinne und nach meinen Vorstel-
lungen tun. 
0.5078 
Factors retained: 1 
Eigenvalue= 2.32 
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.77 
 
2. Reciprocity Scale (Perugini et al. 2003) 
Item 
Factor1 
(pos. rec.) 
Factor 2 
(neg. rec.) 
(1) Jemandem zu helfen ist die beste Methode um sicherzustel-
len, dass man in Zukunft auch selbst Hilfe erhält. 
0.4663 0.1154 
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(2) Wenn mir jemand einen Gefallen tut, bin ich bereit, dies zu 
erwidern. 
0.575 0.2361 
(3) Wenn mir schweres Unrecht zuteil wird, werde ich mich 
um jeden Preis bei der nächsten Gelegenheit rächen. 
-0.4957 0.6467 
(4) Wenn mich jemand in eine schwierige Lage bringt, werde 
ich das Gleiche mit ihm machen. 
-0.5448 0.617 
(5) Ich strenge mich besonders an, um jemandem zu helfen, 
der mir früher schon geholfen hat. 
0.5888 0.3426 
(6) Wenn ich jemandem ein Kompliment mache, erwarte ich 
auch, dass er es erwidert. 
-0.1011 0.3017 
(7) Ich bin bereit, Kosten auf mich zu nehmen, um jemandem 
zu helfen, der mir früher schon einmal geholfen hat. 
0.5258 0.3354 
(8) Ich vermeide es, unhöflich zu sein, weil ich nicht will, dass 
andere unhöflich zu mir sind. 
0.4002 0.0923 
(9) Wenn mich jemand beleidigt, werde ich mich ihm 
gegenüber auch beleidigend verhalten. 
-0.2973 0.369 
(10) Wenn ich hart arbeite, erwarte ich einen entsprechenden 
Lohn. 
0.2116 0.3542 
(11) Wenn mich jemand höflich nach etwas fragt, helfe ich 
gerne weiter. 
0.6541 0.0867 
(12) Wenn mir jemand die richtigen Lottozahlen nennt, gebe 
ich ihm sicherlich einen Teil des Gewinns. 0.3582 0.1695 
Factors retained: 2 
Eigenvalues: 2.573, 1.495 
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.6520 
 
3. Faith In intuition Scale (Keller et al. 2000) 
Item Factor Loading 
(1) Bei den meisten Entscheidungen ist es sinnvoll, sich auf sein Gefühl zu verlas-
sen. 
0.6987 
(2) Ich bin ein sehr intuitiver Mensch. 0.6248 
(3) Wenn es um Menschen geht, kann ich meinem unmittelbaren Gefühl vertrauen. 0.7611 
(4) Ich vertraue meinen unmittelbaren Reaktionen auf andere 0.7187 
(5) Der erste Einfall ist oft der beste. 0.4887 
(6) Wenn die Frage ist, ob ich anderen vertrauen soll, entscheide ich normalerweise 
aus dem Bauch heraus. 
0.589 
(7) Mein erster Eindruck von anderen ist fast immer zutreffend. 0.5409 
(8) Ich spüre meistens sofort, wenn jemand lügt 0.3725 
(9) Wenn ich mir eine Meinung zu einer Sache bilden soll, verlasse ich mich ganz 
auf meine Intuition 
0.5806 
(10) Ich glaube, ich kann meinen Gefühlen vertrauen. 0.7095 
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(11) Ich kann mir über andere sehr schnell einen Eindruck bilden. 0.4972 
Factors retained: 1 
Eigenvalue: 4.079 
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.8462 
 
4. Need for Cognition Scale (Keller et al. 2000) 
Item Factor Loading 
(1) Ich finde es nicht sonderlich aufregend, neue Denkweisen zu erlernen. 0.4915 
(2) Ich finde wenig Befriedigung darin, angestrengt stundenlang nachzudenken 0.6279 
(3) Abstrakt zu denken reizt mich nicht. 0.6438 
(4) Die Vorstellung, mich auf mein Denkvermögen zu verlassen, um es zu etwas zu 
bringen, spricht mich nicht an. 
0.478 
(5) Ich würde lieber etwas tun, das wenig Denken erfordert, als etwas, das mit 
Sicherheit meine Denkfähigkeit herausfordert. 
0.7355 
(6) Denken entspricht nicht dem, was ich unter Spaß verstehe. 0.6099 
(7) Ich trage nicht gern die Verantwortung für eine Situation, die sehr viel Denken 
erfordert. 
0.6588 
(8) Ich versuche, Situationen vorauszuahnen und zu vermeiden, in denen die Wahr-
scheinliohkeit groß ist, \par dass ich intensiv über etwas nachdenken muss. 
0.5581 
(9) Es genügt, dass etwas funktioniert, mit ist egal, wie oder warum. 0.5359 
(10) Ich akzeptiere die Dinge meist lieber so wie sie sind, anstatt sie zu hinterfragen. 0.5924 
(11) Es genügt mir, einfach die Antwort zu kennen, ohne die Gründe für die Antwort 
auf ein Problem zu verstehen. 
0.377 
(12) Wenn ich eine Aufgabe erledigt habe, die viel geistige Anstrengung erfordert 
hat, fühle ich mich eher erleichtert als befriedigt. 
0.5053 
(13) Das Denken in neuen und unbekannten Situationen fällt mir schwer. 0.6109 
Factors retained: 1 
Eigenvalue: 4.345 
Cronbach´s Alpha: 0.8588 
 
5. Item/Scale Intercorrelations 
 
recscale trustscale fiscale nfcscale 
recscale 1    
trustscale -0.2064 1   
fiscale 0.0842 0.1672 1  
nfcscale -0.1054 0.201 -0.0078 1 
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6. Instructions used in the experiment 
The following instructions were used in the experiment. They are listed here in the order in 
which they were presented to the participants. Any reference to the two experimental manipu-
lations, that is, the framing or incentive treatments, will be highlighted, and the alternative 
formulation be presented in brackets, whenever possible. This section includes the (1) general 
instructions which participants found in their booth, and screenshots of the actual experiment, 
presenting (2) welcome screen, (3) on-screen instructions of the investment game (4) the con-
trol question stage, and (5) the decision stage. An English translation of the instructions is 
available from the author on request. 
(1) General Instructions, presented on paper when seating participants in computer booth: 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für die Teilnehmer: 
 
Auszahlungen 
Sie nehmen nun an einem Experiment der Universität Mannheim teil. Im Laufe des Experi-
mentes werden Sie Entscheidungen treffen und können dabei Punkte verdienen. Die Höhe des 
Betrages hängt von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen und von den Entscheidungen anderer 
Teilnehmer ab.  
Am Ende des Experiments wird eine der Aufgaben, die Sie bearbeitet haben, zufällig aus-
gewählt. Die Entscheidungen in dieser Aufgabe werden dann zur Berechnung der endgültigen 
Auszahlung herangezogen. Dazu werden die Punkte im Verhältnis 1:1 in Euro umgerechnet. 
Der Betrag wird am Ende der Sitzung in bar ausgezahlt. 
Hinweis 
Während des Experiments ist es nicht gestattet, mit den anderen Teilnehmern des Experi-
ments zu kommunizieren! Falls Sie Fragen haben, heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand. Wir kommen 
dann zu Ihnen und beantworten Ihre Frage. Eine Missachtung kann zum Ausschluss führen. 
Dateneingabe 
Dezimalzahlen werden bei der Eingabe von Daten mit einem Punkt getrennt (z.B. 6.5).  
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Ablauf 
Zu Beginn des Experiments werden alle Personen zufällig aufgeteilt. Dabei bilden Sie und ein 
Partner [ein anderer Teilnerhmer] ein Team [eine Gruppe] aus zwei Personen. Weder vor 
noch nach dem Experiment erfahren Sie, mit wem Sie in einem Team [einer Gruppe] waren. 
Ebenso wird Ihr Partner [der andere Teilnehmer] Ihre Identität nicht erfahren, d.h. alle 
Entscheidungen bleiben anonym.  
Instruktionen am Bildschirm erläutern die Aufgaben. In jeder Aufgabe treffen Sie nur eine 
Entscheidung. Bevor Sie eine Entscheidung treffen, können Sie deswegen die Dateneingabe 
üben und beantworten Kontrollfragen, die Ihnen helfen, die Aufgabe zu verstehen. 
Wenn Sie diese allgemeinen Erklärungen gelesen haben, klicken Sie „Weiter…“, um mit der 
Bearbeitung der Aufgaben am Bildschirm zu beginnen! 
(2) Screenshot: welcome screens (presented while reading the general instructions) 
(a) Cooperative framing intro screen 
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(b) Neutral framing intro screen  
 
(3) Screenshot: Instructions of the investment game (cooperative framing manipulation 
and high incentive treatments highlighted, the neutral framing / low incentive condi-
tions were established by replacing the fields with the corresponding formulations 
(i.e., “Teilnehmer” [participant], “Gruppe” [group] and low initial endowments of 7) 
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(4) Screenshot: On screen control questions stage (cooperative framing treatment) 
 
 
(5) The decision stage of the experiment (high incentive and cooperative framing treat-
ments highlighted and presented here) 
 
 
386 
 
Appendix C: Deriving Interaction Patterns 
This section will demonstrate how the set of admissible interaction patterns that were used to 
guide the empirical analysis in chapter 6 can be analytically derived. The procedure can be 
adapted to other contexts and situations as well, by following the two steps listed below.  
1. Set up bridge hypotheses  
The analysis begins by linking processing modes to observable outcomes. This is the first and 
most important step in the analysis. Ideally, the outcome variable crucially differs between the 
rational and automatic processing modes. Thus, using the link, we can infer the processing 
mode from the observed data. In the present case, the following bridge hypotheses were used: 
B1 (automatic mode): Unconditional trust leads to a complete transfer of resources, X=E. 
B2 (rational mode): Conditional trust supports any transfer between zero and the initial en-
dowment, XƐ[0, E]. 
B3 (rational mode): Distrust leads to a transfer of zero, X=0. 
B4 (decision time): The decision time in the automatic mode is shorter than the decision time 
in the rational mode. 
B5 (corollary): Unconditional trust results in a shorter decision time than conditional trust. 
Thus, the model predicts relatively lower transfers and relatively longer DT in the case of the 
rational mode, and relatively higher transfer decisions and shorter DT in the automatic mode. 
Of course, these bridge hypotheses can be criticized on empirical and theoretical grounds. In 
the present case, one can claim that rational mode decisions may lead to full trust, and like-
wise, that automatic mode decisions can lead trustors into distrust as well. The argument that 
was advanced in chapter 6.1 and 6.3 is that, on average, the proposed relations will hold. This 
proposition is based on a review of previous studies and empirical findings. Overall, this step 
accomplishes that the results of mode-selection (automatic mode, rational mode) are linked to 
the two dependent variables which are collected in the experiment. 
Next, to simplify the mode-selection threshold and reduce the number of variables which are 
varied along with the treatment conditions, all remaining parameters should be held constant 
or controlled for. A number of additional bridge hypotheses have to be set up for those varia-
bles which cannot be empirically controlled. In particular, the following additional assump-
tions are made when testing the model: 
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1. A trust frame is linked to an appropriate script, that is, aj|k=1  (A1) 
2. The script regulates action to a high degree, such that ak|j=1   (A2) 
(see chapters 4.6 and 4.7) 
3. Situational cues are significant symbols with respect to indicating the appropriateness 
of the trust-related frame Ft, such that li=1  
4. There is a potential gain involved in preventing inference errors which outweighs the 
costs of processing, such that C<p*U  
An important measure to guarantee that these assumptions are valid and can be defended is 
the randomization procedure as part of any experimental design. Randomizing subjects into 
treatment conditions ensures that any unobserved heterogeneity is evenly distributed among 
all treatments and that a systematic influence can be ruled out. The statistical control of those 
remaining parameters for which a control measure exists adds additional information to the 
statistical analysis but is, in principle, not necessary. 
2. Join experimental conditions and processing modes 
In a second step, it is necessary to determine the potential outcome of mode-selection in each 
experimental condition, varying all variables under scrutiny at their potential levels. In the 
present case, the experimental factors vary on two levels, yielding a 2x2 between-subject de-
sign. The experimental treatments change two parameters of the threshold. First, the coopera-
tive versus neutral context is designed to influence the presence of situational cues oi, as part 
of the match mi = mi(oi). Second, the high versus low incentive treatment is designed to ma-
nipulate cognitive motivation U = (Urc+Cw). The third parameter depends on the concrete 
model specification. For example, in model specification (1), the chronic accessibility of a 
trust-related script is varied along with the experimental treatments. What does the model tell 
us about the interaction between the two parameters, the interaction between each parameter 
and the chronic accessibility aj of a reciprocity script,
 
and the joint interplay of all three varia-
bles? Neglecting all constant parameters for the moment, we can write: 
oi * aj > 1 – S / U 
where S is the constant derived from (C/p). Obviously, the threshold depends on all three pa-
rameters at the same time, and whether a single parameter change “tips over” the threshold 
balance crucially depends on the specification of all other parameter values. That is to say, the 
model predicts two- and three-way interactions between U, oi and aj. In a statistical model, we 
would have to include not only main effects U, oi, and aj, but also interaction terms (U*oi), 
(U*aj), (aj*oi’) and the three-way interaction (U*aj*oi). But what is the predicted sign of these 
effects? 
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Note that each experimental condition and parameter constellation will provide for some 
range [0,a*]==Alow and [a*,1]==Ahigh of aj in which the activation weight AW(Ahigh|oi,U) > 
RHS, and AW(Alow|oi,U) < RHS, that is, the threshold defined by the right-hand side (RHS) is 
reached for Ahigh and it is not reached for Alow. The threshold-value a* can (but need not) be 
different for all four experimental conditions (thus, denote each a* with A1-A4). What is 
more, an accessibility-value larger than a* may not be sufficient to “tip over” the threshold 
balance because the remaining constant parameters have an unfavorable specification. We 
need to ask whether a change in oi or U is sufficient to induce a shift from the rational to the 
automatic mode in either range of aj, whether both parameters are jointly necessary to induce 
this shift, or whether their joint effect is not sufficient. The threshold condition may even re-
main unfulfilled when both factors support the automatic mode, because the constant parame-
ters (opportunity p, link li, cost of reflection C, temporary script accessibility aj|i) push the bal-
ance into an unfavorable region where the effect of a parameter change disappears. All these 
possibilities have to be taken care of when thinking about the potential outcomes in each ex-
perimental condition (see Kroneberg 2006a, 2011b). 
The following table summarizes the hypothesized impact of the experimental treatments on 
the threshold value along with chronic accessibility ranges Alow and Ahigh. It shows all effects 
of a parameter change on the left-hand-side (displaying the activation weight, AW) and the 
right-hand-side (RHS) of the mode-selection threshold, along with the resulting outcome, 
which is either the rational or the automatic mode. Every experimental condition or a shift in 
accessibility can “tip over” the threshold balance and trigger the rational or the automatic 
mode. For the incentive treatment, assume that U take the values Ulow<Uhigh; for the context 
treatment, assume that oneutral<ocoop (table 1):  
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Table 1: Experimental treatments and changes in the mode selection threshold  
 
             RHS= 1- S/U 
Incentives Ulow 
RHS decreases 
 
AW= aj*oi 
Incentives Uhigh 
RHS increases 
   AW= aj*oi 
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  A1low * oneutral 
1. >  automatic 
A3low * oneutral 
9. >  automatic 
2. <  rational  10. <  rational 
A1high * oneutral 
LHS increases 
3. >  automatic A3high * oneutral 
LHS increases 
11. >  automatic 
4. <  rational 12. <  rational 
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A2low * ocoop 
LHS increases 
5. >  automatic A4low * ocoop 
LHS increases 
13. >  automatic 
6. <  rational 14. <  rational 
A2high * ocoop 
LHS increases 
7. >  automatic A4high * ocoop 
LHS increases 
15. >  automatic 
8. <  rational 16. <  rational 
Note: Outcomes of mode-selection are presented as a function of experimental conditions U (initial endowments) and o 
(framing condition) in conjunction with chronic accessibility a*. 
With the help of simple logic, we can exclude all combinations from the total of 2
8
 = 256 dif-
ferent outcome patterns which are contradictive and therefore not feasible. For example, it is 
not possible that (1/4/6/8) is reached simultaneously, because the automatic mode was select-
ed in the most unfavorable condition (1) already, and the activation weight on the left-hand-
side can never decrease in conditions (4), (6) or (8); thus the rational mode can never become 
selected given that (1) is true. In this way, we can logically exclude the pairwise combinations 
1/4, 1/6, 1/8, 3/8, 5/8, 9/12, 9/14, 9/16, 11/14, 11/16, 13/16, 2/9, 4/11, 6/13, 8/15, 4/9, 8/13, 
which restricts the potential interaction patterns to a number of 17 admissible patterns: 
1. 1,3,5,7,9,11,13,15 (always automatic) 
2. 1,3,5,7,10,11,13,15 
3. 1,3,5,7,10,12,13,15 
4. 1,3,5,7,10,12,14,15 
5. 1,3,5,7,10,12,14,16 
6. 2,3,5,7,10,11,13,15 
7. 2,3,5,7,10,12,13,15 
8. 2,3,5,7,10,12,14,15 
9. 2,3,5,7,10,12,14,16 
10. 2,3,6,7,10,12,14,15 
11. 2,3,6,7,10,12,14,16 
12. 2,4,5,7,10,12,13,15 
13. 2,4,5,7,10,12,14,15 
14. 2,4,5,7,10,12,14,16 
15. 2,4,6,7,10,12,14,15 
16. 2,4,6,7,10,12,14,16 
17. 2,4,6,8,10,12,14,16 (always rational) 
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In the following, I will present a graphical solution to the problem of predicting interaction 
patterns. The results will be demonstrated using pattern number 16, which is selected here at 
random for presentational purposes only. The principal setup and procedures are similar for 
any other admissible interaction pattern. A full list of all graphical solutions to the derived 
patterns can be obtained from the author on request. Given that pattern 16 is statistically ob-
served, we can update the table to show all mode-selection contingencies (table 2): 
Table 2: Predicted interaction pattern #16 and mode selection contingencies 
 
             RHS= 1- S/U 
Incentives Ulow 
RHS decreases 
 
AW= aj*oi 
Incentives Uhigh 
RHS increases 
   AW= aj*oi 
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  A1low * oneutral 
1. >  automatic 
A3low * oneutral 
9. >  automatic 
2. <  rational  10. <  rational 
A1high * oneutral 
LHS increases 
3. >  automatic A3high * oneutral 
LHS increases 
11. >  automatic 
4. <  rational 12. <  rational 
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A2low * ocoop 
LHS increases 
5. >  automatic A4low * ocoop 
LHS increases 
13. >  automatic 
6. <  rational 14. <  rational 
A2high * ocoop 
LHS increases 
7. >  automatic A4high * ocoop 
LHS increases 
15. >  automatic 
8. <  rational 16. <  rational 
How would the conditional effects on the level of trust (reltrust) in each experimental condi-
tion look like, given that this pattern is observed? From the table we can see that: 
(1) The conditional effect (CE) of aj is zero in the low incentive / neutral context condition 
(2) The CE of aj is positive in the low incentive / coop. context condition (cells 6 to 7) 
(3) The CE of aj is zero whenever incentives are high (neutral and cooperative context) 
(4) The CE of the context oi is positive in the low incentive / Ahigh condition (cells 4 to 7) 
(5) The CE of the context oi is zero in all other conditions (high incentives or Alow) 
(6) The CE of incentives U is negative in the coop. context / Ahigh condition (cells 7 to 16) 
(7) The CE of U is zero in all other conditions (neutral context or Alow) 
Using these conditional effects, we can graphically pin down all outcomes and interactions. 
First, fix one variable at one level. In a graph, let the x-axis display the level of the second 
variable, using the y-axis to graph reltrust, using the bridge hypotheses proposed above as a 
guide. The CE of the second variable can be graphed for each level of the third variable. In the 
following table, each graph refers to another way of displaying the information that can be 
obtained from table 2, holding constant one variable and varying the remaining two each time. 
In this way, derive the predicted sign of all two-way interactions for each experimental condi-
tion and factorial combination. The sign of the three-way interaction can be inferred from ob-
serving all two-way interactions and their common direction of change (see table 3): 
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Table 3: Predicted interaction pattern #16 and reltrust 
Constant: Alow  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
CE oi = zero 
 
CE U = zero 
 
 
Interaction Effect = zero 
Constant: oneutral  
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
CE U = zero 
 
CE a = zero 
 
 
Interaction Effect = zero 
Constant: Ulow 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
CE oi  = zero           if Alow 
          = positive      if Ahigh 
CE aj|i = zero           if oneutral 
          = positive      if ocoop 
 
Interaction Effect = positive 
   
Constant: Ahigh  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
CE oi = positive          if Ulow 
         = zero               if Uhigh 
CE U = zero                if oneutral 
         = negative         if ocoop 
 
Interaction Effect = negative 
Constant: ocoop 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
CE U  = zero             if Alow 
          = negative       if Ahigh 
CE aj = positive        if Ulow 
          = zero             if Uhigh 
 
Interaction Effect = negative 
Constant: Uhigh 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
CE oi = zero 
 
CE aj = zero 
 
 
Interaction Effect = zero 
   
IE Change: zero  negative IE Change: zero  negative IE Change: positive  zero 
 
aj ≥ 0  
U ≤ 0   
oi ≥ 0    
U x oi ≤ 0   
aj x U ≤ 0  
aj x oi ≥ 0   
aj x U x oi < 0  (inferred from the IE changes presented above) 
 
Note: CE = Conditional Effect; y= predicted level of reltrust; Alow (Ahigh) = level of chronic script accessibility aj below 
(above) a*; U= incentive treatment, varying on two levels Ulow , Uhigh; oi = context treatment, varying on two levele oneutral 
and ocoop; The table displays the conditional effects of remaining parameters, holding one parameter constant at a time. The 
constant parameter is indicated in the top of each box. The CE can be inferred from the contingency table, as presented 
above. The two-way interactions can be inferred from graphing each CE within each condition. 
Ulow 
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Ulow 
Uhigh 
aj 
y 
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ocoop 
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Ulow 
oi 
y 
y 
Uhigh 
oi 
Ulow 
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This procedure can be repeated for all remaining interaction patterns. The resulting set of in-
teraction patterns has been presented in section 6.3.3 already, it is repeated here for complete-
ness (see table 4 below): 
Table 4: Predicted interaction patterns for reltrust 
 Predicted Interaction Patterns (Main- and Interaction Effects) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
aj 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0 
U 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 < 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 < 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≤ 0 0 
oi 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 > 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 0 
U∙oi 0 ≥ 0 > 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 < 0 = 0 ≤ 0 0 
ai∙U 0 ≥ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≤ 0 0 
ai∙oi 0 ≤ 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 < 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≤ 0 ≥ 0 = 0 = 0 ≥ 0 = 0 > 0 ≥ 0 0 
ai∙oi∙U 0 ≤ 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 < 0 0 
Note: The table presents predicted interaction patterns between chronic script accessibility aj, situational cues oi and moti-
vation U to predict transfer decisions (reltrust) in the investment game 
 
 
